




RETHINKING LATIN AMERICA

DEVELOPMENT,
HEGEMONY,
AND SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION

RONALDO P. MUNCK



Rethinking Latin America

Also by Ronaldo Munck


- Politics and Dependency in the Third World: The Case of Latin America* (1984)
Revolutionary Trends in Latin America (1984)
Ireland: Nation, State and Class Conflict (1985)
Argentina: From Anarchism to Peronism. Workers, Unions and Politics in Argentina 1855–1985 (with R. Falcón and B. Galitelli) (1986)
The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism (1986)
Belfast in the Thirties: An Oral History (with B. Rolston) (1987)
The New International Labour Studies: An Introduction (1988)
Latin America: The Transition to Democracy (1989)
The Irish Economy: Results and Prospects (1993)
Marx @ 2000: Late Marxist Perspectives (2000)
Labour and Globalisation: A New Great Transformation? (2002)
Contemporary Latin America (2002, 2008, 2012)
Globalisation and Social Exclusion: A Transformationalist Perspective (2005)
Globalisation and Contestation: The Great Counter-Movement (2006)
Globalización, Migración y Sindicatos en la Era Neoliberal (2012)

Rethinking Latin America

Development, Hegemony, and Social Transformation

Ronaldo Munck

palgrave
macmillan



RETHINKING LATIN AMERICA

Copyright © Ronaldo Munck, 2013.

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-00411-6

All rights reserved.

First published in 2013 by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®

in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,

175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-43451-0 ISBN 978-1-137-29076-2 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/9781137290762

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress.

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: March 2013

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Para Corinne, Marcos y Mara

Contents

Introduction	1
1 Placing Latin America	17
2 Conquest to Modernity (1510–1910)	45
3 Nation-Making (1910–1964)	73
4 Hegemony Struggles (1959–1976)	101
5 Market Hegemony (1973–2001)	129
6 Social Countermovement (1998–2012)	157
7 Globalization Within (1510–2010)	189
<i>References</i>	219
<i>Index</i>	231

Introduction

Why would we seek to “rethink” Latin America today from a critical global development perspective? For one, Latin America is assuming an increasingly important position on the world stage with its heterodox economic policies and bold political experiments attracting worldwide attention in an era characterized by a general crisis of perspectives. Another reason is that most of the countries in the region achieved their independence between 1810 and 1820 so we are now two hundred years into political independence and thus a balance sheet would be useful. At its origins, as a land colonized by the European powers from 1500 onward, Latin America played a key role in the modernization and enrichment of Europe. Today Europe is in crisis—in economic, political, social, cultural, and even moral terms—and the whole Enlightenment discourse is in question. Is it possible that Latin America is now showing Europe where it is heading? Marx was always fond of saying “*de te fabula narratur*” referring to the way in which an understanding of industrial England showed the rest of the world where it was heading. Today the very complex, dynamic, conflictual but above all, original processes of development, new constructions of hegemony, and vision of social transformation in Latin America offer a fascinating laboratory for the rest of the world and, maybe, a mirror to the future. The “Brazilianization” of the West, which some European social critics have referred to, can mean different things: accelerated economic development, political recomposition but also acute social inequality and a cauldron of potential unrest. Can Latin America, critically reinterpreted, offer something to a world where economic stagnation and political despair seem to be the order of the day?

Latin American politics increasingly impinge on global affairs and thus we can expect a sharpening of theoretical and political debates that poses a further persuasive reason to rethink our conceptual

paradigms to make them “fit for purpose” for the present era. The modernization theory of the 1950s–1960s was effectively replaced as a dominant paradigm by the dependency approach in the 1970s and 1980s. Since then the neoliberal globalization optic has prevailed whether one saw this as a positive or a negative feature. Even the so-called populist backlash through the likes of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in the early twenty-first century also had this neoliberal paradigm as the dominant horizon even when it was being questioned rhetorically. However, since the Great Recession unleashed by the banking crisis of 2007–2008, we need to rethink the horizon of possibilities opening up before us. Have the likes of Brazil escaped the vicious circle of dependency and underdevelopment? Has the negative relationship between development problems and lack of democracy been overcome? Are we seeing the emergence of new post-neoliberal economic systems and post-liberal democratic political orders emerging? Is the indigenous Amerindian view of the world gaining traction and will it offer a new cosmovision for and from Latin America? In exploring these questions we are relating to issues that are much broader and more complex than the study of Latin America from a now obsolete and faintly colonialist area-studies perspective. A critical renewal of perspectives and opening up of the horizon of possibilities is now essential if we are to rethink Latin America in a way that will provide useful lessons and new outlooks for a world after neoliberalism.

Before we embark on this analysis, though, we need to review the key framing concepts for this text, namely those of development, hegemony, and social transformation. It is well known that the definition and understanding of development has been the subject of major controversies over the last 50 years at least and still there is no agreement. In its dominant guise it is conceived very much as a meta-narrative with a clear goal of where societies should be heading. This perspective tends to be quite ahistorical, posing desirable targets for societies with certain key performance indicators acting as proxies for development or modernization in a rather unsatisfactory manner. On the whole, we see here a fairly short-term perspective focused on specific policy outcomes to the measured, as with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) now coming to a close without achieving their objectives. The postmodern critique of this quintessentially modernist paradigm points us toward its discursive nature, its cultural bias, and its manipulative political intent. Development is thus recast as a top-down and ethnocentric approach to the very real issues of

underdevelopment and poverty. However, while agreeing with much of the post-development critique, I believe we still need a more robust and operational understanding of development in practice. The issues of development and underdevelopment are real enough and they cannot just be reduced to Western colonialist discourse.

For the purposes of rethinking development in Latin America, I thus return to a quite basic Marxist understanding of capitalism as a relation between capitalists and free-wage laborers in which competition spurs technical progress and capital accumulation. Our attention needs to be focused on the formation of and struggle among social classes leading to the development of specific relations of production. Without entering this “hidden abode” of production and class formation, development can only be reduced to a few quantitative indicators of sometimes dubious validity. While I would not, of course, entertain any ethnocentric stance in regard to development I would posit that there is only one capitalist mode of production, thus rejecting the search for an “underdeveloped” capitalism whatever that might mean. Despite its external origins capitalist development in Latin America needs to be analyzed in endogenous terms—that is to say in terms of its own dynamic—rather than as a perpetually exogenous, or external, phenomena such as a “global system” somehow constraining national development.

Hegemony, our second key term, is closely associated with the political philosophy of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, but he was not, contrary to popular belief, its creator. Nor was it designed to act as a bridge beyond revolutionary Marxism to some form of cultural reformism as some of its modern-day proponents seem to assume. Rather, in its original Russian rendering (*gegemoniya*) it was very much a part of the discourse of the Russian Revolution, designed to theorize the role of the working class in what was acknowledged to be a bourgeois revolution. It was then, under the Third International, extended to embrace the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat by confining it to a merely corporate role, for example, exclusively “economic” trade union struggles. Gramsci was very much aware of these debates and his work was to a considerable extent derived from them even if he took them further. However hegemony in the Gramscian sense must also be understood as an ethical and strategic concept that sought to articulate a coherent and consensual alternative to capitalist rule across the oppressed classes, in his era, of course the proletariat and the peasantry, but today it could be extended more widely across the subaltern classes as a whole.

The Gramscian concept of hegemony will thus serve as an overarching political theme for this text, lying between the domains of economic development and social transformation to put it metaphorically. At one and the same time, it not only places a strong focus on the “problem of hegemony” that has bedeviled the dominant classes since independence but also acts as a theoretical and political framework for the awakening of the subaltern and their struggle to forge an alternative world vision to that of dependent development. We will, in our analysis, deal with what Gramsci calls “political hegemony” as well as “civil hegemony” as against the somewhat simplistic embracing of civil society by progressive political opinion in Latin America (and then more widely) since the fall of the military dictatorships. Hegemony is mainly about the relationship between coercion and consent, but it is much more than that insofar as it can serve as an organizing principle for social transformation that takes us beyond the starkly simplified choice of reform or revolution.

Social transformation, our third framing concept, is a more recent term although its origins lie in the early twentieth century opposition between revolution and reform and the attempts made to bridge the gap. While this binary opposition had argued that the system could either be overthrown or subject to piecemeal reform, there was, arguably, a third option of pursuing “revolutionary reforms,” which could act as a framework for broader social transformation. We can also conceive of molecular changes in society that add up to a genuine process of social transformation over time, a qualitative shift in terms of social development. We can think of urbanization, the information revolution, and changes in gender relations as transformative of society as a whole. Incremental social change can become, in specific conditions, a step-change in the way societies are organized. Seemingly separate and even piecemeal changes can create a paradigm for social change through which social relations are reconfigured. Globalization is, of course, the major overarching factor in social transformation over the last 25 years or so. At first the debates were polarized around whether it was truly revolutionary or simply a confirmation of preexisting internationalizing tendencies. Eventually a more nuanced social transformation optic was forged that rejected this simplistic opposition and examined instead the complex contradictions and developments occurring under this new modality of capitalist expansion.

My own approach to social transformation is very much shaped by time spent in South Africa before and after the transition beyond apartheid. The social transformation optic was in part, at least for

some, a way of avoiding the language of revolution but it also became a paradigm for understanding and effecting change with considerable purchase. Its emphasis was and is, to some extent, holistic, moving beyond the artificial boundaries of academic disciplines and giving social change a strongly dynamic emphasis. It is driven by a commitment to empowerment of those who are socially excluded or disadvantaged in any way. The social transformation perspective has at its core an emphasis on not only the reproduction but also the contestation of the social relations of production. It emphasizes how that complex ensemble is articulated across the social formation, what factors assist it, and which might impede it. The language of transformation seeks to be forward-looking and emphasizes the benefits to all sectors of key elements such as democratization in all its facets, which amounts to much more than a zero-sum game. While it does not eschew politics, it is not centered on it to the exclusion of all other elements of state power. It could be called a radical democratic perspective open to a socialist outcome.

In terms of where this text is situated in the Latin American political-intellectual domain it is clearly inspired by the work and example of José Carlos Mariátegui (1894–1930) (whose work is now accessible in English in Vanden and Becker, 2011a, which also includes a useful introduction), the Peruvian socialist and labor organizer who set out to “Latinamericanize” Marx and make him *fit for purpose* in a continent that he misunderstood so badly (see Aricó 1988). My seven chapters below are thus set in the tradition of and pay homage to Mariátegui’s *Siete Ensayos Sobre La Realidad Peruana* (*Seven Essays on Peruvian Reality*), now readily available along with a selection of his other work in an excellent English language translation (Vanden and Becker 2011b). These essays by Mariátegui represent an intense engagement with Peruvian social, economic, political, and cultural reality in the period leading up to 1930 when a major crisis and transition period opened up in Latin America. The 1920s saw a whole series of upheavals amongst the indigenous peoples of Peru that shaped or rather reshaped Mariátegui’s political vision for change. This was also, of course, the period when the great Mexican Revolution was coming to the close of its most active phase. Far away, in Russia, the October Revolution of 1917 brought a new world-historical subject onto the world scene—the proletariat—and a bold ideology for social transformation, Leninism. Mariátegui, during this tumultuous period, laid the foundations for an original and critical Marxist understanding of Latin America, in his writings and

a political practice that is, once again, receiving renewed attention in a continent at the forefront of conflict and change.

In his short but very active and influential career Mariátegui was a labor organizer, an exile in Europe, a radical journalist, and a leader of the emerging Latin American Communist movement. His early career as a journalist shaped his crisp, unpretentious writing style and led him to support the revolutionary demands of students and workers around 1917. In 1919 the dictator Augusto Leguía sent Mariátegui into exile; he went first to France (where he met Romain Rolland and Henri Barbusse) but then soon after to Italy where he witnessed the mobilization of the landmark Turin workers councils of 1919 and the founding of the Italian Communist Party in 1921. Returning to Peru as a committed Marxist he threw himself into worker education (through emerging democratic nationalist leader Haya de la Torre), and in 1926 founded the influential journal *Amauta*, dedicated to critical ideas in all spheres of life. In 1928 he launched the Partido Socialista Peruano, serving as its first secretary general, and published his main work, the *Siete Ensayos*. The Partido Socialista Peruano was a broad based socialist party (with a communist core) that went on to organize the CGTP (Central General de Trabajadores del Peru) to mobilize and lead the workers movement.

Mariátegui's Marxism was what we might call a "warm" one, far removed from the scientific pretensions of the analytical and theoreticist Marxisms (Althusserianism) that dominated Latin America during the 1970s. His whole rationale was one of practical engagement with the lives of workers and indigenous peasants. He was never a follower of Leninist "theoretical practice" or the theoretical preoccupations of what later became known as "Western Marxism." Far removed from grandiose or general ideas, he focused his energies on social transformation as a result of popular practices and traditions. Rejecting all forms of a "class essentialism" that would reduce all life to its class origins, Mariátegui focused on the broad, emancipatory potential of social, popular, and ethnic social forces. His thinking and practice was the very antithesis of the statism that came to dominate Latin American Marxism. For him there was an overwhelming need for a practical socialism—springing from the daily practices of the subaltern classes—that would change society, and for a strong state that would act from above. His fascination with Peru's Inca past was not with the Inca state (and its so-called Asiatic mode of production as labeled by orthodox Marxists) but, rather, with its communal social practices and ethos that he saw as prefigurative of communism.

Mariátegui also understood nationalism and the national question better than most Marxists of his era, and his approach is becoming influential again today. International debates tended to be polarized between a Leninist pragmatics around “national self-determination” and Rosa Luxemburg’s principled opposition to any tarnishing of the proletarian cause by nationalist colorings. The defense of national sovereignty was for Mariátegui a given and, for example, he followed closely and supported the Sinn Féin revolution in Ireland at the time. He also offered an early critique of Eurocentrism declaring roundly that “socialism was an international doctrine; but its internationalism ended within the confines the West” (Mariátegui 1969, p. 138). Only socialism, however, could for him achieve the unity of *Nuestra América* (Our America) and supersede the little nationalisms that had emerged since independence. However Mariátegui, at the same time, eschewed all forms of backward-looking romanticism or populism. He was greatly influenced by the Italian avant-garde cultural currents of the time and reveled in futurism. He was a firm promoter of internationalism. Thus Mariátegui was well placed to decisively break with current (and subsequent) sterile counter-positions between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in Latin America.

Finally, Mariátegui provides an early Marxist engagement with the situation and aspirations of the Amerindian peoples, breaking with his own early, quite orthodox socialism in a European frame. He began to focus on the land question as the main underlying factor in Amerindian subjection. Above all, he argued against all forms of paternalism, that the liberation of the Amerindian peoples was a matter for themselves. His analysis was based on an early critique of Marxist and mainstream theories based on “dualism” between country and city, advanced and backward sectors of the economy. Rather these were seen to be in dialectical unity and the path of social transformation needed to be conceived in a holistic way for him. Mariátegui is extremely contemporary again today in his analysis of the “indigenous communist economy” and even the “agrarian communism” of the *ayllu* (Inca community) and its principles of reciprocity and redistribution of wealth characteristic of these communists, their habits of cooperation and solidarity, and their “communist spirit” were, for Mariátegui, harbingers of the socialist transformation required in Peru and Latin America more broadly. These categories are very much part of contemporary debates in the Andean countries under left-of-center governments today.

At the very end of his political career and life, Mariátegui emerged as a fierce critic of the international communist movement then coming under the cold bureaucratic grip of Stalin. In 1929 the Communist International held regional meetings in Montevideo and Buenos Aires and although Mariátegui was unable to attend due to illness, his reports on the “anti-imperialist” and on “Indian” questions were both controversial and influential. Against the communist movement orthodoxy of the time, Mariátegui argued that “we are anti-imperialists because we are socialists” (Mariátegui 1969, p. 95). He also argued against the orthodox position that agrarian “feudalism” was the main problem and that Marxists should support a nonexistent “national bourgeoisie.” Mariátegui’s nonsectarian broad front approach to Peruvian politics and Haya de la Torre’s party also was at odds with the political rigidity and sectarianism that had gripped international communism by then.

What does Mariátegui mean to us today, over 75 years after his death? Mariátegui’s political thinking and practice has been pulled in many ways by his followers and critics, having been seen as a populist, romantic, and bourgeois nationalist, devoid of a concept of power, amongst other things. Today, as Miguel Mazzeo says, “We need a Mariátegui who is at once prelude and spring, path and promise [*preludio y manantial, camino y promesa*]” (Mazzeo 2009, p. 57) to help us in the task of rethinking, reinventing, and reimagining what Latin America is and what the options opening for its transformation now are.

The first “essay” below (chapter 1) seeks to situate our mission to “rethink” Latin America by first exploring the debates around “placing” Latin America in a conceptual rather than geographical sense. Is Latin America part of the so-called global South? Or is it just a backward outpost of Europe or the West located elsewhere? Is it a “developing” society heading toward modernity eventually, or is it condemned by its colonial origins to always be “dependent” on the advances of industrial societies? We will also explore options beyond these ultimately debilitating binary oppositions so that we might better place and thus understand Latin America in terms of its social hybridity or, put another way, its liminality, which places it betwixt and between different worlds. Some analysts characterize Latin America by what it lacks—a democratic culture, entrepreneurialism, respect for the law, and so on—and not according to what it is. Another current of thought reacts to these imperialist perspectives by stressing difference, a current sometimes known as *Macondismo*, after the mythical land *Macondo* created by Colombian magical realist writer Gabriel

García Márquez. While sympathetic to the postcolonial critique of orthodoxy and recognizing its value in our rethinking mission, it does run the risk of depoliticizing the analysis and ending up with a purely culturalist approach. Another option that needs to be considered is a political one based on a close reading and “translation” of Gramsci into a Latin American context and idiom. Gramsci’s considered and strategic rethinking or theorizing around Italy’s social, economic, political, and cultural development since the Risorgimento and the associated concepts he forged can, arguably, provide Latin American critical analysis with a new and original perspective. This chapter, or essay in Mariátegui’s sense, thus sets the terrain for the historical, economic, political, and social analysis that follows.

Chapter 2 further develops the thinking of Antonio Gramsci from a Latin American perspective. What might his critical analysis of the “Southern question” (the Italian Mezzogiorno) add to our understanding of South America? In particular we deploy the concept of “passive revolution” that, for Gramsci, was a form of conservative modernization typical of peripheral societies. Against this backdrop, we begin to develop the concrete structural/historical analysis of Latin America starting with the Iberian Conquest from the sixteenth century onward. This was an unprecedented and catastrophic event that reduced the indigenous Amerindian population from 30 million people in 1492 (including 15 million in the Aztec empire and 6 million in the Inca empire) to 8 million people in 1650. The pre-Columbian world was totally transformed by the new relations of production introduced by the conquerors with their superior firepower and organizational skills. After three centuries of conflict-ridden development and political struggles, the Spanish American (*criollo*) elites moved toward independence and the construction of the present nation-states through a process of conservative modernization. This was quite successful, in its own terms, and was also based on a productive, albeit subordinate, insertion into the new world economy being forged under British domination from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Latin America was moving toward a form of peripheral modernity under a hegemonic agrarian hierarchy. Though limited—in both its extent and its continuity over time—a limited democratization did prosper and achieved a degree of consent for the new order. However, the indigenous and subaltern classes remained in the background, not only ever-necessary for the labor they could provide to the emerging capitalist order but also an ever-present reminder that revolt lay just under the surface.

Chapter 3 moves on to consider the development and social transformation of the Latin American republics in the twentieth century under the dominant influence of what Gramsci calls the “national-popular” mode. A historic bloc is formed during this period bringing together national and popular aspirations. National development had as its counterpart the forging of a national-popular hegemonic order that incorporated at the material and cultural level some of the aspirations of the masses. This way of constructing hegemony responds to the growing presence of the subaltern classes, especially the workers in the new industries who joined the dockers, miners, and railroad workers after the agro-export period. New political parties began to express the political aspirations of the emerging working class and the ideologies of anarchism, socialism, syndicalism, and then communism began to contest the hegemony of a positivist version of liberalism. National economic development also set up a new matrix for social transformation after the great crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s. Import substitution industrialization took off and new economies would be built with greater or lesser success across Latin America. This socioeconomic transformation—marked by the presence of the popular classes and an emerging industrial bourgeoisie—led to the formation of a “compromise state.” Here again the Gramscian analysis of peripheral states—where there was no *bourgeoisie conquérante* in the classical European mode—can be brought to bear in understanding the rationale and limitations of this compromise state. We could say that Latin America achieved a peripheral form of modernity during this period even though that notion is perhaps problematic.

Chapter 4 focuses on a period of crisis from the 1960s through to the mid 1970s, building on Gramsci’s unique insights into the crisis of the 1930s and the rise of fascism in Italy. This was an “organic crisis” going far beyond a purely economic or political crisis in the usual sense of the words. The balance of forces, or equilibrium, established in the previous period under the compromise state would now be decisively settled. There was first a revolutionary wave including, but not limited to, the Cuban Revolution of 1959 that seriously dented confidence in the compromise state both from a dominant and a subaltern class perspective. The economics of import substitution industrialization was also, in a parallel way, reaching the end of a win-win period. A new economic model based on free-market mechanisms and a rolling back of the state intervention was being developed, particularly after the Pinochet coup in Chile in 1973. The

threat from insurgent forces—perhaps vainly seeking to replicate the Cuban Revolution—and the exhaustion of the economic model led eventually to a counterrevolutionary offensive. Thus emerged the military state or bureaucratic-authoritarian state, which was the result of a struggle to impose a new hegemonic system across much of Latin America. This was, in retrospect, a transitional phase, closing off the old model and trying to force the development of a new historic bloc. The global order was also going through a profound transformation as the long postwar boom came to an end and the internationalization of production became an overarching factor in the capital accumulation process. Thus Latin America was to be transformed from within not only during this tumultuous period, but also in response to shifts in the global order that would lead to a new form of insertion within its relations of production, distribution, and exchange.

Chapter 5 examines the turn toward neoliberalism as part of the “globalization revolution” that decisively transformed the Latin American political economy and social development in the 1980s. We take up Karl Polanyi’s intuition of history advancing by a series of countermovements, first dis-embedding the market from society and then re-embedding it. This double movement acts as frame for our analysis of the rise and fall of neoliberalism across Latin America. To be clear, while there was a global shift toward free-market economics this was set in the context of a decisive bid within Latin America to remake hegemony. To that end, society was remade in the image of the market with consumers replacing citizens as the key social figure and also a de-politicization leading to a considerable political shift away from traditional or established political party patterns. At its core was a disciplining of the citizen/worker by the market that was now to be released from its state and political constraints. This was a process deepened if anything under the democratically elected governments that followed the military dictatorships in the 1980s. While not wishing to minimize the economic, political, social, and cultural transformations that took place during this period, in the end the illusions more or less evaporated when Argentina’s economy collapsed at the end of 2001. A new, more uncertain, period was to begin and society began to fight back against the depredations of unregulated market politics. This uncertainty, following the failure of neoliberalism to build a new stable hegemonic order, is what led ultimately the rise of the various left-of-center governments across the region.

Chapter 6 takes up the Polanyian theme around the need for a re-embedding of the market following a vigorous countermovement

by society seeking to protect itself from the depredations of the unregulated market. As the twenty-first century opened up, popular reaction against neoliberalism was felt across the region not only from various subaltern groups such as the organized labor movement but also from the new social movements. There was also the quite unprecedented rise of the left-of-center governments to power in the majority of the countries in the region. What was the meaning of this “pink tide” as some commentators called it? What was the importance of the new or at least much more visible presence of the Amerindian peoples in the politics of many countries? Was it a decisive move to take Latin America beyond neoliberalism or was it just giving it a human face? At a global level we were seeing at this time a shift from the quite fundamentalist Washington Consensus to a more socially sensitive and state-friendly post-Washington Consensus. This chapter examines the interaction between these global processes and the regional politics in Latin America. The outcome of these struggles is far from determined so our conclusions are necessarily provisional. We can say that while a new order has not been built there is a clear rejection of much of the old political economy and thus a much open future for Latin American development is opening up.

Chapter 7 is a broad retrospective and also a “way forward” focused on how Latin America has been “always-already” globalised and thus we can see how the current era is already inscribed in its makeup in a manner of speaking. During the colonial era Latin America was a constitutive part of the making of European modernity and of the Atlantic economy: it was not a place apart waiting to be integrated into the emerging world order. Political independence gained three hundred years ago was not, however, matched by economic independence and various phases of dependency followed. The main focus of this chapter, however, is on the current situation and the prospects now opening up for the future if we are to apply critical foresight based on what we have learnt through this brief historical retrospective. Has the national development path, and nationalism itself, been rendered obsolete in today’s global world? Does the rise of Brazil as a major global player signal a new role for Latin America as a whole? Overall, we are looking at the ways in which a new Gramscian commonsense might be developing in Latin America, steering between an ineffective nationalism and an empty globalism. Latin America today is important globally because it is a laboratory of social and political transformations that might just help us imagine a path out of the current economic recession and political paralysis. There is much

original thinking and political practice emerging that could be useful to a broader constituency as the world grapples with the failure of easy globalization and the reemergence of classic capitalist contradictions that had never really gone away if we think about it.

It should be clear by now that while my inspiration for these “seven essays” is the work and example of José Carlos Mariátegui, many of the guiding political and theoretical concepts derive from the work of Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) native of the Mezzogiorno, the southern “underdeveloped” part of Italy. Interestingly, in one of those turns of history, Mariátegui was himself in Italy from 1919 to 1922. While there is no proof that he met Gramsci (although his widow said he did) they were certainly “swimming in the same pool” and many of their interests and concepts are shared. Both were closely focused on national reality without ceasing to be internationalists; they were engaged with culture and literature, which was neglected in communist circles; and both firmly rejected all forms of economism and class essentialism. Gramsci and Mariátegui both practiced what we would today call an “open” Marxism, which was curious, flexible, and extremely creative. They were both thinking and acting from the position of a peripheral society and engaged with the rural world more than most Marxists of the day. The coincidences and tensions involved in this encounter might provide us with some conceptual guidelines and, more importantly, the critical spirit of enquiry to rethink Latin America from a subaltern perspective.

Gramsci is usually taken to be the theorist of a Eurocommunism that carried out the social democratization of a once radical identity for social transformation. He was, it seemed the theorist of the superstructures, a great aid to all the critics of orthodox Marxist “economism.” Gramsci has served as the bridge between Marxism and post-Marxism, opening up the cultural turn and the emphasis on discourse. There is another Gramsci, though, who wrote explicitly about the European “late” developing countries, those deemed “peripheral” such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal. In postcolonial Latin America, Gramsci’s way of thinking creatively about the particular politics of late dependent development is extremely suggestive. Latin America is neither a typical Third World region nor a simple subregion of the West. Gramsci—from a Latin American perspective, even as a “Latin American” in some way—can inspire new and productive ways of understanding and rethinking the hybrid social and political characteristics of the region.

There was a small current of Latin American Gramscianism that took up in the 1960s an engagement with the Italian communist and his ideas. They were swimming against the current at the time and it is well to recall that when an Italian journalist asked Ernesto “Che” Guevara whether he had read Gramsci, his laconic response was “not yet.” From someone who would take Trotsky’s *History of the Russian Revolution* in his rucksack this denial probably reflected the social democratic aura his work had at the time amongst revolutionaries. However, a subterranean engagement with Gramsci did occur, particularly in Argentina’s equivalent of Turin in Córdoba from the early 1960s onward. Gramscianism also developed later in Mexico and in Brazil where it served in the 1970s as a conduit out of the *cul de sac* of armed direct action strategies. The renewed Latin American Marxism of the 1980s—more cognizant of democracy, hegemony, and the complexity of social transformation—owed much to the now open influence of Gramsci across wide layers of intellectual life.

Gramsci’s trajectory in Latin America is not a simple or straightforward one. It began in the 1950s within critical communist party currents that led to small followings in some countries, usually quite marginal. This was to change in the 1970s and 1980s when Gramsci’s thinking on the “war of position” and the struggle for democracy acted as a hinge to overcome the voluntarism and militarism of much of the Left. The Cuban model, to call it that, was transformed by a close reading of Gramsci on hegemony and a prioritizing of civil society. A new-found emphasis on the cultural domain within the process of social transformation was also an enduring legacy of this period. However, particularly in Argentina the Gramscian current took a turn under re-democratization in the mid 1980s, which took them away from socialism altogether. Scarred by the military dictatorship, the Gramscians now, in terms of both theory and practice, set democracy as the sole political horizon and eventually took socialism off the agenda.

In a period when the old ways of doing politics are clearly defunct, a fresh reengagement with Gramsci’s thought in Latin America is called for, not burdened with its uses and abuses in the past. His thinking is certainly not posed here as a simple key to an understanding of contemporary Latin America. However, I would hope to demonstrate in the course of these seven essays that the conceptual armory he developed in prison, following the defeat of socialism in Italy, has considerable purchase on Latin American reality and may provide some leverage for its progressive transformation. Above all from Gramsci,

as from Mariátegui, we can take a firm commitment to Marxism as critique and not as dogma. It is very much a creative Marxism, flexible and not at all closed off to other intellectual currents. Gramsci's was a consistent and quite unique drive to forge a political vocabulary capable of understanding peripheral capitalist social formations and arming the subaltern classes with an alternative strategy to one of submission and adaptation.

If Mariátegui sought to "Latinamericanize Marx," I will (following Portantiero 1983 and Aricó 1988) seek here to "Latinamericanize" Gramsci as it were. What he provides us with is an extremely rich repertoire of concepts—from passive revolution to organic crisis, from the national-popular to hegemony and counter-hegemony—of relevance to understanding contemporary Latin America. There is also a clear methodology based on an understanding of national realities and the invaluable advice to balance "optimism of the will" with "pessimism of intelligence." However, I would also argue that to know Gramsci properly his work needs to be grounded in the reality of current popular struggles in Latin America and their aspiration to create a world beyond neoliberalism. In the current era of globalization and its crisis, the struggle for emancipation in Latin America takes multiple forms. Gramsci in Latin America, alongside Mariátegui, may assist us in deconstructing the hegemonic imaginary of neoliberalism and to construct a counter-hegemonic culture. Finally, it is from Mariátegui—perhaps more than from Gramsci—that we can develop a political approach to match the "magical realism" of Gabriel García Márquez that is so much part of the Latin American way of seeing and that allows us to give free rein to creativity and does not compartmentalize our thinking.

Mariátegui shared with Gramsci a strong anti-positivist philosophy and it is well to recall that the latter welcomed the Russian revolution with an article called "A Revolution Against Capital" thus firmly rejecting the mechanical evolutionism of Marxism at that time. But Mariátegui went a lot further in adapting much of G. Sorel's rhetoric of revolutionary myth: "The proletariat has a myth: the social revolution. It moves towards that myth with a passionate and active faith. The bourgeoisie denies, the proletariat affirms" (Vanden and Becker 2011b, p. 387). The emphasis on faith, passion, and will was a source of acute discomfort for many orthodox Mariátegui scholars and they tended to relegate this strand to a youthful error or unfortunate personal deviation. However, shorn of its class essentialism—the proletariat as unique revolutionary subject—there is much contemporary

relevance to the emphasis on subjective will and the reality that social transformations do not occur in a purely rational laboratory-like domain.

Following Mariátegui we could say that “we do not want American socialism to be a copy or an imitation, it should be a heroic creation. We must give life to Indo-American socialism with our own life, in our own language” (Vanden and Becker 2011b, p. 130). This statement should not be read as a simple nativist reaction toward a foreign import, and Mariátegui’s internationalism was never in doubt. It was, however, a view that was very conscious of the deeply Eurocentric nature of contemporary reformist socialism. Today we still see a tendency, both in the mainstream political analysis and in radical contestation of the status quo, to mirror North Atlantic views of the world and analytical approaches. To rethink Latin America it is necessary to develop a Latin American perspective that prioritizes the actually existing social transformation processes, on the ground as it were. In this way Latin American subaltern knowledge can make a genuine contribution to the current search for a social order that is sustainable and equitable after the failure of neoliberal globalization to deliver on its promises.

Placing Latin America

Placing Latin America might sound like an odd place to start. After all, we all know where Latin America is situated on the global map. But when we dig a bit deeper, even the term “Latin America” itself is doubtful given the non-Latin origins of many of its peoples. We thus do need to situate this world zone politically, historically, and culturally if we are to understand its specific characteristics. What is probably most noticeable is how the very different “placings” of Latin America that have been developed, seemingly coexist without apparent strains or contradictions. First we look at Latin America as part of the “West,” albeit a backward zone that still has not undergone the full modernization treatment and achieved modernity, defined in fairly ethnocentric ways. This is the classic modernization theory view and one that underlies much of the area-studies approaches to Latin America. We then counterpose to this a view of Latin America as part of the “East,” a semicolonial “Third World” region or, one that is posited as an exotic exemplar of magical realism, the Other to the West. *Indigenismo* can be read, for example, as a new form of Orientalism. Much as the West needed Orientalism to create its own identity, Latin America needs indigenismo to become what it is. We can also then pursue an analysis based on the route of hybridity in which Latin America is seen to be “Betwixt” and between the West and the East, sharing some characteristics of both in a novel form of cultural *mestizaje*. On the face of it this might seem more fruitful than the binary opposition of West versus East but problems remain as we shall see. We also look at Latin America as a Post-world, that is as postcolonial—albeit quite a long time ago—and postmodern, which is a much more controversial reading, but one which throws up many interesting contradictions of the contemporary Latin

American condition. Finally, I advance a “Political” reading of Latin America’s place in the world, starting with an introduction of some of Gramsci’s key concepts, to be later expanded on in subsequent chapters. I would argue that to rethink Latin America there is an urgent need to bring the political back to center stage, in a field where it is cultural characterizations that tend to prevail after the decline of economistic readings. This chapter thus sets the terrain for the subsequent historical/structural reading of Latin American development.

West

Latin America as we know it today was originally called the “West Indies” given that the Spanish Conquistadores thought they had arrived in India. Since then, this part of the Americas has been an integral part of the story of the West. It entered this stream later than North America and Europe—at the start of the nineteenth century—but that was only because that was when the independence movement came to fruition. The reference points of this independence movement were the Enlightenment values of rationality, order, and science. There was never any doubt that South America, Central America, and Mexico were part of the West. It would have come as a great shock, for example, in Argentina in the 1950s, to find out that the country was now to be classified as “underdeveloped” in the new Western (or North American) paradigm of development.

It was one of Argentina’s early political leaders, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1811–1888) who most clearly articulated the Latin American choice: *Civilization or Barbarism*. For Sarmiento, when independence was declared in 1810, “there were two different, incompatible and rival societies: two diverse civilizations: the one Spanish, European, civilized and the other barbarian, American, almost Indian” (Sarmiento [1845] 2004, p. 77). Civilization is created through commerce and urbanization, which will, in turn, lead to progress. Conversely, the *gaucho* and the Indian live on the pampas, isolated from civilized life and that can only lead to barbarism. The savage campaign of extermination of the indigenous populations in the so-called *Campaña del Desierto* (Desert Campaign) of 1878–1879 was acknowledged as an “injustice” by Sarmiento but thanks to it, he argued, the country was “today occupied by the Caucasian race, the most perfect the most intelligent, the most beautiful and the most progressive of all that populate the earth.”

Another of Argentina's early leaders Juan Bautista Alberdi expressed this matter most clearly: "*Nosotros, europeos de raza y de civilización, somos los dueños de América*" (We Europeans by race and civilization are the owners of America). The non-European Other would have to be eliminated if not physically (although Argentina did pretty well on this front) at least in terms of any significant role, cultural, or otherwise. This was part of a process of self-definition of the criollo elite that, while breaking from Europe, needed to recreate itself as Europeans in America and most certainly not as people to be classified with the inferior indigenous American peoples. Right up to Jorge Luís Borges the theme of civilization versus barbarism saw Europe as the privileged site of progress and America as its opposite. Race was also a critical marker of difference and creator of social differentiation, with whites (criollos) above the Amerindians or simply Indians, not to mention the black African slaves.

In the early twentieth century, Europe represented modernity for Latin America, which at best could only aspire to a peripheral form of modernity. Thus, for example, from the last third of the nineteenth century the Buenos Aires elites "were imagining and constructing a colonial city based on a European model" (Sarlo 2000, p. 10). This "Paris of the South" not only copied French architectural styles but also the sewerage, water, and lighting systems. This technical modernity, which came to fruition in the 1920s and 1930s, also had profound cultural effects. As Beatriz Sarlo puts it, "Beginning with new perceptions of time and space these changes generate new forms of subjectivity" (Sarlo 2000, p. 110). What began as a copy of a European model was beginning to achieve its own identity and also generated a strong sense of modern urbanism.

As the Second World War came to a close, the clearly victorious power within the West—the United States—began to articulate a new modernization paradigm. Certainly since the 1930s at least, the United States was beginning to articulate a strong cultural and economic presence in the region. But the definitive decline of British (and French) imperialism after the Second World War created the space for a new US imperialism based on the economic power of the corporations and the cultural pull of the new "American way of life." Development was seen as a one-way process, a continuum along which all countries progress, it was just that some were further along the way than others. Modernization theory in the 1950s was an integral element of the newfound hegemonic role of the United States at that time: it created a model designed to discipline the development process and channel

it in a direction less likely to lead to communism. The Cold War was the overarching framework for development theories and practice for this whole period.

Thus Walt Rostow's classic text on the stages of economic growth was significantly subtitled *A Non Communist Manifesto* (Rostow 1960). Latin America was characterized as being in transition from a traditional society to a modern society, but only if it adopted the correct policies. The stages of economic growth, as outlined by Rostow, were quite mechanical and had a certain air of universal inevitability about them. It was a quite ethnocentric approach as well, with Hispanic traditionalism considered a distinct handicap vis-a-vis the Protestant ethic supposedly characterizing North America's settlers. In Latin America it was Gino Germani's *Política y Sociedad en un época de transición* (Germani 1965) that most clearly and intelligently articulated this modernization approach. His main argument was that Latin America needed to move from the institutionalization of the traditional to the institutionalization of change. Germani was born in Italy in 1911 but emigrated to Argentina in 1934. Banned during the Peronist era (1946–1955) because of his strong opposition to Peronism, which he linked with fascism, he effectively founded sociology in Argentina in 1955 with strong US linkages. This functionalist analysis of social change was deemed conservative by his critics, but his critique of “totalitarianism” was probably based on his imprisonment by Mussolini (who was, indeed, admired by Perón). Scientific sociology, for Germani, needed to be based on universal concepts, theories, and methods, hence his commitment to US sociology. Interestingly, when Germani left Argentina in 1966, driven out by the military dictatorship, his sociology began to take on a more critical edge. Increasingly his modernization perspective began to shift toward an understanding of social transformation rather than simply seeking to stifle it. Today this migrant-led national sociology is beginning to have an impact again and Germani has an honorable place in Latin American critical sociology.

At one level we can see modernization theory as a simple cover for rationalization of westernization, hence its inclusion in this section. This was the West placing itself at the center or apex of civilization, contrasting itself favorably with the traditional, backward, and underdeveloped rest, or its Other. It also most certainly acted as a legitimating discourse for the neocolonial approach by the United States toward Latin America from the 1950s onward. While this ideological critique is justified, it is also vital to focus on the analytical failings

of the approach. It almost completely downplayed power inequalities and differentials in society, and there was no room for social class (or other) contradictions or struggles. With inequality within and between countries being an all-pervasive factor determining development paths, and with an abundance of social and political conflicts arising from it, this neglect was a basic explanatory flaw. It was essentially a political framework to maintain the status quo.

The notion of modernization theory as a disciplinary agency is based to a large extent on the work of Michel Foucault. Western development theory, particularly during the Cold War period (1945–1985), needed to construct “underdevelopment” as a means to dominate, restructure, and impose its authority over the postcolonial world. In many ways this objective carries on to the present day, for example, with the World Bank’s concern for “good governance” in developing countries, which is still based on the assumed superiority of Western development models. In terms of Foucault’s knowledge-power paradigm, it is necessary to possess knowledge in order to dominate. This discourse is designed to subordinate and contain the rebellious postcolonial subject. Rather than a frontal contestation of the modernization paradigm—as posed by dependency theory—this critique bids us to reappropriate the indigenous, autonomous, and localized strategies to construct “another” development based on different values (see Escobar 2000).

Countering the “made in the USA” modernization theory was Latin America’s own indigenous development theory, known as the dependency approach or paradigm (see Kay 1989). While in its more grounded variants—such as the Cardoso and Faletto classic *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Cardoso and Faletto 1969, 1979)—it was a nuanced structural-historical take on development and its relationship to social classes, it also had a much cruder manifestation. The later trend, best exemplified by the work of Andre Gunder Frank (1970)—elevated outside Latin America to “the” dependency theorist—often seemed to just reverse the modernization discourse to create its binary opposite. Where one saw the diffusion of capital into backward areas as the key to development, the other saw it as simply developing underdevelopment. Diffusion of innovation would develop the traditional areas for one and simply create stagnation and de-capitalization for the other. Creating a mirror image of a theory is probably not the best way to move critical analysis forward. The main issue was that modernization and dependency theory both took for granted and saw as natural the nation-state

framework. National economic development was the objective and the state would play a crucial role in that process. Inevitably the diversity of social interests—and the capital/wage-labor conflict in particular—was somewhat subsumed under this paradigm. A social transformation perspective on the development process in Latin America would stress, rather, the emergence and development of social classes and class conflict. From the colonial period, different social groupings were vying for hegemony and to impose their particular interests as the general interest. Landowners, industrialists, urban workers, rural smallholders, artisans, and others, all had diverse social interests. It was the struggle for hegemony that set a particular development path and determined the modalities of social transformation in each country. National development choices were really the outcome of class development and struggle, not something emerging spontaneously.

Ultimately the modernization and simple dependency approaches shared a methodological nationalism that took the nation-state note to be a natural and self-sufficient envelope for the development process. They also shared a strong economism that led them to ignore or at least downplay the political process, not to mention the cultural dimension. They were also equally teleological in assuming a given end-station for the development process. For modernization theory the end of the journey was to be a consumer based modernity *à la* United States, while for the dependency approach it was socialism *à la* Cuba, based on an ill-defined delinking from the global system. Both thus rejected the complexity of history, the contradictions of the accumulation process in a context of class struggle, and that the future is open to different outcomes and not present in some original DNA pattern of development or underdevelopment. We could go further in relation to a critique of the dependency approach from a postcolonial stance. In a way dependency shares with modernization theory a strong attachment to modernity as an overarching perspective and a commitment to the *logos* of development. It is very much centered on the nation-state that it takes as the unproblematic unit of analysis and the sovereign subject of development as it were. But some authors have gone further and accused the dependency approach of ignoring culture and the politics of representation leading to a general ethnocentrism bordering on Orientalism (Kapoor 2008, p. 10). Europe is still seen as the universal model against which development on the periphery is judged and deemed (in)adequate. For their part, the broad-brush visions of capital accumulation on a world scale run the

risk of submerging the local and creating a totalizing narrative that itself may disable alternative accounts of and strategies for development. We should maybe direct ourselves instead to the more complex cultural and political boundaries that shape the subaltern consciousness in the majority world.

A post-dependency approach would need to break out of its binary opposition with regard to modernization theory. We might still question, of course, whether the structures of domination located by the dependency theorists in Latin America have simply been superseded in the era of “interdependent” globalization (see Cardoso 2001). Few progressive or critical analysts would argue today that the problems of development, as conventionally defined, have been overcome in Latin America. What is being challenged has more to do with the totalizing vision of dependency, one it shares with other modernist epistemologies. The challenge of a transformationalist approach would be to decolonize development knowledge and to adopt a more critical or deconstructionist approach toward the received terminology of development/dependency. We might thus consider more insecure forms of knowledge, a greater receptivity toward bottom-up or indigenous forms of knowledge, and less assurance in presenting a polished alternative to the status quo developed solely at the level of social and political theory.

With the emergence of globalization as the new modernization or development paradigm in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Latin America’s role would change yet again. The language of reform would be subverted to simplify a willingness to conform to the dictates of the new world order. Globalization, or actually existing neoliberal globalization to be precise, was seen as a smooth terrain, devoid of passions or conflicts. All could succeed in this new domain if only they followed the correct politics. Even more so than modernization theory, this paradigm ignored or even rejected the possibility of different/alternative development paths. There was only one right way to achieve development, and only reactionaries and those with vested interests (such as trade unions) could possibly refuse to reform for the common good. An exemplar of this trend in Latin America is Michael Reid’s *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul* (Reid 2009) that focused on the misdiagnosis of Latin America’s development failures by “populists” and, somewhat anachronistically perhaps, on dependency theory. They were the causes of underdevelopment, not the asymmetric world system or the pro-market policies of neoliberalism.

At one level, we could say that globalization theory as the contemporary development prescription is simply the old modernization theory repackaged for the global era. It is probably more than just a rebadged modernization theory however. It is truly post-national and assumes a global terrain for the development of capitalism. Its strongest feature is perhaps its total rejection of any possible role for the state in the development process, which has always been there in the past. On a more positive note, the globalization approach tends to have at least a rhetorical commitment to equality, manifest, for example, in the shift from the neoliberal Washington Consensus to the more “socially responsible” Post Washington Consensus. In true liberal fashion it also articulates its elective affinity with democratization, whereas modernization had also seen the value of authoritarianism to achieve its aims.

Globalization can, of course, be read as Westernization writ large. In Latin America many critical social analysts would tend to read it as simply the latest “made in the USA” externally imposed theoretical and disciplinary framework. It is seen as seeking to naturalize what is effectively a strategy of the US corporations to expand their domination. It can, most certainly, lead to a “flattening” of national realities, all seen as mere reflections of an overarching globalization process. It can also be seen as disempowering if social transformation is now seen possible only at a global level through the formation of global social movements. The rather vacuous concept of global civil society might not mean that much “on the ground” where the state is still very much a real player and people’s social imagination is more local than national, let alone global.

East

While Latin America is, indeed, a peripheral, late-developing, and, arguably, dependent part of the West, it is also different from the advanced industrial societies. Walt Rostow asked himself in the 1950s if Latin America was part of the general case of transition from traditional to modernity or if, rather, it was “among the lucky offspring of already transitional Europe” (Rostow 1960, p. 10). Unfortunately he found that Latin America was not to follow the path of the other settler societies of North America and Australia and had to go through all the stages of development from traditional society, through takeoff to the blessed age of high mass—consumption. That is to say, speaking plainly, that Latin America would need to earn its place in the

West. While it might aspire to the status of its northern neighbors, fortunately settled by English (and some French?) settlers, it was for now in another place.

Walt Rostow was, of course, largely symptomatic of the modernization discourse as a whole. While he recognized that “Latin American cases vary among themselves” (Rostow 1960, p. 19), overall he saw the region as part of a general or universal story of modernization. Presumably it would not take the “European offspring” route of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand because its settlement was not by Anglo-Saxon Protestants, but the rather dubious Iberians. Certainly the “traditional Latin Europe and native traditional cultures” (Rostow 1960, p. 18) were deemed to be impediments to modernization by Rostow. What is also worth drawing attention to are the partially valid parallels that Rostow draws between his stage-of-growth theory and the traditional Marxist modes of production chronology (Rostow 1960, chap. 10). Clearly as an anticommunist he has to label Marx’s communism as a “disease of the transition” to modernity but the fact remained as he showed that a certain Marxist ideology of development and US-driven modernization theory were not incompatible. This should serve as a warning, at the very least, that we are entering a difficult terrain when Marxist and modernization theories converge or share common assumptions.

Latin Americans have always occupied an ambiguous position in the global racial hierarchy posited by racial theorists and it is well to remember that globalization has always been a racialized (and gendered) process. In 1923, Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia University proclaimed that “there are vast difference[s] in political capacity between the races...it is the white man’s mission, his duty, and his right to hold the reins of political power in his own hands for the civilization of the world and the welfare of mankind” (cited in Smith 2005, p. 47). Latin America was sometimes difficult to place in the elaborate racial hierarchy elaborated by imperialist ideologies. The then current image of Mexico and Mexicans legitimized the forceful seizure of nearly a quarter of the nation by the United States in the nineteenth century. Today in the United States where Spanish has become the second language, much thought has been given to the racial/ethnic category of Latino (not a term used by Latin Americans in the United States), but it is certainly inferior to white and is also quite anomalous insofar as it is meant to embrace the descendants of European settlers and also those of the original peoples of the Americas. Consistency is not a problem of course for those keen to use racial categories as a means of subjection.

Cold War warriors such as Walt Rostow were not the only ones seeing Latin America as being placed in the not-quite West. The Communist International, following the Russian Revolution of 1917, found it hard to categorize the continent with its limited repertoire of “colonial” and “semicolonial” countries to deploy, insofar as Lenin’s early use of “dependent” countries—politically independent but economically dependent, such as Argentina—was never mainstreamed in the Communist lexicon. In the end, despite the protests by Latin American Communists (mainly from the more developed countries), there was, as Régis Debray puts it “too great a temptation to tidy away that awkward continent into the pigeon-hole marked ‘East’, along with Africa and Asia” (Debray 1977, p. 43). There was little economic, political, social, or cultural commonality amongst these world regions other than that they were “not the West.”

Placing Latin America was not an easy task for the early twentieth-century communists. The social democrats, for example, in Argentina had no problem in adopting a straightforward European model. One of them who had corresponded with Marx and Engels until their death had stressed the problems of dealing with workers on horseback (the *gauchos*). The communists were more prone to see an “Eastern” model, where there was no European class structure with a clearly dominant bourgeois class to contest. In Gramscian terms these were seen as societies where “the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous.” In reality this categorization was not adequate for societies where political independence was over a century old, where significant nationalist movements had emerged, where the state did function, and where the subaltern classes had a long history of organization. Marxism was appearing as a very European lens seeking to adjust Latin American reality to its limited conceptual framework.

The problem is not just one of classification or even of a Eurocentrism that lumped together all that was not Europe. It was to lead to misguided theory-driven strategies for social transformation that had serious political effects. If a region was deemed colonial, then its revolutionary forces would need to plan for a national democratic and agrarian revolution under the leadership of a “national bourgeoisie.” Conversely in the North the tasks were straightforwardly socialist and the leadership was to be the industrial proletariat. There was no grey, liminal, or in-between categories in this scheme. There could be little understanding of a complex overlap between national liberation and social transformation. For many decades Latin American communists were in search of a mythical national bourgeoisie to lead a

revolution and thus missed out on the actually existing possibilities for transformation.

Whatever sparkle of original thinking communists might have shown in the 1930s, by the 1950s they were firmly set in the grey uniformity of Stalinism. What emerged was a Leninism as an ideology of development, which was very effective in its own way in parts of Asia and Africa. In Latin America it was applied mechanically and the communist "stages theory" of revolution resembled nothing closer than Walt Rostow's stages of economic growth theory. One posited mechanical economic stages of development and the other an equally mechanical political-development perspective. National and democratic stages with an emphasis on agrarian reform needed to precede any orientation even toward socialist transformation. For many decades this political stages theory was underpinned by the notion that a feudalism of some sort prevailed in rural areas and that workers could rely on a national bourgeoisie to develop a democratic capitalism.

We could of course just say that Rostow and the Communists simply got Latin America wrong and misplaced the region in their paradigms. There was also, to be clear, a very real basis for thinking of the Iberian/Catholic conquest as an impediment to modernization. The highly concentrated land ownership patterns, for example, at least usually, blocked the development of a dynamic agrarian capitalism. Political forms such as absolutism were also clearly not conducive to modernization. The problem really arose when analysts and ideologues raised these differences in an essentialist way that "Othered" Latin America in what we might call a new form of Orientalism. Thus, for example, Claudio Véliz views Latin America as Baroque, a result of the Counter-Reformation, where emphasis was on order, centralism, and tradition (Véliz 1994). This overwhelmingly stable system, its resistance to change, and its organicity seemed to liken it to Marx's category of the "oriental mode of production," a form of absolutism where the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the West could not be replicated.

Following the classical Greek proverb Claudio Véliz equates Latin America and North America with the hedgehog who knows only one thing and the fox who knows many things (Véliz 1994). The English speaking fox is all that the Latin American hedgehog is not; mobile, quick to change, copes well with diversity, and accepts that there are many, changing truths. According to this perspective, Latin Americans, for Jorge Larraín, "have lived imprisoned in their

magnificent past, in their distrust of innovations, in their respect for status, in their immovable loyalties” (Larraín 2000, p. 179). Claudio Véliz is no essentialist, however, and he now sees this old identity of Latin America giving way to the dynamic Anglo-Saxon culture of the fox.

While Claudio Véliz does not see Latin American identity as unchanging, he does maintain an essentialist view of North American culture. There is, indeed a direct line of continuity from Sarmiento’s “civilization versus barbarism” oppositions, North American modernization theory of the 1950s, and this new enthusiasm for the cultural liberalization to be brought by North American consumerism. Not only is this North American/North Atlantic development model itself severely brought into question after the 2008–2009 global economic crisis but it also detracts attention from internal changes in Latin America. In fact there have been momentous transformations at all levels in Latin America over the last 25 years that we are prevented from examining if we adopt an Orientalist view, which sees these societies as intrinsically different and totally resistant to change.

Another “cultural tradition” that has often been seen as an impediment to modernization is the indigenous one. As we saw in the previous section, for criollo organic intellectuals such as Sarmiento, the battle between civilization and barbarism saw the indigenous people on the wrong side. More recently there has been a revival of indigenismo that in its own way tends to repeat essentialist notions and also overemphasizes difference. The rise of new forms of indigenismo is not something spontaneous—it is a political construction—and contemporary processes of re-indigenization need to be read in their full complexity. For example, in another epoch, the 1940 Inter-American Indigenous Congress seeking to improve the indigenous situation through access to modern technology was matched by indigenous praxis, by sectors of the Catholic Church, and the Communist Party influenced indigenous movements of a quite different complexion.

Indigenismo is thus not a unified social or political category. Nor does it emerge spontaneously in the midst of the original populations of the Americas. For many decades the Andean states, for example, had promoted the “assimilation” of the rural indigenous social groups. A mestizo identity emerged alongside a process of proletarianization and entry into the paid labor force. It is only decades later in the 1990s in some cases, that this process of “whitening” (*blanqueamiento*) is counterbalanced by a re-indigenization promoted precisely by the same state that saw many “integrated” indigenous social

groups redefining themselves as indigenous. This was of course the era of neoliberalism with its emphasis on decentralization and individualism. Also, the transnational social movements would be supportive of movements for cultural identity affirmation. Multiculturalism was very much part of the global zeitgeist and with a certain elective affinity with the globalization project.

The essentializing of the indigenous as authenticity can also be read perhaps as a new form of Orientalism. Thus Bolivia's Water Wars in the twenty-first century are, by some, traced back to the Incas and their cosmology. Not only does this perspective ignore the complexity of the current situation but it also fails to understand that indigenous rights are socially constructed. As Canessa puts it, in Latin America not only has political protest been consciously indigenized, "but we should not assume that identifying indigenous groups is necessarily a straight forward matter" (Canessa 2010, p. 243). There is a considerable degree of arbitrariness in the political demarcation of indigenous groups in contemporary Latin America. The celebration of indigenous culture in some countries is by no means straightforward in its meaning as it often masks systemic ethnic and social subordination.

In the same way that nationalism is often referred to as an "invented tradition" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992), so we might argue that indigenismo is a modern political tendency and not the recovery of mythical indigenous identities. The indigenous communities are far from being homogenous and political strategies are far from being unanimous. The *indigenismo* of the national development period (see chapter 2 below) is very different from the *neo-indigenismo* of the neoliberal era (see chapter 4 below). National development encouraged an inclusive policy in the 1950s and 1960s that is quite different from, say the World Bank policies of the 1990s in regard to indigenous communities. The ethnification of rural development in the 1990s, according to Víctor Bretón, "in accordance with the spirit of neoliberalism, led to an abandonment of concern with the structural aspects, a privatization (Non-Governmental Organizations NGOs) and an externalization (World Bank) of interventions in regards to the indigenous population" (Bretón 2010, p. 107). Ethnification, to put it that way, is not an unambiguously positive development in terms of the politics of social transformation to put it bluntly for now.

Nevertheless for influential public intellectuals such as Eduardo Galeano, (author of the best-selling *Open Veins of Latin America*, 1971, 1973) Latin America needs to rediscover itself by reclaiming its ancient traditions—"age old freedoms and identity between

human beings and nature” (Galeano 1991, p. 13)—and recovering a community-based mode of production. The assumed close bonds between indigenous identity and nature were stressed in the Bolivian Water Wars with frequent invocations of the Andean deity *Pachamama* (mother earth). The leaders of the movement recognized the importance of co-opting the language of indigeneity for what was emerging as a very visible counter-globalization political movement. The traditional deities associated with water were not as well-known internationally as Pachamama so they were discounted. Mainly though this very modern movement was seeking “to attract the interest of an international press which was accustomed to reporting indigenous rights issues and environmental concerns as one and the same” (Canessa 2010, p. 240). Political identities are created and are not innate.

Clearly now we can see that the West/East organizing principle we have deployed in this text can only be a metaphor for where Latin America might be placed in terms of modernity/modernization theories. As with most binary oppositions we have come up against its limitations. Both a modernity to be achieved through “civilization” and an essentialist identity politics has very clear limitations as we have seen. A binary logic that does not understand the liminal or allow for hybridity has very serious limitations in both analytical and political terms. In many ways the Eurocentrism of civilization discourse finds a mirror image in the claimed “authenticity” of some variants of indigenismo. At this point it is quite clear that we need to break out of the West-East dilemma for placing or positioning Latin America. Neither of these approaches is really adequate to theorize the complexity of Latin America and cannot be even remotely “fit for purpose” in terms of a guide for action for social transformation.

Betwixt

Antonio Gramsci famously remarked that while “in Russia the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state and civil society...” (Gramsci 1971, p. 238). So, the war of maneuver that may have been appropriate in the East to drive the successful Russian Revolution, would need to be replaced by a slower paced, more organic war of position in the West. While it is often assumed that Latin America was more like Gramsci’s “East” than his “West” it is, arguably, better classified as part of Gramsci’s category of “peripheral” Western

countries like Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Not least because, as Roger Bartra puts it, “there is nothing primitive or gelatinous about Mexican society...the structures of political mediation...are extraordinarily strong and provide the state with a solid and broad basis of consensus” (Bartra 2002, p. 72).

Gramsci’s West-East distinctions could perhaps be used as a hinge to unravel a more realistic placing of Latin America in the world order. First of all Gramsci’s distinction was a heuristic device and not a geographical categorization. It was designed to imagine a distinctive “Western” state morphology and the adequate response from below by the subaltern classes. He was careful to emphasize, as Bob Jessop puts it, “the social constitution of categories such as ‘North-South’ and ‘East’ and ‘West’, their reflection of the viewpoint of the European cultured classes, their ideological representation of differences between civilizations, and their material significance in practical life” (Jessop 2006, p. 39). If we take it that Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina are closer to Italy, Spain, and Portugal than to Russia then it follows that they will share some of their characteristics as peripheral countries within Western modernity.

For the Northern popularizers of the Latin America dependency approach, such as Gunder Frank, the answer to modernization theory and its underlying dualism was to simply state that Latin America had always been capitalist. The fundamental error involved here was to view trade as equivalent to capitalism and thus the conquistadores as precursors of General Motors. But capitalism is, above all, a mode of production that requires fundamentally “free” (that is not coerced) wage labor to function. Clearly during the colonial period and right up to the mid-twentieth century (and even beyond) different forms of coerced labor prevailed. First slavery, the *mita* (forced labor by indigenous workers), imported indentured labor, and coerced cash crop production were the norm. A whole range of extra-economic coercion measures compelled workers and totally shaped the relations of production that lay at the heart of the colonial mode of production.

To be sure the debate around capitalist and noncapitalist modes of production was not a politically innocent one. The dominant liberal view and that of the Economic Commission of Latin America was that a deep rooted dualism separated the modern-capitalist sector from the traditional-feudal sector seen as closed and resistant to change. Most of the Left also accepted this vision and argued that the nature of the revolution in Latin America would be national and democratic rather than anticapitalist. Sometimes this view was

applied quite mechanically and led to a rigid stages theory of revolution. What Gunder Frank did was seek to show that the supposedly closed feudal order was linked to the mercantile world system and thus by definition, capitalist because of trading (not production) relations. It was then a short leap of faith to argue that the revolution was anticapitalist against the modern as much as the traditional order.

To carry out an effective critique of dualism we do not need to see Latin America as always-already capitalist. Brazilian political economist Francisco Oliveira has developed what is probably the most sophisticated “critique of dualist reason” as he calls it (Oliveira 1973). The separation between the so-called backward and modern sectors of the economy simply did not exist as such. There was, in fact, a close complementarity between the agricultural and emerging industrial sectors, with the first providing much needed food inputs and a ready supply of labor. A dialectical interdependence meant that “the expansion of capitalism in Brazil occurred through the introduction of new relations in the archaic [sector] and by reproducing archaic relation in the new [sector]” (Oliveira 1973, p. 32). The first process freed up labor to work in the industrial sector, while the second process created a complex process of labor control and its subordination to the oligarchic capital accumulation process.

When we say Latin America is characterized by contradictions we are really saying that it experiences mixed temporalities leading to multiple modernities. Modernization was never a smooth, linear process as we see when deconstructing the traditional dualist model. The most up-to-date modern technologies could be introduced in rural areas, while traditional small-scale production and various forms of coerced labor played a key role in the industrialization process. The new in the old, and the old in the new, was a socioeconomic process but it inevitably impacted on politics and culture as well. Too often Western or North American political analysis assumes a modern democratic model that simply does not apply. Cultural formations in Latin America are most dramatically mixed and hybrid. In short there are multiple paths to modernity and even, as in Latin America’s case there can be modernity without modernization.

So, Latin America can be seen as betwixt tradition and modernity, in a liminal position so to say. Homi Bhabha identifies a liminal space where the hybrid emerges, a translational space or a “Third Space” (Bhabha 1994). Identity and culture is neither fixed nor homogeneous from this perspective. This certainly is a flexible lens through which to analyze the encounters between the indigenous peoples

and the European invaders, in the course of which neither remained unchanged. It was in this third (neither-nor, thus liminal) space where the negotiations between different cultural systems of signification occurred. It is not necessarily a subversive concept because it was the *mestizo* (mixed indigenous-European) identity that played a key role in stabilizing the conservative order of post-colonialism based on the new *criollo* elite.

In recent years it is the concept of hybridity that has gained most purchase within Latin America as an analytical category seeking to explain its specificity. For Canclini and others, the Manichean world of the dependency theorists—with its First and Third Worlds—misses out on the more flexible, hybrid world we now live in. For example, “It does not explain the planetary functioning of an industrial, technological, financial, and cultural system whose headquarters is not in a single nation but in a dense network of economic and ideological structures” (Canclini 1995, p. 229). The transnational cultural political economy that holds sway today, the flows of migrants and money, and the dense network of images and information that shapes our understanding is not amenable to a simplistic explanation around geographical or political belonging to a Third World.

Interestingly, the way Canclini phrases the central tension of Latin America today is that we are between the promise of global cosmopolitanism and the failure of national projects (Canclini 2002, p. 50). Nation building in the traditional sense is no longer seen as viable in the era of global development. But globalism, in turn, seems somewhat of an empty promise when it reproduces hierarchies and inequalities thus appearing to be just the new face of imperialism. Certainly globalization as we know it does not produce a racism free, sexism free, and sustainable oriented world whatever its self-image might be. What it does create is a vastly speeded up world where the interconnections between the local and the global are much denser than they ever have been. We see everywhere in this new world “examples of hybridization that do not reconcile the diverse and intercultural fusions which explode every day in the big cities” (Canclini 2002, p. 50). The story of this hybrid globalization has only just begun.

Gramsci’s portrayal of a non-geographical distinction between West and East has allowed us to open up a new terrain that we can see as characterized by uneven (yet combined) development and a striking cultural hybridity. Similar to Gramsci’s category of “peripheral” Western societies, the Latin American nation-states often had weak states but civil society was relatively well developed. These were also

“late” developing countries, with only a few beginning an integrated or organic development process before 1930. These late peripheral societies were marked by their colonial origins, not least in their highly unequal landowning patterns but also in their state forms. The building of the dominant class hegemony was an exceedingly difficult task given its own weakness and the complexity of the development challenge. Perhaps one of the main characteristics of these “in-between” societies—partly of the West but with some “Eastern” characteristics—was precisely that the construction of hegemony was a never-ending task of ephemeral success at best.

Placing Latin America using conventional social value and cultural categories has clear limitations. The image of *Macondo* suggests an element of unknowability and even if we choose to reject this interpretation we should consider why magical realism has such purchase in Latin America. The construction of the national-popular imaginary in Latin America has been led in great part by creative writers and not the state. Brazilian economist Maria Conceição Tavares wrote in some wonderment how in the 1980s “we witnessed demonstrations of discontent, gigantic elections, rage, joy and creativity of the young urban masses. ‘A land at a critical junction’, Glauber Rocha [Brazilian filmmaker best known for his *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol*: Black God White Devil] would say, ‘Deep rivers’ would be Arguedas’s [Peruvian mestizo novelist José María Arguedas] description. The poets are, as always, in the vanguard” (Tavares 1990, p. 219). The profound changes set in motion by modernity (and its discontents) have most often been captured in the cultural domain.

From a cultural studies perspective Latin America has recently been classified as postcolonial, partly led by the Gramsci inspired postcolonial studies group in India. John Beverley is one of those who took up the subaltern studies in relation to Latin America very much in a post-nationalist mode, after disillusionment over the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions. This school argued that both colonial and nationalist (including Marxist) modernization models were marked by a statist and teleological flavor. This perspective was born out of cultural studies given the centrality of literature in shaping our ideological understanding of Latin American history. It was part of the late 1970s “turn to Gramsci” as the progressive intellectuals sought to salvage something from the wreckage of their illusions following the brutal repression of the military dictatorships.

The postcolonial take on Latin America was part of the post-structuralist critique of Eurocentrism associated with Michel

Foucault and other thinkers. It was an epistemological shift dedicated to “provincializing Europe” (Chakrabarty 2007) and thus prioritizing a broader post—Western form of reason and knowledge. Postcolonialism thus encouraged a theoretical practice responding to the colonial legacy and the complex interactions between European and other cultures. This gave rise to a subaltern perspective (both geographical and social) as well as the emergence of what became known as “border thinking.” However, as Ella Shohat puts it “The term ‘post-colonial’ would be more precise, therefore, if articulated as ‘post-First/Third Worlds theory;’, or ‘post anti-colonial critique’, as a movement beyond a relatively binaristic, fixed and stable mapping of power relations between ‘coloniser-colonised’ and ‘centre-periphery’” (Shohat 1992, p. 108). Beyond the binary oppositions lies a new fluid form of border thinking, more appropriate to Latin America’s place in the world.

Latin America has also been classified as “postmodern” or as Brunner puts it “as sort of regional postmodernism *avant la lettre*” (Brunner 1987, p. 33). Postmodernism has been defined as incredulity toward metanarratives and a rejection of the logocentrism that sets up hierarchical binary oppositions such as man/woman, tradition/modernity, center/periphery, and so on where one is seen as a logos—an invariable presence in no need for explanation. While power is seen as ubiquitous in this new order, it is also de-centered and there is no single simple mechanism to overthrow it such as “the working class” or “the revolution.” Postmodernism can also be seen as a critique of institutional authority, bureaucracy, and the whole disciplinary component of modernity. At its optimistic best, it can be seen as taking up the mantle of modernism to create “a new map of emancipatory practices” (Santos 1995, p. 5) “fit for purpose” in the global era.

Latin American literature has played an important role in the global dialogue around representation and postmodernity. None more so than Argentina’s Jorge Luis Borges whose work (see Borges 1970) is seen by some critics as a profound influence on Foucault, Derrida, and Lyotard, broadly seen as the founders of postmodernism. His writings opened up the modernist paradigm through his fluid narrative interweaving of fictional and nonfictional sources, from well-known and anonymous authors in a way that played with and even subverted the relationship between knowledge and language. As Borges put it in an interview, “I do not believe in absolute creation, because there is nothing absolute: neither colors, nor lines, nor forms” (Barone 1996, p. 131). His favorite motto that “all is relative” prefigures later

post-structuralist concerns with representation and the “magical realism” of more progressive writers such as Gabriel García Márquez in the 1960s.

From a postmodern perspective the Macondo image referred to earlier is quite anachronistic. With Gabriel García Márquez the national was still real, even when it is surreal. Popular culture still reflected a national domain and its reference points. Today, the authenticity of the local is displaced by transnational culture. Thus as Jean Franco writes, “It used to be writers who claimed to be spokesmen for the people. Now Ruben Blades as well as Vargas Llosa run for president and it is Celia Cruz and not Rodó or Bolívar who defines ‘Latinity’” (Franco 2000, p. 267). Latin America in the era of globalization is clearly post-national. This world where authenticity is constructed and folklore is commercialized looks much more like McOndo (in a pun on McDonalds) than Macondo as Fuguet and Gómez call it in a collection of stories with the same title (Fuguet and Gómez 1996).

The new postmodern and post-national, globalized and commercialized McOndo “is just as Latin American and magical (exotic) as the real *Macondo* (which at the end of the day, is not real but virtual). Our McOndo is bigger, more overpopulated and polluted; it has motorways, metro systems, cable TV and shanty towns. In McOndo there are McDonalds, Mac computers, condos, as well as five star hotels and gigantic malls build on laundered money” (Fuguet and Gomez 1996, p. 15). This sounds like somewhere between the original Macondo and the plastic McWorld conjured up by Benjamin Barber in his influential Jihad Versus McWorld metaphor to capture the conflict between tradition and the new global commercial culture. Certainly Latin America cannot find a comfortable home at either end of this continuum and the McOndo image captures nicely the enduring and evolving nature of hybridity.

However, I would argue that neither the postcolonial nor the post-modern categories can be deployed uncritically in Latin America. Post-colonialism, taken literally, can take us back to the simple Third-Worldism that created a global category based on little commonality other than anticolonialism or anti-imperialism. Coloniality as a mode of domination and a knowledge system that needs to be deconstructed would be a different proposition. Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano captures this dimension with his concept “coloniality of power” seen as a global pattern that still permeates the world order based on the imposition of a racial/ethnic classification of the world’s population (Quijano 2000). The decolonizing of knowledge from the

perspective of the subaltern is thus seen as much a task for a critical rethinking of Latin America as it is in the more recently colonial regions of Africa and Asia.

The critique of the postmodern category or framework is perhaps a more fundamental task. Thus Reigadas reacts angrily against what he sees as the iconoclastic irrationalism of postmodernism, "Why should we uncritically assume the end of history... proclaim the perversion of the state, renounce collective projects, celebrate the end of ideologies and utopias, declare that liberation and the Third World are old myths.... And passively enjoy the kingdom of uncertainty?" (Reigadas 1988, p. 142). From this perspective, postmodernism provides ideological cover for neoliberalism and its bid to drive back the state, thwart nationalist projects, and promote individualism. While undoubtedly this is part of the story, postmodernism is also the driver of the Zapatistas as the first "information era guerrillas," their network mode of operation, and their instinctual linking of the local and the global in a bold project of social transformation.

Perhaps the strongest criticism of postmodernism in relation to Latin America is that it tends to elide the unequal relations between center and periphery. While it has been politically enabling through the destabilizing of dominant categories, it has tended to reabsorb the peripheral condition as a harmless image of the other. It has acted as a transgressor of normalizing knowledge but the repressive tolerance of the slogan of the Other has tended to block Latin Americans from reformulating their own conceptual frameworks. There is little doubt though that the condition of postmodernity is a useful way to characterize the partial and dependent modernization, which has taken place since the 1950s. Roger Bartra puts it nicely when he argues that we are now beyond modernity and nationalism in some way and that "we have no choice but to face the post-modernity of the fragmented Western world of which we form a part" (Bartra 2002, p. 64). Perhaps the final phrase is worth stressing: Latin America is not a place apart.

Political

Given the impasse of a West versus East placing of Latin America and the limitations of a "betwixt" liminal status we might now explore the conceptual tools required for "placing" Latin America politically. There are many theoretical vocabularies we could use such as modernization theory, variants of political sociology, or the new political

science approaches. However, I am going to make a case for deploying a Gramscian political methodology for various reasons. The first reason is that Antonio Gramsci was a profound national political thinker and this sits well with the recalcitrant national realities of Latin America, which are not always amenable to international or global conceptual approaches. The second reason is that he was writing about the peripheral states of the Europe of his day and not the advanced industrial societies most often taken as economic and political models for Latin America to emulate.

By foregrounding the importance of the political or “bringing politics back in” we are not, of course, in any way downgrading economic, social, or cultural factors that impact development in Latin America. Even their separation for naming purposes can only be carried out for analytical convenience, given that in any society, its reproduction requires all these factors to come into play simultaneously. What we are trying to signal is, rather, the determinant importance of power relations in establishing how the process of social reproduction maintains existing arrangements or transforms them. Power relations are themselves embedded in a particular configuration of class domination and resistance. It is through the political process that these existing patterns of domination can be contested. This optic also makes central to our analysis the role of the state that has a critical function in regard to economic development, the consolidation of political domination, and in relation to the ideological apparatuses of domination that help ensure the stable reproduction of capitalist role (until it is contested).

Power needs to be understood as a social relation in the same way that capitalism consists of social relations between producers and the owners of capital. It is power that structures the social relations of a given society that are not random occurrences. Power is, however, continuously contested both from below and within the power bloc. Within the labor process there is also continual resistance and occasional conflict as workers contest exploitation and submission. Thus there is no power-in-general, or a one-off contest that determines power relations from then on out. Also, as Jessop reminds us, “the successful exercise of power is also a conjunctural phenomenon rather than being guaranteed by unequal social relations of production” (Jessop 2006, p. 8). Thus, in a necessarily abbreviated account of power transformation in Latin America, we will place considerable emphasis on the conjunctures that might be seen as pivotal or tipping points between one phase of capital accumulation and another.

The linchpin of power relations in a capitalist order is the state, understood not in an instrumental way but as a social relation. Capital accumulation and the continued reproduction of the capitalist relations of production depend on a state form adequate to capital's domination over labor and the subaltern classes in the realm of politics and across society more widely. As a social relation, the state plays a crucial role in ensuring the stable reproduction of the dominant economic order. This system changes overtime and it is crucial to our examination of development, hegemony, and social transformation to trace the changing role of the state in Latin America. The liberal state of the nineteenth century was to give way to the developmental state more or less in the mid-twentieth century. However the role of the state was almost completely transformed by the neoliberal revolution from the 1980s onward leading to what was portrayed as a retreat from the economic realm by the state. What the role of the state is to be in the emerging post-neoliberal order is yet to be defined.

The changing role of the state in Latin America is also a crucial determinant of both development and democratization patterns. A democratic developmental state is very different from an authoritarian neoliberal state. Historically there have been polarized debates around whether political democracy required economic development and of course, the other way round. There has often been an assumption that there is a trade-off between the two. For example, an authoritarian political regime was often seen as necessary to ensure the stable expansion of capital accumulation. In fact what is now evident is that there are no benefits to a trade-off between democracy and development and that, in practice, there can often be a synergistic relationship between the two processes. Indeed, there is an argument that the left-of-center governments across the region in recent decades have been better managers of capitalism than the more traditional or conservative political parties. One way or another, this is a crucial debate that needs to be at core of our analysis.

In terms of rethinking Latin America, we need to be very conscious of the dangers of simply lifting concepts developed in another context and simply "applying" them. It was such an approach that led to the mechanical application of not only the modernization theory but also the Althusserian strand of Marxism that greatly weakened the purchase historical materialism might have had in the 1970s and since. As Centeno and López-Alves warn, when introducing a collection on "grand theory through the lens of Latin America," it is often the case that "much grand theorizing and analysis in the social sciences

focuses on a subject of study without proper consideration of where and how it fits into a larger social context” (Centeno and Lopez-Alvez 2001, p. 7). Certainly what we have argued in this chapter would point us toward a perspective in which local realities must shape and redefine supposedly universal principles. Bearing in mind the Latin American context and the inherent condition of contingency in politics we can put forward a broad analytical framework here as guide to our subsequent analysis.

It is the general interaction between the state and the economy that sets the broad parameters of *development* as we have defined it for our purposes. That is to say we will need to examine the varying patterns of capital accumulation across countries and across time. While conscious of the dependent nature of development in Latin America our emphasis is on the endogenous development of the social relations of production. It is then the state that acts as a nexus between the economic and the political as well as between the governed and the governors of any given society. The struggle for *hegemony* is thus the framework for the political interaction between the dominant and subaltern classes, the result of which is always open. Throughout the state and civil society there is a constant struggle to achieve political hegemony and create a situation where consent might prevail over open coercion. Finally, the overarching concept of *social transformation* will provide us with a richer framework than one based on simple notions of either social or political change as discrete entities or processes. Social transformation thus brings together the economic, political, and social domains in a dynamic way highlighting the ongoing reproduction of the capitalist order and its contestation.

Gramsci’s theoretical and practical engagement with Italy’s social, economic, and political development provides us with a rich repertoire of concepts relevant to a rethinking of Latin America along these lines. Gramsci was focused on “the typical peripheral states, like Italy, Poland, Spain or Portugal [where] the state forces are less efficient” (Gramsci 1978, p. 409). Latin American states were, and still are, peripheral in the global order and they are characterized by a late development as we have argued above. Suitably contextualized—within Gramsci’s own political workshop as it were—we see there an engagement with similar political questions that could be inspirational for our present need for a grounded critical analysis. We need to be aware, of course, that Gramsci was not a professor of political science. In that spirit—and seeking to be creative—we seek a new take on Latin American history guided by an overarching concern

with social transformation that necessarily includes a genuine democratization and more equitable form of development.

The Italy which Gramsci engaged with was characterized by uneven development—symbolized in the status of the Mezzogiorno—and where national unification was not easily achieved. In an unfinished essay “Some Aspects of the Southern Question” (Gramsci 1978, p. 441; see also Gramsci 1972) Gramsci traced the relationship between city and countryside that underlay uneven development and hindered the political unification of the country, which only occurred in 1860. Economic, political, and social integration had hitherto been weak and the nation-state was not consolidated until the Risorgimento. Securing national unification also involved the institutional integration of the state, consistently a major focus for Gramsci. As Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith put it, “The basic problem confronting Gramsci was that of identifying the specific weaknesses of the Italian national state which emerged from the Risorgimento-weaknesses which culminated in the advent to power of fascism sixty years later” (editorial introduction in Gramsci 1971, p. 45; see also Gramsci 1973).

Italian unification was not seen as a classic bourgeois revolution and revolutionary France was a constant counterpoint. In Italy, according to Gramsci, “what was involved was not a social group which ‘led’ other groups, but a state which, even if it had limitations as a power ‘led’ the group which should have been leading” (Gramsci 1971, p. 105). It is this insight that lies behind Gramsci’s key concept of a “passive revolution,” which has, we will argue, great resonance in Latin America. The Risorgimento is one such case where we witness not a revolution but “molecular changes which in fact progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces, and hence become the matrix of new changes” (Gramsci 1971, p. 109). This is a historical process Gramsci also dubs “revolution/restoration” and in Latin America we can detect clear parallels in the process of “conservative modernization” where change from above as it were co-opts and defuses demands for change from below.

If there is one overarching concept that provides a key to the overall Gramscian paradigm for social transformation it is the notion of hegemony. For Gramsci, hegemony is the process through which a social class produces itself as a historical subject. It moves beyond narrow class interest to achieve consensus across society. It rejects a process of leading rather than merely dominating the rest of society. A hegemonic system leads to the creation of a “historic bloc” where

the hegemonic class dominates society through the institutions of political society (state-government) and of civil society (state-society). Hegemony rests not on coercion alone but also, fundamentally, on consent. The subaltern classes and, we might argue, regions seek to construct counter-hegemonic movements that might supplant the dominant logic but to do so they must also seek to lead and create consensus across wide layers of society.

From a Latin American perspective, the Gramscian notion of the “national-popular” is one that merits further development. It was a concept developed in relation to the need to integrate the *Mezzogiorno* into national culture. The construction of a national-popular culture implied not only overcoming notions of Southern backwardness but also of developing popular classes’ cultural strands, which might articulate an alternative vision of the world. Gramsci refers to “the formation of a national-popular collective will” (Gramsci 1971, p. 130). It could be seen as a new historic bloc between national popular aspirations. In Latin America this concept was somewhat stretched to theorize the populist movements of the 1950s, whereas for Gramsci it was certainly not meant to denote any form of “national socialism” or populism. What Gramsci provides is a fluid concept oriented toward social transformation that takes us beyond any form of class essentialism.

We have also much to learn in Latin America from Gramsci’s complex notion of an organic crisis. Gramsci breaks exclusively with catastrophic notions of crisis—then common in the communist movement—and stresses rather the importance of countertendencies and the capacity of the capitalist system to reconfigure itself. An organic crisis is also complex and not reducible to either economic or political causes. The modern crisis, for Gramsci, is essentially a crisis of authority when the ruling class has lost consensus and is no longer “leading.” In brief, “The crisis consist precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born” (Gramsci 1971, p. 276). The masses become detached from their traditional ideologies and there is at least the possibility of creating a new culture. More often, there is an interregnum period that may lead to a restoration of the old order, or, the emergence of what Gramsci calls “morbid symptoms.”

Since the 1980s, Latin American politics were highly influenced by a Gramscian understanding of civil society, which was seen as the site where contestation of the authoritarian state could take place. Gramsci refers to two superstructural “levels”; “the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly

called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the state’” (Gramsci 1971, p. 138). Whereas the state is based on direct domination, civil society is the milieu through which the dominant group builds hegemony. It is also, perhaps confusingly, the site in which the subaltern classes and its political organizations begin to contest the state and create incipient forms of counter-hegemony. In Latin America the concept of civil society came to denote in the 1980s a space between the state and the market where social organizations of citizens could organize human rights associations, trade unions, and varied social movements.

Finally, in terms of how the subaltern classes might contest established power we should take up Gramsci’s distinction between a “war of maneuver” and a “war of position.” This shift was based on an understanding that “in the East [Russia], the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous. In the West [for example, Italy] the strength of civil society was immediately obvious” (Gramsci 1971, p. 238). A full frontal attack on the state—as in classic Leninism—was not the best way to deal with the dense networks of civil society that created hegemony. Rather what was needed was a “war of position,” the only possible option in the West for Gramsci. In Latin America this political-strategic vision enabled a shift in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America toward a democratic rather than insurrectionary conception of social transformation.

In terms of the overarching themes of this exercise in rethinking Latin America, these would be development, hegemony, and social transformation. It is the interaction between the state and the economy that leads to different modalities of “development” or capital accumulation. The state form acts as a nexus between economies and politics in this regard. The state also acts as a nexus, though, between the governed and the governors of a given society. “Hegemony” is thus the result of the state’s interaction with the masses and its ability to generate consent and not just rely on domination. The third overarching concept of “social transformation” seeks to provide a richer context than simple notions of social or political change.

Conquest to Modernity (1510–1910)

This chapter further develops the insights that can be gained from a flexible development of Antonio Gramsci's thinking from a contemporary Latin American perspective. The first section, "Passive Revolution," focuses on the rich conceptual armory Gramsci developed to explain uneven development and conservative modernization in the Italy of his time. An overarching theme is the continuous struggle by the dominant classes to achieve hegemony, that is, a form of rule where coercion is matched or balanced by consent. Gramsci's way of working conceptually and concretely at the same time will be our own methodological guide in subsequent sections. The second section, "Conquest," is a rapid sketch of the brutal Iberian destruction of the Amerindian civilizations and the introduction of a mercantile model of production with a mixture of free and servile relations of production. The pre-Columbian world was totally transformed by this rapacious and exploitative regime, but it did create the social forces that would push for independence. After three centuries, the Spanish-American (*criollo*) elite sought to gain "Independence" from Spain so as not to be constrained in terms of trading relations. From the 1810–1820 struggle for independence—with indigenous and other subaltern groups restless in the background—the current republics of Latin America were formed (with the exception of Brazil) through a process of passive revolution. We trace the main socioeconomic and political parameters of the postcolonial era that set the basis for the modern development process. Finally, did this passive revolution usher in a period of "Modernity"? The construction of the nation-state and of "modernity" is usually taken to be a simultaneous process. However, the modernity achieved was peripheral in terms of global

power relations and was exclusionary in terms of gender, class, and ethnicity, thus marking the whole postindependence social order.

Passive Revolution

Antonio Gramsci was a leading figure in Italian communism, rising to prominence during the 1919–1920 Turin workers council uprising. He played a significant role in the Communist International, which arose out of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Gramsci was not a lone figure but, rather, very much part of a collective leadership. In terms of the discussions that emerged in the new communist state after the death of Lenin, Gramsci took a pragmatic stance in backing the Stalin leadership but not necessarily its policies. When he was imprisoned by the Italian fascist regime of Benito Mussolini, he took an interest in the writings of the Left opposition leader, Leon Trotsky, and became more oppositional. It is important to note this background, as too often Gramsci's thinking is seen as a series of disembodied ideas rather than an integral element in Gramsci's political strategizing as a leader of the Italian Communist Party and of the international communist movement.

In Latin America, Gramsci's ideas were first circulated by the Communist Party of Argentina in the late 1940s. This was very much an "ethical" reception of a great "man of ideas" with this actual politics and critique of orthodoxy airbrushed out of the picture. In the early 1960s there was a new Gramsci as "philosopher of praxis" being presented within what might be called a culturalist reading. By the mid- to late-1960s, the *Pasado y Presente* journal and group in Argentina (see Aricó 1988) were using Gramsci to break decisively with the dominant mechanistic Marxism. Gramsci would allow for a rereading of Peronism through a national popular lens. His participation in and analysis of the Turin council movement also inspired the emerging worker's control movement in Argentina in particular.

Gramsci in the 1970s began to lose the earlier "social democratic" air he had gained due to the diffusion of his writings by the reformist Communist Party of Argentina. From the 1970s onward, it was Gramsci as theorist of hegemony who became known across Latin America. The influence of Althusser's dogmatic structural Marxism waned as the mature and fully rounded Gramsci entered the political discourse (see Portantiero 1983). Gramsci was crucial for rethinking a politics of transformation after the failure of the armed struggle. In the democratic Latin America of the 1980s and 1990s Gramscian

thinking came into its own, so much so that, somewhat exaggeratedly, the likes of Chilean dictator Pinochet warned of the dangers of Gramsci as a new inspiration for the Left alongside the emerging theology of liberation.

Against the dominant reception of Gramsci's thought in the North in the 1970s as "Western Marxist" par excellence, we can now try to imagine a Latin American Gramsci. He was always explicit that he was writing in and for the European periphery. In a 1926 report on the Italian situation for the Third International, Gramsci contrasted the "advanced capitalist countries" to the "typical peripheral states, like Italy, Poland and Spain or Portugal [where] the state forces are less efficient" (Gramsci 1978, p. 409). In a country like England, by contrast, "even the most serious economic crisis do not have immediate repercussions in the political sphere," given the political and organizational reserves the ruling class holds. The bigger countries of Latin America have always been part of the global semi-periphery and thus quite amenable to a Gramscian lens I would argue. It was a weakness of the state and not its overdevelopment that characterized these semi-peripheral late-industrializing countries.

Essentially, Gramsci's work can be presented in its Italian context as a radical, sociological analysis of Italian uneven development. Central to this analysis was the concept of "passive revolution" that he borrowed from Vincenzo Cuoco to provide an analysis of the distinctive features of the Risorgimento and national unification process. A passive revolution was for Gramsci a simultaneous restoration-revolution that created "more or less far-reaching modifications into the economic structure of the country" but "in a reformist manner, thereby managing to safeguard the political and economic positions of the old feudal classes, avoiding agrarian reform and making especially sure that the popular masses did not go through a period of political experience such as occurred in France in the Jacobin era" (Gramsci 1995, pp. 349–350). Gradually in Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* the concept was extended to denote the whole process of bourgeois hegemony in the imperialist era and in Latin America the concept has been taken up in that way.

The passive revolution could, in practice, stress either the revolutionary or the restorationist elements, giving it quite a different inflection. Mainly Gramsci could be taken as a "pessimist," for example, in his critique of insurrection in the 1930s and his stress on the capacity for initiative that the bourgeoisie possesses. Passive revolution allows it to pacify and incorporate radical challenges to its

rule. However, we can equally read passive revolution as a matrix for social transformation, for example, in Latin America and the actually existing path to modernity, which prevailed. The concept of passive revolution, as Gramsci put it, acts as “the interpretative criterion of molecular changes which in fact progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces, and hence become the matrix of new changes” (Gramsci 1971, p. 108). In Latin America this concept is indispensable for an understanding of the Vargas period in Brazil (1930–1945, 1951–1954), the Perón era in Argentina (1946–1955), and that of Cárdenas in Mexico (1934–1940).

Gramsci based his elaboration of the concept of passive revolution on his understanding of the uneven and combined nature of development. The North-South divide in Italy—one part industrial, the other primarily agricultural—set the basis for a process of development, which was profoundly uneven. This process marked Italian history from unification through to fascism and beyond. The alliance between northern industrialists and the southern landed interests gave rise to the political alliance and development process that Gramsci described as a passive revolution. It described and generalized a situation in peripheral European states where the path to modernity did not pass through a radical-popular Jacobin movement comparable to that which characterized revolutionary France. It is a bourgeois hegemonic project for peripheral capitalist modernization under conditions of uneven and combined development. While not a revolutionary class in the Jacobin sense, this peripheral bourgeoisie is able to forge a form of hegemony appropriate to the conditions of backwardness and maintain the power to keep the subaltern classes in their position.

However, as Adam Morton notes, “The notion of passive revolution should not be limited to this understanding. It is equally used in a related but alternative, second, sense to capture how a revolutionary form of political transformation is pressed into a conservative project of restoration...” (Morton 2010, p. 317). In Gramsci’s own words this was an outcome in which the dominant classes react to the rebelliousness of the popular masses through “‘restorations’ that agree to some part of the popular demands and are therefore ‘progressive restorations’, or ‘revolutions-restorations’ or even ‘passive revolutions’” (Gramsci 2011, vol. 3, p. 252). It is perhaps not too far-fetched in a Latin American context to conceive of the populist regimes post-1930 in these terms. Thus Perón in Argentina articulated explicitly that his national-popular revolution was necessary to preempt communism.

More generally across Latin America passive revolution in this active political sense can be seen as a technique of statecraft whereby the peripheral bourgeoisie successfully co-opts elements of contestation to carry out reforms while simultaneously, at a more fundamental level, maintaining the stability of the bourgeois order.

In recent years there has been a revival in interest around the concept of passive revolution as a lens to examine the processes of conservative modernization on the periphery. Situations that have been analyzed from this perspective include the Meiji Restoration in Japan (1868–1912), the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), and modern state formation in Turkey (1919–1923). The concept of passive revolution is not posed “as some trans-historical affirmation” as Morton puts it, but rather as a continuum of a particular form of social transformation under conditions of peripheral modernization. It is not a revolutionary rupture but, as Gramsci put it, a series of molecular changes that set the matrix for the emergence of a new hegemonic project. This can be seen very clearly in Latin America when incipient industrialization under the “old regime” created the conditions, albeit not voluntarily, for the emergence of an industrializing project when international conditions made it possible or even essential. Likewise, passive revolution as a means of absorbing discontent is very common across Latin America even if in the long run it does not prevent the reemergence of popular discontent and challenges to the established order.

While mindful of the analytic possibilities presented by an extension of the concept of passive revolution, we should also be aware of the possible pitfalls. Already Gramsci had extended the concept from the *Risorgimento* to Mussolini’s Italy in ways that are not always convincing. Fascism has after all, a quite specific significance in terms of its economic, political, social, and cultural significance as a “state of exception.” While recognizing that passive revolution is one of Gramsci’s “most fertile ideas,” Alex Callinicos has reacted against its current extension reminding us of the dangers of removing a concept from the original problem-situation it responded to and the problem of conceptual drift (Callinicos 2010). While the value of Gramsci’s grounded application of passive revolution to define and explain the Italian *Risorgimento* is granted, Callinicos warns us that an extension of the concept to so many diverse restructuring processes “runs the risk of becoming just another way of referring to the dynamism and flexibility of capitalism” (Callinicos 2010, p. 505). That is correct indeed but, from a Latin American perspective,

passive revolution seems to be a concept that is suggestive and worth exploring further I would argue. It most certainly takes us beyond sterile West versus East oppositions in terms of analytical lenses.

In terms of the project being developed here focused on “rethinking Latin America” through the lens of development, hegemony, and social transformation, what role might the concept of passive revolution then play? First it can act as a general backdrop for the period of conservative modernization that opened up at various phases across Latin America, running up to 1929 and the 1930s depression usually. There is also a similar role played by traditional social relations and the interests of the agrarian oligarchy comparable to Italy’s *Mezzogiorno* as analyzed by Gramsci. Also when revolutionary outbreaks did occur as in Mexico in 1910, they tended to be absorbed by the dominant classes in ways similar to Gramsci’s second way of deploying the concept of passive revolution. We must also be aware, however, that the concept can be overextended to an extent that it will lose analytical purchase. Some analysts have portrayed the Brazilian military regime post 1964 as an example of passive revolution when in fact it might better be analyzed as a preventative counterrevolution that does not have the same dynamics as the mixed reform/restoration of the conservative modernization captured by the Gramscian concept of passive revolution.

In Latin America his concept of passive revolution has been deployed by Dora Kanoussi and Javier Mena (Kanoussi and Mena 1995) as the master key to understanding the thwarted development process and conservative modernization. Certainly the oligarchic order of the immediate postcolonial period was modernized without challenging the dominance of this class and (predominantly) without an agrarian reform. In terms of broader political theory the idea of passive revolution could be seen as an alternative to the classic Marxist notion of “bourgeois revolution” based on the Jacobin experience. Modern state formation in the periphery and semi-periphery did not follow this route and it would be futile to always bemoan this lack. The state led the group that should have been leading and it did so in a way that incorporated the traditional noncapitalist relations of production prevailing in the rural areas.

Gramsci took other quite common Marxist concepts and gave them new, more nuanced, and active connotations. Thus Marx had distinguished between the economic “base” of society and its political and ideological “superstructure.” This had given rise in the Marxist tradition to an economism that saw the first “determining” the latter. While Gramsci deployed the category of “levels” he did so in quotation marks as he developed a quite novel rereading of Marx. He refers

to how “structures” and “superstructures” come together to form a “historical bloc” that following Gill, “refers to an historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements” (Gill 2002, p. 58). This reasoning is based on what Gramsci refers to as “the necessary reciprocity between structure and superstructure a reciprocity that is nothing other than the real dialectical process” (Gramsci 1995, p. 366). In the 1970s there was an attempt by Norberto Bobbio and others to portray Gramsci as the “theorist of the superstructure.” Rather we should see him as the dialectical analyst of the construction of the historical bloc and the realization of its hegemony.

The traditional Marxist conception of the state also took on new meaning in Gramsci’s strategic political thinking. For Gramsci, the state was not an instrument that could be seized. We should not identify state and government nor can the state be reduced to an organ of coercion. Rather, for Gramsci, “the general notion of state includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that we might say that state = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion” (Gramsci 1971, p. 263). Against all instrumental notions of the state—quite common in orthodox Marxism-Leninism—Gramsci developed the notion of the “integral state” where the apparatus of coercion (army, police, courts, etc.) is matched by apparatuses of hegemony (economic, political, cultural, etc.) in a dialectical fashion.

Finally, Gramsci took the Leninist notion of “hegemony” that referred to the working class alliance with other oppressed strata and gave it a much richer set of meanings. First, it became an issue for the dominant class (how to maintain consent and unify itself) as much as the dominated classes. Second it went beyond a conception based on class alliances to uncover the whole process in which a social class produces itself as a social subject. Gramsci is not just a sociological or Weberian supplement to Marx that adds consent to the other forms of bourgeois domination through coercion. For Gramsci, “the normal exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by a combination of force and consent, which counterbalance each other (*si equilibrano* in the original), without force predominating excessively over consent” (Gramsci 2011, vol. 1, pp. 155–156). Coercion is still the guarantee of consent and there is also “coercion through consent to put it that way.”

The whole history of Latin America since the Conquest could be seen as a struggle for hegemony by the dominant classes. There was no “bourgeois revolution” in the classic Jacobin sense of the French Revolution. There was no “*bourgeoisie conquérante*” rising to modernize the country against reactionary feudal landowners. Rather, hegemony was always a fragile affair based on compromise with the established order. There were of course dominant classes but there were rarely constituted into a stable and powerful ruling class that could achieve consent and not just domination. Further Gramscian concepts will be elaborated on in subsequent chapters on the national-popular period of the 1940s–1950s and the organic crisis of the 1960s–1970s, but for now our emphasis will be on the conservative modernization through Latin America’s own passive revolution following the wars of independence.

Conquest

When the five hundredth anniversary of Latin America’s “discovery” was marked in 1992, the Amerindian organizations had to point out forcefully that it was not a meeting of cultures that had occurred in 1492 but a violent conquest of a civilization. Between 1519 and 1540 the Spanish obtained control over 30 million people and 2 million square kilometers of territory. The portents of catastrophe manifest in both Inca and Maya culture were borne out in practice. Within one generation two destructive waves of conquest had brought Central and South America under Spanish control. Their superior technology and firepower, the spiritual power of the Bible, and the destructive diseases they carried almost obliterated the preexisting civilization. Pockets of resistance among the less well organized indigenous peoples—such as the Mapuche in the South—were all that remained unconquered and outside the yoke of Spanish colonial rule.

What was of major significance in terms of the outcome of the Iberian invasion is that some of the Amerindian civilizations already had a strong centralized state. It meant that once the central authority was overthrown, the Spanish found themselves as masters of an already subjugated population. The more dispersed, nomadic, and less structured groups proved harder to bring under control. The most coveted regions in terms of mineral resources were—to the Spanish advantage—characterized by a strong centralized state and a systematic system of authority. The Inca ruling class in particular was vulnerable given its own shaky hegemony in terms of internal cohesion

and its repression of other smaller groupings. It was precisely, as Wachtel puts it, “because they were centrally organized societies, heavily dependent on the authority of a single ruler that the empires of Montezuma [Mexico] and of Atahualpa [Peru] fell relatively easily into Spanish hands” (Wachtel 1984, p. 175).

The Iberian invader was seeking mineral wealth—gold and silver in unimaginable quantities—but he also acted as an entrepreneur. So, for example, “Hernán Cortés, exploiting the vast estates that he had acquired for himself in the valley of Oaxaca, showed that the conqueror also had the ambitions of an entrepreneur” (Wachtel 1984, p. 204). The period of conquest was followed by a phase of settlement. With its Amerindian owners dead or subdued, land was plentiful. The new population had to be fed and according to its own customs that meant meat and wine, along with white bread rather than the Amerindian diet of maize. A new society based on a new mode of production was being forged. The territories of the Americas would be Christianized and civilized, a market economy would prevail, and the natives would be conscripted into the wage economy.

The territory known today as Latin America, stretching from Mexico to Tierra del Fuego, was not of course a blank sheet. It was home to wide range of peoples and two major civilizations, the Inca and the Mayas (or Mexicans). These were kinship-based social systems with well-established exchange mechanisms based on reciprocity. The basic unit was the *ayllu* for the Incas and the analogous *caepulli* for the Aztecs, a kinship unit that held the grazing land in communal ownership and allocated arable land to each family according to size. This was a society based on self-sufficiency and social solidarity. The whole production process was based on mutual aid that allowed people to call on their neighbor’s labor in a reciprocal manner. This society was one where land distribution, consumption patterns, and labor use were regulated by equitable reciprocity norms.

At a higher social level a much more hierarchical and unequal form of reciprocity prevailed. The lands of the Inca were worked in a spirit of religious service and the forced labor system of the *mita* was used to create the economic infrastructure in terms of social granaries and fortifications. As Nathan Watchel puts it, “The imperial Inca mode of production was based on the ancient communal mode of production which it left in place, while exploiting the principle of reciprocity to legitimate its rule” (Wachtel 1984, p. 216). Much later in the 1920s, the Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui would seek to deconstruct this ambiguous legacy in an original bid to harness the energy

and creativity of this early Amerindian social order. In a period of renewed peasant unrest in the 1920s (and again in the 1960s) the “primitive communism” of the Incas found a powerful echo.

For “entrepreneurship” (for which read capitalism) to flourish, a plentiful supply of labor was required and, indeed, its availability and control was one of the overarching questions throughout the colonial period. The supply of labor to the mines and the plantations was absolutely critical to the colonial project. Pre-Columbian labor drafting systems were redeployed such as the *mita* in Peru and the *coatequit* in Mexico. The broader term of *repartimiento* (sharing or rationing) described the paid labor draft commonly applied to a percentage of the male indigenous population who were assigned to specific projects or work places. In principle this was to cover the labor needs of public projects or industry that were vital to the public interest. As Macleod describes, many of these forced laborers “stayed [on] at the mines as free laborers, petty traders, or petty smelters, becoming more or less acculturated to the mining or city societies where they found themselves” (Macleod 1984, p. 226). The subjugation of labor was clearly a core element of the Conquest project without which it would never have succeeded; this was carried out in a not only ruthless but also flexible manner incorporating other forms of labor and seeking consent or at least developing mutual interest where possible.

When the direct exploitation of the Amerindian peoples had become exhausted as mode of delivering labor power, then slavery was always an option. Apart from the well-known transatlantic slave trade—which was particularly important in Brazil and the Antilles—Indian slave exports also thrived in the sixteenth century. Thus many of the peoples of Nicaragua were sent as slaves to Peru and Panama (Macleod 1984, p. 221). The oyster pearl fields of Venezuela were tended by Indian slaves from Trinidad until that community was run down and the slaves were reexported to Panama. Another form of labor exploitation developed during the colonial period (and later) was that of debt peonage whereby peasant families rented small plots of land on large estates where they could make a subsistence living in exchange for a set amount of work on the *hacienda* (large estate). Free wage labor only developed at the margins of the system during this period and thus capitalism as such was slow to develop.

Slavery was at the core of the colonizing enterprise in Latin America. Spain and Portugal would continue to trade and exploit slaves even after England’s early move to abolish slavery in 1808, to the extent that two million more slaves were trafficked from Africa

to the Americas (especially to Cuba and Brazil) after that date. The attraction of slave labor for the owners of property was very clear. As Klein and Luna put it in a survey of slavery in Brazil, “Masters could use their slaves at far less cost in reciprocal obligations than any other labor group in their societies” (Klein and Luna 2010, p. 13). Given the inherent limitations in terms of further exploiting the Amerindian populations—which were economic, political, and even religious—the importing of African slaves seemed a rational business proposition. It also fitted in nicely with Portuguese imperial exploits, for example, in relation to Angola, which provided a convenient sea voyage route. For a whole historical period slavery was the mainstay of sugar production in Brazil and the Caribbean and a vital supplement to labor supply in other countries and branches of production.

Slavery was not, however, an ideal solution to labor shortage. As Paulo Singer notes in relation to Brazil, “Plantation owners generally could not entrust to slaves any but the simplest and cheapest equipment for fear of damage or sabotage” (Singer 2009a, p. 56). In other words, the enforced nature of the relation of production precluded technological progress and the emergence of relations of production, which depended on consent and not coercion. Many years later, in the 1920s, Fordism was to emerge as a labor relation where reasonably high wages and job stability would result in a labor force that was not only compliant but also open to further technological innovation. Of course, underlying this economic rationale was the persistent resistance of the slaves to the inhuman exploitation they were subjected to. In purely economic terms though it is clear that abolition opened the way for the widespread adoption of wage labor that not only provided work but did not represent a capital investment and, crucially, began to build a substantial domestic market for the products of an incipient industrialization in the folds of the predominantly agrarian economy.

It is not widely recognized that the struggles for independence saw slaves and ex-slaves playing an important role. As Robin Blackburn notes, “The Spanish American liberation struggle prominently featured colored soldiers and sailors” (Blackburn 2011, p. 256). There is still a hidden history of the independence struggle to be told in terms of the influence of slavery as a political issue and slaves as a contingent of the subaltern classes struggling for freedom. The armies of the independence movement had large—if impossible to quantify—numbers of combatants who were ex-slaves or slaves who were promised their freedom by the pro-independence political groups (see Blanchard

2008). While Bolívar had promised much to the slaves who joined the independence movement, the consequences of independence for the slaves were essentially disappointing. The Atlantic slave trade had ended and the so-called free-womb (those born from slaves would be free) laws were passed in most countries but it was not until the 1850s (and much later in Brazil) that slavery was to cease in Latin America. Its role in the economic development of Latin America within the emerging international division of labor was too important to allow for a swift demise.

Even then the impact of slavery did not, of course, end with its belated abolition in the Americas. Brazilian landowners in particular were quick to develop other forced labor techniques. Up until recent times we have seen the reproduction of forced labor in various forms in Brazil as elsewhere. Landowners retained many of the prerogatives of slavery including, in particular, the right to inflict physical punishment on their plantation workers. Where slavery persisted as in Cuba and Brazil, where the abolition of the slave trade was widely flouted, it still had to be brought under the new rule of law and order. As Blackburn puts it, "The work of the world still had to be done but employers would have to pay for it.... Economic compulsion was to replace brute force" (Blackburn 2011, p. 343). Gradually following the Haitian Revolution and the US Civil War, slavery became simply not viable in political terms. The resistance of slaves had also eroded the viability of the slave mode of production from within. While forms of extra-economic coercion never really disappeared, the dull economic compulsion of the market would prevail in the twentieth century.

The influence of slavery in Latin America would continue to have an impact long after abolition, not least in Brazil. Antonio Negri and Giuseppe Cocco, in a recent account of bio-power and struggle in a globalized Latin America refer strikingly to "the racism of the neo-slavery hierarchy" that in alliance with the "corporativism of the technocracy" they see as the new bio-power bloc (Negri and Cocco 2006, p. 22). Can we really trace back Brazil's current power holders to the slave-holding oligarchy of the nineteenth century? We can certainly reject facile notions that Brazil, or any other Latin American country somehow surpassed racism through the development of a hybrid society. Much is made of the fact that barely more than half of Brazil's population is today classified as "white." In reality the racial divide operated by slavery cast its shadow across the whole of society and established a mode of dominance and domination that continued to have an impact long after abolition.

The pre-Columbian world was entirely transformed by the new mode of production introduced by the Conquest that completely remade older patterns of labor use and production relations. As Nathan Wachtel puts it, "The most important elements of this process of destructurement seem to have been the new forms of tribute, the introduction of money and the market economy" (Wachtel 1984, p. 219). These last elements—money and market—led to the gradual commodification of society as goods were exchanged according to exchange value rather than use value. Competition replaced reciprocity as the foundational logic of society. Marketization was obviously going to corrode the pre-Colombian pattern of labor allocation and exchange of goods. The logic of the market became dominant, even if a subordinate or hidden logic of reciprocity remained on the fringes. In the post-neoliberal era this hidden logic is once again making its presence felt.

The socioeconomic system taken as a whole was rejuvenated by mercantilism, a seventeenth/eighteenth century economic doctrine based on economic unity and political control. There have been debates in the past around whether a colonial mode of production could be discerned (see Assadourian 1973), but there was never a persuasive or solid case made. As is perhaps better known, André Gunder Frank has argued that since the Conquest the capitalist mode of production has prevailed because production was geared toward a world market. That is, of course, to confuse participation in the market with capitalist production. Others have argued for a feudal mode of production as though the Conquistadores had brought it along in their ships. That would represent a fairly mechanical application of a European model to a quite different social reality. Having said all this, the mercantilist economic drive of this period led to the expansion of commercial capitalism through control of foreign markets and in particular colonies as a source of raw materials and market for manufactured goods. But, this occurred on the basis of very diverse relations of production including slavery, free wage labor, and range of coerced labor from a revival of traditional forms, through to the importing of "coolie" labor. The modes of production debate is thus replaced by a much more concrete analysis of different forms of labor/capital relations and their combination through uneven and combined development.

The violent conquest of the Amerindian peoples caused devastation and demoralization but also generated considerable resistance. In the 1770s, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru—a Spanish-educated descendant of the Inca royal family—began to seek reform to benefit the

subjugated peoples through the courts. When this move led to even greater repression he launched an armed revolt in 1780, which eventually engulfed the whole of Peru. He sought the abolition of forced labor (the *mita*) and promised to free the slaves. Túpac Amaru's revolutionary programme and the militancy of his followers led the *criollos* (whom he had tried to recruit to his cause) into Spanish hands and the revolt was drowned in blood by early 1783. Overall, the initial shock of conquest was followed by a process of social reintegration with a movement toward syncretism as well as Hispanicization. But, as Wachtel writes. "Between the dominant Spanish culture—which tried to impose its values and customs—and the dominated native culture—which insisted in preserving its own values and customs—the conflict goes on to this day" (Wachtel 1984, p. 247). As a footnote we can mention that the army of Túpac Amaru, the *Tupamaristas*, gave their name to one of the most famous guerilla groups of the 1970s namely the *Tupamaros* of Uruguay.

Independence

The Spanish invaders would eventually become Americans and the hybrid figure of the *criollo* (creole) was born. The traditional explanation for the independence movement that gathered steam toward the end of the eighteenth century centered around the antagonism between the American Spanish and the Peninsular Spanish who retained considerable privileges and a higher racial status. While the "whiteness" of the latter was a given, the American Spanish sometimes needed to justify their own, after a generation or two. While these two groups were united on political essentials and certainly found unity in regard to any Amerindian stirrings, there was nevertheless a very real conflict of interest. Essentially this was over the right to trade internationally and the monopoly the Spanish state had over commerce and over senior positions in the armed forces and the judiciary.

"Spain missed the opportunity of fundamental change in the eighteenth century and finally abandoned the path of modernization" (Lynch 1985, p. 4) is the blunt but realistic assessment of one historian of this period. Agrarian reform was off the agenda, investment in industry was rejected in favor of luxury imports, and business organization was extremely weak. It should be recalled that in good years, fully one-fifth of Spain's treasury income came via treasury income from the colonies. Added to this economic background there were a series of European wars (especially a long war with Britain from 1796

to 1805) that greatly weakened Spain's strategic position. The metropolitan crisis in Spain came to a head in 1808: there was no king, the economic monopoly with the colonies was lost through war, and its future as an imperial power was in serious doubt.

Spain's crisis was Spanish America's opportunity. A violent mass revolt in Mexico in 1810 showed the criollo elite that they would have to secure their own future. The economic contradictions and insecure social base of the colonial system were now coming to a fore. The criollos were caught between an ineffective and prejudicial colonial government and a seething rebellious population especially amongst the Amerindian communities. Increased tax burdens proved the final straw and gradually a movement was formed to secure independence from Spain. It was led in the first stage by the *Cabildo* (colonial government house) of Buenos Aires that issued a proclamation in 1810. Independence armies set out to Chile and Peru seeking to join up with Bolívar's armies descending from Venezuela. Peru remained a royalist bastion for a while (wary of Buenos Aires domination), but the die was cast and the independence process was completed within the decade. The 1810 revolutions were extremely significant from a historical long view. For a while a new horizon of possibilities opened up and the national development path that ensued was by no means inevitable or the only option open as the old colonial order crumbled and existing power relations were shattered.

The unraveling of colonialism took a quite different course in Brazil. Portugal never colonized Brazil the way Spain did for the rest of Latin America, and its political institutions were patchy at best. With Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, the Portuguese royal family decamped to Brazil where a monarchy was set up lasting until 1889. This meant amongst other things that slavery lasted a lot longer and had a more enduring impact. The republic, when it was declared, was not based on a long struggle and the 1891 constitution effectively just transferred power to the regional oligarchies. The agro-industrial complex forged during the colonial era proved very enduring and persisted with minor adjustments at least until 1930. Control over the labor force was crucial to maintaining the profitability of this model of conservative modernization. Politics were, more or less, subordinated to this overall goal.

Brazil's development path was quite distinctive due to Portuguese colonization, its sheer size and diversity, and its particular route to decolonization. A huge, drawn out decolonization process was in marked contrast to the rest of Latin America. In 1822 it achieved

only partial decolonization, then went through various phases of Empire as Portugal lost out in the Peninsular wars. A republic was only declared in 1889 and, significantly in terms of the development of capitalist relations of production, slavery had only been abolished in 1888. While coffee was the lynchpin of the postcolonial economy, Brazil was also a major producer of rubber (the Amazon), sugar (the Northeast), cacao, and cattle. This very same economic order geared toward production for the world economy also worked toward the unification of the state from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Coming from a region where national identity was really quite weak—and where Balkanization on the Spanish American pattern was quite likely at one point—Brazil was quite fortunate to become a coherent nation-state led by a coherent agro-export oligarchy.

Following independence in 1823, Brazil entered the Atlantic economy under British hegemony in the same way as Spanish America had earlier. Still dependent on slave labor, Brazil became a major exporter of tropical goods such as coffee, sugar, and rubber for the European market. According to Paulo Singer “Brazil’s dependent position in the global economy as a producer of primary products and a consumer of manufactured goods delayed the development of its economy for at least eighty years” (Singer 2009a, p. 56). We might add to this exogenous perspective an endogenous explanation in terms of the pattern of capital accumulation that emerged centered around the plantation with its semi-servile social relations of production. There was no particular reason for the extremely cohesive and self-assured dominant class to diversify the economy until much later when the fortunes of the coffee economy became more uncertain. Certainly the abolition of slavery in 1888 was a precondition for the emergence of wage labor and thus the development of capitalism.

Declaration of a republic in Brazil came through a military coup against Pedro II in 1889. From the start, political participation under the old Republic was extremely limited. While formally a constitutional democracy this regime prevented both women and the majority illiterate population from voting. This was a period of considerable political instability, with little agreement amongst the dominant classes and the military on the best form of governance. The overwhelming political factor was the highly concentrated form of landownership where the top five hundred landowners owned twice as much land as the five hundred thousand small to medium-sized landowners. There was no national economy as such (much the same

as in pre-Risorgimento Italy) with regional economies having little interaction with each other. With the exhaustion of the slave labor system, the early twentieth century saw the rise of overseas migration that brought with it the new ideologies of socialism and anarchism. Inscriptions of the world economy due to the First World War led to an incipient industrialization as well. The old Republic was no longer a viable political vehicle for development and it was ended by another military coup in 1930.

Throughout this period a constant complaint from the propertied classes concerned the *falta de braços* (shortage of labor). The basic economic unit of the Brazilian economy—and of society—continued to be the large coffee, sugarcane, and cotton plantations alongside the very extensive cattle plantations. The most common labor pattern was work on the plantation combined with a smallholding producing corn, beans, and small livestock. The landowner's extended family lived in the big house while the workers' families subsisted in dwellings of wattle and daub. One account of this period tells of how "the hierarchy was evident even in posture and voice. The erect bodies of owners contrasted with the appearance of workers bowed when standing or walking crouched on their heels when resting" (García and Palmeira 2009, p. 25). This pattern of practically servile labor continued right up into the 1920s. It took the revolution of 1930 to decisively supersede archaic labor forms as dominant mode during the drive towards industrialization.

Brazil probably best epitomizes the passive revolution in Latin America in both its progressive and reactionary sides. By all development indicators it underwent a massive social transformation during the period after independence. But, as García and Palmeira point out, "Change has not been simply linear or mechanical" (García and Palmeira 2009, p. 20). Rather, it has shown all the characteristics of uneven but combined development. Slavery was extremely late to fade away but it was deployed in the lead export economy, namely coffee. The social hierarchy of the plantation was in fact reproduced in the postcolonial period. In short the archaic was always a part of the modern and, vice versa the old world was not really traditional if by that we mean backward-looking and closed to the outside world. Right up to 1940, three quarters of Brazil's population was rural that makes even more exceptional the "great leap forward" that was to occur in terms of industrialization and urbanization in the decades that followed. The point for now is that the legacy of a delayed decolonization was considerable.

The struggle for independence in Latin America took place, to be clear, in a changing world order. We have seen how Spanish power faded and how Britain became the hegemonic global power. Britain began its own commercial engagement with Latin America after 1808 through the port of Rio de Janeiro and thus did not require Spanish consent. British merchant adventurers descended on the continent and began to weave the British informal empire. This was particularly successful in Argentina following a failed invasion in 1806, which led to a more intelligent partnership with the criollo elite and landowners. The driving force was mutual self-interest; Britain was the world's greatest source of capital, built the railways necessary for an export economy and provided a market for Argentina's beef, cereals, and leather.

The postcolonial states of Latin America were anything but stable and cohesive entities. They inherited economies that were often devastated—for example, the mining sector—and the social costs were considerable in terms of death and dislocation. Thus Mexican silver output fell to half of what it had been in the colonial period. On top of that from 1836 to 1848, Mexico suffered a serious aggressive war by the United States, which led to the loss of Texas, California, and New Mexico, the impact of which is felt to this day. In political terms there were huge tensions between the more centralist and the more federalist forces in each country and between countries. It was not until 1850–1870 that there was some degree of political cohesion established and an economic recovery based on an agro-export role in the new British dominated world system.

In terms of global development theories, there is an expectation that nation building takes place through the construction of a solid state structure and a confident bourgeois class. That simply was not the case in Latin America. The European model of nation-state formation simply did not fit the circumstances of Latin America. States were not forged through wars. Nations did not exist before the nation-state was created. In short, the formation of the nation-states in Latin America including the whole notion of nationality took a different form. What is also in question, quite clearly, is the modernization theory and classic Marxist notion of a *bourgeoisie conquérante* as a thrusting new industrializing elite pushing aside the old landowning hierarchy to create a proper capitalist economy with no unfortunate “feudal” throwbacks standing in the way.

The basic difference in terms of the formation of the Latin America state, as Centeno shows in a wide-ranging study was that “as in much

of the postcolonial world, states preceded nations in Latin America" (Centeno 2002, p. 24). A vague sense that Spanish Americans were different from Peninsular Spanish did not create a sense of nationhood. The Amerindian population were definitely "separate but equal" or not according to the period and place. The subaltern classes had very rapidly become disabused of the notion that independence would lead to political transformation. There was no ruling class "hegemony" or anything approaching it even in the more cohesive parts of the Southern Cone, for example. Nor did independence create nationalism in the commonly accepted understanding of it as Centeno explains, "Bolivarian nationalism completely lacked references to ethnic or cultural dimensions; the ultimate criterion for nationality was political in nature" (Centeno 2002, p. 132). This was the democratic spirit of the Bolivarian revolution that was not simply a type of Napoleonic chauvinism, as Marx seemed to believe.

The social impact of this very particular route out of colonialism was felt most clearly in the labor domain where traditional patterns more or less continued to operate as the norm. The Amerindian population, for their part, probably found their situation worsened after political independence. Almost everywhere debt peonage not only continued but was often extended into new sectors, such as the rubber gathering regions of Amazonia. Parts of Latin America, like Eastern Europe, as one historian put it, "experienced a second enfeudation with the spread of a capitalistic market for rural products" (Glade 1986, p. 38). While capitalism can, and did in this case, lead to a recrudescence of extra-economic measures to control labor, the overall tendency since at least 1850–1870 was a steady proletarianization of labor with workers becoming free to take up employment without coercive measures.

So, finally, did political independence mean that Latin America also achieved economic independence? In some countries national social groups retained or gained control over the main sources of wealth. In others, foreign interests retained or gained control over economic "enclaves" such as mining. Either way, the colonial economy was not really diversified and thus new opportunities were not created. Stein and Stein also refer to "the colonial legacy of social degradation and racial prejudice" (Stein and Stein 1970, p. 119), which had an adverse effect on social integration to say the least. Above all the colonial patterns of land ownership, capital accumulation, income distribution, and social expenditure persisted in a way that was almost guaranteed to increase class conflict. Modernization, as we shall see below, could

only exacerbate the situation as new social layers entered the economic and political equation.

Modernity

In Latin America, as Renato Ortiz puts it, “modernity, modernism, modernization are terms which are associated with the national question” (Ortiz 2009, p. 142). We must now examine whether and, if so, how independence led to modernity in Latin America and, if so, what type of modernity. The construction of the nation and the construction of modernity can be seen as inseparable in that process. We can say, generally, that by the mid-nineteenth century, a degree of economic stability and political consolidation had been achieved across most of the continent. As Cardoso and Faletto put it, “In the years after 1850, almost all the Latin American countries entered a period of great prosperity” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, p. 54). The international economic order under British hegemony was a stable one and Latin American trade expanded greatly during this period through outward oriented expansion under imperialist domination.

This was an expansive phase for capitalism both globally and in Latin America. It was the first wave of globalization—1870 to 1914—with new means of transport leading to greater integration of the world economy. Financial intermediation—provided by a thriving City of London—oiled the wheels of trade and investment. Export openings for traditional and new products provided opportunities to the ruling elite. Even so, in some countries they lost control of the export sector to foreign interests, as was the case with the nitrate industry in Chile. It was also clear, as Glade notes, that new opportunities for the agro-export model led to “dwindling artisan production and the virtual extinction of manufacturing workshops...economic decline in some areas [and] a decay of inter-regional transport systems” (Glade 1986, p. 2). This pattern of uneven development would continue until the present day albeit with regional variations of course and with varying degrees of success.

In political terms this period also saw a degree of stability being achieved after the disruptions caused by the struggle for independence, which dislocated many of the basic social and political relations. The period of fluid ideological conflict and intense debates over the basic project of nation-building—for example, between centralists and federalists—seemed over and a reasonably stable political consensus emerged. Political stability was of course good for business.

The landowning oligarchy was aware of social tensions and sought to co-opt the emerging elites and, already in the early 1900s, the emerging middle class. Certainly the Southern Cone countries as well as Brazil and Mexico were more successful in terms of the degree of domestic political stabilization they achieved. The machinery of the state was developed to provide the infrastructure to deliver on economic policies. Brazil is perhaps emblematic of this optimistic scenario with a seamless transition to a republic in 1889 (and the abolition of slavery in 1888) under an absolutist monarch. Interestingly the Brazilian communist party was the first national level party to be formed in 1922, the rest being regional political formations.

One pivotal symbolic element in the construction of modernity/nation would be the port city of Buenos Aires. Reviewing the changes of the 1870–1914 period and a favorable insertion into the international division of labor, Glade concludes that “the Buenos Aires of 1914 symbolized the changes; in place of the primitive out-post of empire that stood beside the Río de la Plata as the nineteenth century began, there had grown up a burgeoning, cosmopolitan metropolis managing a hugely increased flow of goods in and out of the country” (Glade 1986, p. 14). The dull and poor criollo city of the Spanish *Virreinato* (Viceroyalty) was transformed at the turn of the nineteenth century into something resembling Paris, from the architectural style down to the sewage model. Its rapid and dramatic change signaled both the emergence of a new criollo elite and a new international workforce.

As the new Buenos Aires emerged in the 1900s, it symbolized the arrival of modernity. Its proximity to the pampas, its *patios*, and its dusty streets with horse-drawn carts would disappear. The tall buildings, schools and hospitals, billboards, and modern transport replaced the old. As Beatriz Sarlo notes, these rapid and dramatic changes created “new perceptions of time and space” and also “generated new forms of subjectivity” (Sarlo 2000, p. 110). The earlier inhabitants of the city were also replaced by a massive wave of labor migration from Europe attracted by the high wages. Between 1820 and 1930, 6.4 million migrants entered Argentina, which was the second most important receiving country after the United States. For the elite these were maybe not the immigrants they had hoped for; instead of skilled German artisans they got unskilled peasants from southern Italy, or those escaping political or religious persecution. Nevertheless the world of labor and of politics were utterly transformed by these migration processes.

In Brazil there was also a strong movement for modernity in the shape of positivism. The Brazilian flag has the emblem *Ordem e Progresso* (Order and Progress) on it, declaring the centrality of Auguste Comte's ideology of positivism, "*l'ordre pour base; le progress pour but*" (order as the basis, progress as the goal). Positivism provided the philosophical foundations for Brazil not only to modernize itself in relation to Europe but also to "civilize" its own interior and in particular the Amerindian peoples. Progress would happen, if necessary looking down the barrel of a gun. The modernist cultural movement of the 1920s, on the other hand, was less confident about this evolutionist perspective. Rather than regret the past, Brazilians needed to rediscover Brazil, the universal gods of modernism could only be achieved through the elaboration of a national culture and a sense of "Brazilianness."

The dramatic Canudos revolt of 1893–1897 can be taken as a symbol of not only modernity's destructiveness in Brazil and Latin America more generally but also of its vulnerability. Canudos was a commune in the Northeast of Brazil drawing in rural migrant populations displaced by commercial farmers and led by the charismatic Antônio Conselheiro. Eventually it became the second largest city in Bahia and "stood out as a model of social organization, hard work, community collaboration and prosperity" (Sevcenko 2000, p. 83). The story of its destruction by waves of military repression is told by Euclides da Cunha in his 1902 classic *Os Sertões* (Rebellion in the Backlands). Imbued by positivism himself and quite unable to understand the revelations and mysticism of Counselor, da Cunha nevertheless saw it as a crime against the Brazilian people and started a move against overidentification with European culture and the discovery of Brazilian culture.

Modernity in Latin America (as elsewhere) was thoroughly imbued with racist and gendered views of the world. As Vivian Schelling says, "Latin American political and intellectual elites at the turn of the nineteenth century conceived of progress and civilization as inextricably linked with the whitening—the cultural and biological de-indigenization and de-Africanization—of their societies" (Schelling 2000, p. 111). And given the long-standing association of the indigenous people as "less than" men, at best akin to women and children, the project of modernity was also thoroughly masculinist in its ideology and intent. The spirit of the *Conquistador* lived on in the postcolonial era—he had now become a large landowner or a merchant. The new Latin America would be based on the values of the "white man," the only bastion standing in the way of nature and irrationality.

It is well known that Gramsci placed considerable emphasis on the role of the intellectual in the making of the nation and in the construction of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Gramsci resisted economic or reductionist readings of the intellectual and, rather, placed them according to their organizing function in the division of labor and the totality of social relations. Their social function is only realized when they are “organically” fused with the political aspirations of a particular social class. Gramsci distinguishes between “the traditional type of intellectual: the literary man, the philosopher, the poet” (Gramsci 1971, p. 14) from the “new intellectual” who disrupted pure-existing social categories and responded to “complicated and radical transformations of social and political forms” (Gramsci 1971, p. 7). In this sense, all the early social and political thinkers of Latin America could be seen as organic intellectuals.

In terms of key intellectual figures in Latin America’s first century after the independence movements, we have already mentioned Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1811–1888). While he understood that Latin America emerged from a mixture of indigenous, African, and European peoples, he did not rate the progeny positively. It seemed that for the American races “continuous and hard work” was not on the agenda. He was not, of course, unique in this view, and none other than Friedrich Engels was writing about the same time about the “hardworking and industrious workers” of the United States in contrast to the lazy Mexicans. Sarmiento also needs to be understood in the context of the contemporaneous authoritarian *caudillo* (Juan Manuel de Rosas in his case) and his championing education for young people and women along with his promotion of the railway and postal systems of Argentina.

We have also mentioned *Os Sertões* landmark piece by Euclides da Cunha (1866–1909). As with many intellectuals of this era he was still imprisoned in racist categories and the notion of white superiority characteristic of positivism at the time. However his sympathetic portrayal of the Canudos revolt created a wave of interest in Brazilian identity and the need to focus on Brazil’s way of being which could not be a copy of North America or Europe. The revolt of the rural migrants with its strong spiritual component and capacity for collective solidarity was contrasted with the French trained army sent to quell them that had no knowledge whatsoever of the Brazilian backlands. The hidden Brazil had shown its capacity to disrupt the “order and progress” deemed necessary by the dominant positivist intellectual order.

In terms of construction of a Latin American identity an absolutely central figure is Enrique Rodó (1871–1917) and his work *Ariel* (1900), which has had considerable impact in postcolonial literary studies. Rodó decries the notion that Latin America must copy the North American model if it is to succeed. He deploys Shakespeare's counter position of Ariel and Caliban in *The Tempest*. Whereas Ariel (Latin America) is characterized by idealism, heroism, and good artistic taste, Caliban (North America) is quite the opposite: shallow, pragmatic, and lacking in spiritual refinement. Rodó was not, however, simplistic and simply argued that Latin American identity should not be forsaken to follow the US model and that the leading US role in terms of industrialization did not automatically make it a model of civilization. Rodó's vision of the one great Latin American *patria* was mainly cultural, but none the less powerful because of that.

In terms of this book's theme of hybridity perhaps the most relevant figure is José Vasconcelos (1882–1959), who developed the figure of *La Raza Cósmica* (1925). This posited a unique role for Latin America in creating a mixture of races that would produce a superior (cosmic) human being. According to Vasconcelos, whereas the Anglo-Saxon destroyed the indigenous "races," "we assimilated them, and this gives us new rights and hope of a mission without precedent in history" (Vasconcelos 1997, p. 17). That integrating mission would lead to a new "synthesis race," a universal spirit that would surpass all the predecessors. While submerged in racist categories and wishful thinking, this discourse did bring to the fore the issue of *mestizaje* or hybridity, deemed a weakness by many but now promoted as a strength, something that would be taken up in the postcolonial literature.

In the decades following the Spanish-American war of 1898, the theme of anti-imperialism came to the fore in a wide range of Latin American intellectuals whereas the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had already signalled US imperialist ambitions in regard to the southern neighbors. The notion of Latin American union, trading its pedigree back to Bolívar, began to gain traction. The project for Latin American cultural autonomy traced back to Sarmiento (despite his racist categories) became part of the new common sense in the twentieth century. Earlier notions of cosmopolitanism, prevalent in the immediate postindependence period, began to fade as an all-embracing nationalism began to color much intellectual output. Identity formation in Latin America inevitably developed within an anti-imperialist frame that had progressive and reactionary facets.

Modernity required a modern labor force at least in theory. In practice, landowners in particular would complain that “free labor” was both too expensive and not docile enough. Thus while labor laws would have begun to operate in the cities in the early twentieth century, in the countryside “custom and practice” still prevailed. Thus in Brazil the abolition of slavery meant the loss of planter’s capital tied up in slaves but “relationships of personal dependency and subordination were recreated, allowing the perpetration of earlier practices in the exercise of power on the large estates, including the power to inflict corporal punishment on subordinates” (García and Palmeira 2009, pp. 33–34). This mixed-mode modernization process, based on traditional patterns of labor control including extra-economic forms of coercion, was also prevalent in Mexico and the Andean countries.

Argentina, and the Southern Cone generally, stood out due to an early introduction of free wage labor. Whereas the successful coffee export sector in Brazil was based on slavery, by contrast in Argentina the laborers in the beef-salting plants were wage-earners “who benefited from the high level of remuneration enjoyed by specialized workers in Latin American cities at this time” (Donghi 1985, p. 315). There were draconian labor laws to prevent “vagrancy,” that is to say people were obliged or forced to work. But in the cattle industry and later in agriculture, workers received wages and were not subject to non-economic coercion to spend it on the *estancia* (estate). Scarcity of labor in the expanding agro-export economy after 1870 to a large extent explains the early dominance of wage labor in the Southern Cone.

Modernity did not emerge in Latin America in 1900 or 1910 fully clad in European garb ready to transform the recalcitrant reality of Latin America. As with Italy we can see the pivotal role of what we might call a passive revolution in explaining Latin America’s faltering and incomplete entrance into modernity. The legacy of absolutism was similar to that prevailing in Gramsci’s Italy, as was the resultant dialectic between the progressive and the reactionary movements of the passive revolution. Italy’s North-South uneven development was mirrored in most countries of Latin America in situations that some analysts have referred to a process of “internal colonialism.” This was a specifically peripheral path to modernity, a late modernity, an uneven modernity. The legacy of absolutism and the consequences of uneven development meant that any political schema based on a mythical bourgeois revolution was not going to be able to capture this elusive reality. The continuing importance of agriculture and the

dominant role of the agrarian oligarchy played a role similar to Italy's Southern Question in explaining Latin America's particular path to modernity. While passive revolution was, no doubt, a genuine revolution it was carried out in the context of strong reactionary elements, characteristic of absolutism.

Another optic to approach Latin America's particular path to modernity through would be in terms of differential temporalities. Thus Fernando Calderón and colleagues refers to how "modernity in our countries is precisely, a new time, containing many times" (Calderón, Hopenhayn, and Ottone 1996, p. 91). This late peripheral dependent modernity was not governed by historical linear time based on the orderly succession of civilizations and modes of production. In Latin America an acceleration process of modernization during the period we are dealing with (1810–1910) led to certain elements of modernity being implanted in a context that remained dominated by more traditional patterns of power and capital accumulation. The mixed temporalities that ensued meant that different parts of society were moving at a differential pace, or to put it another way, led to a hybrid social formation. This created different economic, political, social, and cultural forms of development that were quite distinct from conservative and traditional Marxist models.

In terms of the broad story of modernization in Latin America, Jorge Larraín has characterized the period of 1810–1900 as one of "oligarchic modernity" (Larraín 2000). The legacy of the wars of independence was a heavy one in terms of social dislocation, economic blockages, and the militarization of political life. The new modern democratic ideals had also to confront the stasis created by three centuries of Iberian absolutist rule. The process of modernization and social transformation was thus inevitably slow. What made it an oligarchic form of modernity was that this was an era in which "liberal ideas were adapted, lay education was expanded a free press was established, a republican state was built and democratic forms of government were introduced" (Larraín 2000, p. 73). This process was set in the context of political rule by a small oligarchy where participation by the people was severely restricted. This uneven modernization and embrace of liberalism was perhaps in keeping with the nature of the social formation and typical of the process Gramsci described as a passive revolution.

Writing in the 1920s, José Carlos Mariátegui reflected on this particular Latin American path to modernity. He was, on the one hand, driven to recover the communist heritage of the Incas as he saw it,

but he also celebrated modernity, engaging with the Italian futurists, for example, in the same way as Gramsci did. Mariátegui's engagement with Inca communism never took him into a backward-looking folkloric *incapolitics* (like *gauchopolitics*) direction as was common in the contemporary indigenous movement, especially in the cultural domain. In other words Mariátegui's version of *indigenismo* was not an antimodern outlook; there was no nostalgia or romanticizing of the past in his outlook. On the contrary, according to Miguel Mazzeo, Mariátegui "showed his support and was even dazzled by futurist themes when faced with the manifestations of modernity of his time: the automobile, airplane, the cinema, the city" (Mazzeo 2009, p. 73). Mariátegui, not least during his time in Europe, showed great confidence in the future, was seduced by machinery and efficiency, and (along with Lenin and Gramsci let it be recalled) was a great admirer of Fordism, then emerging as a new modality of capitalist development.

Mariátegui was not, however, an uncritical supporter of modernism and modernity. He explicitly rejected the equation between Western civilization and capitalism that would reduce the Russian Revolution to an expression of Eastern barbarism. Mariátegui was a fierce critic of the tendency for modernity to atrophy and its lust for profit as well as the way it atomized society and dissolved preexisting forms of sociability. More controversially, Mariátegui criticized modernity for its irreligiosity and there is a lifelong commitment in his thought to spirituality. In a Latin America where religion continues to play a hugely important role this engagement with religion does not, of course, put him at odds with popular common sense. Mariátegui provides us with a nuanced approach to modernity, far from uncritical but basically, welcoming the role it could play in terms of social transformation and in advancing the life prospects of the people.

Nation-Making (1910–1964)

In 1910 much of Latin America was celebrating one hundred years of independence in a mood of great optimism with economic development delivering and political unification largely completed. This is the period that includes that of the “National-Popular” development and hegemony construction in Latin America as we shall explore below. It is a time of nation-building and of construction of a historic bloc, which incorporates popular aspirations. There is a convergence around a new development matrix that began to construct new forms of hegemony based on the so-called populist state. It is also the period in which the “Subalterns” come onto the political scene. The process of proletarianization under the previous oligarchic regime had created new social classes not bound by traditional identities. Instead anarchism, syndicalism, and socialism were now becoming considerable contestatory force. These subaltern classes and groups were to become part of the populist order that emerged during this period that provided encouragement to and set limits on their activation at the same time. The collapse of the old liberal economic model after the 1929 crash led to the emergence of a new *National Development* model through import substitution industrialization. This model was statist in orientation, protectionist, and strongly developmentalist, creating new social layers and new consumption needs. Unlike the previous model it required an internal market and thus, popular consumption could be profitable as well as desirable in terms of securing consent. The final section on the “Compromise State” examines critically the decline of the oligarchic state without seeing the emergence of a fully democratic state. This state form deployed populist methods and was based on a balance of power between the old order and the emerging social forces promoted by industrialization and urbanization. This

is a period marked by what Gramsci called Caesarism that emerges when no one class has the power to decisively impose its mark on the social order.

National-Popular

To be clear, Gramsci was neither a nationalist nor a populist and thus the term “national-popular” might seem a counterintuitive one to deploy, at least at first glance. The political history of Latin America, however, allows us to develop his interpretation in a manner that both aids our comprehension and grounds the concept as well. The extension of the political community in the postcolonial period had undoubtedly a strong class element but absolutely central was the construction of a national-popular political will. The situation of structural dependence vis-a-vis the global system and as a postcolonial region could be said to overdetermine the manner in which this national-popular will was constructed. Both the development of the dominant hegemonic bloc and that of the popular classes were set in a context where organic social development did not predate politics. Their construction as a social subject was molded from the start by the political and ideological context set by dependency and the profound disequilibrium it created as well as recurring crises of the state.

In Gramscian terms what occurred in Latin America after the crisis of 1930 was the construction of a national-popular collective will based on a great “intellectual and moral reform” (Gramsci 1971, p. 133). It is this national-popular formation that overcame and surpassed the oligarchic system of hegemony or oligarchic modernity as we called it above. The work by Portantiero and Ipola in the 1970s around the national-populisms in Latin America (Ipola and Portantiero 1989) renewed the classic debate between José Carlos Mariátegui and Raúl Haya de la Torre in the 1920s around the significance of the national question from a socialist perspective, and posed anew the relation between the national and social questions to use the traditional Marxist terms.

Central to the development of a national-popular will was the concept of the people (*pueblo*). For Ernesto Laclau it is only by developing and extending Gramsci’s work in this area that we can overcome the exclusion/opposition between particularity and universality in the construction of the people. “For him there is a particularity—a *plebs*—which claims hegemonically to constitute a *populus* while

the *populus* (the abstract universality) can exist only as embodied in a *plebs*. When we reach that point, we are close to the ‘people’ of populism” (Laclau 2005, p. 107). The development of populism is probably the main difference between Latin American political development and that of other regions. To this day, in international commentary on the “left populism” of Chávez et al. we find quite an ethnocentric emphasis on the irrationality of populism and a constant tendency to see it as the enemy of “normal” political development toward class patterns and progressive social transformation. It is also deemed of course, the enemy of development that can only come about through the unrestricted operation of the market without political interference.

Gramsci’s emphasis on hegemony as anything but a systemically closed totality allows us (following Ernesto Laclau) to understand populism as the Latin American manifestation and development of the national-popular. It is a political logic that explains the deep divide between liberalism and democracy during the post-1930 period we are dealing with here. For Laclau “populism presents itself both as *subversive* of the existing state of things and as the starting point for a more or less radical reconstruction of a new world order wherever the previous one has been shaken” (Laclau 2005, p. 177). The old order was changed utterly by the emergence this nation-popular ideology and worldview. It could also become radicalized at key conjunctures when the “people-oligarchy” opposition became the dominant divide in society. Emerging in the historical period of the 1930s, with the failure of global market mechanisms and the limits of local laissez-faire industrialization it was inevitable that this populist mobilization would express a strong commitment to the development of a robust national state.

Gramsci’s concept of the national-popular entered Latin America’s political discourse in the 1950s as theoretical backing for the then emerging populist political movements. But in reality Gramsci’s thinking was never even remotely populist in intention and nor was his practice. It is indicative though that Mariátegui’s orthodox Comintern critics dubbed his thinking “populist” after his death, at least in part because he had advocated a flexible attitude toward American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), the national-democratic party led by Raúl Haya de la Torre. If the national-popular should not be conflated with populism what then was it signifying. The editors of Gramsci’s *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* put it that “it is perhaps best described as a sort of ‘historic bloc’ between national

and popular aspirations in the formation of which the intellectuals, in the wide Gramscian sense of the term play an essential mediating role" (Gramsci 1971, p. 421). It is part of a nation-building process but it is not in Gramsci, related to the so-called National Socialism of the European Right. Rather, it is about generating a new common sense, or alternative conceptions of the world, through the development of existing currents within the culture of the popular classes, even if these are deemed primitive by "high culture." Mariátegui's relationship with the Amerindian peoples and their mobilization had a similar intent: Peruvian socialism could never be built without them and thus the worker's movement needed to engage with their history, needs, and aspirations.

It is a commonplace to assert that Gramsci was profoundly "national" in his way of thinking but in relation to the cultural domain this is undoubtedly the case. Given the Mezzogiorno's systematic exploitation by the industrialized north of Italy, the Southern Question was a key element in his political strategy. His strong interest in linguistics led him to focus in particular on the social exclusion, which could be caused by standard "Italian" grammar. Thus, for Gramsci, the person "who only speaks dialect, or understands the standard language incompletely, necessarily has a conception of the world which is more or less limited and provincial" (Gramsci 1971, p. 325). The creation of hegemony entails bridging that gap and the creation of a truly national culture. While not partial to Italian opera himself, he recognized it as a popular nonliterary cultural form resembling folklore that could construct a national structure of feeling. Mariátegui was even more directly engaged in cultural politics and the artistic avant-garde, particularly before his turn to become a labor movement journalist and then organizer.

Gramsci, it must not be forgotten, lived in a historical period when *Italia fatta, bisogna fare gli Italiani*: Italy made, we must make the Italians (Jessop 2006, p. 32). This was a cultural task and one in which the forging of a national-popular consciousness was central given that Italy was so poorly integrated. Gramsci called the south "a great social disintegration" (Gramsci 1978, p. 454) in the sense that the national scale was not hegemonic in terms of organizing the social formation. So much so, that the Catholic Church could, in Gramsci's words, appear like "a surrogate for the spirit of the nation" (Gramsci 1995, p. 221). The making of the people—and here Gramsci stressed education and the ethical dimension—was crucial to the making of an Italy ripe for socialist transformation. This type of theoretical-strategic

cultural politics has profound resonance in Latin America. We need to only think of an Argentina where the construction of the nation-state was synonymous with forging a nationality: *fare l'Italiano*. Except here it was the forging of the *Argentino* from the migrant masses coming from Italy, Spain, and the rest of Europe.

Gramsci's own engagement with Latin America was not sustained but what he did have to say is possibly interesting. The identity of South and Central America was not concentrated around "Latinity" for Gramsci. Rather it was characterized, like the Mezzogiorno, by a "great fragmentation, which is not accidental" (Gramsci 2011, p. 11). Referring back to Bismarck's struggle against the Catholic Church in Germany in 1871–1887, Gramsci proclaimed that "all countries of Central and South America (with the possible exception of Argentina) must go through the *Kulturkampf* (culture struggle) and experience the advent of the modern secular state" (Gramsci 2011, p. 12). Mexico, particularly in the 1910–1920 revolutionary period that saw the construction of a national-popular historical bloc, was very much on Gramsci's mind. Latin America needed a cultural revolution; it needed to confront its clerical and feudal past; and it needed to carry out a far-reaching agrarian, social, and political reform process. Gramsci did not however endorse mechanical schemas that first feudalism would need to be confronted, led by a national bourgeoisie, and only then could socialism be placed on the agenda. Rather the process of nation construction and the struggle for socialism were inseparable as they were for Mariátegui.

In another fragmentary note Gramsci also writes (in the context of a book review it should be added) that "it is interesting to observe this contradiction that exists in South America between the modern world of the great commercial coastal cities and the primitivism of the interior" (Gramsci 2011, p. 195). In terms of contesting "the ruling power of small traditional oligarchies," he refers to the role of Freemasonry and "the so-called anarchic syndicalists who get their intellectual nourishment from anti-clerical scientism" (Gramsci 2011, p. 195). Somewhat cryptically he refers finally to "the problem of the resurgence of the native masses in political and national life; did something similar take place in Mexico, under the impulse of Obregón and Calles" (Gramsci 2011, p. 196). Overall, bearing in mind the very peripheral engagement of Gramsci with Latin America, we can take the notion of *Kulturkampf* to be a metaphor for cultural transformation, and Latin America as "a great social disintegration" akin to the Mezzogiorno.

In its links with contemporary notions of popular culture, Gramsci's national-popular frame is perhaps most timely. In the peripheral or dependent societies the subaltern classes must often achieve awareness through a national-popular lens. Populism is thus not simply a form of manipulation but an integral element in the political constitution of the subaltern classes as political actors. Certainly the national-popular political form can create or deepen political division based on ethnicity or region. From a Northern perspective it is very easy to see national-socialism and racism as the articulator of national identity. From a Southern perspective the ever-present struggle for national unification and against the disarticulation generated by colonialism and imperialism puts a very different complexion on the issue.

In Latin American studies there has recently been a renewal of interest in the Gramscian approach toward the subaltern through the formation of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group. It seeks to question elite historiography and focus on the subaltern as the subject of history. It is more post-Gramscian though in its rejection of "the ideology and reality of nationalism" seen as an invention of the national bourgeoisie (Latin American Subaltern Studies 1993, p. 117). It seeks, rather, to "represent subalternity in whatever form it takes wherever it appears—nation, hacienda, workplace, home, informal sector, black market..." (Latin American Subaltern Studies 1993, p. 119). While this approach might remind us of how contemporary and relevant Gramsci can be in Latin America, we should bear in mind that Gramsci never sought to glorify subalternity as such. He was also aware, as a critic of the postmodern subaltern approach puts it, of how the native intelligentsia "strategically enlists backwardness as a new epistemology of otherness" (Brennan 2001, p. 168).

Returning now to the themes of the state and hegemony as articulated in the previous chapter we can continue building the Gramscian political framework. In relation to the national-popular, two further interrelated themes need to be explored: the notion of the "compromise state" and the politics of what Gramsci calls *transformismo*. In a similar way to the manner in which passive revolution could stress the reactionary or revolutionary element, Gramsci saw what he calls Caesarism as "a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each other in a catastrophic manner" (Gramsci 1971, p. 219); taking either progressive or reactionary forms. Gramsci writes that "Caesarism is progressive when its intervention helps the progressive force to triumph, albeit with the victory tempered by certain compromises and

limitations" (Gramsci 1971, p. 219). In Latin America we could argue that this process took the shape of a national-popular "compromise state" (see Portantiero 1983, p. 165). This populist phase (Perón, Cárdenas, and Vargas, for example) has often been read as a ruling class imposition on the subaltern. Read as a compromise state, rather, populism was the particular route that the politicization of the popular classes took in Latin America. Rather than see here as a deviation from the European pattern of social class formation followed by political activation, a Gramscian reading allows us to see Latin America as part of a peripheral pattern of social transformation.

Related to this process is that of *transformismo*, a term developed by Gramsci to characterize the Italian state from 1848 onward during which "the formation of an ever more extensive ruling class...involved the gradual but continuous absorption...of the active elements produced by allied groups—and even of those produced by antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile" (Gramsci 1971, pp. 58–59). In Italy, the historic Left and Right parties that emerged from the Risorgimento tended to converge in terms of their programmes. It was one of the historical forms that the passive revolution took. It was a strategy designed to achieve a disarticulation, or at least a co-option, through "transformism" of the subaltern classes and their representatives. In Italy, by the mid-1870s the Action Party of Mazzini and Garibaldi had been absorbed by the monarchy, Gramsci argued. This was not an isolated event: "It was an organic process which, in the formation of the ruling class, replaced what in France had happened in the Revolution under Napoleon, and in England under Cromwell" (Letters from Prison, cited in Gramsci 1971, p. 128).

If passive revolution can be posed as the matrix of the postcolonial period, it is the national-popular that frames the post-1930s period in Latin America. The passive revolution leads—through social and political struggles—to a situation where a balance of forces prevails that produces a progressive or reactionary Caesarism. In Latin America this takes the form of the national-popular compromise state. This is at once the product of activated subaltern classes but also demonstrates the ability of the ruling group to operate a process of *transformismo* to neutralize them. To come back on our placing debate, Latin America is neither the Orient where the state is everything nor simply the West where civil society creates a dense social and cultural network of consent. It is, rather, a peripheral, late developing and ultimately dependent part of Western capitalist expansion in the imperialist era.

We should not simply take an uncritical view of Gramsci's contribution to a new understanding of the national-popular and to cultural studies more broadly in Latin America. Canclini quite correctly warns us about the "churning" of Gramscian concepts that occurred in the 1980s and led, more or less, to a self-referential *cul de sac* (Canclini 1991) in Latin American critical cultural studies. Its positive impact overall was in terms of definitively overcoming the lingering economism in Latin American social analysis. The concept of hegemony opened up new avenues for research and original ways also to develop counter-hegemonic strategies. Gramsci was a precursor in terms of understanding that the popular was not a self-contained traditional domain but, rather, it was defined by the particular position of the subaltern classes in each historic bloc. At a certain stage though, economism was no longer a danger and the word superstructure was hardly novel, in fact it had long since been forgotten. It was time to move on.

Gramsci's questionable relevance today is not only because "surpassing Lenin" is hardly on top of our agenda at the present time. As we have seen, Gramsci brought a profoundly national approach to Latin American cultural studies around issues such as education, religion, and popular culture. However, Canclini, quite rightly, questions any simplistic opposition between the national and the foreign and the subsequent equation between the national and the popular: "This schematic model can no longer explain the functioning of a planetary model where centers of emission and power are not in one nation but in a vast delocalized network of economic and cultural structures" (Canclini 1991, pp. 98–103). The very concept of a national culture becomes problematic in this new globalized world. Whether a "globalized Gramsci" can be developed has yet to be seen. This cautionary note does not invalidate the Gramscian contribution but it does alert us to its historical limits.

Subalterns

Gramsci's writings on the subaltern in the *Prison Notebooks* are open to diverse interpretations. For many, including notably Gayatri Spivak, the term subaltern was just Gramsci's way of getting round the prison censor when in fact he was simply referring to the traditional Marxist concept of the working class. A closer reading of the *Prison Notebooks* shows that censorship was not really such an important issue, any more than it was when Gramsci refers to the "philosophy

of praxis” as something distinct from and not just a polite way to refer to Marxism. Marcus Green has carefully gone through the Gramscian notes on the subaltern and concludes that “in his early and late notes, he refers to slaves, peasants, religious groups, women, different races, the *popolani* (common people) and *popolo* (people) of the medieval communes, the proletariat, and the bourgeoisie prior to the Risorgimento as subaltern groups” (Green 2011, pp. 399–400). This is not the orthodox Marxist conception of the industrial working class and, in fact, it is closer to the conceptions of the laboring masses developed by the new international labor studies in the 1970s. It is perfectly attuned to recent stress on the spatial, gender, and ethnic divides within the working classes and it resonates, quite clearly, with Latin American notions of the popular classes. The subaltern classes or groups (Gramsci uses both terms) are subject to the power and will of the dominant classes, but they are also makers of their own history for Gramsci. Again following Green we can say that, for Gramsci, “subaltern groups do not necessarily lack political power by definition. Rather, in Gramsci’s conception, subalternity is constituted through exclusion, domination, and marginality in their various forms, and a subaltern group’s level of subordination is relative to its level of political organization, autonomy, and influence upon dominant groups and dominant institutions” (Green 2011, p. 400). The subaltern groups are thus an integral element in the forging of a national-popular will and a refusal of domination by the powerful propertied classes. They struggle alongside the organized proletariat to construct hegemony out of their subordinate position in society through empowerment, organization, and political will.

Subaltern studies as a more recent politico-intellectual movement was specifically grounded in the study of colonial-era peasant rebellions in India. As Partha Chatterjee recounts, “The argument of the subaltern studies group of historians has been...the study of the history of peasant rebellions from the point of view of the peasant as an active and conscious subject of history” (Chatterjee 2000, p. 17). Peasants are subordinated by established power relations, but they have an autonomous consciousness that can contest this domination. A top-down focus on legal relations between the state and the people obscures the other domains of struggle such as the community and more diffuse, perhaps less political, forms of resistance. There was an explicit influence from Gramsci’s analysis of the Southern Question and the peasants of the Mezzogiorno in particular. This subaltern class could break its condition of domination by overcoming its own

internal weaknesses and by forging an alliance with the industrial working class. In practice, much of the Subaltern Studies group turned away from this project to a focus on literature from a postcolonial perspective. That turn perhaps opened the way to a return to orthodoxy by some who were disenchanted by the cultural turn that lost much of the benefits this current had provided to a radical rethinking of critical analysis.

In Latin America there was an attempt to create a subaltern studies school or approach with mixed results. It renewed a tradition going back to Eric Hobsbawm's early work on the Latin American peasantry (Hobsbawm 1963, 1969) that brought an English social history focus on the everyday forms of peasant resistance to bear. It was also set in the context of debates around dependency, liberation theology, and the emerging *indigenismo* movement. An underlying very Gramscian assumption was that Latin America was more like Italy and India rather than France in terms of the how the bourgeois revolution might develop and the historic failure of the nation to come into its own. This opened up an emphasis on resistance studies and the various patterns of accommodation/struggles manifested by different subaltern groups on the margins of the nation. This is not the place to carry out a balance sheet of this approach, but I would signal my agreement with Florencia Mallon's verdict that its various theoretical positions have been contradictory and that, ultimately post-structuralism took many in this current through a linguistic turn and then "collapsing the linguistic and textual analysis methods of the school into their more general political goals and purposes, neatly covering over their Gramscian genealogy" (Mallon 1994, p. 1501). The loss of the original Gramscian problematic deprived the critical thinkers of a flexible and creative tool for analysis of subaltern politics. What we might now take from these debates to deploy in the current study are several methodological and conceptual commitments. They should open up previously unexplored convergences between the national and class struggles. The relationship between insurgency and nationality received new, more open-ended, and less-dogmatic treatment. The complex relationship between state power and popular unrest was now the subject of dialectical analysis. While it was only dominant at the start of the subaltern studies enterprise (before its post-structuralist turn) I would also wish to recover its commitment to a people's history, a history from below, which prioritized the imagination of the subaltern. This allowed for a reinvigoration of the study of nation formation "from below," which broke with the state

incantations of nationalist historiography. While in the Indian subaltern studies movement there was a split between the post-structuralist strain and those committed to a more politicized people's history, this need not be carried through to the present and we can value both strands positively.

The relationship between these Third World perspectives and Gramsci's original deployment of the term "subaltern" is by no means straightforward. In its postcolonial usage, the term began to merge with that of marginality to the extent that it was even celebrated as a condition. There was an emphasis on subjugated knowledge that would somehow erupt to shatter Western paradigms. Timothy Brennan has considered Gramsci's reception in the postcolonial milieu and "the licence it has given to an exaggerated focus on the struggle over hegemony's *moral* centre, whose corollary is autonomy of the subaltern realm" (Brennan 2001, p. 170). For Gramsci, the struggle for hegemony was primarily political and his understanding of subalternity was based on its subjection to the dominant worldview and not its autonomy. This is probably a case of a culturalist reading of Gramsci consistent with the early 1970s reading of him as theorist of the superstructure and corrective of Marxism's enduring focus on the economic base. Nevertheless these recent debates have at least renewed interest in the subaltern as a category of analysis.

Latin American subaltern studies—in a broad sense—have not, of course, been restricted to applying international theories (see Beverley 1999). There has been a rich seam of peasant and worker studies in Latin America going back to the nineteenth century. Rural revolt and popular protest in Latin America has generated scholarship that has had an international impact. It has long been recognized that no history of Latin America is complete if it does not include a "history from below." Daniel Nugent, in introducing an influential collection on rural revolt in Mexico, argues that a focus on the domain of subaltern politics or the politics of the people should not occlude an understanding of how "they are *connected* to global structures of power. At the same time, through the modalities of their own structure they *give expression to* global structures of power" (Nugent 1998, p. 14). It is in this dialectical understanding of the relationship between the local and global dimensions that one of the main strengths of Latin American subaltern studies lies.

Contemporary social movement theory in Latin America has made a considerable contribution to global research on the subaltern and their emancipatory politics. In a review of social movement research

in Latin America, Fernando Calderón and coauthors refer to “the richness and multiplicity of this experience” and how “even in the process of disintegration and social anomie experienced by the region [during the neo-liberal era], Latin American societies have managed to maintain their capacity for invention and cultural creation” (Calderón, Piscitelli, and Reyna 1992, p. 29). In terms of social movement research in Latin America there has never been a simplistic adoption of US resource mobilization or European new social movement paradigms, rather “there has always been a highly creative transformation of the categories and theories generated by the centre” (Calderón, Piscitelli, and Reyna 1992, p. 35). This syncretism has taken due cognizance of Latin America’s hybrid social formations and the complexity of the social transformation processes. The issue of the state has been more present than in Northern paradigms and attention to identity issues has never obliterated the inescapable context of class and class struggles. In Latin America, the transition from a labor-based to an information-based society is extremely partial at best, so social movement theories need to be cognizant of the old as well as the new to put it that way.

The first half of the twentieth century in Latin America can be read, quite simply, as the rise of the subaltern. The postcolonial oligarchic pact was beginning to crumble despite the considerable success of the dependent development model it had constructed. Its social and political exclusion of the popular masses was about to be challenged. The economic expansion of the period 1870–1914 had led to a vast process of proletarianization and even an incipient industrialization in some countries. A working class emerged during this period in most countries. A particularly strong nucleus was formed in the export economy; mining, docks, and railways, for example. Another was constructed by artisans and small scale producers. In terms of organizational models the early mutual-aid societies were superseded during this period by trade unions with varying anarchist, syndicalist, and socialist complexions.

The Mexican Revolution of 1910–1920 was a world historical event that utterly transformed the history of Mexico and the whole of Latin America (see Gilly 2005). Was it a bourgeois revolution, an interrupted permanent revolution, or a simple concatenation of localized events? In a sense there was, in Mexico, a revolutionary process or set of waves in 1810, 1854, and 1910 that shifted the relations of production decisively (see Knight 1990). It was not a bourgeois revolution in the sense that it represented the inexorable progress of a *bourgeoisie*

conquérante. It was however clearly a democratic and a capitalist revolutionary process that decisively wiped out the old order. The debate continues as to whether there was a potential for socialism in the Zapatista peasants revolt in particular that was thwarted by reformism or political underdevelopment. Either way, it really does confirm Trotsky's dictum that "the history of a revolution is for us first of all a history of the forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of ruler-ship over their own destiny" (Trotsky 1970, p. 16).

The 1910–1920 process of the Mexican revolution was complex and did not pit two neat sets of opponents against each other. As Knight notes, there were four main contenders: "old regime (Porfirismo and Huertismo); reformist liberals (chiefly though not exclusively urban middle class); popular movements (subdivided into *agraristas* and *serranos*); and the ultimate national synthesis, Carrancismo/constitutionalism, which mutates without significant genetic innovation, into the governing coalition of the 1920's" (Knight 1985, p. 9). The popular movements—under the emblematic figures of Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa—carried out mass mobilization that changed the face of Mexican politics and led to fundamental social transformations including intense laicization, nationalist economic policies, an agrarian reform, strong state organized trade unions, and an overarching legitimizing nationalist ideology.

Another major political revolution in Latin America was that of Peronism in Argentina. This was a nationalist-laborist revolution with no real socialist content at all at least in its original incarnation. On the contrary Perón saw his movement as a bulwark against communism. Nor was it a local manifestation of fascism as the dominant Eurocentric analysis argued. Colonel Perón was indeed an admirer of Benito Mussolini in the early 1940s particularly for his national chauvinism and corporatist labor model. In Argentina he forged an alliance with the powerful syndicalist current within the trade unions that was more pragmatic than the socialists and communists. In particular, though, he cultivated relations with an emerging generation of labor leaders who were beginning to organize the wave of internal migrants from the provinces coming to the city to find employment in the expanding economy.

After a vast labor/popular mobilization in 1945 when Perón was jailed by his fellow military leaders, he came to power in elections in 1946 until he was overthrown by the military in 1955. In what way could we call this a revolution? This was a personalist populist regime with scant regard for parliamentary niceties. However the

national situation was transformed dramatically during his time in office and the unions were the backbone of the Peronist movement. Unionization figures went up from eight hundred thousand in 1945 to one and a half million in 1948, and labor's share of the national income rose from 41 percent in 1946 to 49 percent in 1950. Above all, workers gained the intangible benefit of "respect" and from then onward Argentina has seen a confident and sometimes combative labor movement at the heart of national politics.

The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 was another major event in this period. The actual "event" itself only lasted three days and the urban insurrection entailed relatively few casualties. However, it built on a long tradition of militancy amongst the tin miners since the 1920s and a wave of peasant mobilizations. It was "revolutionary" according to Knight because of "the functional outcome—rapid and substantial success—political change" and because it was "embedded within a broader process of political mobilization and conflict" (Knight 1990, p. 180). It did not usher in socialism or even a stable radical democracy but it did decisively accelerate the development of capitalism and the destruction of precapitalist relations, thus distinguishing Bolivia from other Andean countries.

The popular revolts referred to here cannot be easily subsumed under the traditional class concepts. In many ways, the formation of the working class in each country can only be understood in terms of its political shaping. In other words there was not a formation of the working class through economic processes and then its engagement in politics. The Mexican popular classes and their worldview are inseparable from the Mexican Revolution (see Bonfil Batalla 2006). Argentina's labor movement is simply incomprehensible without centering the Peronist phenomenon. And so on in each country. A strand running through many of the subaltern movements, though, is that of a populism that is not reducible to nationalism and a construction of the category of *pueblo* (people). The populist movements cannot be understood solely as manipulative and co-optive of the working class.

As Juan Carlos Portantiero explains, "The national-popular compromise state has usually been explained as a determination of the bourgeois class, but not according to another dimension—that of the early participation in it of the popular classes—which have tended to be seen solely in terms of heteronomy and manipulation" (Portantiero 1983, p. 165). The detailed history of Peronism, for example, has conclusively established that the workers movement played a pivotal role

in its formation and that it was not just a top-down populist co-optive operation. The preexisting class organizations—led by communists and socialists—were swept aside by a hegemonic laborist populism that was better able to constitute the workers as *pueblo* (people), a political struggle in which the syndicalist trade union current played a key role.

The subaltern classes can thus be seen as active agents in the forging of national-popular culture. The compromise state can, for its part, be seen as a reaction to the activated subaltern classes. Workers and the working class are forged in the crucible of national-popular politics (see Hall and Spalding 1986; Bergquist 1986). That shapes the consciousness and the activity of the masses in ways that are quite distinct from the models promoted by European or “Asian” Marxism. Socialism could only grow out of the peculiarities of national culture and, as Mariátegui argued, Latin America did not have to and, indeed, could not repeat the history of the development of capitalism in Europe. The national-popular collective will, a Gramscian concept that was echoed in Latin America by Mariátegui’s thinking and praxis would shape the particular way of constructing a counter-hegemony to that of the postcolonial oligarchy.

Mariátegui provided an original analysis and programme for action based on the activation of the subaltern classes and, in particular the Amerindian peoples, in Latin America. He drew his distance equally from Eurocentrism and its mechanical categories and from the temptations of populism, then dominant in Peru. What he developed was a very practical conception of socialism as springing out of the real social movement of workers, peasants, and indigenous peoples. He certainly did not see intellectuals filling the gap between the subaltern classes and effective political interventions. As to actually existing socialist internationalism he saw that as totally limited in practice to the European domain. It was only the class struggle, experience, practice, and the forging of identity that would create the new historical subjects. The construction of counter-hegemony could not be the prerogative of a political party but the result of self-conscious activity by the subaltern masses.

National Development

In the same way that the emergence of a national-popular political discourse was overdetermined by the condition of dependency, socio-economic development was very much shaped by the colonial legacy.

As Cardoso and Faletto put it in their foundational statement on dependency in Latin America, “The analysis of structural dependency aims to explain the interrelationships of classes and nation-states at the level of the international scene as well as the level internal to each country” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, p. 18). This dialectic is totally in keeping with Gramsci’s view of the national/international relationship. “Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow....Even the geographical position of a national State does not precede but follows (logically) structural change” (Gramsci 1971, p. 176). It is not as though external factors can determine or even explain a given national development path. In the Latin American dependency approach (as against many of the Northern popularizers) “the history of capital accumulation is the history of class struggles” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, p. 18). The formation of political movements, ideological struggles, and the ongoing processes of social transformation are pivotal factors in determining national development paths.

To understand the role of the state in shaping national development paths we can turn to Gerschenkron’s late industrialization model (Gerschenkron 1962) developed in the 1940s in the light of the Russian Revolution, which was a precursor for contemporary engagement with the role of the developmental state in overcoming underdevelopment. For him it is only the state that can mobilize the technical and industrial resources to close the gap between the late and early industrializers. The bigger the gap the stronger will need to be state-orientated ideology to mobilize the resources for development. Gerschenkron believed however that this was a transitional state and that the market would eventually take over these functions, a belief encouraged in the heyday of neoliberal globalization of course. In his *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Gerschenkron 1962), he examined Russia’s and some other European countries’ advantages given a late start to industrialization. Echoing the earlier analysis by Trotsky he showed how the late industrializers needed to create a veritable leap forward to give a decisive spurt to industrialization. This was a clear break with linear modernization theory and Gerschenkron can be seen as the most coherent (if largely unacknowledged) critic of Walt Rostow and his teleological and ethnocentric stages of economic growth.

Within Latin America this type of structural-historical focus on national development probably reached its high point in the work of Raúl Prebisch, an economist from Argentina who became the

leading light of the Economic Commission for Latin America when it was formed in 1949. It not only urged the Latin American governments to promote national development but also made one of its early cases against the unequal nature of the international division of labor. Neoclassical trade theory was turned on its head through an analysis of how central countries exported manufactured goods and the peripheral countries exported primary goods, a view that was to eventually become widely accepted. The subsequent analysis of the deteriorating terms of trade for the peripheral countries was the background for the emergence of the dependency perspective and also the unequal exchange analysis of the world economy. The core-periphery model of development Prebisch pioneered did not, however, ignore the basic differences in the economic, political, and social structures, which he saw as much more heterogeneous in Latin America, consistent with later perspectives around hybridity, for example.

In the era of globalization it became an accepted article of faith that national development was an anachronism given the interdependence of the global system and the unchallenged benefits of international free trade. Development and democracy became synonymous with the neoliberal pro-market “reforms.” The problem was the state and any role by that state in influencing or restricting market-based conduct. Certainly any policy that smacked of national protectionism was deemed regressive and counterproductive. The very concept of “national development” as we have deployed it here was deemed an oxymoron. There was no reason why development should be conceived within the limits of a given territory. The new agents of international development—the multinational corporations—were deemed to be above such narrow considerations. But in practice the multinationals were not quite as “footloose and fancy free” as had previously been imagined. Nor was the market as omniscient as had been preached that became evident with the 2007 banking collapse and the subsequent recession providing ample evidence that national development was still on the agenda.

Returning now to the Gramscian theme of this book we should note that Gramsci always focused on territoriality and was well aware that “in Italy political, territorial and national unity enjoy a scanty tradition (or perhaps no tradition at all)” (Gramsci 1971, p. 274). To be clear Bob Jessop is perfectly correct to note that “Gramsci did not naturalise or fetishise national territory as the pre-given or pre-destined basis of state formations...given the historical problems of national formation that he recognised and also struggled to

overcome" (Jessop 2006, p. 37). Nevertheless, national state formation and national development were seen as prerequisites for the move beyond absolutism and the emergence of a bourgeois democratic liberal state. The absence of clear class formation processes and, in Latin America particularly, the great difficulty in forging a stable form of hegemonic bourgeois rule was always going to be an impediment to the development process and to dynamics of social transformation.

The agro-export economic model had served the Latin American dominant classes quite well from around 1870 to 1914 until the outbreak of the First World War, which greatly disrupted international trade. The Great Crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s is usually taken as a turning point in the Latin American economic policy. There was not in reality a sharp turn in economic policy, however there was certainly a socioeconomic shift and the emergence of new political forces. This shift would eventually lead to a new economic model but "a residual commitment to primary products and outward-looking development survived throughout the region" (Bulmer-Thomas 1994, p. 65) well into the 1930s.

Despite some industrialization in some countries, the 1930s were still driven by the agro-export economy. This began to change toward the end of the 1940s and by the 1950s a new economic model was in full flow. This was the model of import substitution industrialization (ISI) that was inward-looking compared to the outward-looking agro-export model, which had prevailed hitherto. For many economists the move toward a new model was not a rational one. Thus for Rosemary Thorp its key characteristics were a strong discrimination against exports combined with an increased need for foreign exchange. Thus it discriminated against the sector that was crucial to its functioning. (Thorp 1994, p. 117) Be that as it may, the scholarly consensus is now swinging to the view that the stagnation of the 1980s should not obscure the success in terms of national development achieved by the ISI model.

Brazil was an interesting and emblematic example of how ISI transformed social relations in Latin America. Prior to 1945 there had been considerable industrialization but purely as a subordinate element of the agro-export economy. The 1930s, which saw dramatic changes in economic policy, was also the period in international political economy when Keynesianism made its mark. The 1929 crisis impacted on Brazil immediately in terms of a dramatic drop in the volume and price of coffee exports. The coalition that came to power in the 1930s

Revolution under Getulio Vargas simply had to address the situation whether it wanted to or not. As Paul Singer describes, "It destroyed the prior political leadership, which had been firmly entrenched in financial orthodoxy, replacing it with a heterogeneous and pragmatic cadre of politicians and technocrats" (Singer 2009a, p. 68). Little by little it became the driver of a national bourgeois or at least capitalist revolution.

Pivotal to the ISI model was the role of an interventionist state. There is a long-standing debate in development studies around the nature of the developmental state. One clear-cut definition is that of Manuel Castells for whom: "A state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship with the international economy.... Thus, ultimately for the developmental state, economic development is not a goal but a means" (Castells 1992, pp. 56–57). There has been a widespread debate around the developmental state since and, although it fell into disuse during the heyday of neoliberalism as dominant development discourse, it is now very much back on the global development agenda.

In Latin America, from around 1950 to 1980 this was, more or less, the type of state that prevailed. This is a state that promoted industrialization and accelerated the social division of labor. This was responding to the needs for a rapid accumulation of capital best captured by President Kubitschek's slogan in Brazil in the early 1950s of "Fifty years in five." The economic structures and social relations were transformed utterly by the inward-looking development strategy aimed at the home market and not export trade exclusively. The state expanded vastly in economic terms through the creation of new public enterprises and nationalizations. It played a key role in financial intermediation and developed a synergistic relationship with foreign capital. In political terms this was a *national* development state with its remit the nation-state and its people. The expectation as Garretón et al. put it "was that industrialisation brought national wealth and that this wealth could be distributed indirectly to the population at large through government programmes" (Garretón et al. 2003, p. 21). The national development state was committed to the health and education of the nation's workers. While it welcomed a cordial relation with foreign investors there was a clear understanding that their interests were not those of the nation-state.

Clearly not all countries engaged with the ISI approach in the same way or to the same extent. In Mexico, the Cárdenas government (1934–1940) challenged the foreign oil companies and eventually nationalized them. The state encouraged industrialization across the board even if in practice, it was quite closely integrated with the United States. In Chile state intervention was more reluctant with state subsidiaries for employment in the nitrate industry entering the equation only out of necessity. Also out of necessity the state began to encourage the industrial sector. Public works were essential to resolve the unemployment crisis caused by the effects of the 1929 crisis. As Cardoso and Faletto put it, “The creation of an import substitution industry and the direct intervention by the state to guide the economy, were two important consequences of the 1929 crisis” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, p. 146).

Argentina and Brazil are successful examples of import substitution industrialization, as we have already mentioned. The 1950s and 1960s saw the creation of a powerful steel industry, a national automotive sector, and a strong national led synergy with foreign capital. These two countries were probably the epitome of the national development state in economic, political, social, and cultural terms. Quite different was the situation in Central America and most of the Andean countries. The middle sectors grew only slowly there as industrialization was patchy and sporadic at best. Fearful of popular revolts they tended to side with the oligarchy and the dominant sectors of the enclave economy. There was no bourgeois revolution or even semi-bourgeois revolution in these countries. The contradictions created would explode in the 1980s.

One of the main theoretical debates emerging from the political economy of this period is around the so called dualism question. This posited a “modern” versus “traditional” sector reminiscent of the old Marxist categories of capitalism and feudalism. Dualism posited the notion of two economies with separated dynamics and an opposing logic. Modernizers and Marxists agreed that the traditional sector needed to be removed as an obstacle to progress. One of the most effective critiques of dualism came from Francisco de Oliveira in his classic “critique of dualist reason” based on the Brazilian experience but whose logic is of wider applicability. Oliveira’s basic argument was that “the expansion of capitalism in Brazil occurred through the introduction of new relations [of production] in the archaic [sector] and through the reproduction of archaic relations in the new [sector]” (Oliveira 1973, p. 36).

During the period 1930–1945, industrialization occurred in Brazil (as elsewhere) due to the impossibilities of continuing with the old agro-export model due to the international situation. State intervention created the transfer of resources for the agro-export sector to an incipient industrial bourgeoisie. This shift was possible due to the creation and mobilization of new subaltern classes. But the counterpart of this compromise state was that the state did not extend the new labor protection laws to the countryside. Thus, from Oliveira's optic, at stake here was not just the future of import substitution and the advance of the modern over the traditional. Rather, it was about a particular model of capital accumulation that harnessed "old" relations of production in the rural, informal, and service sectors to the benefit of a modern monopoly capitalism based on the extensive subordination of labor.

By the early- to mid-1960s the contradictions of the ISI model were apparent and some authors even spoke of its "exhaustion" (Tavares 1964). During the "easy" phase of import substitution industrialization there was a developmentalist alliance among the state, private, and foreign sectors. International capital was seeking new investment possibilities. Consolidation of the internal market was in everybody's interest. Protectionist provided benefits also to the foreign investors who could shelter behind tariff barriers. However, when the substitution process slowed down, the contradictions between the partners came to the fore. The consumers, who were also workers, were also demanding a share of the gains that the capitalist sectors were unwilling to concede. The die was now cast for a decisive move by the ruling classes to recompose their hegemony.

Moving forward a few years we note that this national development model took on a distinctly archaic look by the 1990s. From a perspective, post the 2008/2009 Great Recession things might look a bit different however. While global integration did not cause the crisis per se, it did mean that its impact spread like wildfire throughout the global system. What was most notable in Latin America was that those economies that most integrated with that of the United States—such as Mexico—suffered most, while those where trade diversification had gone furthest—such as Brazil—the impact was less severe. Also the fact that Mexico's banks had been privatized (and thus in foreign hands) contrasted negatively with the situation in Brazil where the government controls the huge Banco do Brasil, the Caixa Econômica (the largest mortgage lender), and the largest development bank BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social).

Overall, the impact of the crisis in Latin America was not caused by its integration into international financial flows. It was the secondary impact of the Northern recession on the “real economy” through which it impacted locally. As Paul Singer explains, “The crisis struck Latin America by means of changes in external economic conditions, such as extinction of external credit and sharp reduction of exports, direct foreign investments and transfers from emigrants to the First World” (Singer 2009b, p. 92). The crisis deepened when it began to impact at local industrial production of course. What this situation gave rise to was a generalized discussion on how to avoid future crises in the region. One clear conclusion was that it had been generated externally and not through weaknesses in the Latin American economies. What also became transparently clear across national policy-making circles was that the period of unregulated markets was now decisively over. There would be increasingly a move toward greater state regulation of the economies and a return to structuralist developmental policies for growth and equity. In that sense the processes dealt with in this historical chapter are also very relevant and timely to consider today.

Compromise State

A common phrase in Brazil in the 1920s was, “The social question is a question for the police.” That is to say, the subaltern classes and their demands could be dealt with simply through repression. That worldview was perhaps a reflection of the oligarchic period and even went back to the slavery era. The concerns of workers, women, domestic servants, blacks, Indians, and peasants clearly did not overly worry the dominant classes. This was all to change with industrialization and the gradual emergence of an organized labor movement along with the general spread of contestatory ideologies. An urban middle class had also emerged that did not share the outlook of the landowners and sought a modern society and political system. In 1930 Getulio Vargas became president of Brazil, proclaiming a programme of state-led industrialization and a commitment to what we today would call social inclusion around class and race exclusions. Vargas also posed the question of the compromise state as a successor to the oligarchic state.

The “compromise state” was the form of state appropriate to the national-popular era and the commitment to state-led industrialization. The era of oligarchic hegemony where the state simply expressed

the interests of one particular social class or group was over. The unstable equilibrium between different dominant sectors, some going up, some going down, meant that they would have to enter compromises with each other. As Garretón et al. put it, "The resulting political formula was a hybrid democracy and authoritarianism, around which emerged in an uneven, often implicit, and sometimes tension-ridden fashion, an informal coalition of the most significant social and political actors in order to sustain it" (Garretón et al. 2003, p. 15). The decline of the oligarchic order had led to a period of great instability in many countries including the emergence of military regimes. Industrialization and urbanization had created a new social order but the political system adapted only slowly to it. The form of democracy that emerged was, naturally enough, one which reflected these conditions and did not mirror the European liberal democratic model.

The national-popular compromise state in Latin America played a crucial role in terms of bringing the subaltern classes into the political arena. The dominant interpretation of it and the populist discourse underpinning it has been that it was represented and included by the dominant classes to co-opt or disarm the subaltern masses. Certainly there was an element of Gramscian *transformismo* to it, in which progressive sectors find their discourse taken over by conservative modernizers, but that is not the only interpretation possible. The interpretation that prioritizes manipulation ignores the very real element of popular mobilization that the compromise state either facilitated or led to indirectly. For example, while it is undoubtedly true that Perón manipulated the working classes in Argentina and even possibly diverted them from an evolution toward socialism continuing the trend of the 1930s, Peronism also represented a massive entry of the subaltern into politics and a radical rupture of the oligarchic landowning elites' grip on power.

In terms of Gramsci's elaboration of a complex theory of the state fit for purpose in the modern democratic era, this Latin American experience adds considerably to his *Prison Notebooks*. The period of passive revolution had led to the national development of capital accumulation but in a manner that did not resolve the inherent political contradictions of the process. The hegemonic project was at best incomplete and certainly it did not create a sustainable democracy. What occurred, rather, was an acceleration of instability mirroring the progressive variant of Caesarism in the Gramscian vocabulary. "Caesarism is progressive when its intervention leads the progressive

force to triumph, albeit with its victory tempered by certain compromises and limitations" (Gramsci 1971, p. 222). The 1930s was indeed a period of crisis and the contradictions of the old regime came to a fore. From the resulting catastrophic balance of forces between the various social forces emerged the compromise state as a particular expression of Gramsci's progressive Caesarism albeit with a much stronger national-popular coloration.

The political economy of national development under the ISI model had as its correlate the compromise state typical of the populist period. The economic crisis of the 1930s and the subsequent crisis of political representation had prompted the need for a renewal of the historic bloc. The agrarian oligarchy retained a position of dominance but it had clearly lost its hegemonic role. Industrialization was creating a working class, but the important role of foreign capital prevented the emergence of a strong national bourgeoisie that could articulate a coherent alternative hegemonic project. The compromise state and the populist modality of politics represented a form of political domination typical of a power vacuum with no class able to assume a hegemonic role.

One variant of the compromise state was Cardenismo in Mexico during the 1930s. Lázaro Cárdenas was the president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940, and Cardenismo utterly changed the course of the country's history. Its main planks were designed to create a stable and viable regime for capital accumulation, a far-reaching agrarian reform and a massive expansion of state-sponsored trade unions. While its nationalization of the oil companies clearly displeased foreign capital, overall Cárdenas offered stability to capital through the development of powerful but pliant trade unions organizing the new proletariat. While between 1915 and 1934 the revolutionary governments had assumed land titles for 7.6 million hectares, in his first six years in office Cárdenas distributed double that amount (17.9 million hectares) benefiting 771,640 peasant families. The revolutionary dream of land reform had come to fruition.

Cardenismo was clearly not socialist and in many ways it served to consolidate bourgeois hegemony in Mexico by providing stability and legitimized co-optation of the subaltern classes. However, as Knight puts it, "Cardenismo was, in terms of its objectives, a genuinely radical movement, which promised substantial change; that is also embodied substantial popular support, albeit this was not mediated through liberal democratic forms of representation" (Knight 1994, p. 79). It was simply inconceivable without the impact of the

1910–1920 revolutionary upheaval. While land reform can be seen as a precondition for capitalist development in agriculture, its symbolic and material impact in Mexico can hardly be overestimated. While it differed in style from the populism of Perón and Vargas, it also reflected the particular conjuncture in Latin America and the possibility of national development with popular mobilization.

Peronism in Argentina was another influential model of the populist or compromise state. There was considerable pressure placed on the agrarian sector to divert some of its profits into building an industrial base. National industrialists were encouraged by the state, but cordial relations were also forged with foreign capital. Trade union organization took a massive leap forward—but these trade unions were firmly linked to the state through corporatist measures. Workers achieved labor dignity but they were also expected to deliver better labor productivity. Above all, the developmentalist state promoted capitalist expansion and ensured the stable reproduction of the labor force through better education and the beginning of a serious welfare regime, previously neglected by the oligarchic state.

Peronism probably had a more enduring impact in Argentina than any of the other populisms. When it was overthrown by a military coup in 1955 backed by the agrarian oligarchy and the Catholic Church, it went into opposition. Thereafter, without the physical presence of Perón, it was radicalized and provided a distinctive identity to a combative labor movement. Every single political moment from 1955 until Perón's brief return to office in 1973 (he died in 1974) was dominated by the Peronist—anti-Peronist dichotomy. This dividing line between the popular or subaltern world and that of the dominant classes is crucial to this day in understanding social movements in Argentina. Of course, Peronism mutated many times and it has many tendencies but it is exemplary of the importance of the national-popular in Latin America.

In Brazil there was a similar variant of populism in the shape of Varguismo and its successors up to 1964. The traditional oligarchy was, however, much stronger than in Argentina, industrialists were weaker and the working class much weaker. The noncapitalist sector of the economy and the workforce was also much greater than in Argentina. Populism offered a limited path for mass political participation first under Getúlio Vargas and then under his successors until João Goulart who presided over a radicalized, chaotic period that ended in the seizure of political power by the military in 1964. Populism was neither a radicalizing nor a clearly containing type

of political formation. It mobilized and acted as a bridge between the state and the emerging working class, but it was also politically demobilizing.

Populism in Brazil was quite different from that in Argentina. As Cardoso and Faletto put it, “The populism of Vargas was a rather vague movement of people’s incorporation into the nation....It was less an economic definition of workers’ rights, which would imply political participation, than a political movement in favor of the ‘humble’” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, p. 141). Even then Brazilian “*trabalhismo*” (laborism or workerism to be precise) lacked the dynamism and radicalizing impact of Peronist trade union organizing and in terms of creating a worker identity. Despite its moderate politics, Brazilian populism crossed the line when it encouraged or just allowed the formation of peasant leagues and rural workers associations in 1962–1963. When the military regime of 1964 finally gave way to democracy in the mid 1980s, populism had been supplanted by a new more radical workerist ideology growing out of a combative labor movement operating under very restrictive conditions.

A populist compromise state did not emerge everywhere in Latin America but it was remarkably common across the region. Certainly in Central America and most of the Andean countries (with the exception of Colombia) the working class was not a significant player. In Brazil, Mexico, and the Southern Cone countries, the compromise state took its clearest shape. It was an unstable hegemonic equilibrium amongst ruling class factions with the presence (or threat) of the subaltern classes a significant factor. Despite highly authoritarian features—for example, in Peronism—this was very much part of the Latin American route to democracy. This was not a gradual organic growth emerging out of the old regime, but a quite abrupt new beginning with massive economic, political, social, and cultural transformations afoot.

One way of understanding the dynamics of the compromise state and the political economy of the period is through the simple matrix (table 3.1) below that seeks to show the different elements create an overall ensemble.

This statist-national-popular sociopolitical matrix as Garretón et al. call it, was quite stable in its heyday. The development model was based on national industrialization led by the state. The political system of representation was based on a compromise state that showed both democratic and authoritarian tendencies. In civil society we saw

Table 3.1 The national-statist popular sociopolitical matrix (1930–1990)

<i>Matrix elements</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>
Development model	National industrialization, strong state role
Links to international economy	Import substitution industrialization
Civil society	Social actors based on work, social class, or political affiliations
Ideology/Culture	Nationalist, populist, politically focused
Politics	The compromise state, weak institutions
State role	National development model, focus of collective action
Modernity concept	Western, industrial, people-oriented, political
Risks	Political instability, ideological polarization, dependence on foreign capital

Source: Adapted from Garretón et al. (2003, p. 9).

a high level of mobilization with new layers bursting on the scene from urban workers to mobilized rural subaltern groups.

There came a time when the contradictions of the ISI model and of the compromise state burst into the open. One watershed moment was the 1964 *coup d'état* in Brazil that brought to power the first of the “modern” military dictatorships. The mass mobilizations under the Goulart government combined with an ineffectiveness of the state to control them and the economic process at the same time. There was a perceived situation of capitalist regime instability or even crisis on the part of the dominant classes. Maybe this was exaggerated but it was nonetheless real. The military organized an effective military takeover committed to resolving order and stability as well as providing an impetus to the economy through the disciplining of labor. We could, from a Gramscian perspective, hypothesize that the underlying objective of the 1964 coup was to create a more stable hegemonic bourgeois order.

As Arturo Escobar has written from a post-development perspective “what is at stake with ‘development’ is precisely the completion of the modern project, the transformation of Third World subjectivities that are allegedly not yet rational enough into fully modern modes” (Escobar 1992, p. 67). Uneven development and extensive poverty

quite clearly belie the promise of classical European modernity discourse. To be modern in Latin America is quite different but it should not be read as a deviation from the one true path of modernity as laid out by the Enlightenment philosophers. There are “premodern” social practices and there are postmodern worlds integrated into globalization but all are part of a contradictory and uneven development process. Above all, we must note the ability of social activism in Latin America to subvert accepted wisdom through a creative process of transformation and syncretism.

An extremely relevant example would be the 1920s modernist movement in Brazil that declared for a modernity that was not a *simulacrum* of foreign models, nor a futile affirmation of so-called national culture. In the Cannibalist Manifesto, Oswald de Andrade declared that “only cannibalism unites us. Socially. Economically. Philosophically. We were never baptized. We had the Carnival. The Indian dressed as Senator of the Empire.... We already had communism. We already had a surrealist language. The golden age.” Cannibalism was related to a fascination with difference and otherness. This was a hospitable cannibalism that did not devour the other but, rather, welcomed it and sought to “absorb it.” Modernity in Brazil, and more generally in Latin America can be seen as uneven assimilation of difference. Today, as Beatriz Resende puts it, “cannibalism is a category to be re-read, emphasizing the need to seek common objectives, interests which unite (or should unite) classes, races, sexual choices, professional categories and cultural manifestations” (Resende 2000, p. 208).

Hegemony Struggles (1959–1976)

Taking a historical long view, the period considered in this chapter could be said to be one characterized overall as a period of “Crisis”: an organic and not just a conjunctural crisis, to put it in Gramscian terms, which dominated events in a most dramatic manner. The dominant classes responded by seeking to establish a more decisive form of hegemony that would hitherto not need to compromise with social demands from below. It was also a period characterized by “Revolution” from the Cuban Revolution in 1959 onward through to the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979. Not only—or even mainly—guerrilla movements in the cities and in the hills, but a mobilized proletariat, active rural worker, and small-holder movements were abiding characteristics of this period. Perhaps inevitably, a period of counter-revolutionary dynamics ensued. To the political challenges faced by the dominant order we must add a consideration of this period as one of “Economic Transition” as the dominant accumulation model faced a crisis of perspectives. The apparent exhaustion of the old industrialization and national development model coincided with substantial changes in the global economy with the emergence of a clear-cut US hegemony. Foreign investment was on the rise as was the financial sector and thus a more clearly subordinated working class was required. The counterrevolutionary offensive led to the emergence of the “Military State,” sometimes called a bureaucratic-authoritarian state. The compromise state was the result of the decline of the oligarchic state without the emergence of a true, popular state. Now the military state would seek to reestablish conditions for profitable capital accumulation and to create a new hegemonic order to overcome the cycle of crises and subaltern resistance. This move was only partially successful and a change in international political conditions—signaled

most clearly with the end of the cold war—as well as the emergence of internal contradictions and resistance from below led eventually to the return of democracy.

Crisis

The Marxist tradition has always contained within it a fairly catastrophic understanding of the capitalist crisis, even though more subtle interpretations also existed. The contradictions of capitalism—be it the immiseration of the working classes, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, or the class struggle—would lead to its collapse and the ushering in of a new more humane social order. The Second (social democratic) International was particularly prone to catastrophism but it was also present at times in the Third (communist) and Fourth (Trotskyist) Internationals. Behind the dependency rhetoric in Latin America and particularly slogans such as “reform or revolution” lay a much older understanding of capitalist crisis. Thus, for example, Dutch far-left thinker Anton Pannekoek put it in the 1920s that “the idea that capitalism was in a final, its mortal crisis dominated the first years after the Russian revolution” (Pannekoek [1934] 1977). The inevitability of the collapse of capitalism was an article of faith across wide sectors of the Left. There were different versions of this theory of course. Rosa Luxemburg, for example, argued that as a closed system capitalism was bound to collapse (based on a misreading of Marx’s *Capital*, Vol. 2), but trading with noncapitalism could alleviate that situation. Then of course there was a difference between its reformist versions of the theory that saw it as legitimation for parliamentary reform and the revolutionary version that saw it as an incentive for an all-out assault on the capitalist state. While in practice the communist movement in the mid-1920s began to accept the possibility of capitalist stabilization, the crisis/collapse scenario still exercised considerable intellectual influence.

Perhaps the most technically developed theory around the inevitable breakdown of the capitalist system was that carried out by Henryk Grossman for whom capitalism simply must collapse for purely economic reasons. In his 1929 book *The Law of Accumulation and Collapse of the Capitalist System* (Grossman [1929] 1992) he argued that, independent of human intervention, capitalism would collapse for purely economic reasons. This complex intellectual model gave capitalism only 35 years before its contradictions would overcome it. While he acknowledged the existence of countertendencies, his

extension of Marx's reproduction schemes led him to the conclusion that "beyond a certain point the accumulation, the surplus value available does not suffice to maintain accumulation at a given level of wages" (Grossman [1929] 1992, p. 590). This perspective—whatever its conceptual limitations and its mechanical aspects—did have an impact on the radicalized sectors of the international labor movement in the 1930s. In particular, Grossman's ringing statement that "there the objective limit of trade union action is given" (Grossman [1929] 1992, p. 599) provided strong support for those challenging reformist, accommodations, and pro-state labor leaders.

The limits of capital accumulation and its contradictions are real enough, even if we cannot accept premature predictions of capitalism's imminent demise. As David Harvey writes in relation to the situation after the 2008–2009 Great Recession, "Can capitalism survive the present trauma? Yes, of course. But at what cost?" (Harvey 2010, p. 215). Marxists and others have long analyzed the role of crisis in capitalist development in particular what is called its tendency toward "creative destruction" whereby each cycle leads to a savage sorting of winners and losers to emerge leaner and meaner at the other end. As Harvey puts it, "Crises...are the irrational rationalisers of an irrational system" (Harvey 2010, p. 215). New production lines will be found, new geographical areas will be exploited, and new forms of extracting surplus will be developed. This is, and always was, the way in which capitalist development occurs.

In Latin America, albeit not always consciously, there was a reprise of these early Marxist positions within the dependency school. Thus, for example, Ruy Mauro Marini continually posited the blunt choice between underdevelopment and socialism (Marini 1980). In an exchange with F. H. Cardoso and J. Serra he argued for the inevitable collapse of the dependent development model in Latin America because it was simply based on exploitation by the West and greater underdevelopment was the only logic of this system (Marini 1980). For Marini an increase in unequal exchange reduces profits on the periphery, thus necessitates an overexploitation of labor and a crisis/revolutionary solution is inevitable. It was easy to show that overexploitation was not inevitable when the increased production of relative surplus value (through capital investment) was always possible. Indeed internationalization of the internal market was during the 1960s leading to an increase in capital investment amid the intensive (as against extensive) exploitation of labor. In response, Cardoso and Serra (1978) were able to demonstrate without any shadow of

doubt that dependency and development were not incompatible and that the imminent collapse of the dependent development model was simply not on the cards, and certainly not due to immanent economic causes.

Taking a look ahead from the 1929 crisis and its analysis, to the 2008–2009 Great Recession and its analysis, it is clear that there are similar analytical dangers present today. We are not witnessing the final crisis of capitalism and, most certainly, socialism is not the inevitable alternative. Capitalism has a great ability to regenerate and reconfigure. What is most interesting for us here is that Latin America is widely perceived to have escaped the worst of the crisis with Brazil in particular being seen as a future bastion of capital accumulation. There is, on the other hand, very little cognizance that a period of crisis does open up an opportunity to explore alternatives. For all its determinism and political shortcomings, the dependency debates at least had the merit of discussing the alternatives to an exclusionary model of capitalist development. Today “another world is possible” exists as a rhetorical statement but it is not translated into a viable strategy for revolutionary or transitional reforms that would represent a genuine breakthrough vis-à-vis the now exhausted neoliberal development model.

Gramsci—for his part—placed all his emphasis on the various counter tendencies to collapse and on the plasticity of the capitalist order and its ability to reconfigure. Gramsci’s focus in prison was on the post–First World War crisis of the state in Europe and its implications for the workers movement. He rules out any notion that an economic crisis, in and of itself, will produce a crisis of hegemony. Nor, however, is the crisis a purely political affair. Rather Gramsci develops the concept of an “organic crisis” to describe a long and complex crisis process that needs to be distinguished from a “conjunctural” crisis occurring around specific events. For Gramsci “a crisis is dangerous when it spreads to all the political parties and among all the different classes.... When the crisis is not resolved in [an] organic manner... it means that a static equilibrium exists, it means that no class, neither the conservative nor the progressive class has the strength to win...” (Gramsci 1971, p. 242).

This organic crisis leads to a crisis of party representation and affects the whole of the superstructures as well as the overall relationship between state and society. In terms of the state, the debate was about “how to reconstruct the hegemonic apparatus of its dominant group, an apparatus that disintegrated in every state throughout the

world as a result of the war” (Gramsci 1971, p. 211). The reasons for this collapse, though, were far from simple. If it had been “because of the growth of a strong antagonistic collective will” (Gramsci 1971, p. 211) then the problem would be resolved in favor of that antagonist, namely the subaltern classes and the worker’s party. However, “the antagonistic forces turned out to be incapable of organizing the actual disorder to their advantage” (Gramsci 1971, p. 211) as “the previously passive great masses went into action.”

It is this situation that prevailed in the 1920s, which set the context for the rise of fascism in Italy. The ruling class had lost its consensus—“i.e. is no longer ‘leading’ but only ‘dominant’” (Gramsci 1971, p. 275) and the great masses no longer believe what they used to believe previously. In this situation “the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci 1971, p. 276). The crisis of authority becomes a crisis of hegemony and organic crisis affecting the state as a whole. The historical basis of the state is in question. This is very different from a conjunctural and economic reading of, for example, the 1929 Wall Street Crash that, for some communists signaled the imminent end of capitalism based on a rather mechanic reading of Marx’s *Capital*.

Gramsci’s political life (and his death) is linked with the rise of Mussolini to power through his “March on Rome” in 1922. The Italian fascists gained ground after the defeat of the Factory Councils movement in 1920 (which Gramsci had been closely involved in) and expressed the feeling of betrayal in the petty bourgeoisie following the First World War. Some analysts saw them as simply the tool of the big landowners and the wealthy industrialists, but Gramsci began to develop a more subtle analysis. At first his analysis was somewhat brusque: “What is fascism if viewed through an international scale? It is an attempt to resolve the problems of production and exchange with machine guns and rounds of gunfire” (Gramsci 1978, p. 23). Gramsci, however, had great foresight in relation to the significance of Mussolini’s movement and gradually developed a rounded analysis guided by the need of a united front between all democratic forces against fascism.

Gramsci followed closely the phases of Mussolini’s seizure of power from the March in Rome (1922) through its suppression of press freedom (1925) and the final dissolution of all democratic parties and organizations in 1926. In one of his parliamentary speeches, before his arrest, he argued correctly that Mussolini’s attack on the

Freemasons was the prelude to the closure of all democratic organizations. Fascism was, for him, a modern form of Caesarism, marked by the global rise of the proletariat through the October Revolution of 1917. Fascism—as the most reactionary party of the dominant class—would not hesitate to carry out a bloody coup d'état to safeguard its interests. Already in 1921 he had written that “today there exist in Italy two repressive and coercive apparatuses: fascism and the bourgeois state. It is possible to foresee that, for reasons of its class interests, the ruling class will seek at some particular movement to amalgamate these two apparatuses...by a direct *coup d'état*” (Gramsci 1978, p. 31).

With all due cognizance of the different historical context this analysis of Gramsci's can set the context of our subsequent analysis of the rise of the military dictatorships in Latin America. They responded to a profound organic crisis where the old models of capital accumulation and political legitimation were exhausted. The previously passive masses had become mobilized by populism but this had not been challenged by any effective opposition party. Thus we entered a period of “catastrophic balance” that resulted, for example, in the 1964 military takeover in Brazil. The fascist analogy at the time—for example, in relation to the Pinochet coup of 1973 in Chile—seemed somewhat forced and politically overdetermined. But Gramsci's analysis of the rise of Mussolini is rich and suggestive in a Latin American context I would argue.

To set this period of Latin American history in a broader theoretical context we can also usefully deploy Gramsci's distinction between a “war of maneuver” and a “war of position.” This is a key element in Gramsci's rethinking of what revolution might look like after the era running from the French Revolution to the October Revolution. This was the era after the French Revolution that Marx and Engels dubbed that of “revolution in permanence” when society, as Gramsci put it, was still “in a state of fluidity,” before the great mass political parties and the great economic trade unions (Gramsci 1971, p. 243). Already Engels had recognized toward the end of his life that the models and techniques of bourgeois domination had changed and that the 1848 style “revolution in permanence,” or war of maneuver as Gramsci called, it was no longer viable for the working class and its political parties in the West.

According to Gramsci's logic as he rethought revolution in Italy, “The same thing happens in the art of politics as happens in military art; war of movement increasingly becomes war of position” (Gramsci 1971, p. 243). There is a shift from a frontal attack—the

storming of the Winter Palace in Russia to put it metaphorically—to a slower, more cautious accumulation of forces and building of hegemony in the face of a bourgeoisie now much better protected by the trenches of civil society protecting the citadel of the state. The communist party needed to win allies across society and engage in a democratic type transitional policy in the face of fascism. This was a far more complex political struggle for Gramsci, but one not reducible to a simple reformism. We will return to this crucial distinction—and the associated West-East distinction in Gramsci's thought—but for now we signal its importance in the context of a crisis and the search for alternative strategies of social transformation.

This introduction of the concept of “organic crisis” and the related strategic driver “war of maneuver” sets the context for the analysis that follows of the post-1960 period of crisis in Latin America. There was certainly a “catastrophic balance” between the dominant classes and the newly mobilized masses. We can also detect a situation in which the old order is dying but the new one cannot yet be born. Above all it is an organic crisis of hegemony we are dealing with and not a conjunctural economic or political event. The state again acted in place of the dominant (not ruling) class to restore order and, most crucially, to build hegemony. As with the phase of passive revolution this was—at least in part—a case of the state doing what the ruling class should have been doing.

Revolution

In many ways mirroring the catastrophist visions of the capitalist economic crisis, this period also saw the emergence and rise to dominance of a theory of imminent revolution. Given its condition of dependency and the closure of democratic spaces, the alternatives were now deemed stark: reform or revolution. Debray codified, and arguably simplified, the politics of revolution post-Cuba in the same way in which Gunder Frank had done for the economics of development and underdevelopment. This was a military doctrine and political line that would supposedly take the whole of Latin America forward to revolution. Despite a rhetorical denial that the Cuban Revolution could be repeated, *Revolution in the Revolution* (Debray 1970) did actually seek to produce a timeless blueprint for revolution in Latin America. The underlying assumptions were that all other political currents (Moscow and Beijing above all) had an incorrect analysis,

that the inevitable revolution in Latin America had been delayed only by incorrect imported misconceptions of the situation, and that close study of the Cuban Revolution would provide the key to success. Of course this perspective had a certain resonance in the generalized and global revolutionary atmosphere of the 1960s.

Revolution in the Revolution focused much of its attack on the Marxist conception of a peoples' war and peasant mobilization. For Debray, the peasant has been oppressed from "time immemorial" and has a subconscious respect for the powerful: "It immobilizes the discontented, silences them, leads them to swallow affront..." (Debray 1970, p. 51). Previous peasant-led struggles such as those in Colombia in the 1950s had inevitably led to defeat because of this factor in particular. Ultimately it is the enlightened guerrilla who must lead the revolutionary process through his (yes) own example of self-sacrifice and revolutionary fervor. From this individualist politics flows seamlessly a commitment to military means of struggle forgetting, Karl Clausewitz's famous dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other means." The incipient militarism—tempered in Cuba's case by Castro's own deep roots in Cuban political culture—of this current inspired by Debray who was inspired by Cuba, led almost to the reversal of that principle as the military element became the *sine qua non* for the political struggle, against which all others were measured.

Debray was not alone, of course, in advocating these positions and only epitomized the 1960s belief in armed struggle as a shortcut to revolution, bypassing the slow build up forces and class alliances that had ensued success in the classic Russian and Chinese revolutions. As a student of Louis Althusser, Debray was able to confidently articulate a theoretical revolution in relation to the dusty dogmas of the Communist parties that had, indeed, become rather domesticated in the 1940s and 1950s on the whole. But he remains a vanguardist of the purest sort except that it is not the party but the guerrilla *foco* (focus or vanguard) that plays that role. This is the "small motor" that will start the big motor of the revolution. But there were no mediators between the small and large motors. There was no political strategy vis-à-vis the state other than its destruction. There was little understanding of, or patience with, the political processes of what were after all complex modern societies not least in the Southern Cone. This was an orientation that probably set back the counter-hegemonic struggles of the subaltern by substituting it by the actions of an enlightened heroic guerrilla vanguard.

The death of Che Guevara in 1967 effectively ended the ideological hegemony of this view of revolution even if a number of political movements (not least in the Southern Cone) still acted within its broad parameters. An alternative vision emerged in Chile in 1970 with the victory of the Popular Unity Coalition of Salvador Allende. A parliamentary road to socialism it seemed was not only possible but also suited to the more “developed” parts of Latin America. When Fidel Castro visited Allende in the early 1970s, he did not really dissent from this view. Certainly there were considerable tensions between the more reformist and the more revolutionary wings (to call them something) of Popular Unity but the Cuban Revolution model and its commitment to military means was not really an issue. Only far away overseas after the military coup of 1973 could crass slogans like “Armed road, only road” be heard. While certainly in the very different situation prevailing in Central America armed struggle might have had a role, the millenarian belief in an immediate revolution against imperialism and its local lackeys soon began to lose any purchase it might have had in the early 1960s.

It was only after the period considered here—under re-democratization in the 1980s—that the forces of the Left began “*Reinventing Revolution*” (see McCaughan 1997). What is most interesting from our perspective is the influence of Gramsci’s thought on that process which amounted to a rethink akin to his prison reflections. Gramsci’s critique of economic reductionism, his valorization of culture and civil society and, above all, his understanding that hegemony required consent greatly aided this rethinking of catastrophic economic and political processes. As Evelina Dagnino points out, Gramsci’s conception of social transformation allowed the Latin American Left to move beyond the idea of a revolution as an insurrectional act to seize state power, to posit that “revolution is [now] envisaged as the process of building of a new hegemony, which implies a new world conception [and] the role of ideas and culture assumes a positive character” (Dagnino 1998, p. 37). Revolution was not a predetermined affair, nor even an inevitable outcome of structural contradictions, but rather part of a broader process of social transformation the outcome of which was contingent.

During this period, Latin America experienced revolutionary upheavals of an unprecedented level that had world historical effects. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 is undoubtedly a watershed moment: a full-scale overturning of the old relations of production and property regime. Thus it differed from the Mexican Revolution of 1910–1920

and the Bolivian Revolution of 1952. From very early on it had declared its commitment to socialism. It was not just based on the small group of armed guerrillas. Soon it achieved considerable traction with sections of the peasantry in serious need of an agrarian reform. Furthermore—and against iconic images of the *guerillero heróico*—an absolutely vital role was played by the urban insurrectionary elements. In many ways Cuba was ripe for revolution. Considerably developed in terms of the usual socioeconomic indicators, it was not a question of absolute poverty. Rather, the structural factors included not only uneven development but also an absolute concentration of political power in Batista and his henchmen.

The significance of the Cuban Revolution in Latin America's contemporary history can hardly be overestimated. This is not the place to chart the economic and political cycles or the sometimes-theological debates around its true nature. We should note, however, that for a quarter of a century at least it showed that a noncapitalist social order was possible. Certainly Cuban socialism was never going to be easy to construct: if socialism in one country was impossible, socialism in one island would be even less so. This created considerable deformations at the economic level—dependency on the Soviet Union—and a political order that was highly bureaucratic and commandist. However, keeping within our period 1959–1976 the overall impact on Latin American politics was to empower anticapitalist alternatives and act as a counterweight to the reactionary tendencies unleashed by the Brazilian coup of 1964, that of Chile in 1973, and that of Argentina in 1976.

The Cuban Revolution encouraged a wave of rural guerrilla warfare across a number of countries. This cycle of guerrilla struggles lasted approximately from 1959 to 1967. Its clearest discursive statement was made by Che Guevara in his message to the Tricontinental Conference in 1967 where he declared that “the indigenous bourgeoisie have lost all their capacity to oppose imperialism—if they ever had it—and they have become the last card in the pack. There are no other alternatives: either a socialist revolution or a caricature of revolution” (Guevara 1968, p. 574). This was a period when guerrilla fronts were formed—largely by urban intellectuals and students—to fight in the hills for a recreation of the Cuban Revolution. Thus rural insurgencies were mounted in Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela, for example, all ending in abject failure. The most decisive attempt at implementing this strategy occurred in Bolivia in 1966 led by “Che” Guevara and supported by the local Communist Party.

Bolivia had seen a nationalist revolution in 1952 and there was a mining proletariat of considerable weight and political experience. But the Cuban strategy of *foquismo* (creating a revolutionary focal point) was probably doomed from the start. An ill-chosen social and geographical terrain, a lack of serious implementation in the local class struggle (then in a downturn anyway), and a reliance on the only halfheartedly committed local communists, meant that failure was only a matter of time. Regis Debray—author of *Revolution in the Revolution* and closely involved in the insurgency—concluded that “Che’s loss—savage, sudden, unbelievable—came like a shock of cold water to those who were living in the euphoria of those extraordinary times” (Debray 1977, p. 238). Rural guerrilla warfare now took a downward turn. Ironically, the workers movement—which it had not engaged with—began the process of recomposition with the Cordobazo in Argentina and strikes in Brazil in 1969 followed by a radical popular assembly experiment in Bolivia itself in 1970.

It was not only a rural impact but also an urban effect that the Cuban Revolution had, as local revolutionaries translated the Cuban model to an urban setting. This cycle ran approximately from 1967 to 1973 and was focused very much on the Southern Cone and Brazil. In these locations Debray’s original critique of the corrupting influence of the city made little sense as in Argentina, for example, with a powerful and well organized urban working class. Abraham Guillén, theorist of this turn to the urban domain, declared in 1966 that “the revolution’s potential is where the population is...prolonged urban warfare based on many small military victories which together will render final victory” (Guillén 1969, p. 79). The rural *foquismo*—the small engine that would start a bigger engine—as described by Regis Debray—was replaced by a new urban based militarism. Technically proficient, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria) in Chile, the ALN (Alianza Libertadora Nacional) and others in Brazil, and above all the Montoneros and ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo) in Argentina constituted the second great wave of insurgency, to varying degrees inspired by the Cuban Revolution.

Again Regis Debray provides an informed eyewitness account of how “it became patent with the death of Marighela [leader of the Brazilian ALN] in 1970 that urban guerrilla warfare in Brazil had suffered a strategic defeat” (Debray 1977, p. 230). No amount of sensational kidnappings, audacious Robin Hood type actions, or dramatic media headlines could mask this defeat. It was only a matter of

time before the disconnected urban intellectual militants were seized by the repressive apparatus of the state. In Chile the MIR's trajectory was interrupted by the rise of Popular Unity in 1970. In Uruguay the near legendary Tupamaros were fairly easily wrapped up by a military regime in 1972. Notably, however, ex-Tupamaro leader José Mujica became the president in 2011 even though that is another era of course. In Argentina the outcome was more drawn out. The Guevarist ERP sought to continue Guevara's futile rural foco in the northern province of Tucumán but later mounted spectacular large scale urban actions. The Peronist Montoneros were a more formidable force with strong roots in Peronist civil society. However, both were effectively decapitated by the Peronist regime in 1975 even before the seizure of power by the military in 1976.

It was not only isolated guerrilla movements that ensued from the Cuban effect but also a new working class insurgency. Argentina's Cordobazo uprising of 1969 symbolizes this new mood of insurgency and that all was now possible. Cordoba's car industry was well established and had created an urban working class less marked by Peronism than elsewhere. Rather various class struggle (*clasista*), rank, and file (*basismo*) tendencies vied for influence. The Onganía dictatorship of 1966 was seeking to impose order over weak civilian governments much as the Brazilian reformers that came to power in 1964 was. In 1969 a semi-spontaneous urban insurrection sprung to life in Cordoba bringing together the new working class, public employers, and a volatile student movement. The armed struggle organizations were there but only in support. The spirit of Gramsci was also there in the shape of the *Ordine Nuovo* 1921 factory council-influenced current emerging out of the Communist Party. The Cordobazo marked the emergence of something new that, much later, would produce working class formations such as the Workers' Party in Brazil.

Guevarism was not absent from the Cordobazo either (even from the Gramscian grouping around Aricó) and it would be wrong to reduce its significance to the *guerillero heroico* myth, or going up to the mountains. Debray was right, I think, to argue that "Che seems intuitively to have grasped the danger...of being trapped between the confused stagnation...of the armed fronts which had come into being from 1960 to 1965, and the fact that the legal road seemed to be barred to everyone" (Debray 1977, p. 240). This was, after all the era of the 1964 coup in Brazil and the 1966 coup in Argentina. If the guerrilla movements stagnated for too long then they would, indeed,

cease to represent a credible political alternative. A stabilization of dependent development and a *modus vivendi* with US imperialism would ensue. A strong subjective impetus was needed and hence the adventurist expedition to Bolivia was launched. Two years after its failure—and Che's death—the Cordobazo in Argentina represented the birth of a new revolutionary subject.

The phase of the Cuban Revolution closes really with the Nicaraguan revolt of 1979, which overthrew the Somoza regime. The Sandinista movement built on the legacy of Augusto Sandino, anti-imperialist leader of the 1930s, but it was essentially a Cuban model carrying out insurgencies in 1963 and 1967. From the mid-1970s onward a renewed Sandinismo under a pragmatic leadership (Daniel Ortega, current president of Nicaragua) was able to isolate the Somoza regime politically and construct a counter-hegemonic alliance. The military campaign or insurrection that came to a head in 1979 was relatively quick and decisive. However, as was predicted by some at the time the Sandinista regime did not achieve a new democratic socialist society and was soon bogged down in a war with the counterrevolutionary *contras* that had the active support of a considerable proportion of the peasantry and the tacit support of many more. When Daniel Ortega returned as president in 2007 after the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990, it was as leader of a reactionary personalist coalition with little in the way of a Left programme.

Overall this period ended in defeat—Nicaragua 1979 being the exception proving the rule. The brief revolution in Grenada (1979–1983) showed just how exposed radical regimes were in the new world order. The 1980s were, of course, the “lost decade” in terms of development and the 1990s saw retrenchment in Cuba (the “special period”) and confident reactionary policies in command. It would only be after 2000 that a new wave of revolutionary energy was unleashed taking this time its shape of left-of-center governments overall. This is a new Left which, as Jorge Castañeda puts it, had moved “beyond utopia” (Castañeda 1993). Dependency in its crude Frankian version lacked any credibility and posing the political options as either “socialism or fascism” was simply not adequate in the new order. The militarization of the Left had led to a militarization of politics or, as the very least, contributed to it. The era of the Cuban Revolution was closed symbolically in 1976 with the military dictatorship in Argentina moving into a merciless dismantling of one of the strongest armed political formations Latin America had ever known.

Economic Transition

During the heyday of economic liberalism—basically the 1990s—there was a tendency for many commentators to (re)construct the import substitution (ISI) period as one of rampant economic populism that was bound to end in disaster. The reality was, of course, more complex as we need to explain, but it is certainly the case that its demise marked a key economic transition in Latin America's pattern of capital accumulation and social development. It was central to the Prebisch/ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America) vision for development that reforming the structures of the economies of Latin America through industrialization was the means to escape their dependent position in the global order. The 1950s thus saw an unprecedented level of state intervention directed toward industrialization. This would include the creation of national development banks, tax credits to national industry, and raised wages so as to help create a domestic market. It is often forgotten that this strategy was not set against foreign investment and Perón, for example, was very keen to attract international companies to empower this development model.

The structuralist perspective underlying the ISI strategy placed the state in a pivotal role. This interventionist state would seek to transform the relations of production and kick-start a new phase of capital accumulation in Latin America. The economic role of the state expanded vastly as it took on the development of the steel, engineering, transport, and communications industries. It also set the parameters for the new economic model through the macroeconomic policies—including, where necessary, protectionist measures and flexible exchange rates to facilitate imported inputs. This was a national development state explicitly committed to nationalist objectives, although often posed within a broader Latin American frame. The state also acted as a pivot between the new capitalist sectors it was seeking to generate and the subaltern classes—in particular the urban working class—which it sought to co-opt in its drive to create a new hegemonic bloc. The social and cultural policies of this state were also directed at securing a broad popular mandate for its national development strategy.

In terms of its achievements, the ISI strategy resulted in a veritable economic transformation of Latin America. A number of countries (including Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina) were able to create a heavy industry sector while almost all acquired the capacity to produce basic goods. Above all, in terms of the structural dependence

diagnosed by ECLA, there was a decisive move in many countries to reduce reliance on traditional primary products for export. This also generated a boost for employment, creating a working class and an emerging professional class as well. Manufacturing grew steadily in importance, representing 25 percent of GDP in 1980 compared to 18 percent in 1950. Brazil in particular achieved remarkable levels of industrialization with the national production of goods increasing by 250 percent between 1950 and 1964. Annual growth rates in Latin America were higher than those in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Industrialization and urbanization created a Latin America in the 1960s that was unrecognizable from that of the 1930s.

By the 1960s, however, it was generally acknowledged that the “easy” phase of ISI had become exhausted. Part of this was about reaching technical limits in terms of what previous inputs could be substituted by locally manufactured goods. A leap into more sophisticated forms of production—both for local consumption and also for export—was now called for. This would require new skills and greater levels of efficiency. Raúl Prebisch himself began to call for a move beyond ISI and the removal of protectionist barriers (Prebisch 1950). Other proponents of ISI, particularly Brazil’s political leaders, began to call for a greater emphasis on agricultural modernization and a thorough agrarian reform to boost productivity and broaden the property owning classes. There was a need for greater investment, as well, something that could not be generated locally. Overall though, a key limit to ISI as hegemonic project was reached because it was limited in its social impact, it did not reduce social inequality, it generated inflationary tendencies, and it had a tendency toward undemocratic corporatist political arrangements.

As with any paradigm, or period of paradigmatic change, ISI as a development model did not just collapse in the 1970s; indirect elements of ISI can be seen in various countries into the 1980s. The alternative free-market approach—which had always existed in the Latin American debate on the fringes—first had to prove itself. The two first forays into a new free-market-oriented strategy were carried out under military dictatorships: the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile after 1973 and the Videla dictatorship in Argentina after 1976. The “Chicago boys” in Chile and the Martínez de Hoz team in Argentina were able to rely on the repressive measures needed to remove any countervailing social power that might contest the new model. However, they

were not able to achieve hegemony for the new approach given that it emerged into the world dripping with blood. Thus ISI continued for some time as the dominant paradigm even while its assumptions were being challenged from without, and its modalities changed internally to deal with its obvious limitations.

The import substitution model, as we saw in the previous chapter, emerged at least in part as a response to the disruptions to world trade caused by the depression of the 1930s and the impact of the Second World War. While it was successful in both economic and political terms during this period, its contradictions became evident as the transition to a new model of accumulation began. The ISI model did reduce external economic dependence to some degree and utterly changed the structure of production. What is sometimes forgotten is how successful the model was in development terms. Between 1910 and 1980 Latin American GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increased by an average of 5.3 percent annually across the board (Ffrench-Davis 1994, p. 159). Average income per capita increased albeit around half that rate—but in a very uneven way between social groups, rural, and urban areas as well as intra and inter-regionally. Capital accumulation accelerated but also, not surprisingly, social differentiation as the division of labor became more complex.

The 1960s was a period of great international trade expansion that the Latin American economies were very much part of. Clearly it was the largest countries with significant preexisting levels of industrialization that benefited most including the Southern Cone, Brazil, and Mexico. But Central America and the Andean countries also benefited from this trend. In the 1970s there was easy access to cheap external capital that allowed the import substitution industrialization boom to continue. The fear of being closed off from international capital markets that was prevalent in the 1950s now seemed forgotten. Nor was there any perceived need to continue with a self-reliant inward-looking strategy, which created some delinking from the global economy, because it was later perceived as benign and favorable to Latin American development. All this was to change in 1980 with an abrupt end to growth, growth rates shrinking to one quarter what they were previously, and average income levels beginning to drop across the board (Ffrench Davis 1994, p. 174).

The global economy had begun to go through profound changes in the 1970s that led to considerable impact on Latin America. The so-called oil shocks of 1973 and 1978 were significant markers, but the underlying crisis of the postwar capital accumulation model

would have long-term structural impact. Capitalism in the core countries was clearly floundering from the mid-1970s onward and the legendary postwar stability of the model had evaporated. The transnational corporations were emerging as the dynamic bearers of new, more internationalized relations of production. The hegemony of the United States was countered by an emerging European Union and a dynamic Japan. Of particular relevance to Latin America, this was the period of the rise of the NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries). Coming from behind Latin America, the East Asian NICs (but also China and India) achieved higher GDP per capita rates in the 1970s and then simply raced ahead in the subsequent decades. Economic policy makers in Latin America were rethinking the situation and their economic strategies.

The exhaustion of import substitution industrialization had been mentioned since the mid-1960s but it became more common in the 1970s. However a level of inertia and the absence of a clear-cut alternative meant it continued albeit with less dominant class backing. Horizontal expansion of capitalist relations was more or less achieved, now vertical integration was required. To achieve this result the labor process and relations of production needed to be brought fully under the sway of capital. The “formal subsumption” of labor needed to be followed by the “real subsumption” of labor to ensure the continued expansion of capitalism. Marx distinguishes between the “formal” and “real” subsumption of the labor process by capital. At first, capital draws into itself *existing* labor processes, for example, deploying noncapitalist techniques, markets, means of production, and workers. This Marx calls “*formal*” subsumption, under which the labor process as such continues much as before. Capitalism, however, cannot develop on this limited basis and is compelled to transform the relations of production. The prerequisite for the *real* capitalist subsumption is a shift to a labor process created by capital itself. Thus, capital gradually *transforms* the social relations and modes of labor until they become thoroughly imbued with the requirements of capital, and the labor process is then *really* subsumed under capital.

The “deepening” of industrialization thus required greater labor discipline, hence the rise of an authoritarian regime from the mid-1960s onward. Undoubtedly though, it was the external environment that would provide the key impetus for a change of direction in Latin America. The debt crisis of 1982, as the loans accumulated throughout the 1970s exploded, brought an end to expansion and the

start of the “lost decade” in terms of growth rates and human development indicators.

While import substitution was growing as Cardoso and Faletto note, “The penetration of foreign capital was not regarded as a development problem even though it marginalized certain domestically owned industries” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, p. 158). Indeed there was a notable synergy between national, private, foreign, and state capital sectors with considerable interconnections and synergies. There were backward and forward linkages created across sectors and thus the “developmentalist alliance” prospered. The urban market expanded and a new working class consumption pattern was added to the preexisting middle class market. Protectionist policies also benefited the foreign investor. Populist political forms were not a major concern for the dominant classes as basic stability was ensured. That all began to change in the late-1960s and early-1970s as more complex technologies were imported insofar as light industrialization was completed and the global shift from competitive to monopoly capitalism began to have an impact in Latin America.

Once ISI slowed down then it was inevitable that contradictions between the new internationalized sector and the one dedicated to the internal market would come to the fore. The technologically advanced capital goods sectors, for example, were not that interested in the internal consumer market compared, say to the right consumer goods sector. Increased productivity meant greater capital intensity that meant a smaller workforce and those remaining being more exploited. The modern/traditional divide previously incarnated in the urban/rural worlds was now evident within the industrial sector with an internationalized high-productivity sector becoming differentiated from a less competitive, less capital intense sector. This contradiction was apparent within the working class but most particularly within the “dominant” classes that became quite seriously split following this divide. New forms of dependency—technological and financial above all—were also being created that would dominate over the next period.

In the nonindustrial sector we note that the agrarian question in Latin America was marked since the early postcolonial period by an extremely uneven distribution of land. In 1960—as the national development state became dominant—the large *latifundios* (representing barely 5 percent of the total farming units) held 80 percent of the land, with the small *minifundios* (representing 80 percent of the total farming units) owned barely 50 percent of the land (Kay 2004, p.

232). There was not, on the whole (except to an extent in Argentina) a significant medium-sized farm sector between the minifundio and latifundio. This system was the underpinning of the agrarian oligarchy we have been referring to and it was based on strong government support and extremely repressive and exploitative conditions for the smallholders and the different categories of agricultural laborers that kept this system going.

Even the populist politicians tended not to interfere with this land holding pattern and the local power of the landholders. Both Vargas in Brazil (1930–1945) and Perón in Argentina (1945–1955) focused more on industrial development policy with barely some measures in favor of rural workers but posed no fundamental challenge to the agrarian oligarchy. All this was to change in 1960 in the wake of the Cuban Revolution of 1979. Already in the 1950s “population pressure on inadequate land resources was a...factor making [agrarian] reform an urgent issue in densely populated regions” (Long 1998, p. 348). So while urbanization and industrialization brought their own pressures to bear on a system that was as inefficient as it was inequitable, it was the political risk created by the peasant-based Cuban Revolution that turned US policy in particular, through the Alliance for Progress, toward agrarian reform.

In the course of the 1960s there was a major emphasis placed on land reform across Latin America. More than half of the countries carried out an agrarian reform “from above” rather than as a response to peasant protest. The issues to be tackled ranged from security of title, lack of infrastructure, and working conditions but, above all, access to land. The Chilean land reform under Christian Democrat governments after 1964 symbolized this “conservative modernization” or enlightened preventative state reforms. This was the basis for a more aggressive land reform after 1970 under the socialist government of Salvador Allende. In general terms despite all the limitations, Norman Long argues that “agrarian reform produced substantial changes in agrarian structures. It put an end to the underexploited, decentralized estate and inadvertently, fostered the development of the middle-sized, privately owned farm” (Long 1998, p. 540).

It would also be wrong to underestimate the political effect of the agrarian reform discourse and practice in the 1960s and into the 1970s. However, overall, we are left with an impression that the promise of land reform never really materialized and that the redistributive impact of the reforms was actually relatively minor. There were many problems in the delivery of the agrarian reforms as Cristóbal Kay explains,

“Mistakes in their design and implementation contributed to their eventual unravelling. Often they were implemented in a half-hearted fashion: in other instances fierce political opposition from landlords restricted the reforms” (Kay 2004, p. 232). Nevertheless, even if just in terms of their unintended consequences—increased penetration of capitalism and social differentiation of the agrarian sectors—these reforms were a watershed in Latin American history.

Underlying debates on economic policy was the ongoing crisis of hegemony within the dominant bloc. No social group seemed able, during this period, to construct a politico-moral leadership for social transformation. This applied equally on the conservative side as in the subaltern side of society and politics at the time. Norbert Lechner also poses this period as a failure of reformism in the sense that “reformism is the failed attempt to construct hegemony” (Lechner 1977, p. 63). There had been no decisive bourgeois revolution in Latin America as we saw in previous chapters. Going further we can say, with Lechner, that the bourgeoisie was never a national class in the dual sense that it did not unify the various social groups within the borders of the national state nor was it able to bridge the divide between the urban and rural worlds with a unifying discourse and practice. In brief, it was not able to build an autonomous national power base with any degree of stability.

Certainly while the very category of national bourgeoisie is problematic in Latin America we must note that it was not certainly created during the national-popular period. Its dependence on external forces, flows, and powerful economic players was allied to its dependence on an agro-export oligarchy that still wielded considerable power. The “compromise state” could only contain for a limited time the contradictions of dependent capitalism. These cannot be interpreted mechanically as leading inexorably to a catastrophic political outcome. But it is clear that the “compromise state” never became a national state with a solid hegemonic base and a sustainable degree of legitimacy. Without the emergence of a “general interest,” the state would inevitably have to rely on coercion. That is the meaning of the military interventions of this period that had the backing of key sectors of the dominant classes seeking outside assistance to ensure the stable reproduction of the capitalist relations of production and the disciplining of an increasingly recalcitrant subaltern world, which had been empowered by national-popular discourses and practices.

The national-popular period closes symbolically in 1964 but we could argue that the transition period to a new model was completed

in 1976 with a decisive military coup in Argentina that set a new standard in terms of brutality against its own people. In that country the revolutionary alternative was posed most clearly with an insurgent labor movement building strength since 1969 and a number of armed struggle organizations with considerable roots in the popular classes. The dominant classes, while confident enough, were quite short-term in orientation and never regained anything comparable to the hegemonic project of the 1870–1930 golden era. With the decomposition of Peronism as a stable transformist ideology keeping the working class within certain limits, the moves toward military intervention were more or less inevitable. What emerged was a decisive shift toward the recomposition of bourgeois hegemony on a new basis, more “fit for purpose” in the era of an internationalized internal market and a new finance—driven monopoly capitalism.

The 1964 coup in Brazil brought to power a state-oriented military regime that implemented a technocratic but nationalist economic programme. The military intervention in Chile in 1973 led to a monetarism *avant la lettre* as the “Chicago Boys” economic team sought to implement at the point of bayonet—the free-market doctrines of Milton Friedman. The cohesion and power of this economic team was legendary with O’Brien commenting that “they were able to act as a ‘vanguard party’” of a sector of capital. Backed by leading sectors of the Chilean capitalist class, as well as international capitalist agencies, and US business interests, they argued for a revolutionary overhaul of the Chilean economy and society” (O’Brien 1985, p. 151). This decisive move by a technocratic group, with unprecedented political power, and the full panoply of repression to back it up, was equally evident in Argentina after 1979. Time would tell whether this “capitalist revolution” would come to fruition.

Military State

The military regimes of the 1970s were unprecedented in terms of the ferocity of the repression they unleashed and in their promotion of a radically different development model. The compromise state, as developed since the 1930s, was to be summarily dispatched. The international domain was crucial here as had been the crisis of 1929 in detonating the political crisis of the 1930s in Latin America. It is the period 1973–1976—coinciding with the first oil crisis and the start of the post-hegemonic period in the North—that set the context for the rise of the new military dictatorships in Latin America.

Since the Second World War, the Latin American economies had become integrated into the international circuit of production, now it would become an integral element of the international financial circuit through the massive rise of the foreign debt. The end of the populist cycle and the ISI model was to be followed by a new political order based on force and integration into the international financial markets through the rise of a new financial oligarchy with agrarian and industrial bases as well.

The first Left analysis of the new dictatorships gravitated toward the historical experience of fascism in 1930s Europe. From this activist perspective there was an analysis of the military intervention as a form of fascism, an approach taken in relation to the Pinochet coup of 1973 in particular. There was also a similar tendency to discern anti-Semitic and extreme Catholic nationalist views amongst Argentina's military dictators. It was not difficult to find parallels with 1930s Europe, but it did not serve to define the new regimes. The fascist analogy had some general relevance in terms of the coups responding to economic crisis and political activation. However, most of the core characteristics of fascism as a regime of exception including a mobilized petty bourgeoisie were rarely present.

In Chile particularly, given the deep roots of Marxism as a form of common sense on the left, and the history of a long, practically unbroken experience of parliamentary democracy, this was an understandable reaction to the 1973 coup. A vicious counterrevolution from above, a mobilized anti-Left middle class, and the displays of a goose-stepping military repression, including book burning, all evoked memories of Nazism. On closer inspection, however, the label of fascism was taken out of context when applied to Latin America in the 1970s. The international setting was different; the middle class soon passed into opposition and no new political order was actually going to be established. In Brazil, dependency theorists such as Theotonio Dos Santos developed an interpretation based on the notion of "dependent fascism" while others even saw Brazil playing a "sub-imperialist" role across Latin America sometimes in alliance with apartheid South Africa (Dos Santos 1973; Marini 1976). Ultimately fascism, as an analytical category, did not travel well away from Germany in the 1930s and it acted more as a political interpellation than a guide to action.

From progressive intellectual circles, a more nuanced characterization emerged that focused largely on Guillermo O' Donnell's notion of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state. In terms of theoretical

explanations and conceptual models to understand the new political order this soon became the dominant approach in academic and, later, in policy-making circles. Its basic argument is that by the early-1960s the delayed dependent industrialization since 1929 had reached an impasse with chronic inflation and instability, a decline in local and foreign investment, and a fiscal crisis of the state. The Bureaucratic State (BA), according to O'Donnell "is a set of organizations in which specialists in coercion have increased weight, as do those who seek to 'normalise' the economy" (O'Donnell 1979, p. 35). The bureaucratic technocratic element is designed to distance the BA from the caudillos or personalist military rulers of the past. There is an "elective affinity" posed between the economic transformation and the BA as political regime. While it had considerable empirical purchase in relation to the Southern Cone and Brazil, this model provided little insight into Mexico, Central America, and the Andean countries at this time. The basic argument was that the crisis of the ISI model and increased political activism had led to a "deepening" of industrialization under authoritarian regimes that were necessary to subdue the popular sectors. The delayed dependent industrialization since the 1930s had reached an impasse and the hitherto quiescent urban and rural masses entered a phase of intensive activation thus causing a political crisis. The international context was set by a transnationalizing dynamic that rendered the nationalist state redundant. While it sometimes read as if there was an implacable logic leading to the BA state, sensitively deployed (somewhat like Cardoso and Faletto's structural-historical reading of dependency) this framework could sensitize analysis to the interplay between national/international and economic/political processes. Subsequent models of the transition to democracy developed by O'Donnell and colleagues (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986) equally carried the risk of abstract model building while also promoting concrete analysis of democratization dynamics.

My own preference is to work on the assumption that these were modernizing military dictatorships. Their overwhelmingly dominant characteristic was the monopoly of political power by the armed forces. They were modernizing in a way that nineteenth century military caudillos were not, given their role in promoting an accelerated rhythm of capital accumulation based on a deeper integration with the world economy. The bureaucratic-authoritarian state model suffered from a certain economism in which economic and political affinities were sometimes overdetermined. The term "dependent fascism" on the other hand suffered from a political reductionism that reduced

the political choice to “fascism or revolution,” thus foreclosing any notion of democratic dependent development (which was what eventually emerged after dictatorships). In more general terms it is perhaps important to be wary of structural determinism in accounting for these very different regimes across many countries where the dynamic was always different and where contingency, political process, and even personality (Pinochet) played a role in the construction and dismantling of the new military dictatorships.

The military states generally went through two clearly defined phases: the first was a reactive one seeking to undo the perceived flaws of the previous order, while the second was aimed at a virtual, political reformation. In the first phase repression was the main modality of power, whereas in the subsequent phase some form of institutionalization was attempted. “cutting out the cancer” of populism or Marxism could only be an emergency operation, it had to be followed by something positive. That is where the new economics fitted in because it could be portrayed as the foundation of a new order while conflict would be in the past. The cultivation of fear, passivity, and conformity was the main drive at first, seeking to reconstruct a new model citizen followed and it was often a more difficult task. Dealing with subversion of the established order was something the repressive apparatus of the state were well equipped to do. Building a new order that would not slip back into disorder, through monetarist economics, a military conception of politics, and an authoritarian social and cultural ethos was something they all eventually failed to achieve.

The revolutionary upsurge and the economic crisis of the old national-popular model called for a decisive dominant class response. A structural interpretation according to Norbert Lechner would be premised on the notion that “the new authoritarianism emerges as a reaction to two movements: internally, the shaping of the class struggle which destabilizes the structure of domination without being able to create a new order. Externally, the internationalization of capital transforms the process of accumulation and promotes a reordering of the local economies” (Lechner 1977, p. 32). The internal-external dialectic of dependent development is clear enough. But my own view would be to give priority to the “internal” class struggle dynamic that in many ways incorporates or internalizes the wider global struggle that cannot really be seen as “external.” Likewise, while certainly these factors underlie the shift toward coercion over consent we should not overplay the structural element and thus neglect the element of contingency and the concrete dynamic of politics in each country.

Undoubtedly the threat from the subaltern classes, real or imagined, played a significant role in motivating military intervention. The “communist peril” was real enough in the minds of military strategists, and the specter of the Cuban Revolution played an important role in their decision making. Of course the popular pressure on the state could take a different form as in the ever-present threat of a “*retorno*” of Perón after 1955 or Goulart’s diffuse and confused radicalism in 1962–1963. Democracy was now perceived as a clear threat to the established order insofar as it permitted the articulation of popular demands. Military intervention was seen as a necessary precondition to ensure development and national security. The military could also quite readily, within its own doctrinal framework, see its intervention as that of an arbiter standing above sectoral interests. Thus its decisive move into economic, political, and social affairs could be posed—and seen by itself—as a rational, technocratic form of arbitration on behalf of the national interest.

The achievements of the modernizing military regimes or BA states were mixed. The restructuring of the economies by the economist teams with military backing was an ambitious task and not without contradictions. There were, most certainly, fundamental changes in the structures of production, employment, and financial intermediation that would not be easily reversed. The conditions were created for a decisive move toward the concentration of capital and the atomization of the working class. Inflation was brought down on the whole but, as Thorp and Whitehead argue, “The gains from any such reduction must be weighed against the damage to development prospects that has frequently accompanied anti-inflation packages” (Thorp and Whitehead 1987, p. 318). The opening of the economy to the world market was successful but not necessarily for long. And any gains in terms of diversification of the economic base must be, however, set against the massive debt accrued under the military regimes and its subsequent impact across society.

In political terms, it could be said that in the short-term a macabre peace of the graveyards was imposed. Terror was certainly an effective tool for political disarticulation, especially when used decisively and practically without limits to destroy any opposition as in Argentina. But as Germany’s arch-modernizer Count Bismarck was fond of saying you can do many things with bayonets but sitting on them is not one of them. Once the immediate crisis was over the military regimes were far less successful in articulating an alternative political model with the partial exception of Pinochet where “Pinochetismo”

achieved a certain base. The rhetoric of national security was ultimately a fragile basis for establishing a new legitimate political order. Likewise there was no escaping the interpretations of democracy and even the military foundation documents usually returned to some concept of democracy, albeit “managed” or limited in some way. The logic of war—opposing sides in full “win or lose” confrontation—would eventually give way to a political logic, and the military began to negotiate their withdrawal from the political arena.

While the Southern Cone and Brazil provided the raw material for the BA state model there were, of course, other political responses to the crisis of the national-popular model. Thus in Peru there was a military regime from 1968 to 1975 that could perhaps, be seen as both bureaucratic and authoritarian, but in its essential dynamics it was quite different. Thus Velasco Alvarado presided over a “progressive” military regime that nationalized its Peruvian mines and fisheries, telephone, and power production industry, as well as carrying out a far-reaching agrarian reform. While the regime ran into the same problems as elsewhere in terms of growing inflation and balance of payments problems, its political impact was quite the opposite of the Southern Cone modernizing military regimes. They supported the popular unity government in Chile and allowed the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) to open an office in Lima. Though Alvarado was eventually displaced by his fellow officers when he died, his coffin was carried around Lima by for six hours by an entourage of campesinos who had benefited from his agrarian reforms.

Elsewhere in Latin America more traditional patterns of politics and of opposition continued. Thus in Mexico the government of Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) continued with populist economic policies such as the nationalization of the mines and electricity as well as a deepening of the agrarian reform. Mexican trade unions continued to be a powerful part of the state apparatus that certainly controlled labor but did not decimate it. That is not to say the regime was benign: as Interior Minister, Echeverría had ordered the infamous Tlatelolco massacre in 1968 and another killing of students occurred in 1971. This was not however, a military dictatorship. In Central America meantime there was what seemed like a postponed reprise of the 1960s revolutionary wave. The FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional) was formed in El Salvador in 1970 and in Guatemala several guerrilla groups were formed and garnered some support amongst indigenous communities, and in Nicaragua the Sandinistas began a campaign that would achieve victory at the

end of the decade. That is to say a pattern of ruling class division and subaltern insurgency prevailed.

The turbulent period of Latin American history running from the Cuban Revolution (1959) to the 1976 military coup in Argentina can, in retrospect, be seen as a clear transitional phase. The old way was dying but the new was not ready to emerge. The compromise state that had served the purpose of bourgeois legitimation and controlled popular participation from 1929 onward no longer worked. The impact of the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s was to demonstrate a decisive, revolutionary impetus for radical change. *Guevarismo* was not amenable to *transformismo*: it could not easily be tamed and brought into safe institutional channels. Even the reasonably moderate Popular Unity government in Chile (1970–1973) was seen as a fundamental threat and it unleashed a terrifying response from imperialism and the dominant classes. It was a veritable counterrevolution that emerged seeking to alter fundamentally the capital-wage-labor balance of forces and create a democracy that was safe for capital.

The other purpose of the military state was to achieve a recomposition of the dominant classes that would allow them to establish clear-cut hegemonic rule as the agrarian oligarchy was able to show prior to 1929. In some cases it was reasonably successful as in Brazil where a self-confident hegemonic order learned to live with the likes of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the critical voice of dependency. It was less successful in Argentina where 30 years on from the military nightmares, Kirchnerismo in power represents the heirs of the Montoneros to a large degree. Furthermore in Mexico, where neither BA nor military dictatorship occurred, stability of the dominant order was achieved (until recently) within the parameters of a revolutionary nationalist ideology. Even in Chile, where Pinochetismo aspired to many more decades in power as occurred with Francoism, the demise of the dictator was sudden: held in Britain for crimes against humanity, tried in Chile, and then buried with no state honors. The militarized agony of society was not just over but truly exorcised.

Market Hegemony (1973–2001)

A combination of global economic transformations and Latin American political shifts came together in a decisive move to impose free-market politics in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s. The previously dominant development model was no longer delivering in economic terms and it had failed to secure stable hegemonic governance. The result was a process of market “Dis-Embedding,” a concept that follows through on Gramsci’s early political economy through to the Second World War period theorizing by Karl Polanyi on the relationship between market and society. In particular we show the relevance of the Polanyian “double movement” (market dis-embedding and re-embedding) for a reading of social transformation in Latin America. The section on “Global Discipline” takes up the massive transformations of the global political economy that occurred in the 1990s ushering in the era of globalization, as it became known. This more integrated global political economy meant that the national development path in Latin America was now foreclosed as neoliberal economic policies began to take a grip. Then, the section on “Remaking Society” is dedicated to the Foucaultian disciplinary subjection of Latin American society by the military dictators and some of their democratically elected successors in government. A fundamental reordering of society was seen as necessary to prevent a return to populism and all its perceived unpredictability. The dominant social figure was to become the consumer who now replaced the citizen in the leading role. The final section entitled “Illusions End” deals with the gradual unraveling of the neoliberal edifice and the eventual failure of this decisive move to dis-embed the market from society. The contradictions inherent in this model began to unfold and it generated social forces in opposition that would, eventually,

lead to its downfall. Argentina's dramatic economic collapse in late 2001 and the emergence of a strong counter-dynamic, signals the end of this period and opens up the current phase of dramatic social and political transformations.

Dis-Embedding

Gramsci began his prison sentence in 1928, one year before the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression of the 1930s. There is considerable continuity in his work from the Turin Workers' Councils and Ordine Nuovo period, through the foundation of the Communist Party of Italy and the rise of Fascism through to his prison years, which lasted until his death in 1937. His political evolution was marked by a singular and consistent concern as Peter Thomas put it, "The attempt to elaborate a political theory which would be adequate to give expression to—and just as importantly to shape and guide—the popular and subaltern classes' attempts to awaken from the nightmare of their histories and to assume social and political leadership" (Thomas 2009, p. 59). The organizing axis of this strategic thinking was now the concept of hegemony around which all other elements were to be organized.

In its dominant interpretation, Gramsci's notion of hegemony signals his distance from state-oriented Leninism and acts as a bridge to modern social democracy. In practice, Gramsci deploys the concept of hegemony in a much more nuanced way that cuts across both political society and civil society. Hegemony, as Thomas puts it nicely, "is a particular practice of consolidating social forces and condensing them into political power on a mass basis—the mode of production of the modern 'political'" (Thomas 2009, p. 194). It is thus not a reformist abandonment of politics to focus on civil society through, for example, the media and public opinion. Rather, it is a key to understanding how the political domain is constituted, how social groups are integrated into the political power structure of the state, and how the subaltern may in turn build its own hegemony and strive toward an alternative to the established order.

We have previously stressed the national optic adopted by Gramsci and thus his relevance to nation-building in Latin America. However, we also need to be clear that for Gramsci, while "the point of departure is 'national'" and that is where we must begin, "yet the perspective is international and cannot be otherwise" (Gramsci 1971, p. 240). Gramsci's perspective is thus firmly internationalist and it

is thus no surprise that he has been influential in the contemporary debates in international political economy. The national political domain is unique and needs to be understood in its own right and not just as a reflection of a universal model, be it modernization theory or Marxism. The struggle for hegemony within the nation-state is set in the context of, and conditioned, by the prevailing international political economy as a moment of state formation.

Gramsci's international outlook is manifest most clearly in his later engagement with Americanism and Fordism in the *Prison Notebooks*. Fordism—by which Gramsci meant not just the assembly line but the whole Fordist social system constituting a social regime of accumulation—was triggered by the 1929 crash and the subsequent depression. It was seen as an organic outgrowth of US capitalism and not just something imposed from the outside or through the law. It was in relation to this experience specifically that Gramsci declared that “hegemony here is born in the factory” (Gramsci 1971, p. 285). Gramsci was wondering if a new world order was being built around a specific regime of accumulation (Fordism). He was quite conscious that the global balance of forces was slipping away from Europe. In the United States, compared to Europe, “the non-existence of viscous parasitic sedimentation left behind by past phases of history has allowed industry and commerce in particular to develop on a sound basis” (Gramsci 1971, p. 285).

North America never experienced European feudalism as Latin America did. Therein we find another contrast where Gramsci's concepts may illuminate our rethinking of Latin America. For Gramsci, “The disappearance of the semi-feudal type of *rentier* as in Italy are one of the major conditions of an industrial revolution (and, in part, the revolution itself)” (Gramsci 1971, p. 293). These “predators of surplus value” produced by the peasantry reflected a “most hideous and unhealthy means of capital accumulation” (Gramsci 1971, p. 293). In North America, feudalism neither as a mode of production nor as a mode of political domination has ever prevailed. Gramsci was positing a Fordist mode of regulation based on mass production, high wages, and a minimum “quality of professional political and ideological intermediaries” (Gramsci 1971, p. 285) as the ingredients for a new hegemonic superpower on the rise.

Gramsci did not live to see the full flourishing of Americanism and Fordism after the Second World War. The theme of market dominance over society was taken up during his time in prison and after his death by another European Marxist who also broke with orthodoxy, albeit

outside the communist movement. At its most basic, the Karl Polanyi problematic was premised on the notion of a “great transformation” at the start of the nineteenth century leading to the dominance of free-market principles. But this social transformation led to countermovement through which society protected itself from the effects of untrammelled free-market expansion. History thus advances in a series of “double movements,” according to Polanyi, whereby market expansions create societal reactions. We can posit that the emergence of “globalization” in the last quarter of the twentieth century represents the belated fulfillment of the nineteenth internationalizing phase of human history characterized by “an attempt to set up one big self-regulating market” (Polanyi 2001, p. 70).

According to Polanyi, who was writing during the cataclysm of the Second World War, “The fount and matrix of the [capitalist] system was the self-regulating market” (Polanyi 2001, p. 3). Polanyi traces the birth of market society as we know it to Britain’s Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. Previous societies had been organized on principles of exchange, reciprocity, and redistribution, now market based exchange would be the sole form of social and economic integration. Markets were previously an accessory feature in a system controlled and regulated by social authority. Henceforth the market ruled unchallenged and changed society in its image. “A market economy can exist only in a market society” (Polanyi 2001, p. 74). Economic liberalism was the organizing principle of the new market society where economics and politics were, for the first time, split up. What is remarkable about this economic discourse is that “the road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous centrally organized and controlled interventionism” (Polanyi 2001, p. 146). As with neoliberalism in the 1980s, laissez-faire economics was nothing if not planned.

Polanyi’s self-regulating market was to be based on the “fictitious commodities” of land, labor, and money. That labor should become a commodity that could be bought and sold was essential to the logic of the market economy. But, as Polanyi (Polanyi 2001, p. 75) argues, “Labor, land and money are obviously *not* commodities.... Labor is only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself... land is only another name for nature, which is not produced by man; actually money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power.” Polanyi goes further than Marx to argue that “labor power” is but an “alleged commodity” precisely because it “cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused without

affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity" (Polanyi 2001, p. 76). This is more than just a moral critique of capitalism, however, because Polanyi goes on to argue that trade unions, for example, should be quite clear that their purpose is precisely "that of interfering with the laws of supply and demand in respect of human labor, and removing it from the orbit of the market" (Polanyi 2001, p. 186). Any move from within society to remove any element from the market ("decommodification") thus challenges the market economy in its fundamentals.

When Polanyi distinguishes between real and fictitious commodities, he is going beyond the moral principle that people or nature should not be treated as though they could be bought and sold. The project of creating a fully self-regulating market economy required this fiction but if fully implemented then society and the environment would both be destroyed. In practice, against the basic tenets of liberalism (and in our era of neoliberalism), the state plays a continuous, intensive role in regulating the flow of labor across frontiers: educating and training workers, dealing with unemployment, and so on. The use of land in rural and urban areas is tightly controlled by the state. In actually existing market societies, the state plays a guiding economic role and is never "outside" of the market in any real sense. As Polanyi puts it, "Undoubtedly, labor, land and money *are* essential to a market economy. But no society could stand the effects of such a system of crude fiction for the shortest stretch of time unless its human and natural substance as well as its business organization was protected against the ravages of this satanic mill" (Polanyi 2001, pp. 76–77).

The self-regulating or self-adjusting market was, for Polanyi, a "stark-utopia" in the sense that it could never be achieved. "Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surrounding into a wilderness" (Polanyi 2001, p. 3). In modern terminology, the self-regulating market was neither socially nor environmentally sustainable. Neoliberals today have developed a similarly fundamentalist discourse based on the "magic of the market." Central to this identity is the notion that government interference in economic affairs must be reversed and that the individual market agent or "entrepreneur" should be given a free hand. In this grand schema, society does not exist and nature is seen simply as a factor of production. This market system and the associated laissez-faire ideology "created the delusion of economic

determinism" (Polanyi 1947, p. 70) against which Polanyi calls for the "reabsorption of the economic system in society, for the creative adaptation of our ways of life to an industrial environment" (Polanyi 1947, p. 143).

For Polanyi, in his day, but probably even more so today, "The true implications of economic liberalism can now be taken in at a glance. Nothing is less than a self-regulating market on a world scale could ensure the functioning of this stupendous mechanism" (Polanyi 2001, p. 145). Globalization, in the broadest sense of the word, can thus be seen as inherent in the free-market project. The world, naturally enough from this perspective, becomes just one giant marketplace where everything and everybody can be bought and sold. Social relations are reduced to market relations. The "opening up" of the world market becomes the *raison d'être* of development, with only some token gestures paid to social and human development. What Polanyi analyzed for the national level—in terms of a separation of the economy from the social and political domains of human life—is now becoming realized and empowered on the global terrain. Even the proponents of "globalization with a human face" in the United Nations and elsewhere simply take this free-market project and ideology for granted.

Central to Polanyi's non-economistic understanding of the contemporary economy was the notion of "embeddedness" that has since led to a copious literature in economic sociology. For Polanyi the economy is normally embedded in *social* relations; it is not autonomous. Prior to the emergence of the modern market society, "The economic system was submerged in general social relations. Markets were merely an accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated more than ever by social authority" (Polanyi 2001, p. 70). The self-sufficient precapitalist peasant household was not regulated by the market but, rather, by a moral order. Even when mercantilism began to free trade from localism, it was very much regulated. In fact, according to Polanyi (2001, p. 71), "regulation and markets, in effect, grew up together." Economic relations had always been subordinated or submerged within social relations that were at the core of human existence. Even today, at the height of globalization as dominant development matrix, we find many spheres of social life, such as the household, not subordinated to the logic of the market.

Much of Polanyi's analysis of "embeddedness," depends on his analysis of precapitalist societies that has been neglected by most of those who now value his relevance for an understanding of neoliberalism

and its contradictions. While it serves as a useful paradigm to contrast with contemporary society, it is probably dubious to assume that premarket societies are necessarily more socially cohesive than market ones. Occasionally we might see Polanyi romanticizing “primitive” and “archaic” societies, perhaps reflecting his early commitments to Guild Socialism with its own particular version of a “premarket utopia.” This nostalgia for a long-lost cohesive and secure past is common to most utopian discourses. On the other hand, contemporary analysis of “embeddedness” shows there is no clear-cut and decisive break between embedded premarket and disembedded market societies. Indeed, there is now a flourishing pro-capitalist literature such as Fukuyama’s on “trust” (Fukuyama 1995) that builds precisely on the social and moral ties that bind the ostensibly purely rational agents of the market today.

The rise of the liberal order requires, however, the systematic “disembedding” of the economy from society. This is an order in which “instead of the economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system” (Polanyi 2001, p. 135). There are long-term tendencies under capitalism toward marketization, commodification, and what we could call “economization.” They all entail a “disembedding” of the economy and economic relations from social, community, cultural, or religious forms of regulation. What Polanyi analyzed in terms of the “great transformation” wrought by the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century we can see, in a magnified and more intense form with the Globalization Revolution of the late twentieth century. As Altvater and Mathkopf (1997, p. 451) put it, “The intensity of the process of disembedding is...increased due to...the money form taking on a life of its own *vis-à-vis* the ‘disembedded market’ and...the economy becoming globalised.” The dynamic of disembedding has now taken on global character for the first time, with momentous consequences.

Global Discipline

The new market society to be created by the military and their economic teams in Latin America needed a strong state to achieve their objectives. As the Chilean minister for the economy between 1976 and 1979 stated, “The new democracy...will have to be authoritarian, in the sense that the rules needed for the system’s capability cannot be subjected to political processes” (Cited in Taylor 2006, p. 42). It is well to remember how deeply institutionalized torture

was in these political orders. It was not the breakdown of orderly repression by “normal” means but very much an integral part of the juridico-political system. It fulfils a role akin to that of the Absolutist era. As Michel Foucault recounts for that period, but equally applicable to the late twentieth century dictatorships, “It displays before all eyes an invincible force. It bring[s] into play as its extreme point, the asymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength” (Foucault 1977, pp. 48–49). As all performances of power, this was not merely a negative display designed to terrorize but it was productive in the sense that it generated fear, compliance, and mistrust.

Having noted the sharp end of the disciplinary spectrum we need to take a broader look at how global discipline was exercised by neoliberalism; this period saw a virtual reconstruction of global capitalism based on what Stephen Gill has called “disciplinary neoliberalism” (Gill 2000). The term was not one coined by Left critics but sprung from within one of key promoters of this new order namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that stated in 1997: “The discipline of global product and financial markets applies not only to policy-makers via financial market pressures, but also to the private sector, making it more difficult to sustain unwarranted wage increases...markets will eventually exert their own discipline” (quoted in Gill 2000, p. 4). The market, not least through the international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, would create “investor confidence” and quite openly discipline those who did not submit to the rules of the game, for example, trade unions that insisted on pitting their illegitimate collectivist strength against the market with another logic, namely that of social protection.

The global disciplining of the peripheral capitalist economies occurred under the Orwellian label of structural “reforms.” These were not, of course, progressive if incremental changes in society designed to improve the lot of humanity. Rather these were all measures—such as liberalization, flexibilization, and privatization—designed to increase the power of capital and atomize organized social networks. The state is both subject to global discipline and itself a pivotal element in ensuring internal discipline. The structural power of capital was required fundamentally in the labor market to ensure the subjection of labor to the new political economy. As Gill argues, “While discipline in the workplace is viewed by investors as crucial for confidence it indicates that the indirect power of market forces is not enough to ensure the reproduction of capital. Direct power is

also needed in the form of state action to ensure social control and the provision of laws and coercive potential to ensure that the owners of capital determine how production takes place” (Gill 2000, p. 5). Ultimately the capital/wage-labor relation lies at the heart of the capitalist system and its effective management was the primary issue for the military dictatorships.

The internal discipline is exercised by the state that, contrary to neoliberal myth, does not reduce in importance but, rather, sees it increased. This was an ambitious exercise in social engineering that depended on a strong state. As Marcus Taylor notes in relation to post-1973 Chile, but more broadly applicable, “State institutions that uphold the regulatory power of markets are made more robust through neoliberal restructuring” (Taylor 2006, p. 44). This includes a series of measures to secure the rights of property through judicial and taxation functions as well as the measures necessary to secure monetary stability. Even when the state retreated from previous regulatory functions it does so purely to remove or dis-embed itself from social relations and political contestations. As a systemic programme of social transformation, neoliberalism wielded considerable power to discipline society and the subaltern classes when they put up resistance either active or passive. The objective was an ambitious one: to overcome the economic and political crisis which created the conditions for military intervention but also to restructure society through a global disciplinary programme that would prevent its recurrence.

The changing pattern of capital accumulation and the associated state policies profoundly affected the structures of production but it did not resolve the problems of Chile’s or any other country’s underlying problems. The emphasis on capital development in its money form particularly began to create new imbalances. For example, the removal of vestigial protectionist measures led to imports rapidly outstripping exports. As industrial production faltered—despite the move toward ever-increasing labor-saving techniques—so the “economic miracle” began to rest on the fragile shoulders of unproductive and speculative expansion. The expansion of credit and the rapidly escalating price of real estate provided only temporary respite from the crisis that was bound to come. By the time the global debt crisis impacted on Latin America in the 1980s, the economic strategy of the military regimes was in disarray and the once coherent and unified technocratic managers of the economy were left bereft of strategic initiatives.

Taking a long-term historical view the post-1973 phase is one in which a strong global discipline was (re)imposed on the Latin

American economies. This constrained and distorted the development process requiring a whole-scale reorientation, euphemistically known as “economic reform.” The main tenets of the monetarist doctrine that came to replace *desarrollismo* (developmentalism) were deceptively simple. The market should be allowed to operate unhindered to permit the free determination of prices. The state should thus withdraw from all its regulating functions, the national economy should be opened up to international trade, and the capital and labor markets should be deregulated. The new economic model, launched first under the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile after 1973, was premised on the market—functioning free from state intervention—as the most efficient allocator of resources in society. The main sources of economic difficulties in Latin America were, supposedly, a “bloated” public sector and the distortion in relative prices introduced by an “artificial” industrialization policy.

The compromise state was shattered by military intervention and the development model was overthrown equally decisively. Some analysts point to 1975 as a turning point in this regard that was as decisive and as punctual as 1929 was in terms of being able to see a clear before and after. Be that as it may, the transformed and increased role of international finance after that date saw a new form of international integration beginning. Since the Second World War the more industrialized countries of Latin America had been integrated into the international circuit of production through foreign direct investment (FDI). Now the internationalization of the money-capital circuit opened up a new era in which the international financial markets were dominant. Capital flight out of Latin America was a dominant feature of the 1970s and 1980s, with financial liberalization increasing even further the vulnerability of the Latin American economies. The new financial conglomerates brought profound socioeconomic transformations and also severely weakened the ability of the state to negotiate with foreign capital or take the measures necessary for national economic development, a concept that would, itself, soon be deemed irrelevant with the arrival of globalization in the 1990s.

The roots of this “great transformation” lay in the crisis of the postwar global development model, which opened up around 1973. The first oil crisis of 1973 was followed by the abandonment of the gold standard in 1974 that signaled the start of clear market dominance over international finance. The great debt crisis of 1982 in Latin America can be traced back to this period and the recycling of the petrodollars that accrued from the hike in oil prices in 1973.

Globalization emerged as a strategy by the dominant powers, the big international financial institutions, and the transnational corporations to launch a new more internationalized phase of capital accumulation. They would not rest until the world became “one big market,” as Polanyi had foreseen. Latin American economic strategy, insofar as there were any vestiges of national development still present, was deemed to be at odds with the new world order. “Reform” would be necessary of the banking system, of trade regulations, of labor law, and of any state investment in production.

The crisis in the imperialist heartlands had an immediate and devastating effect in Latin America. It led to three intertwined external shocks: an unprecedented rise in interest rates following the second oil price rise in 1979, a sharp deterioration in terms of trade in the early 1980s, and an almost complete halt in foreign lending (Ffrench-Davis et al. 1994, p. 185). This set of circumstances was a direct result of the rich countries seeking to offload part of the price of the capitalist crisis onto the global South. This had happened under the classic patterns of dependency earlier in the century, when raising interest rates, cutting imports, and stopping loans was a standard recipe. It was the sudden halt to foreign loans in 1982 that precipitated the disastrous economic and social performance of the 1980s in Latin America, subsequently known as the “lost decade.” It saw stagnation of production, a lowering of living standards, some staggering episodes of hyperinflation, and an ever-increasing foreign debt.

Within Latin America there was also a certain “exhaustion” of the previous development model based on inward oriented growth, which necessitated a new approach. The issue of inflation loomed large and its corrosive social effect was one reason why there was a certain acceptance of the new model at first. So, for example, when President Menem took office in Argentina in 1989 it was in the midst of a bout of hyperinflation that had severely constrained the credibility of the democratic transition presidency of Raúl Alfonsín who took office in the first post-dictatorship elections in 1983. Faced with this dire predicament as Gerchunoff and Torre puts it, “The decision to privatize was swift, far-reaching and included neither restrictions on the participation of foreign capital nor efforts to nationalize the state-owned enterprises targeted for transfer to foreign ownership” (Gerchunoff and Torre, 1996, p. 739). Trade was completely liberalized, domestic deregulation was systemic, and to cap it all Menem committed Argentina to participate in the Gulf war in support of the imperial power.

As a way to symbolically, and in real terms, signal the new era of subordination, Argentina's currency was pegged to the US dollar. This would later prove to be disastrous, but for much of the 1990s Argentina enjoyed a consumer boom and even those not at the table worked on the assumption that they would at some point enjoy the benefits of the *plata dulce* (sweet money) era. Elsewhere, as in Mexico, the integration into the global order was through specific regions such as the *maquillas* or assembly plants on the border with the United States. Since the mid 1970s and the launch of an export-driven development strategy, sealed with entry into NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), Mexico was headed toward ever closer alignment of its economy with that of the United States. The north Mexican border is now one vast export processing zone dominated by the transnational corporations with a controlled, largely female workforce and only a token trade union presence. But President Salinas (1988–1994), along with the dictator Pinochet in Chile it might be added, still “refrained from transferring to the private sector their main source of fiscal revenue—the state copper and oil monopolies, respectively” (Gerchunoff and Torre 1996, p. 739).

The impact of the new economic model was uneven across countries, economic sectors, and social classes. Maybe it did not restrict absolutely the choices open to developing countries but it certainly set clear parameters on what was possible and what was not. It acts, as F. H. Cardoso puts it, “more like a fragmenting force than a leveling force which would make the world more homogeneous. It disconnects and reconnects segment of countries locally and internationally as economic growth produces more inequality...within” (Cardoso 2009a, p. 302). Just as with the earlier turn in the 1930s toward industrialization, the 1990s adaptation to the new era of globalization was more or less successful depending on the prior level of economic diversification. Thus a Brazil or a Mexico was more likely to have the resources to find a form of integration into the new order—albeit subordinate—than these smaller, less diversified countries that were more likely to continue in a more traditional agro-export form of integration. The latter was the fate of Argentina too after the dramatic collapse of the economy in 2001.

The critics of neoliberalism tend to offer a blanket critique of its record in Latin America as though the spirit of Pinochet and the Chicago Boys in 1973 continued up to the present. There is probably little doubt that Chile became a model for the rest of Latin America in terms of what could be achieved under the new economic model. It was

a model that achieved a considerable degree of economic dynamism and—especially after the return of democracy in 1989—a degree of social cohesion and inclusiveness. Targeted social programmes, better education for the poor on and off the job, and the promotion of community leadership have all had a significant social impact. Certainly, with Robert Gwynne we must still remember that “unfortunately, Chile is not representative of Latin America as a whole in its success at reducing the incidence of poverty” (Gwynne 2009, p. 49). We should probably also note that there is political economy *status quo ante* in any major country of Latin America.

As with all other great social transformations there are winners and losers in society. Exporters, financiers, and investors, all recouped huge benefits from the move toward an unregulated market, but skilled workers and service providers also did well, at least for a while. Those who did not do so well included not only industrialists oriented toward the internal market, peasants, and low paid workers, but also consumers hit hard by devaluation and a falling standard of living. Beyond these layers adversely affected directly, was a whole new sector of socially excluded and marginalized populations that did not serve a useful purpose to capital in the new order. This is where the polarizing effects of globalization were most apparent. At one end of the spectrum was the *patria financiera* (financial country), secure and affluent, while at the other extreme were the newly dispossessed including rural populations not integrated into the export economy, the urban poor, and even a newly impoverished middle class, once so characteristic of countries like Argentina.

In the neoliberal era there was also a drive toward agrarian reform but it was very different in nature and intent from that of the 1960s and 1970s. Essentially this was a counterreform in the agricultural domain leading to the privatization of much of the reform sector as marketization became the driver of all policies. This shift began, most emblematically, in Chile following the Pinochet military coup of 1973 as part of the broader move toward privatization and a dramatic reduction in the role of the state. As Alain de Janvry and coauthors recount, “Lands that were held in collectives were parcelized into individual tenures, some were restituted to former owner, and many public lands were auctioned” (de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford 1998, p. 9). The stated intent was to dismantle inefficient cooperatives to provide land to a more efficient class of entrepreneurs and to promote the development of agribusiness or capitalist agriculture. The economic results of the agrarian counterreform were actually quite disappointing for its

architects. Agricultural exports have increased certainly, particularly in nontraditional agricultural exports such as soybean, which lay at the heart of Argentina's recovery since 2001. But agriculture's average yearly growth rate across Latin America today only a bit better than half of what it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Basically, as Cristóbal Kay notes, "the neoliberals promise of a new agricultural dynamism has so far remained unfulfilled" (Kay 2004, p. 234). Rural heterogeneity has increased as the technological gap between the agrarian capitalist and the peasant farmer has widened. The emergence of an agribusiness sector has thus not increased productivity overall but, rather, has widened gaps and is proving inappropriate insofar as it demands scarce capital resources while providing little in the way of employment.

The fact remains then that the land issue is still unresolved in Latin America and some form of land reform is a pressing need. Rural poverty and exclusion are rampant and landlessness is still an overwhelming reality for many. The social cost of the agrarian counter-reform has been enormous and the decimation of the collectivized sector is probably irreparable. Thus the effective dissolution of the collectivized *ejido* sector in Mexico—a legacy of the 1910–1920 Revolution—in 1990, following the move in 1982 to allow sale of its lands, symbolizes the end of a whole historical era. With the withdrawal of the state from any commitment toward land reform any initiative in that direction would, henceforth, come from below as it were, from mobilized landless sectors.

This was nowhere more the case than in Brazil where the MST (Movimento dos Sem Terra-Rural Landless Workers Movement) has created 2,500 land reform settlements and mobilized 370,000 families to occupy land deemed unproductive. De Janvry concluded that the "MST has successfully reintroduced the campaign reform in Brazil by exploiting a constitution constitutional clause that land has a social function to fulfill" (de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford 1998, p. 14). The agrarian question has thus been redefined in the neoliberal era in two dramatic ways. In the first place the drive toward marketization has disrupted the old *latifundio-minifundio* pattern by creating a more heterogeneous capitalist-driven agrarian sector. In second place, the effective withdrawal of a reformist state has energized a new wave of grassroots-driven reform initiatives that show little sign of being co-opted or running out of steam.

The land question is very much part of the contradictions of contemporary Latin America and not just of historical interest. From a

broad comparative perspective this unequal pattern of land tenure can be seen as a major impediment to development. Whereas it was once seen as conducive to capital accumulation on an extended scale, it is now clear that China and much of East Asia have outstripped Latin America precisely because of their more equitable land ownership patterns. As Giovanni Arrighi et al., argue in terms of the limits of “accumulation by dispossession” as applied to South Africa (or as Marx called it, primitive accumulation), “Without some form of state-promoted redistribution of land and other resources to the dispossessed African population, not only with social imbalances worsen, but the chance if any strategy of development that aims at widening the market... may be seriously compromised” (Arrighi, Aschoff, and Scully 2010, p. 435). Substitute South Africa by Mexico and Brazil and the point stands. Rural development and industrialization have gone hand in hand in those countries now deemed to have experienced an economic miracle such as China. And, in promoting this move toward agrarian reform we might recall how, Mariátegui saw the Inca descended populations as “displaying favorable conditions for primitive agrarian communism, subsisting in concrete structures and a deep collectivist spirit, to become transformed, under the hegemony of the proletarian class, into one of the most solid bases of the collectivist society proclaimed by communist Marxism” (Mariátegui 1970, p. 68).

To sum up this section then we note that the “bottom line” for the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s was quite simple really. Sebastian Edwards, who was the Latin American head at the World Bank for many years, put it plainly when he declared that “in order to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the world economy—and not to succumb to international competition—countries need a lean and dynamic labor market. Companies should be able to adjust their payrolls quickly and at a low cost. This means that employment laws should be flexible and that hiring and dismissal costs should be kept as low as possible” (Edwards 2010, p. 97). While this imperative was a driver of change, it was set within a more ambitious strategic plan to transform the whole society. In retrospect then the 1980s were a clear transition phase to a new model of development and social regime of accumulation. The whole basis of social transformation had changed as Roberto Korzeniewicz puts it, “Innovation has displaced industrialization as the key component of development strategies, inherently justifying and promoting a developing differentiation between states, enterprises and households” (Korzeniewicz 1997, p. 228). Social differentiation was

thus accentuated at all levels of society. This was truly a new great transformation, comparable in its impact to that observed by Polanyi for the emergence of industrialization. Society, politics, and culture would all be utterly transformed by this new order.

Remaking Society

The military dictatorships carried through a radical restructuring of social relations and a dramatic shift in the patterns of daily life that can be seen as amounting to a remaking of society. The overwhelming structures of feeling generated focused around fear and uncertainty. As Norberto Lechner puts it, “The military dictatorships promise to eliminate fear. In reality, however, they generated new fears. The dictatorships profoundly transformed routines and social habits making even daily life unpredictable. To the extent that normality disappears there is an increase in the feeling of powerlessness” (Lechner 1990, pp. 92–93). Daily life becomes a hostile arena and social relations become shallow or are avoided altogether. The powerless individual sees no reason to take any responsibility for anything. Privatization squeezes out the social sphere and any idea of bridging or bonding “social capital” becomes more or less impossible. Collective identification with basic social goals is one of the casualties of the military dictatorships.

As citizens become marginalized or even become redundant, so the state becomes ever more present and powerful. Driven out of the political arena, persecuted directly or submitted to a generalized regime of fear, the citizen is driven to trust in miracles. The omnipotent state, the powerful strutting men in uniform, and the clever economists trained abroad will bring salvation. After all the problems facing the country seemed insurmountable: I cannot see a way to contribute to their resolution so I will have to put my trust in others. More than disempowerment there is a process of infantilization at play here. Fear—in a generic sense—is transmuted into fear of the enemy within. Repression is no longer needed once terror becomes internalized and a general depoliticizing dynamic seizes society. Thus economic reformation and political restructuring has its counterpart in a profound remaking of society to make it a compliant partner in the hegemonic project of the military dictators.

Michel Foucault’s rethinking of classical and critical conceptions of power probably provides the best insight into the *modus operandi* of the Latin American dictatorships. Foucault dismisses all objective

conceptions of power and instead focuses on the productive nature of modern power's exercise. It does not just repress or censor, it produces reality and knowledge. There are many different modalities of power in modern society—economic, military, legal, bureaucratic, and so on—but they come together when they function politically within a given order. Disciplinary power plays a dominant role in the constitution of industrial capitalism in the workplace, the family, and across society. The underlying form of bio-power directs its powers at the level of life itself producing compliant bodies both in the working place and within the political realm. The term bio-power was coined by Foucault to refer to “the disciplines of the body and the regulation of the population [which] constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was displayed” (Foucault 1977, p. 139). Both these modalities are crucial for an understanding of the remaking of society under the military dictatorships of the 1970s.

In Foucaultian terms, what we saw in Latin America during the military regimes was the emergence of a “disciplinary society,” “not because the disciplinary modality of power has replaced all the others; but because it has infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, linking them together, expanding them and above all making it possible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements” (Foucault 1977, p. 216). This distribution of power relations is extremely effective and reflects clearly how power needs to be seen as productive and not just a negative constraint. The new disciplinary society is infinitely more flexible and has a deeper reach than the destructive power of the armed forces, for example. It seeks to establish mastery over the inchoate forces of society and create an organized system where before there was unpredictability. It is hard to confront this new bio-power head on but it is still vulnerable to the counterpower of horizontal networking that may resist passively, agitate, and create generalize unhappiness or even active resistance to power in a favorable conjuncture.

The remaking of society by the military dictatorships was not without its contradictions. Its deactivation of the political arena led to a disengagement that was ultimately unproductive in regard to its own project. Neoliberalism posed individual liberty in terms of free markets and entrepreneurs. Thus individual political liberties would use their legitimacy whenever they conflicted with the market. Market distortions were not recognized and the undemocratic heart of the free-market drive was never acknowledged. Thus even the entrepreneurs who were supposed to benefit from these regimes eventually

began to look for democratic openings, certainly once the immediate threat from below had been dissipated. A broader contradiction emerged between the ideological drive for individual freedom and the realities of civil liberties under these regimes. The contradiction between the discourse of freedom and the reality of repression eventually chipped away at the monolithic block of the new regimes and exploded whatever base it may have created out of fear or ambition.

We cannot separate the restructuring of the capital accumulation process from the profound social recomposition it led to and was based on. The free-market ideology the military economists espoused led to a real “shake out” of the capitalist class, with less “efficient” sectors marginalized, and also a partial recomposition of the working class. A fundamental reordering of society was seen as necessary to prevent a return of populism or any challenge to bourgeois hegemony. Given the widespread perception of chaos prior to the military interventions there was a quite widespread support for “order” that was not just imposed. Order can mean stability as well as discipline and punishment. The capillary transmission of this impulse throughout society played a key role in giving the dictatorships some room to maneuver at first. Passivity was the price to be paid for a “curing” of society from its previously hyper-political state and the chaos it led to.

The good citizen should aim to work hard and then enjoy the benefits of modernization to be delivered by the military economic teams. There was an ever-present risk of this project being subverted by politics, so it was best removed from the workplace, the schools, the streets, and, even, family gatherings. The public arena is constituted by the market and not by politics. It would be the market that would provide the rules for social coexistence and the philosophy for society as a whole. The objective was to create a society based on functional differentiation according to market needs where “individual” conflict would be a thing of the past. There was no fascist-style mobilization of disaffected middle layers but rather a continuous bid to drive out the political itself. Economics takes over from politics as the compass for human activity and betterment. In a society without voice, “power surrounds itself with silence...anxious generals and economists contemplate only their own image” (Lechner 1990, p. 156). Whether they would succeed in reinventing society in their own image was a different question.

The primary method used by the modernizing military dictatorships to remake society in their own image was simply terror. Torture was a very effective form of “extra-economic” coercion that was used

to pave the way to a free-market society. Penal torture, as Foucault reminds us, “is a differentiated production of pain, an organized ritual for the marking of victims and the expression of the power that punishes; not the expression of a legal system driven to exasperation and, forgetting all principles using all restraints” (Foucault 1997, pp. 34–35). Through the “excesses” of torture, a new political economy of power was created. It created a culture of fear and marked the victim and the wider civil society alike. The punishment of the recalcitrant individual body through the regulated production of pain is also a punishment of a rebellious social body that had aided upfront the established order. State terrorism was the conscious and widely validated means through which society was cowed and atomized to make it a suitable case for treatment by the neoliberal governs and their military muscle.

It would be wrong to think that coercion is now a thing of the past as the transition to democracy is well consolidated across the region. Not only is there an ongoing civil war in Colombia that the regime does not seem disposed to settle, but Central America (bar Costa Rica) lives a very different temporality as well. There an endemically weak state and extreme dependency created a situation where coercion was the norm and not a last resort. Whereas South America embarked on the path to re-democratization in the 1980s in El Salvador, a peace treaty was only secured in 1990 and in Guatemala in 1996. As Edelberto Torres-Rivas notes the “transition” period here is quite distinct: it was imposed by “decisions of non-democratic actors, and what is expected is stability, citizen backing and a civic routine” (Torres-Rivas 1987, p. 86). In the years since, most of Central America has fallen into a spiral of gun crime and drug trafficking with unprecedented levels of violence, this time as a by-product of globalization that creates the profitable drugs trade and promotes emigration as employment sources at home dry up.

The dictatorships and the civilian regimes that followed also sought to rearticulate society along market lines. This meant a great upsurge in consumerism as both the reward for good behavior and the new overarching pleasure principle. Baker, in an analysis of “the market and the masses” in Brazil concludes that “Latin Americans in this new era think about the most important economic issues of their time as consumers and not as workers” (Baker 2009, p. 258). Leaving aside the unnecessary opposition between an identity as workers or as consumers, there is indeed a point here. While privatization has been opposed by the majority of public opinion, there has been support

for more open trade and availability of diverse consumer goods. The number of shopping malls tripled in Brazil in the course of the 1990s and one analyst concludes that “the twentieth century in Latin America ended with a shopping spree” (cited in Baker 2009, p. 258). While this was certainly not the picture for the majority of the population it would be true to say that the market policies of the 1990s did generate a consumer boom.

The market can act also as a disciplining agent creating a new conception of order based on possessive individualism. Under the aegis of neoliberalism, as Lechner puts it, “the laws of the market [act] as the rejuvenating principle of social processes” (Lechner 1990, p. 154). Against the primacy of politics as the organizing agent of society, this doctrine promotes the self-regulating market as national regulator of society. The sovereignty of the people means little when faced with the sovereignty of a mystical market whose “hidden hand” allocates resources and rewards automatically. It is the market—or the neoliberal market principles enforced by the military—that disaggregated previous collective forms of identity (worker, citizen, etc.) and replaces these with the promise of individual upward mobility and the dream of consumer as king. Democratization needed to confront this marketized view of society as much as it did the abusers of human rights and the torturers. We cannot really say that it has succeeded overall.

There is little doubt that society was quite fundamentally disarticulated and restructured during this period. Writing about Chile in the 1980s, Norberto Lechner observed how it was characterized by “the loss of beliefs, certainty and confidence... the result is a type of passive consent” (Lechner 1990, p. 150). Privatization as an economic strategy was matched by privatization as a social strategy. This analysis gave rise to what has been called a sociology of disintegration, or a sociology of decadence (for example, Tironi 1984). While political scientists were beginning to optimistically posit a “transition to democracy,” a more pessimistic sociology pointed in a quite different direction. Social cohesion would disappear in a Durkheimian vista of anomie (normlessness), intermediary organizations such as community groups would fade away and society would become atomized. Individualized forms of adaptation and survival would replace all forms of collective identity or social movements for change.

The disciplinary society of this era created a form of social autism or a frozen, conformist quietism. Not only did counter-hegemonic projects fade away but so did the counter-hegemonic imaginations.

Despite instances of resistance, the dictatorships did, on the whole, effectively impose a self-policed silence on society. There was a flourishing of micro-authoritarianism in everyday life with informers, mini-despots, homophobes, and patriarchs doing their best to secure the disciplinary society. The corrosive effects on the bonds of solidarity within society were considerable and long lasting. Following Foucault, the disciplinary modality of power “has infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, but serving as an intermediary between them, linking them together, extending them and above all making it possible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements” (Foucault 1977, p. 216). And yet the bonds of solidarity survived in church halls, women’s groups, community organizations, trade unions, and the new movements of relatives of the disappeared.

While, undoubtedly, Latin American societies were disarticulated and recomposed through the twin pressures of repression first and then consumerism, it would be wrong to assume that this exercise was always successful. Neoliberalism was a political project with its own ambiguities. The individualism fostered in the consumer could also become someone engaged with civil society. Its bid to depoliticize society was itself a contradictory political project as it also opened up new spaces for its citizen. The market might, indeed, foster individualist behavior and weaken social links. However, as Jelin notes, “This is not a linear and total process” (Jelin 1998, p. 96). The diversification and differentiation of society not only creates fragmentation but also allows for multiple sites of contestation. Jelin notes how, as the market economy returns to democracy, “there is room for other expressions and other meanings, for collective actors who are searching for their identities and struggling for their legitimate space in the socio-political scenario” (Jelin 1998, p. 409). Poverty and social exclusion would emerge as overarching themes and women, indigenous groups, and human rights activists would all come to the fore.

The last word can be given to General Pinochet who, in a speech of 1982 (not quite a decade after the coup), ruminated on how, despite a new constitution to lead Chile into the future, “I have a disquiet within me which will not settle: what will become of this country after this government has finished? Will it be the same? Will the political parties return? Will the politicians return again to drain the atmosphere? Will we have lost all we have gained in these years through the ambitions of a few, because there are even religious organizations which are thinking already of the future and are thinking of giving in?”

(Cited in Lechner 1990, p. 151). The general's worries were, indeed, well founded. Despite the concerted attempt to atomize Chilean society and to create a political wasteland where only authority and order prevailed, Chile would revert, more or less, to its pre-1973 political patterns in 1989. Certainly also, sections of the Catholic Church were to the forefront in maintaining the dense networks of civil society that would outlast the dictatorship and help reconstruct a democratic Chile.

Illusions End

Critical analysts were always aware of the contradictions of the neoliberal model. As Marcus Taylor puts it, "Unfortunately for the neoliberal utopians...the vision they pursued was unrealizable owing to the implausibility of the assumptions from which neoclassical assumptions of the market began" (Taylor 2009, p. 67). Earlier critics, such as Karl Polanyi, had since the Second World War clearly expounded on the limitations of a free or unregulated market policy. It was not a viable or sustainable development strategy quite simply. Joe Stiglitz, then chief Economist of the World Bank, began to question the model from within inspired openly by the work of Polanyi. Eventually he was to articulate a full-blown critique of World Bank and particularly IMF policies that represented a full paradigmatic shift (Stiglitz 2002). It centered on a careful analysis of globalization, its promise, the achievement in development, and its very clear shortcomings. It could be said that he wanted to save globalization from neoliberalism and reconstruct it on a more stable and consensual basis but, one way or another, the illusion of a "one true way" to development had evaporated.

For Stiglitz, the main issue is to recognize that free-market remedies could actually kill the patient. Market fundamentalism went a lot further than, for example, the likes of Adam Smith who was well aware of the limitations of the market. Writing at the turn of the century, Stiglitz's well-informed view was that, while there was a vigorous debate in the corridors of power on "the precise role of government...there is broad agreement that government has a role in making any society, any economy, function effectively and humanely" (Stiglitz 2002, p. 218). The governance of globalization—particularly through international financial institutions—would need to change to become more representative to the changing patterns of global power. The severe dangers posed by capital market globalization and

so-called “hot money” flows were acknowledged and improved risk management was called for. We can question whether the “globalization with a human face” that Stiglitz proposed as an alternative to neoliberalism was, or is, possible but it did essentially represent the end of the great experiment launched at the end of the 1970s.

Within Latin America, the illusions around the Washington Consensus as a viable development strategy began to fade with the so-called Tequila Crisis in Mexico in 1994. In 1995, the Inter-American Development Bank was warning that this crisis showed the vulnerability of the Latin American economic to internal and external shocks (IDB 1997). This was not just an economic outcome whereby inherent contradictions of the model were coming to the fore. Clearly it was having a political knock-on effect as the social benefits (at least for some sections of the population) were being brought into question. As Francisco Panizza recounts, the questioning of the paradigm affected even some of the organic intellectuals of the model such as Sebastian Edwards. Barely a year after publishing a book lauding the achievements of the free-market reforms, Edwards was writing in an influential article in *Foreign Affairs* that while the region “had gone through a notable transformation, economic results were disappointing and the region’s social situation showed little signs of improvement” (cited in Panizza 2009, p. 124). Reality was beginning to sink in.

No paradigm collapses from its internal contradictions alone. For a considerable period of time it can adjust its theories, models, and policies to suit the changing environment, including facts that contradicted it. Thus the various crisis situations (at least until Argentina’s economic collapse at the end of 2001) could be absorbed and adjustments made. Gradually, however, a post-Washington Consensus emerged that sought to keep faith with its original postulates while modulating the message to suit the more hostile environment and questions being asked. In the broader global economic policy arena, Joe Stiglitz was in the late 1990s carrying out an effective critique of the Washington Consensus very much from within, as it were. A new development agenda began to take shape without seeking to openly question the old model. The role of the state was quietly reestablished. The combating of poverty and inequality was given a new-found urgency, and it was openly acknowledged that the market did not hold all the answers.

Disillusionment and reorientation was not, to be clear, a prerogative of the managers of neoliberal globalization. The social and political restructuring that occurred under the military also undermined the

cherished beliefs of the Left. A multiplicity of contradictions emerged that could not be expressed within the old political party paradigm. There was a need to rethink individual freedoms, the impact of religion, the importance of democracy, and the very way in which politics was engaged in. Of course, previous reliance on the state for economic development and as a lever of social transformation would also need to be rethought. Consumerism, competition, and individualism were not simply a product of the neoliberal drive; any strategy for social transformation would need to take account of the extent to which they had become embedded in the Latin American societies. In brief, a whole range of illusions on the Left would be superseded—albeit unevenly and with different degrees of sincerity—as Latin America emerged from the long night of the Latin American dictatorships.

Neoliberalism was based on a mirage that convinced many that it was the royal path to modernity, or, more crudely, a belief that torture + markets = modernization. That was not, of course, a model that could be imposed in the affluent West. The strength of the social compromise with labor, though stretched, still had a lingering presence in that part of the world. Furthermore liberal democracy was embedded, across society and it was no mere “trappings,” as some Marxists argued. Nevertheless the neoliberal model at the global level had begun to show its contradictions and there was a move from the so-called Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus. At a global level, a succession of financial crises signaled deeper underlying problems under the surface: Mexico and Brazil in 1982, Soviet Union in 1990, and the broader East Asia in crisis of 1997. This culminated in the events beginning with the so-called sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States in September 2007. A chain reaction soon had the global financial system reeling with many analysts explicitly calling for a return to Keynes.

Open financial systems had not led to a more stable global order; rather, it has vastly increased instability and the propensity to crisis. The difference with the various regional crises mentioned above is that this time the global financial system was so intertwined that there was virtually no place to hide. What was also apparent was that the larger countries of the South—China, India, and Brazil primarily—had managed to achieve a level of development that probably saved these countries from being pulled into the vortex. From a Latin American perspective, this crisis was but the latest manifestation of an endemic tendency toward crisis. Indeed it was reminiscent of the financial crisis of the 1860–1930 golden era such as the Baring

Crisis of 1890. The crisis of 2008–2009 and the subsequent collapse of neoliberalism as hegemonic doctrine was relative insofar as “the predominant response of governments in Latin America [to the Great Recession] reflects an understanding of the crisis as essentially an issue of regulating financial markets and monetary-fiscal policies” (Veltmeyer 2010, p. 218). Thus some continuity with the old regime of accumulation was evident, much as we saw with import substitution that persisted long after its contradictions became evident in the 1960s.

It was on the ground, though, that the neoliberal hegemonic project really hit the rails in Latin America. The first sign of things to come was on New Year’s Day 1994—as Mexico entered the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)—when an indigenous revolt in the state of Chiapas alerted the world to a new Zapatista Army of National Liberation. The million or so Amerindians living in the Chiapas region had seen their coffee and maize livelihoods decimated by various free-trade agreements. The mythical *ejido*—the communal land ownership regime that was a key gain of the Mexican Revolution and the Cárdenas era—was being dissolved by market forces. The social pact between the state and the people was broken. Voter abstention increased and a small guerrilla group from the 1970s began to gain recruits. The Catholic Church locally supported the re-vindications of their Amerindian communities. When the revolt came, it resonated widely as it was couched in terms of the constitution and Emiliano Zapata: the right to land and the right to dignity.

The Zapatistas have been considered the “first information era guerrillas” and as part of the broad counter (or after) globalization movement that came to Northern attention in Seattle in the year 2000. In Mexican terms, though, it was part of a tradition of peasant insurgency. The Revolution of 1910–1920 had more or less bypassed this Amerindian community and it was now claiming its space in the arena of modernity. Its communitarian ideas—and emphasis on human dignity—had a wide resonance and contrasted sharply with the market logic of the regime and NAFTA in particular. The other keyword used by the Zapatistas in their discourse—justice—resounded with the then emerging “global justice” movement and this provided a link between the “hidden Mexico” or “*Méjico profundo*” (see Bonfil Batalla 2006) and the emerging global contestation of actually existing globalization. For Adolfo Gilly “the much abused and rounded-up survivors of that destruction” wrought by US imperialism and globalization “have risen in revolt against this intervention” that now

“encounters the direct and unmediated resistance of rural rebellion” (Gilly 1998, p. 331) by the indigenous people of Mexico.

The second big shock to the imperial order was the election of Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela in 1998. Chávez then proclaimed a Bolivarian Revolution building on the legacy of independence hero Simón Bolívar aimed at achieving a “second independence.” My purpose here is not to assess Chavismo as a movement for social transformation or as a left-of-center government (see chapter 6 below) but, rather, to make the point that it represents a clear rejection of the imperial order. The United States recognized in Chávez, an implacable foe and played a decisive role in the attempted coup against him in 2002. This coup attempt was in the worst tradition of US intervention in Latin America with “the Embassy” playing a pivotal role endorsed by immediate US recognition of an illegitimate government. Chávez would be able to replay Peron’s 1946 presidential election slogan—“*Bráden ó Perón*”—posing a simple choice to the electorate of the US ambassador or the nationalist leader.

For his part, Chávez has been very clear in his rejection of the dominant world order. In a speech to the United Nations in 2005, he declared: “Today in Venezuela we demand a new international economic order. But also essential is a new international political order. We cannot allow a handful of countries to unconstrainedly reinterpret international law.” Simón Bolívar is posited as a champion of Latin American integration and an international order based on peace and justice. Rhetoric or not, this is a discourse at odds with that of neoliberal globalization. It resulted in a strong alliance—ALBA (*Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas*)—with Bolivia and Ecuador, with Cuba obviously in full support. It has had resonance in Argentina under the Kirchner governments and further afield. Whether “socialism in the twenty-first century” will be constructed via the Venezuela of Chávez is a moot point, but it is quite clear that it has put socialism on the agenda a decade after the collapse of actually existing socialism in a way which really cannot be ignored.

Soon after the emergence of Chavismo on the scene, the Andean region began to experience a resurgence of Amerindian militancy. In Bolivia the struggle against World Bank promoted privatization took on a mass and internationalized character with the Cochabamba “Water Wars” of 2000. Resistance to water rate hikes escalated and began to take on wider anti-privatization connotations. Massive protests brought together peasant irrigators, urban workers, and the retired. A four-day general strike in Cochabamba ensued and

eventually the regime declared a 90-day state of emergency. In the end a total victory for the protestors ensued. This was a significant movement in the global movement against the depredations of the unregulated market. In Bolivia it also marked the beginning of a concerted rise of the indigenous peoples to seize their rights and end centuries of repression and discrimination. Evo Morales—president of the Cochabamba Coca Growers Federation—was to become the president of Bolivia in 2006 and be reelected in 2010.

The foundation of the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) has proved a viable way of linking the growing indigenous social movement into the political process. Whereas in the 1952 Revolution the main revolutionary force had been the miners, these had long since closed down and now the indigenous smallholders began to drive the struggle against privatization. For Evo Morales, to emerge as a national political leader and as a candidate of the Left for the presidential elections was a breakthrough. As Emir Sader writes, “This achievement is a milestone in the history of the Latin American left and more specifically in the history of anti- and post-neoliberal struggles” (Sader 2009, p. 17). As head of a post-neoliberal government, Morales went on to symbolize the different worldview of the Amerindian peoples, not least in his public international support of the coca producers of Bolivia (many of these incidentally being ex-tin miners). A very popular programme of renationalization and confrontation with corporate interests put the free-trade offensive of the United States, supported only by the likes of Colombia, very much on the defensive.

From a broad historical perspective there can be little doubt that it was events in Argentina at the end of 2001/beginning of 2002 that finally shattered any remaining illusions in neoliberalism as a sustainable development hegemonic project. The 1990s had seen Argentina follow a textbook version of the neoliberal development model. By the end of the decade the model was in crisis and toward the end of 2001 the banks collapsed with social and economic chaos ensuing. The convertibility of the peso to the US dollar was the lynch pin of the neoliberal model and its collapse meant the model’s collapse. Banks were closed down; small investors saw their savings frozen in the notorious *corralito* (corral) and the middle classes, for once, rebelled openly. In the months that followed, an alternative social order was forged with neighborhood assemblies and barter clubs set up to compensate for the virtual evaporation of the state. Of course, order was eventually restored but all had changed for politics in Argentina and the neoliberal model.

The massive mobilization of early 2002 had one overarching slogan—*Qué se vayan todas* (let them all go)—by which the demonstrators meant the political class as a whole. This was a genuinely popular—as in cross-class—rebellion expressing a total rejection of the neoliberal model and the politicians who had imposed it on Argentina. All illusions were at an end: there was total clarity that this path could not continue. The subsequent government of Néstor Kirchner restored social and political stability to Argentina. However the impact of this episode in Latin America and globally cannot be overestimated. The crisis in Argentina in 2001–2002 was a harbinger of what was to occur in the United States (and across the North) in 2008–2009: the banking system which was at the core of neoliberal financial strategy was no longer stable and its unraveling would lead to a systemic crisis. Debt default not only could be an option but also a successful one—something that was promoted as an example in Ireland, for example, in 2009 when the crisis of the Euro began to unfold.

Social Countermovement (1998–2012)

As various elements within society across Latin America reacted against the free-market policies of the previous era, so a vigorous countermovement began to take shape reacting against the effects of marketization. The outcome of this process that we might call one of *Re-embedding* the market under social control (to use Polanyi's terminology) is still uncertain but we can draw some provisional conclusions. The countermovements took different shapes and not all were politically progressive, but they all undermined the notion that the market can simply impose its logic on society. The next section on *Popular Reaction* examines the various facets of the social countermovements, their main activities, and emerging values. In particular, we explore the theme raised first by Mariátegui, namely that of the indigenous practices of reciprocity and collective solidarity and consider whether they could be part of a broader movement to create a society no longer dominated by the market. Our next section on the rise of the *Left Governments* describes one of the most notable features of the 2000s, especially from an international perspective when so much of the world was slipping into reactionary political models. We need to unpack the variety of Left governments that emerged given that they have very different origins and political dynamics. We also need to go beyond the simplistic analysis that the main challenge is slipping back into, something dubbed populism. The next big question, which the final section examines, is whether we are now moving *Beyond neoliberalism* and moving into a new political domain. We explore the concrete economic policies of the various left-of-center governments that some analysts have characterized as post-neoliberal. While we see many elements of continuity—not surprising given the path-dependent nature of the neoliberal reforms—there are also

many new elements in terms of a political economy serving social need over individual gain. This is where the debates are today in terms of “whither Latin America?” and where the rest of the world might have something to learn.

Re-Embedding

While Gramsci was the theorist of hegemony par excellence, we could say that it is Karl Polanyi who has most clearly articulated a theory of counter-hegemony fit for the global era. It is not simply that Gramsci is a “pessimist” while Polanyi is an “optimist,” as some have argued. They were, in reality, acting in very different contexts and their political practice was quite distinct. However, they both operated within the broad framework of Marxism even if Gramsci opened it up as we have seen in earlier chapters, and Polanyi was influenced also by other political strands such as the Christian Socialism of the British guilds movement. I think we can find complementary insights from both political theorists that can inform the post-neoliberal hegemony era in Latin America. We now need to go through a more detailed account of Gramsci’s conception of “civil society” before taking up Polanyi’s more recently influential model of a social countermovement contesting the unregulated market.

In a famous passage Gramsci wrote that “in the East the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relationship between state and civil society, and when the state tottered, a sturdy structure of civil society was revealed: The state was just a forward trench; behind it stood a succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements” (Gramsci 2011, p. 169). Post 1989 a simplified version of Gramsci’s concept of civil society took off internationally, directly influenced by events in Latin America and, later, in Eastern Europe. It basically posited civil society as a democratic space against the state and all forms of state politics. In fact, Gramsci makes no firm division between civil society and political society as though they were distinct zones of a social formation. The function of hegemony (civil society) and the function of direct domination (political society or state) are inextricably linked in Gramsci and the first presupposes the latter.

The East-West distinction has also given rise to very simplistic readings in which Russia = East and Europe = West. On closer examination, as we have already seen above, this is neither a simple geographic distinction nor is the West alluded to seen as homogenous.

In fact, Gramsci's passages on Americanism and Fordism refer to the weakness of civil society in the United States and Italy, which we could expect him to counterpose to Russia, is also characterized according to him by an "underdeveloped" civil society (compared to the Jacobin ideal type) given its belated modernity and mixed modern/premodern class structure. In Gramsci's East-West paradigm the world is not divided into different temporalities. It is a historical and not a geographical analytical device. We take from this reading the possibilities of placing Latin America in the category of West, albeit with the specificities dictated by the nature of its colonization and subsequent development and social transformation.

For its part, Polanyi's problematic poses the possibility that history advances through a series of "double movements." So market expansion on the one hand, leads to the "one big market" that we call globalization today. Yet, as Polanyi argued in his day and we could argue even more so today, "simultaneously a counter-movement was afoot" (Polanyi 2001, p. 136). This countermovement reacted against the dislocation of society and the attack on the very fabric of society that the self-regulating market led to. The "double movement" consisted of economic liberalism driving the extension of the self-regulating market on the one hand, and the principle of "social protection" on the other hand, defending social interests from the deleterious action of the market. This can be through protective legislation or through various collective associations such as trade unions as Polanyi showed. As a new way of life spread over the planet—"with a claim to universality unparalleled since the age when Christianity started out on its career" (Polanyi 2001, p. 136)—so a diverse countermovement began to check its expansion. This not only involved specific social classes—directly engaged in the process—but was also a generalized societal reaction. It was largely a defensive movement; it was for Polanyi "spontaneous" and there was no agreed societal or political alternative involved.

Taken in its broadest sense, Polanyi's notion of a social countermovement could be seen as an incipient theory of counter-hegemony. That is certainly the argument of Michael Burawoy (2003), for whom Polanyi provides a necessary counterpart to Antonio Gramsci's influential theory of capitalist hegemony. For Gramsci, modern "Western" class orders are able to impose "hegemony" over society as a whole, with consent being as important as direct control of repression. It is through the organs of civil society—such as churches, schools, trade unions, and the media—that capitalist hegemony is constructed and

maintained. Gramsci, in practice an orthodox communist, saw the proletarian party as the agent of counter-hegemony. For Polanyi, on the other hand, who had broken with communism and was more influenced by the socialist Guild and Christian socialist traditions, it was a primarily social reaction to the market that would spur a counter-hegemonic movement. Not only the subaltern classes but also powerful capitalist interests would be threatened by the anarchy of the market and would thus react. For Polanyi, "This was more than the usual defensive behavior of a society faced with change; it was a reaction against a dislocation which attacked the fabric of society, and which would have destroyed the very organization of production that the market had called into being" (Polanyi 2001, p. 136).

Today, as Stephen Gill puts it, "we can relate the metaphor of the 'double movement' to those socio-political forces which wish to assert more democratic control over political life, and to harness the productive aspects of world society to achieve broad social purposes on an inclusionary basis, across and within different types of civilization" (Gill 2002, p. 8). Movements struggling for national or regional sovereignty, those seeking to protect the environment, and the plethora of movements advancing claims for social justice or recognition are all part of this broad countermovement. In different, but interrelated ways they are bids to re-embed the economy in social relations. Challenging the movement toward commodification, they seek to "decommodify" society and reassert moral and cultural values. Against materialism and market-determined values, the social countermovement generated by neoliberal globalization brings to the fore the democracy of civil society and the social value of all we do. As Polanyi put it for his era, "The great variety of forms in which the 'collectivist' counter-movement appeared [was due to] the broad range of the vital social interests affected by the expanding market mechanism" (Polanyi 2001, p. 151).

There are many ways in which the self-protection of society can operate. For example, the Western welfare states that emerged following the Great Depression of the 1930s and the social dislocation it produced was one such self-defense mechanism. Likewise, in the postcolonial or "developing" world, the post-Second World War years saw the emergence of the development state, also a mechanism of defense against the self-regulating market. The development state of the 1950s and 1960s was a conscious bid to temper the free market to create national development based on state-led industrialization behind protectionist barriers. While not to the same extent

as the “developed” Western state with its strong social protection mechanisms, the development state also introduced a degree of social security, the concept of minimum wage, and respect for trade union rights. Since the neoliberal offensive (or counter-countermovement in Polanyi’s terms) of the 1980s and 1990s, both the above elements have been severely curtailed or reversed. The development state has been forced to “open up” the developing economy to powerful transnational capitalist interests. And even the advanced industrial societies that can, of course, afford it, see their welfare states and welfare rights cut back on the basis that marketized individuals should provide for their own future.

After drafting *The Great Transformation* in 1939–1940, as the Cold War began and his ideas fell on deaf ears, Polanyi turned to the study of precapitalist societies. He articulates a threefold model of economic integration that, over and above its merits as anthropology, serves to show there is more to human life than the market. In nonmarket economies the two main forms of economic integration are, for Polanyi, reciprocity and redistribution, usually in combination. Reciprocity involves sharing the burden of labor and through the exchange of equivalencies. Redistribution “obtains within a group to the extent to which the allocation of goods...takes place by virtue of custom, law or *active* central decision” (Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957, p. 153). Land and labor are integrated into the economy through the norms of reciprocity and redistribution. Sometimes one or other model may prevail and exchange through barter may also play a role. It is only at a specific point in history though that “exchange becomes *the* economic relationship, with the market the sole *locus* of exchange” and, in Polanyi’s words, where “economic life is reducible to acts of exchange all embodied in markets” (Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957, p. 169).

But that it was not always so means, in terms of contestation, that “another world is possible” both in a philosophical and a practical sense. It is only Western ethnocentrism that could imagine other human worlds were not possible. Other worldviews and cosmologies exist that are opposed or quite independent from what Polanyi (1947) called “our obsolete market mentality.” Market sovereignty is daily contested by social action based on reciprocity. Even “actually existing capitalism” recognizes that the market could not exist without trust and shared norms of reciprocity. Those expelled from the market society through the various forms of social exclusion characteristic of global capitalism (see Munck 2005) also revert to reciprocity

and redistribution in order to survive. These norms are imbued with moral-ethical principles at odds with those of the “market mentality.” Sustainable economic cultures are being built today seeking ecological sustainability and based on social solidarity. The precapitalist and today’s noncapitalist worlds show to what extent the society as market is a recent and quite limited human innovation.

Against all forms of economic determinism and the “class reductionism” of classical Marxism, Polanyi stresses that social class is not always determinant. This critique resonates with the contemporary transition toward “new” social movements mobilized around nonclass issues. For Polanyi, “Class interests offer only a limited explanation of long-run movements in society. The fate of society is determined by the needs of classes” (Polanyi 2001, p. 159). Certainly Polanyi recognized the essential role played by class interests in social change, but he refuses to adopt a narrow class logic. “There is no magic in class interest which would secure to members of one class the support of members of other classes” (Polanyi 2001, p. 160). This is particularly the case in times of social crisis—“those critical phases of history, when a civilization has broken down or is passing through a transformation” (Polanyi 2001, p. 163)—when new options for society are being debated, sometimes in extremely short periods of time. In this dramatic situation no narrow class interest can well defend one’s own class interest. “Unless the alternative to the social setup is a plunge into utter destruction, no crudely selfish class interest can maintain itself in the lead” (Polanyi 2001, p. 163). These are precisely the types of consideration lying behind current concerns with “global governance” from above and they should inform any articulation of “good globalization” from below.

The critique of economism implicit in Polanyi’s work also has a contemporary ring, as when he stresses the “cultural” element in social dislocation and resistance. A cataclysmic event such as the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century and the “Globalization Revolution” today are, in Polanyi’s words, “economic earthquakes” that transform the lives of vast multitudes of people. But, “actually, of course, [argues Polanyi], a social calamity is primarily a cultural phenomenon that cannot be measured by income figures or population statistics” (Polanyi 2001, p. 164). When people are dispossessed of their traditional means of livelihood, when customs and ways of life are disrupted, and “alien” cultural values are imposed, this affects the very way in which people ascribe meaning to their condition. So, argues Polanyi, it is “not economic exploitation, as often assumed,

but the disintegration of the cultural environment of the victim is then the cause of the degradation" (Polanyi 2001, p. 164). While fully cognizant of the role of social classes in "the great transformation" and an acute interest in the working class and its forms of organization, Polanyi articulated a quasi-Gramscian notion of the need to provide societal leadership or what Gramsci called "hegemony."

Does then a classical Marxist understanding of how the working class develops and struggles for socialism have no relevance under the "new capitalism" and globalization? One possible response could start from the distinction drawn by Beverley Silver (2003) between "Marx-type" and "Polanyi-type" forms of labor unrest. The "new international division of labor" in the 1960s and 1970s had led to the forging of an industrial working class in many parts of the "developing" world. They were much like Marx's proletariat created by the Industrial Revolution in terms of their working conditions and developing consciousness. Today, new working classes are being created by the "new capitalism," and they will form trade unions or similar associations and probably develop class interests. But, there are also Polanyi-type forms of unrest emerging across the globalized world, these being defined by Silver as "backlash resistances to the spread of a global self-regulating market, particularly by working classes that are being unmade by global economic transformations as well as by those workers who had benefited from established social compacts that are being abandoned from above" (Silver 2003, p. 20). So, for example, the blue-collar workers in the West displaced by the shift of investment to cheaper labor locations, or those affected by the collapse of manufacturing and other sectors typical of the "old" capitalism would engage in defensive and even reactionary labor struggles.

More broadly, this distinction between different types of reactions to globalization confirms the point made by Gill, that "some of today's counter-movements involve attempts to reassert democratization, whereas others are highly reactionary: the neo-liberal globalization tendency is being challenged in complex ways" (Gill 2002, p. 10). It is precisely the Polanyi problematic that allows us to grasp the complexity and tensions between the different reactions to globalization. An example would be the various forms taken by the "new localisms" that can be extremely reactionary (that is, literally backward looking) or progressive, sometimes at the same time. Whether it is anti-immigrant ideologies in postcolonial France, or the so-called Patriot movement in the United States, the struggle against the impact of the self-regulating market and the onward march of globalization

can easily take a reactionary form that seeks a reversion to exclusionary social patterns identified as the source of stability and social cohesion. Whether reactionary or progressive, it is important to recognize the growing contemporary importance of struggles against dispossession by the expansion of the “free market.” David Harvey argues persuasively that “struggles against accumulation by dispossession were considered irrelevant” by most Marxists, and that the antiglobalization movement today “must acknowledge accumulation by dispossession as the primary contradiction to be confronted” (Harvey 2003, pp. 171, 177). A modernist Eurocentric Marxism finds it difficult to acknowledge the effectiveness, or even legitimacy, of struggles against globalization that are not recognizably socialist. The Polanyi problematic, on the other hand, is well equipped to understand the way in which the countermovement against economic liberalism is “a spontaneous reaction” against “a threat to the human and the natural components of the social fabric,” expressing “an urge on the part of a great variety of people, to press for some sort of protection” (Polanyi 2001, p. 186).

The Polanyi problematic provides, potentially, a complex and dialectical framework for an understanding of globalization and contestation, but it does require concretization in my view. In the first place, it points us toward the dilemmas of the current world (dis)order and its prospects. Because, as Peter Evans (2000, p. 239) puts it, “Elites, no less than the rest of us, need to resolve the Polanyi problem.” But can the dominant world power construct durable and robust hegemonic institutions and ideologies? For Polanyi, there was a point in the 1920s when the “double movement” of economic liberalism and social protection led to such institutional strain that, with the onset of class conflict, “turned crisis into catastrophe” and then “the time was ripe for the fascist solution” (Polanyi 2001, pp. 140–244). If narrow sectional interests abuse the general political and economic functions of society, then this will be the result. There are, for Polanyi (2001, p. 163), “critical phases of history, when a civilization...is passing through a transformation, when ‘no crudely class interest can maintain itself in the lead’” if it does not become hegemonic, “unless the alternative to the social setup is a plunge into utter destruction.” So, in normal circumstances, the disadvantaged will be protected by enlightened rulers, meaning today that “global governance” would build its democratic institutions, and those marginalized by neoliberal policies would be protected by the World Bank’s “safety nets.” World events over the last decade, however, suggest as Silver and Arrighi

(2001, p. 327) put it, that such plunges into utter destruction “are a sufficiently widespread phenomenon in the early twenty-first century that we might want to treat as a more ‘normal’ phenomenon, than Polanyi’s concept of the double-movement seems to allow.”

Polanyi’s problematic in the era of globalization, however, needs to be “scaled up” to meet the challenges posed by the new matrix of social development. In the period following Second World War, as Evans observes, “the Polanyi problem of reconciling free markets with stable social and political life was taken up again through the construction of international norms and institutions” (Evans 2000, p. 238). For the core capitalist countries, this led to a degree of social stability to the extent that liberalism was “embedded” in a social compromise. For the majority of the “developing” world this was not the case, as rule by the market was joined by political and military imposition of Western interests. As the long postwar boom waned from the 1970s onward, social dissent broke out both in the core countries and through the anticolonial revolution. Economic internationalization from the 1980s was also undermining the nation-state. As Evans puts it, “The ‘re-scaling’ of the global economy brought the Polanyi problem back to life” (Evans 2000, p. 238) as the managers of the newly globalized capitalism sought to create a degree of sustainability for the machine they had created.

The second issue that requires concretization, in my view, is the precise way in which “society” might protect itself from the ravages of the self-regulated market. In an era when neoliberals and post-modernists alike query whether there is such a “thing” as society, we cannot simply assume Polanyi’s rather functionalist analysis of its response to the market mechanisms. Polanyi (2001, p. 160) does tell us that “the ‘challenge’ is to society as a whole; the ‘response’ comes through groups, sections and classes.” But that is still a quite under-specified analysis in terms of a political sociology fit for a globalized complex era. We need to ask which “groups” or “sections” of society are likely to respond to the encroaching marketization and commodification of life. What is the role of social movements in this process, a set of actors rather absent in Polanyi’s narrative? The problem is a broader one, namely the tension between Polanyi’s account of the double movement, and his belief that while such a counter-movement was vital for the protection of society, “in the last analysis it was incompatible with the self-regulation of the market, and thus with the market system itself” (Polanyi 2001, p. 136). What thus emerges is a self-balancing system, where the social countermovement

is not allowed to go too far lest it undermine the system itself. The dual movement is thus more about embedding social relations within the market, rather than contesting its logic. The interests of society as a whole also remain fairly under-specified in Polanyi's account. This is where, following Bob Jessop (2001, p. 7), "the role of specific economic, political and social projects, of hegemonic visions, and of associated capacities become crucial." If the fight back by "society" is to go beyond dispersed and possibly contradictory struggles, the basis on which social cohesion and political projects are forged needs to be examined in much more detail than that provided in the original Polanyi problematic.

Finally, we would need to explore further the political dilemmas posed by Polanyi's diagnosis that the countermovement might equally take reactionary and progressive forms. We simply cannot value equally all the disparate countermovements that respond to the depredations of neoliberal globalization through projects of social self-protection. On what basis do we decide which are "good" and which are "bad" countermovements? Most claims based on the professed values of "good governance" or "transparency and accountability" do little to conceal an openly Eurocentric agenda. We can maybe move forward by "spatializing" the Polanyi problematic and bringing to bear the recent "politics of scale" debates. For many sections of the broad counter-globalization movement the "local" is seen as a privileged site of resistance to globalization and it is valorized above all forms. Yet, there are countless examples of local parochial backwardness where a reactionary response to globalization leads to other forms of oppression, such as that of minorities and all things lacking "authenticity." We can only conclude that, from an analytical perspective, there can be no good or bad responses to globalization. Polanyi's problematic allows us to revisit creatively the local/global dichotomy or dialectic. For one thing, Polanyi was acutely aware of the very "local" origins of the "one big market" that globalization represents. It is not the "hidden hand" of the market that creates actually existing globalization but concrete social and political forces and groups. However, this is its limitation today, this analysis for countermovement focused almost exclusively on the scale of the nation-state. For Polanyi (2001, p. 211) protectionism had produced "the hard shell of the emerging unit of social life. The new entity was cast in the national mold." Polanyi refers to how "*within the nations* we are witnessing a development, under which the economic system ceases to lay down the law to society" (2001, p. 259). Clearly Polanyi

worked within the parameters of what we now call “methodological nationalism” and that is not surprising of course. What we now need to do is to bring both the local and the global back into the Polanyi problematic to explain how the countermovement is generated and how market-driven globalization might be deconstructed. In developing this task, we are aided by Polanyi’s rich anthropological studies of noncapitalist societies, and an understanding that capitalist commodification has never been complete and never can be, without destroying society.

A final, and politically highly relevant, conundrum is whether it is indeed ultimately possible to actually achieve “dis-embedding.” In Polanyi’s writings there is an apparent contradiction between the arguments for dis-embedding and the recognition that this would be impossible to sustain. Polanyi is most often read as arguing that the liberals had successfully “disembedded” the economy and that we now need to “re-embed” it. But Polanyi also appears to be saying that the market liberals wanted to embed society in the economy, a project that was “utopian” in the sense of unrealizable. Not least because of the countermovement from society that it engenders, as society seeks to protect itself from the market. This protective countermovement, however, weakens the ability of the self-regulatory market to function effectively. Fred Block gets around this ambiguity by arguing that “Polanyi discovers the idea of the always embedded market economy, but he is not able to name his discovery” (Block 2001, p. XVII). This argument would imply that today’s neoliberal globalizers will inevitably fail in their bid to create a global marketplace where society is embedded in the economy and thus effectively ceases to exist.

Popular Reaction

The expansion and consolidation of the unregulated market political economy in Latin America gave rise to a range of popular reactions as society sought to protect itself from its destructive effects. This was neither uniform across countries or in the forms it took. I take as my starting point the observation of Aníbal Quijano in 1988 that “in Latin America the dominated masses are generating new social practices founded on reciprocity, equality and collective solidarity as well as on individual liberties and the democracy of collectively agreed upon decisions against external impositions” (Quijano 1988, p. 438). Inevitably, some of the societal reactions could take a nationalist turn given the continued context of dependent development. There

would also, however, be a new wave of transnational organization. Some struggles were based on traditional organizational forms such as those of workers and peasants. Others such as those waged by the unemployed and the Amerindian peoples would deploy new forms of organization with identity politics at their core. All can be seen as part of a broad countermovement without denying their specific identity.

The neoliberal restructuring of socioeconomic relations and absolute privatization of the free market led inevitably to a popular reaction. Sometimes muted and covert, as other times quite open, this reaction began to build from the mid 1990s as Evelina Dagnino recounts, "The work of Gramsci offered the Latin American left an appropriate framework with which to examine the historical specificity of their own focuses, especially the particular kinds of relations between state and society" (Dagnino 1998, p. 87). The Gramscian political categories helped open up previously static and Manichean approaches to social transformation. Above all, it allowed for the re-centering of democracy as a political category, replacing previous simplistic oppositions between socialism and fascism. The democratic terrain was rediscovered and the notion that socialism could be nothing other than democratic was reestablished (see Castañeda 1993).

The reactivation of civil society saw the emergence of old and new social actors. The 1990s saw the emergence of a vast contentious cycle as diverse movements began to seek representation and to have their needs addressed. In particular, the indigenist or neo-indigenist movements saw the 36 million descendants of the original Amerindian peoples articulating their collective rights with considerable impact on the political system most notably in the Andean countries. As Leo Zamosc reports for Ecuador but more broadly applicable: "The participatory breakthrough came on two fronts. Practicing the politics of influence, the movement forced new issues in to the public agenda, wrested concessions from governments, and led alliances that repeatedly hindered the imposition of neoliberal reforms. Engaging in the politics of power, it contested the control of the state's indigenous agencies and spawned a party that made strides in the electoral representation of the Indian groups, the procurement of their collective rights and their progress towards self-government" (Zamosc 2007, p. 26). In terms of the development of democracy in Latin America, these movements played an absolutely pivotal role.

Another overarching theme allowing us to understand the wave of popular protest unleashed against the dictatorships is that of

re-embedding. Embeddedness acts as a metaphor for the relationship between the economy and society, or economic behavior and its social context. Thus we can conceive of the developmental state as being embedded in society in ways that the neoliberal state is not. While in one sense all economies are embedded, there are clearly gradations. The free-market offensive of the 1980s sought to dis-embed economic relations from any social or political constraints. In the 1990s there was a certain re-embedding with even the World Bank and others recognizing the importance of social or cultural traits such as “trust” for the success of an efficient economy. When re-embedding goes further in bringing the self-regulated market under control then we might also see some signs of decommodification as the tendency of the unregulated market to buy and sell anything and everything, is reined in by political forces responding to social pressure.

A sea change seems to emerge in the late 1980s—early 1990s regarding the dis-embedding or re-embedding of social relations. Traditional forms of sociality were in decline throughout the 1980s, civil society was disarticulated, and the capacity for collective organization, never mind action, was severely curtailed. Douglas Chalmers and coauthors refer to the emerging political systems as “socially dis-embedded” that is “where remaining popular organizations are few and often politically isolated and ineffective” (Chalmers, Martin, and Piester 1997, p. 553). Capital restructuring is thus seen to lead to what is effectively a form of social decomposition as social relations are subsumed within market relations. However as the crisis-driven agenda in relation to inflation was completed inevitably, the social issues came to the fore again and citizenship was once again on the agenda. With democracy came the concerns for sustainable long-term growth and equity (itself necessary for development). As Chalmers, Martin, and Piester point out this new situation emerging in the 1990s meant that “greater opportunities will emerge for a re-embedding of politics linking state and societal actors” (Chalmers, Martin, and Piester 1997, p. 553).

The radical democratic challenge to the neoliberal state also began to assume a clearly transnational character from the mid 1990s onward. Transnational advocacy groups, particularly in the human rights domain, had already emerged during the period of the military dictatorships. The post Cold War era greatly facilitated the emergence of these networks. But a qualitative leap was created in the mid 1990s with the emergence of the Zapatista transnational support and emulation networks. As Thomas Olesen puts it, “The interest and

attraction generated by the EZLN [Zapatistas] beyond the national borders is matched by no other movement in the post- Cold War period" (Olesen 2005, p. 2). Its emergence signaled a new domain of transnational popular politics that closed the gap between the local and the global and, in a certain way, subverted our understanding of national politics. Whether this is part of the emergence of something called global civil society is a moot point but it certainly draws our attention to the politics of scale regarding contestation of the dominant neoliberal paradigm.

With the advent of democratization, a particular version of "civil society" came to the fore in the political debate and in the analysis of social movements. We do not need to believe that the NGOs that became important during this period were the "vanguard of imperialism" (see Petras 1997) to understand that a particular Northern version of civil society prevailed. Social movements—some traditional as, for example, the labor movement, others newer such as the human rights movement—played an important role in driving back military authoritarianism. In the new democracies they were most often placed on the defensive again—for example, in regard to the labor movement—or more or less co-opted, as happened with the women's movement in many cases after the return of democratic government. Furthermore, as we moved into the era of neoliberalism, we saw it deploying its own privatized notion of civil society where individuals could be organized and the NGOs began, more or less systematically, filling in the gaps in terms of social provision caused by the forced retreat of the state from its traditional social role.

In terms of the movements contesting neoliberalism, it was the trade union or labor movement that was to the fore if we take a continental perspective. In most of the transitions to democracy in the Southern Cone, the trade unions' steady activity at the grassroots level and occasional bouts of open strike action had an undoubted impact (see Munck 1989). If the military dictatorships had been able to dismantle trade union organization as against decapitating its leadership, then the outcome would have been very different. While they could, indeed, ban strikes with a display of military force, they never stopped workers from engaging in go-slows or the aptly named "sad working" (*trabajo a tristeza*). While neoliberalism has since decimated the industrial working class, the workers movement continues to play a significant role in most Latin American countries, including Colombia where the level of repression has reached unprecedented levels by any international comparison. Labor may be an "old" social

movement but it played a significant—and sometimes pivotal (for example, in Brazil)—role in the construction of the new democracies in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s.

The peasant movement also took great strides forward during this period most notably in Brazil but not only there. Globalization of the rural sector utterly transformed the traditional, rural social structure. Despite the commercialization of agriculture and consequent proletarianization, the peasantry continued to exist and act as a significant sector. However it was forced to diversify its livelihood and take on wage employment as a survival strategy. The Zapatistas were one response from below to this situation at the time, as was the MST (Movimento dos Sem Terra) in Brazil, which came to organize over half a million peasant families by the early 1990s. As Cristóbal Kay notes, “The MST has greatly contributed to the democratization of rural life, especially in the settlement areas” (Kay 2004, p. 246). Elsewhere peasant insurgency has become intertwined with issues of ethnic discrimination and a wide range of environmental issues as in the Andean countries. Peasants, while one of the world’s oldest working population, have been at the heart of resistance to neoliberal globalization in Latin America promoting national, regional, and transnational forms of organization.

Urban workers and rural peasants have traditionally been seen as class-based movements and contrasted with the “new” or identity based social movements. This is somewhat of a false divide insofar as identity-formation is also an integral element of material oriented or so-called ‘bread and butter’ movements. The cultural struggle to create an identity is inseparable from the struggle for power or access to it. In Latin America, during the transition from dictatorship to democracy, there was a flourishing of interest in Gramsci’s politics as a way out of the all-or-nothing ultimacist politics of the 1960s and 1970s. As Dagnino argues in a deconstruction of citizenship and democracy during this period, the “Gramscian concepts of hegemony, civil society, organic intellectual, collective will, and intellectual and moral reform provided suitable means to both intellectual construction and political action in the new scenario” (Dagnino 1998, p. 39). A new understanding of social transformation though the construction of hegemony was being formed in a way that went beyond any academic divide between old and new social movement.

Workers and peasants are also usually viewed as essentially national social movements as distinct, for example, the transnational counter-globalization movement. However, when during the 1990s

a transnational movement was gorged across the America contesting the US neoliberal free-trade project, workers and peasant organization were at the core of it. As Marysa von Bulow in her study of this movement argues, “Never before had so many CSO’s [civil society organizations] from the region come together to debate and mobilize transnationally around a hemispheric agenda” (von Bulow 2010, p. 11). There were of course activists involved in generating this campaign and the NGOs dedicated to free-trade issues were key players. What is most interesting though is the absolutely critical weight of the traditional battalions of labor. The “race to the bottom” in terms of labor standards generated support amongst quite traditional trade unions for radical transnational action. What this campaign also throws up as an interesting question is the relationship between international regulation of trade (and labor standards) versus national sovereignty, a conflict not easy to take sides on from a Latin American perspective.

If there is one form of popular reaction that symbolizes the neoliberal era, it is the rise of the indigenous movements in the Andean countries principally. There is an analysis that conditions were laid by the shift from a regime of corporatist citizenship to one based on a neoliberal conception of citizenship (Yashar 2005). Against corporatist homogenization of the citizen condition (manifest in assimilation of the indigenous peoples), neoliberalism promotes individualism and the formation of nonclass identities. This is certainly a factor during this period that saw an unprecedented rise of indigenous movements, particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador. However, closer ethnographic studies on the ground have painted a more complex picture. Thus Carmen Martínez Novo argues, on the basis of her work and that of others in Ecuador, that “the desire for inclusion and social mobility are stronger motivations in indigenous cultural politics than the search for difference, which might only be a means of achieving the first objectives” (Martínez Novo 2010a, p. 17). In other words the “new” indigenous identity movements might not be that different from more traditional collective movement such as the trade unions.

Going back to the 1920s when José Carlos Mariátegui was articulating a coherent socialist position on indigenous rights in Peru, this issue has been taken up only sporadically. Even if neoliberalism has to some extent, opened up the politics of Amerindian identity and re-vindication, it could never resolve the emerging demands. Neoliberal reforms have actually intensified inequality levels and social differentiation within the Amerindian communities. While decentralization

and a general encouragement of a depoliticized civil society may have enabled indigenous mobilizations there is no solution to their issues within that system. In Ecuador the indigenous movement in the 2000s made some gains but also some dubious political alliances that took them further away from democracy as a practice and as a social and political objective. In Bolivia, on the other hand, a solid alliance with nonindigenous sectors, the trade unions, the church, and some NGOs created the type of social movement that would not only be more likely to attain its objectives but also to be sustainable.

The subaltern classes can also forge a people's identity that cannot (though it often is) be reduced to a crass form of populism. When class interests are transcended to become national-popular interests then we have a political breakthrough as both Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi recognized. In the contemporary era it is Ernesto Laclau who has most clearly articulated this insight. For him, "the construction of the 'people' is the political act *par excellence*... the *sine qua non* requirements of the political are the constitution of antagonistic frontiers within the social and the appeal to new subjects of social change" (Laclau 2005, p. 154). In Argentina toward the end of 2001 when the banks collapsed and the country defaulted, there were four governments in the space of as many weeks. The state's control over the economy and authority over the political process more or less evaporated. The popular reaction to this system collapse—unseen since the 1930s—included neighborhood assemblies, a widespread barter economy, and an extremely militant movement of the unemployed (the famous *piqueteros*). The *Argentinazo* to match the *Cordobazo* of 1969 at a national level did not quite materialize but the potential for a seismic shift was clearly there.

The events in Argentina at the end of 2001 and early 2002 have given rise to a vast literature. For our purposes I would simply highlight the conclusion of Ruben Dri for whom, what exploded then "was not simply a multitude as [Antonio] Negri believes, but a '*pueblo*' [people], that is to say a multitude which, in the act of rebelling and its expressing its wish for the total repudiation of politics becomes a collective subject we call '*pueblo*' and which forms an essential part of the political struggles in Argentina and Latin America" (Dri 2011, p. 21). This is not an inchoate multitude "raging against the machine" but a national-popular revolt. Nor was it seeking to do away with the state as some interpretations in terms of "anarchism" argued but rather, for its replacement by a national-popular state that could respond to the needs of the people.

Inevitably—given Argentina’s submissive attitude toward neoliberal imperialism over the previous decade—this revolt also took a national and anti-imperialist character. That was not a sign of backwardness compared with the “post national” revolts in the North but a simple reflection of reality. Latin America’s revolts against neoliberalism are bound to take a different shape and reflect both the historical context of dependent development and popular revolt going back to the early twentieth century.

Left Governments

Since 2000, most of Latin America—with the major exceptions of Mexico and Colombia—has been under Left governments of one type or another. What we need to note at the start is how totally unprecedented those Left governments are. Not since Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in the 1950s, Salvador Allende in Chile in the 1970s, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the 1980s has a self-declared Left been in office in Latin America (Cuba excepted of course). Certainly also unprecedented is a swing of this type across a whole region. What is also significant in world historical terms is that this shift to the Left (although what that means remains to be established) occurred only a decade after the fall of the Berlin wall and Fukuyama’s declaration of the “end of history.” We were supposedly moving with a smooth post-ideological world where the hegemony of neoliberal globalization would be utterly hegemonic. To even have a president (Chávez) stand up and proclaim “twenty-first century socialism” is not something anyone would have expected at the time.

There has been a huge amount of international interest in the rise of the left-of-center governments in Latin America. However, much of the analysis has been somewhat driven by external political agencies and is often reduced to a “good left” versus a “bad left.” The first variety is deemed to have learned the economic lessons of the neoliberal phase and has a healthy respect for Western liberal democratic political norms. The latter are deemed economically irresponsible and politically authoritarian. In short, we are led to believe there is a democratic Left versus a populist Left. This is essentially a neocolonial perspective with its view of the good native who has learnt his lessons well and the rebellious, still part-savage, colonial who will revert to type, spend money he has not earned, and make false promises to the people, all held together by a dubious nonrational, non-European type of charisma. It is clear that the international financial institutions

would prefer not to deal with someone who might be unpredictably swayed by the will of the people. Nevertheless there are still distinctive strands in current Latin American Left theory and practice that we need to analyze not least to assess the prospects of this new political order.

There is no one clearly defined social-democratic Left, although Chilean socialists and F. H. Cardoso in Brazil are most often mentioned in this regard. Others may view these political figures as belonging to the center-right. Be that as it may, they clearly aspire to a social-democratic type of social order. The democratization of the market economy, or at the very least its regulation or reorganization to compensate for its inequalities, is a key belief. In political terms it preaches a reform of the state and a social policy based on empowerment and capacity building. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, the Brazilian philosopher and politician who might be seen as a maverick social democrat, argues clearly that “empowerment, both educational and economic, of the individual worker and citizen, democratization of the market economy and the establishment of a social solidarity based on social responsibility requires a deepening of democracy...” (Mangabeira Unger 2011, p. 42). Democracy is at the core of this new Latin American political current and that is probably unique in a situation where democratic politics most often responded to an economic or military crisis in the past.

The populist Left is not, of course, a self-proclaimed category but rather an epithet deployed against radical nationalists by observers at home and abroad. We could say that they take a different approach to democratizing democracy to that of the more European social-democratic discourses just mentioned above. At the heart of this “populist” current lies a commitment to economic nationalism and a recovery of the category of people (*pueblo*). Thus, for example, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina “set up a discursive dividing line” (Panizza 2009, p. 245) between the previous antinational neoliberalism of Menem and the military to frame his own economic and political project as the current manifestation of the national-popular politics of the 1940s and 1950s. Its economics mirrored the neo-developmentalism being articulated by CEPAL and its politics was based on democracy plus personalism. Rather than read this “populist left” in a purely negative antidemocratic sense it would be better to conceive of this emerging current as national-popular governments that represent a twenty-first century national-popular politics, rebalancing globalization in favor of the nation-state.

From an international Left-networked perspective the main progressive alternative is the grassroots or autonomist Left in Latin America symbolized most clearly through the Zapatistas. Certainly many myths have circulated about the Zapatistas and their autonomism has never really been theorized, although John Holloway's *Change the World Without Taking Power* comes close to an unauthorized version. For Holloway "the starting point of theoretical reflection is opposition, negativity, struggle. It is from rage that thought is born..." (Holloway 2002). Given that capitalist relations are everywhere, even embedded in the state, reigning power through reformist or revolutionary means is futile. Thus, for Holloway "The struggle to liberate power to is not the struggle to construct a counter-power, but rather an anti-power..." (Holloway 2002). This strategy is a refusal of the state, of power, of the party form—it is ultimately negative. The autonomism of the Zapatistas is not the only form—and other Amerindian groups in Mexico and elsewhere conceive it differently—but it has come to symbolize a politics that has not really made any significant advances 20 years since the Zapatistas shook up international politics in 1994.

There is, of course, a Left that is neither social democratic, populist, nor autonomist. This is an independent Left in the tradition of Mariátegui, and Gramsci focused on national reality but from an internationalist perspective. It is clearly opposed to the new social-democratic tradition that it views as implausible even compared to European social democracy in its heyday when conditions were much more favorable. It has also long been aware of the negative connotations of nationalist and populist politics in terms of constructing a strategy for workers power in Latin America. More surprisingly, perhaps, it is quite critical of the autonomist current to which it counterposes a re-centering of politics. Thus Guillermo Almeyra fiercely criticizes the Zapatistas for "taking refuge in an ill-defined a-politicism...characterized by silence and a total absence of discussion around the big national and international questions" (Almeyra 2004, p. 81). While understanding the frustrations around political parties and their way of doing politics there is no escaping the political realm—and the question of power—to hide behind the grass roots. For another world to be possible, resistance from below does not suffice and a new strategy for power must be forged.

Not surprisingly, a plethora of interpretations have emerged to theorize and deconstruct the new Left governments. What seems clear from the evidence so far is that this turn is not due to a massive shift

to the Left in terms of public opinion. It would be complacent of us to see the Leftist parties in government as a result of a great swing to the Left by the masses, now totally disenchanted with neoliberalism. Marco Morales is right to argue that “the more plausible story is that the leftist parties that won elections were skilled at broadening their appeal beyond those that identify with the left” (Morales 2008, p. 37). That is certainly the case in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay most clearly. Over and above that, we can argue that this shift at government level does reflect a growing disenchantment with a “made in U.S.” economic model and a deep desire to explore more nationalist and regionalist approaches to development. The 2008–2009 global crisis—with its clear roots in the US economic system—deepened that feeling that a more indigenous response to the crisis was called for.

The main division established by the most influential analysts (led by Jorge Castañeda, ex-Althuserian, ex-advisor to the Sandinistas, former Mexican foreign minister) is around whether they deploy a populist style and economic policy or not. Thus we have the “good left” governments of Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay versus the “populist left” governments of Venezuela, Argentina, and Bolivia. The well-behaved Left is seen as honest and responsible, eschews populism, and does not hide behind empty anti-US rhetoric. Its economic policies are moderate—neoliberalism with a human face—and they certainly do not indulge in renationalizations. For Castañeda and Morales there is another “swashbuckling left” that “offers a grab bag of social welfare initiatives, boosts to consumption and wages, ad hoc concessions to business interests and nationalist hand-waving” (Castañeda and Morales 2008, p. 238). Given its fragile basis, its success can only be ephemeral and depends on extraneous factors such as being in recovery from a catastrophic crisis (Argentina) or being blessed with extravagant oil-derived wealth (Venezuela).

This type of dichotomy is a bit of a caricature but it does reflect some kind of a divide between a social-democratic (or social democratization) Left and a more radical, nationalist Left. Another analyst Steven Ellner, based on a careful reading of the evidence, takes the governments of Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia), and Rafael Correa (Ecuador) as a common category. For him, “All three had ample congressional majorities which allowed for democratic endorsement of social transformation, emphasized social participation over social productivity, diversified economic relations and promoted a radical national democracy as against traditional liberal democracy” (Ellner 2012, p. 2). Certainly the traditional Left could,

with some justification, say that this was not socialism as they understood it. Clearly also the United States was not happy with what they saw as independent economic and political choices made outside the parameters of the Washington Consensus. Overall there is little doubt that these three governments are truly radical, based on considerable popular participation, and have not engaged in draconian pursuit of the opposition (even Chávez is more sinned against than sinner in this regard).

Other analysts, not least F. H. Cardoso (of dependency theory and Brazilian presidency fame) has identified a discernible social-democratic Left in Brazil (Cardoso and Lula), Chile (Concertación governments), and Uruguay (Cardoso 2009a). The political origins of the three governing parties are quite distinct: the labor-based Workers' Party in Brazil, the Socialist-Christian Democratic coalition in Chile, and the broad Left Frente Amplio in Uruguay that includes the ex-Tupamaros who do not have that much in common really. Nevertheless they are seen to have steered a "responsible" course, not threatening vested interests. In Chile, for many years Pinochet's political structures were not touched and his economic strategy has remained more or less in place, albeit with a "human face" added. In Uruguay, a president who was once a leader of the Tupamaros was at the forefront of a move to insert the country into a free-trade agreement against the wishes of many people and the two large neighbors. In Brazil, F. H. Cardoso was widely derided as the founder of dependency theory who became a neoliberal and "Lula" had been seen as even worse—a neoliberal "Taliban" by some on the Left (for example, Petras and Veltmeyer 2005).

It probably is accurate if, in a non-pejorative way, we were to refer to the social democratization of all three governments. That is they have taken up some of the traditional banners of social democracy—a steering role for the state, and a social safety net—in a Latin America moving beyond fundamentalist freemarket policies. Cardoso—a well-informed participant observer in this historic shift—argues that "globalized social democracy" in Latin America "acknowledges that the stability of the democratic process depends on some measure of economic progress. But a great deal also depends on active policies geared to reducing poverty and enhancing social well-being" (Cardoso 2009a, p. 309). This is essentially a "social market economy" approach albeit in very different circumstances of dependent development. No doubt all these governments could have promoted social transformation over stability but their achievements are significant.

The main difference compared to the previous group of governments considered is that these were based on solid political parties and thus their leaders did not need to build a personal following, as was the case with Chávez, Morales, and Correa.

Argentina does not fit into either camp readily and can be used as a way of dismantling any oversimplistic paradigm. The theorists of the good Left—bad Left binary opposition tend to place “Kirchnerism” (Néstor Kirchner followed by Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner) firmly in the bad “populist” bag. They derive from the Peronist movement and reflected the radical 1970s politics of the *Montoneros* and Peronist youth movement more broadly. They are firmly nationalist and argue forcefully for recovery of the Malvinas, in a similar idiom to that of Chávez. Yet their economic policies are quite traditional (based on revival of the agro-export sector) and they have not engaged in major social redistribution. Sectors within Kirchnerism are clearly part of the anti-imperialist Left. While the traditional oligarchy are wary of Kirchnerism (because they do not control it), wide sections of the middle class support it as an answer to the need for stability. That we cannot pigeonhole Kirchnerism should, I believe, make us wary of any political schema that neatly divides the new “progressive,” “radical,” “left,” or “centre-left” governments now dominating the scene in Latin America into neat boxes.

If we take a broader perspective on the new Left governments in Latin America there are several key questions we need to assess. The first, I would argue, is around their record in regard to social inequality. There has been much made of recent data apparently showing a decline in inequality in Latin America during the 1990s. It seems clear that Lula’s systematic redistribution policies rapidly reduced poverty levels from 30 percent to 25 percent in a few years after he took office in 2003. On most health and education spending indicators the Left governments have performed better than the others. Some economists, however, argue for “the superior performance for non-populist left cases vis-à-vis populist left case” (Merino 2008, p. 86). Other analysts point to the dramatic progress in combating inequality in Venezuela and Bolivia compared to the cautious progress, at best, in Chile and Brazil. It might be safer at present to say that the Left governments as a whole have addressed poverty and inequality decisively and that the jury is still out on whether the globalized social democracies have done better than the radical “populist” regimes (see G. Munck 2009).

The second question we need to address is the relationship between the Left regimes and the development of democracy in the region.

Many critical and mainstream analysts have complained about the “quality” of democracy in Latin America and the dubious standing of the rule of law. For pro-neoliberal writers (for example, Reid 2009 and Edwards 2010) any Left policy that is anti-imperialist or pro-participation or pro-redistribution is “populist” and not democratic. While there is, of course, a difference between democratic and populist policies, it is not clear whether the new Left governments have actually infringed democratic norms. Certainly Chávez has played power games with the press, and Kirchnerism in Argentina is far from being a model of best democratic practice. However electoral successions have occurred smoothly, government corruption has been exposed by a free press, and political parties have multiplied. From a longer term vision all these governments—not least Kirchnerism in Argentina—have reaffirmed the sanctity of human rights and continued to expose and punish the perpetrators of the military dictatorships.

Finally we need to assess the sustainability of the Left governments. For the moment we can say that a renewed round of military interventions in politics seems unlikely. With signal exceptions (Honduras and Venezuela) the coup seems a practice of the past. Whatever the quality of democracy it has certainly become consolidated, also, of course, where Right wing regimes prevail such as in Mexico and Colombia. Whether the Left can sustain its positions of power remain to be seen. Chile in 2010 showed how a long run of center-left governments with benign economic conditions and strong social policies could still ensue in Right wing electoral victories. It would seem that where there is a strong party structure—as in the Southern Cone and Brazil—a pragmatic Left able to carry out political alliances can continue being a popular choice as governing party. The more fluid political conditions in the Andean countries (Colombia excepted as a strong and stable party regime prevails) means that the Left must rely on more ad hoc coalitions and, more often, a strong political personality to hold them together. And there are not so many Evo Morales about.

Too often, this complex array of Left governments is dismissed with a word or two. The most common is the word “populism” that has been deployed by Left and Right critics alike. Too often it is taken to be a term of abuse, a personalistic, demagogic authoritarianism. In economic terms it denotes a dangerous profligacy designed to “buy votes.” Another way of looking at populism is as a political mode of intervention between the powerful and powerless aimed at consolidating the sovereignty of the people. In this sense populism “marks

a ‘rupture’ with the existing *unjust* order and the ‘reconstruction’ of a truly *democratic* order” (Panizza and Morelli 2009, p. 40). The emancipatory promise of populism may, and often does, conflict with the norms of democracy. It is often at odds with liberal constitutional values and institutions. The Left governments of Latin America have been more or less “populist” in this sense, but they are better assessed on their records than on a pejorative and simplified label of populism.

Beyond Neoliberalism

As we have argued above, the establishment of a self-regulating market on a global scale—the objective of what we tend to call globalization—often activates a countermovement committed to what Polanyi calls “social protection,” based on “those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market” (Polanyi 2001, p. 138). Also, however, the neoliberal regime became subject to its own contradictions at a global and a Latin American level. Policy-making needed to become more pragmatic than allowed for by the “ten commandments” of the Washington Consensus. The state was granted a new regulatory role and there was a newfound interest in empowerment of the poor. This new neoliberalism was, in brief, less fundamentalist. It is a moot point whether we moved into a post neoliberal in the 2000s or just witnessed a transformation of the doctrine into something more viable (see McDonald and Ruckert 2009; Burdick, Oxhorn, and Roberts 2009). Neoliberalism had certainly achieved its objectives to carry out “a wide reaching reconstruction of the institutional basis of society in an attempt to fashion a depoliticised, individualistic and market-driven society...” (Taylor 2009, p. 22).

There are few more important questions in terms of development and social transformation than whether globalization can reduce poverty and inequality or not. For its proponents free-market globalization was going to unleash a productive revolution creating untold wealth that would benefit everybody. Even long-standing critics of orthodox capitalist development strategies such as Keith Griffin were to argue in the mid 1990s that “in recent years the pattern of global growth, contrary to unduly held belief, has helped to reduce inequality in the distribution of world income, for once the proportionate gains by the poor exceed these of the rich” (Griffin 1995, p. 364). Poverty and equality were once again at the center of international debates. This gave rise to an explosion of research often based on extensive

new data sets, seeking to unravel whether the optimistic scenario was justified. The overall conclusion was that absolute poverty had been reduced in China and India and that this had created the impression that global inequality had been reduced. If one excluded China (with its associated measurement problems), global inequality had not been reduced by the neoliberal globalization policies.

In Latin America there was widespread acceptance that this was a most unequal global region. It is based, most often, on the notion that this was inherited from the colonial era and reflects the absolutism of Spain and Portugal as against the more “democratic” colonization of North America. It is thus interesting to note recent data brought to bear by Jeffrey Williamson, which seems to indicate that “compared with the rest of the world, inequality was *not* high in pre-conquest 1491, nor was it high in the post conquest decades following 1492. Indeed it was not even high in the mid-nineteenth century just prior to Latin America’s *belle époque*. It only became high thereafter” (Williamson 2007, p. 11). That is to say, inequality—and later poverty—was socially constructed by the propertied classes that built fortunes rather than nations through a favorable insertion into the imperial world orders, first that led by England between 1860 and 1930 and later that led by the United States between—1945 and 1989. There is nothing inevitable about inequality and it is simply a myth that it predates modern-capitalist development in Latin America.

The neoliberal offensive of the 1990s did create untold wealth for some in Latin America but did it do anything for the poor? Recently, a new “revisionist” orthodoxy has emerged that claims an unprecedented reduction in poverty and inequality levels across Latin America on foot of the Washington Consensus driven economic reforms. Thus World Bank data suggests that moderate poverty has fallen from 26 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 2004 while extreme poverty fell from 100 percent to 90 percent over the same period (World Bank 2007). ECLAC data go even further seemingly showing extreme poverty or indigence dropping from 23 percent in 1990 to 150 percent in 2005 (ECLAC 2007). Leaving aside the discrepancy of absolute poverty rates of 10 percent (World Bank) and 23 percent (ECLAC) in 1990, it does seem that poverty has probably been reduced. At one level this is not surprising as, with high level of growth it would take worsening income inequality distribution for poverty not to fall. Over and beyond the reliability of the data (is it measuring what it claims to be measuring?) the conclusion by Helwege and Birch sounds a cautionary note. “A closer examination [of the data] suggests that

generalizations about Latin American poverty reduction are driven largely by improvements in Mexico..." (Helwege and Birch 2007, p. 23) and thus we cannot really generalize. There is even considerable doubt that Mexico more than halved its poverty rates in the 1990s, but the numerical importance of that country's poor would lead any improvement to affect the regional average. Brazil, the other major economy of the region, did see an improvement prior to 1996 but not much change since. But if we then take the rest of the region even on the basis of World Bank data moderate poverty increased between 1990 and 2004 from 21 percent to 27 percent and extreme poverty from 70 percent to 110 percent over the same period. Worst affected were not the poorest countries in Central America, for example, but large, "developed" countries such as Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela where even moderate poverty more than doubled. Nor does the base year of 1990 make much sense coming as it did at the end of the "last decade" of the debt crisis and hyperinflation. Overall, though the problem is a deeper and more structural one as Helwege and Birch put it, "The fact that poverty is as high and as stubborn as it is in Latin America reflects the fact that trickle down is extremely slow in the context of income inequality" (Helwege and Birch 2007, p. 25). A rising tide does not lift all boats equally in an unequal sea.

The Economic Commission for Latin America has, in recent years, rightly put great emphasis on equality in its economic policy recommendations. This is set in the context of a postcrisis scenario with a greater degree of regulation over the market. The regional context is set by the widespread and seemingly durable democratic governance achieved. The ECLAC programmatic position is quite simple: "The value of equality, together with that of freedom, is the most humane way of taking on the tasks of modernity" (ECLAC 2010, p. 39). Political equality is currently being undermined by massive levels of socioeconomic inequality. Social justice is thus seen as the greatest current challenge of the regions. The solution is posed in somewhat technocratic terms—social spending to address inequality should be seen as social investment in human capabilities—but that is a language that will be understood by the newly empowered states in Latin America after the end of neoliberal globalization in its pure form. There is now at least a clear understanding that there is a positive relation between the narrowing of social divides and the need for greater competitiveness.

The collapse of the neoliberal model in Argentina in 2001–2002 had a dramatic effect across the region. Here was a country that had

followed the model to the letter with a “strong” president (Menem), with trade union, and popular backing. In other words the neoliberal policy was implemented with a degree of legitimacy. The specter of hyperinflation—as well as the popular trust in Peronism—made for a quiescent population. There was confidence that an absolute identification with the US and its interests might at least create some benefits for Argentina. Menem was able to reconstruct bourgeois hegemony with considerable consent of the subaltern classes for a decade. However it was based on a policy of convertibility from the peso to the dollar that was simply not sustainable. When the financial bubble burst in late 2001, it led not only to a collapse of the neoliberal model but also of hegemony itself insofar as politics in general was questioned as a means to address social needs. Governments and policy makers throughout Latin America took notice and it also encouraged the emergence of the post-Washington Consensus.

Neoliberalism did not, of course, collapse from one day to another. It had, after all, reshaped power relations in an enduring manner over a long period of time. This path dependence was illustrated best in Chile where there was considerable continuity between the dictatorial and democratic phases in terms of economic policy. The economic fundamentals were not contested by the new democratic economic managers. Chile would remain an “open” economy and its dynamism would come from niche agro-mineral exports. It would stress its reliable climate for foreign investment and something like renationalization would be unthinkable. At the same time per capita social expenditure rose by over 60 percent in the 1990s. As Gwynne puts it, “Chile became a model for other Latin American countries, initiating...a ‘competitive-plus-social’ combination of policies” (Gwynne 2009, p. 49). Certainly Uruguay—under its left-of-center governments since 2004—adopted this model explicitly. This was possible for Uruguay given a similar political history with well-established political parties, efficient mechanisms to overcome conflicts, and being an early Latin American pioneer of the welfare state.

The Chilean debate is relevant for Latin America because under the Bachelet presidency in particular (2006–2010), “The centre of political debate in Chile [moved] beyond the classical narrow argument between right and left about being ‘for’ or ‘against’ neoliberalism” (Oxhorn 2009, p. 227). A different way of doing politics was emerging, more open, transparent, and participatory. Gender issues were to the fore as never before. This was a non-technocratic, bottom-up approach quite at odds with traditional party politics in Chile. While

the advances in this regard were not really sustainable, this period in Chile did effectively break down positive and the negative elective affinities between economic neoliberalism and democracy. In other words the relationship was contingent and not predetermined. As Oxhorn points out, this gives rise to a situation where “Latin America [is] at a crossroads between the emergence of a genuine post-neoliberal development model that can begin to address historical problems of inequality and exclusion, and the emergence of new forms of populism...” (Oxhorn 2009, p. 218). Whether populism is the enemy of post-neoliberalism is a moot point, but certainly we are entering an era very different from that of the Washington Consensus.

At the other extreme to Chile, would be the radical rhetoric of the Chávez government in Venezuela, Tussie and Heidrich however, point to a mismatch between the rhetoric and the reality of the Chávez regime economic policies (Tussie and Heidrich 2008, p. 60). Speeches may be socialist in tone but the deeds are more ambiguous. Certainly the creation of community councils and new models of production represent a break with neoliberal orthodoxy. Private capital—both national and foreign—is subject to forms of regulations that have not been seen for many years. The social role of the state—and assistance to the poor—also sets Venezuela apart. Economic policy in general though has been characterized by pragmatism despite the post-neoliberal rhetoric since 2006; the Chávez discourse has become more radical with the promotion of the “21st century socialist Revolution.” The new model of production based on increased state ownership and corporation based indigenous development however, is not unique to Venezuela and is more or less the regional norm.

A broader question is whether the Venezuelan model is generalizable. Probably no more than the Chilean model would be the simple answer given its heavy dependence on oil revenue. Certainly oil revenue has provided Venezuela with regional leverage, for example, in Argentina. The alliance with Cuba, Bolivia, and Ecuador is seemingly solid. But broader aspirations to create a common Latin American position seem unlikely to prosper. Even then Venezuela has probably done better at establishing a regional presence than Brazil. The latter could have been expected to play a strong regional role and it does, to some extent, in Mercosur. Further afield Brazil has met definite limits to its regional leadership aspirations based in part on traditional Spanish America-Brazil rivalries. Nevertheless, in the longer term it is likely to be Brazil that will act as a driver of autonomous development in Latin America due to its overwhelming economic weight in the region.

In Bolivia we have seen an interesting hybrid model of “Andean capitalism” or “Andean-Amazonian capitalism” as theorized by Vice President García Linera. This project seeks to make capitalist development compatible with the values and traditions of indigenous peasant communities. For García Linera, “Andean-Amazonian capitalism” is a stage in the transition to socialism, perhaps 20 or 30 years down the line (Linera 2006). In theory, a strong state would regulate industrial expansion and transfer the surplus to the community sector to empower self-organization and an Andean-Amazonian development process. While there are some echoes here of Mariátegui’s positive analysis of the indigenous communities and their noncapitalist relations of production, it is unclear how it would work in practice. For those most critical of this vision, it is simply the same old free-market orthodoxy in indigenous clothing and would simply become a vehicle for corruption. Whatever our ultimate assessment is, to date this model seems to be stronger in terms of rhetoric than in reality.

While many hopeful Left analysts have seen in the Morales administration, a radical post-neoliberalism government, others are less sanguine. Thus Jeffery Webber, based on a careful analysis, shows a considerable degree of continuity with the inherited neoliberal model in terms of its commitment to fiscal austerity; low-inflation growth; and its mining, agricultural, and labor-market policies (Webber 2009, p. 105). The much vaunted renationalization of the hydrocarbon industry turned out in practice to be no more than a moderate increase in the royalties paid to the state. While this has freed the state from its deficit since 2005, it has not resulted in significant social investment insofar as the Morales administration has chosen to set up a stabilization account abroad with the surplus funds. While this need not detract from the very significant political effect that the Evo Morales election has had across Bolivia and further afield, it cannot really be seen as a radical alternative in terms of the political economy.

Neoliberalism emerged in Latin America as a response to crisis and achieved its stated aim of taming hyperinflation. The incredibly decisive way in which it became embedded was due, according to Marcus Taylor, “not only [to] the coercive power of the international financial institutions but also from the particular nature of the social, political and economic malaise that Latin American countries encountered” (Taylor 2009, p. 23). It is that crisis, as analyzed in chapter 5 above, which sets the terms of reference for the neoliberal political project. It explains its considerable social consensus and the reluctance to depart

suddenly or totally from its norms. Neoliberalism “with a human face” was the best that could be hoped for and that would probably describe the Chilean model. The development of genuinely post-neoliberal model would probably have to go further than Venezuela or Bolivia if it is to truly deepen democracy in Latin America as well as act as a driver of a principled anti-imperialism. International conditions are probably now more favorable for the development of such a strategy.

We are probably now in a post-neoliberal era even if certain neo-liberal tenets—such as the opening up of trade to the world market—continue in force. The post-neoliberal (yet still neoliberal?) economic policies are now seeking to reconnect the market with the social domain. The overarching influence of the 2008–2009 global capitalist crisis and the subsequent crisis of Euroland from 2011 onward, form the backdrop to this rethinking in Latin America. In Latin America, it is the combined impact of about 13 left-of-center governments and a vibrant—sometimes rebellious—civil society that is encouraging new ways of thinking about development. The movement toward an alternative neoliberalism is most advanced in Latin America, according to Perry Anderson, because “here, and only here, the resistance to neo-liberalism and to neo-imperialism melds the cultural with the social and national. That is to say, it implies the emerging vision of another type of organization of society and another model of relations among states” (Anderson 2004, p. 42).

Globalization Within (1510–2010)

Most of Latin America is marking two hundred years of political independence around this time, there are mainly radical nationalist governments in office, and the old dream of a unified *Nuestra América* is thriving, at least in some quarters. What does this mean, though, in the era of globalization when the capacity of the nation-state has been severely curtailed? Should the project for social transformation not now simply be scaled up to the transnational terrain? To begin to answer these very current questions—where perhaps the old is dead but the new is not yet born—we need to look back at the way in which Latin America has “Always-Already” been globalised. Globalization was not something new that arrived in the 1980s when academic debate on it began to rage, rather, it was always the condition for development, albeit called dependency. This sets the terrain for a brief review of the current aspects of “Transnationalism” in their main social and cultural facets. There was a widespread belief that nationalism would fade away as a relevant social and political category and a new cultural cosmopolitanism would prevail. While transnational flows increased dramatically during the last 25 years in terms of cultural and people flows, for example, a shift toward cosmopolitanism and acceptance of the dominant world order did not necessarily occur. We examine next the main “Responses” to this new world order, which we categorize as nationalist, transnationalist, accommodationist, and social-democratic. Each in different ways provides channels for the subaltern groups and society at large to forge creative social responses to the new situation of dependency to use the old language. This chapter, and the book as a whole, then ends with an analysis of the prospects for a “New Matrix” that might set the terms for social and political development in the twenty-first

century. What will the economic and political order look like after neoliberalism? Will the left-of-center governments continue to set the political pace? What role will the insurgent indigenous imaginaries play in forging a new future for Latin America? What broader lessons can we learn from the interaction between development, hegemony, and social transformation in Latin America?

Always-Already

When the globalization paradigm of world development began to take a grip in the 1990s it was, on the whole, resisted in Latin America, at least by critical intellectuals. The notion of globalization as something new did not seem to make much sense. Nor was there much appetite for what seemed like an undue enthusiasm for globalization, even by those critics of capitalism who saw it as a bright new path to modernity. Against the globalizers—who argued that the level of internationalization was qualitatively greater than in previous waves—many Latin American analysts argued that nothing fundamental had changed. While mindful of this subaltern critique of Northern globalization theory, what I propose here is a different type of analysis. While I will argue that globalization as we know it was a watershed, it also must be seen as part of a longer history of subordinate integration of Latin America, which we could say was “always-already” part of a global power system.

There was considerable resistance within Latin America to the concept of globalization as a new overarching development paradigm. Ultimately, we could argue that this was based on an understanding that Latin America had, in reality, always-already been globalized. This was not a novel condition in a continent where powerful external forces have shaped the political economy of development since the conquest. Atilio Borón (2008) develops a Latin American reading of globalization that focuses on its neoliberal intent and tends to minimize its transformative impact. In terms of its impact, globalization in Latin America had simply “caused the new Latin American democracies to surrender important margins of national sovereignty and self-determination” (Borón 2008). Globalization is seen very much as an imposition of neoliberalism, a myth that, in terms of its benefits was not nearly as coherent as it presents itself discursively. While there are, of course, some valid objections to the “one true religion” approach of neoliberal globalization presented in this critical view, it also rather underestimates the profound changes that have

occurred in Latin America since the 1980s promoted by external changes and the “internal” dynamic of the class struggle. We need to understand that “national sovereignty” and “self-determination” are not self-explanatory categories, in and of themselves, nor do they provide obvious alternative guides to a politics of liberation in the era of complex globalization.

Antonio Negri (in collaboration with Giuseppe Cocco) has extended his global analysis of the “age of empire” to Latin America (Negri and Cocco 2006) in ways that contradict Borón’s insistence that little has changed. They emphasize how dependence has become transformed into interdependency by the globalization processes. An important argument is that “*The world market is no longer external [no tiene un afuera]* and conflicts cut across it at all levels: between the centre and periphery, clearly of course, but also within the centre and the periphery” (Negri and Cocco 2006, p. 491). Thus there is no return to the national development paradigm that orthodox Marxists still turn to when tempted by isolationist or rhetorical anti-imperialist politics. What Negri calls the bio-political power bloc in Latin America understands the new interdependency and stresses the need for a greater integration of the Latin American markets to compete more effectively in the world market. This is neither a simple dependency nor an anti-imperialist view that is well worth pursuing in our critical understanding of contemporary Latin America.

Counter-hegemonic strategies in Latin America today emerge in the context of neoliberal globalization’s deepening crisis since 2008 and the rise of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Political thinkers in Latin America—such as Roberto Mangabeira Unger in Brazil—have highlighted the potential for resistance by these countries that now represent 40 percent of the global population. An alternative Left perspective, forged through partnership with these countries, could for Unger “help convert that alternative into a universalizing heresy, more than a cluster of local national heresies. It would have the effect of establishing the alternative as a movement in global politics” (Mangabeira Unger 2011, p. 18). Certainly this does not represent the vision of “another world is possible” advanced by the alter-globalization activists. However, from a global-transformation perspective we cannot simply write off these powerful nation-states in terms of their potential ability—through deeper democratization and a great leap forward in terms of imagination—to construct an alternative model to the failed North Atlantic neoliberal regime of capital accumulation.

Other Latin American countries—particularly in the Andean zone—have further exemplified in different ways the notion that the nation-state can play a key role in imagining and constructing a new world order. Social, political, and cultural mobilizations in Bolivia, Ecuador, and (in a different tone) Venezuela has opened up a post-neoliberal vista. Indigenous visions of social transformation—from the “postmodern” Zapatistas to the “premodern” indigenous discourses elsewhere, are all building up an alternative vision of the future. In a firmly modernist idiom, Bolivarianism is seeking to recapture the continental vision of Simón Bolívar during the struggle for independence. Brazil’s rejection of a unilateral trade deal with the United States in favor of Latin American unification also falls under this rubric. Perhaps the most advanced expression of transnational state efforts to show that “another world is possible” would be ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas). This Venezuelan-initiated movement is seeking to put into practice the World Social Forum slogan of “just trade” rather than “free trade” along with other social and economic initiatives with a broad international scope.

Certainly at this point of world history it is not wildly utopian to assert that “Another world is possible,” as has been proclaimed at the World Social Forum in Pôrto Alegre in 2001 and since. However, this vision has not as yet materialized and there is a gap between this discourse and what it wishes to achieve. The alternative vision of the autonomist political currents seems to explicitly abandon the struggle for power and thus for hegemony. There is an underlying belief that all forms of political representation will inevitably corrupt the political will of the subaltern. The politics of social movement “autonomy” and rejection of the political domain (conflated with that of the state) has not resulted, however, in a serious strategy (or even vision) of this other possible world. Very much strengthened by the existence and support of the NGO movements and the discovery of a sometimes-mythical “civil society,” this current has mounted resistance to the existing order but has not even tried to construct the articulations necessary to confront existing power relations. In some ways in its fierce opposition to the state—and all forms of politics around state power—this current mirrors the antistatist rhetoric of neoliberalism thus, to some degree, sharing its discursive space.

We have long since moved beyond the interpretations of globalization as a veritable revolution or through a “nothing has changed” attitude that prevailed in some radical circles. Clearly, we have lived through something of the order of a “second transformation” akin to

the first one that Karl Polanyi described in relation to the emergence of industrial society. The globalization of the capital/wage-labor relation may be something Karl Marx predicted in abstract terms but few would pretend that the economic/political/social/cultural changes over the last 25 years were part of some grand master plan or even predictable. Our world is now characterized by flows and complexity, a disorganized (rather than organized) capitalism, maybe even by chaos, most evidently since the 2008–2009 global recession and its effects across the globe.

Faced with this renewed and revitalized global order in the 1990s, the Latin American dependency approach did not really change its analysis. Its worldview remained firmly locked in a nationalist frame (with some exceptions) and it simply rejected globalization as yet another Western-imposed model. Interestingly F. H. Cardoso has argued that the “new dependency” he referred to in the 1970s was in fact referring to the emerging condition of globalization, a globalization theory *avant la lettre* as it were (Cardoso 2009a). In retrospect this is probably quite accurate because there was clearly a pre-globalization phase in which its conditions were laid in terms of increased internationalization. It would take the collapse of actually existing socialism and the end of the Cold War to signal the advent of globalization as we know it, a paradigm for global development and domination. The point is that this was not something new, imposed from the outside, a malevolent nebula casting a shadow over a virtuous development path.

Where the dependency analysis was really renewed and reinvigorated in the 1980s and 1990s, it was through the postcolonial studies approach in a broad sense. Thus, for example, Aníbal Quijano, very much part of the first generation dependency paradigm, now articulated a more cultural “coloniality of power” approach. The pattern of power that created the modern world was a colonial one and its Eurocentric nationality was based firmly on a racial classification of the world’s population. For Quijano the globalization of the world is, in the first place, the culmination of a process that “began with the constitution of America and world capitalism as a Euro-centered colonial/modern world power” (Quijano 2000, p. 215). Far from being a new dawn based on modernity and equity for all, globalization is thus seen as part of a historical pattern in which power is traversed by the colonial relationship. The first wave of dependency analysis was quite unaware of the cultural dimension (with some exceptions), so this postcolonial theory influence was beneficial in providing that element now.

European modernity, and its global reach through the Enlightenment, cannot be conceived without the early colonization of the Americas. Even the utopias built in Europe during this period have roots in the image forged by the Amerindian communities and their basis in another rationality of cooperation and reciprocity. Global hegemony of the European conception of the world was then constructed, articulated, and rationalized through a racial grammar, not then really current. The imposition of colonial rule on the peoples of the America was inextricably linked with racial categorizations that created a form of internal colonialism. The creation of “Whites” as a category of power-holders went along with the creation of “Blacks” and “Indians” who could fulfill various labor power needs in the American colonies.

Latin America was created from the sixteenth century onward as part of European expansion outward. The two main powers involved—Spain and Portugal—were themselves losing ground in the inter-hegemonic struggles in Europe itself. They were thus not able to create a neocolonial role for themselves, that task was taken up first by Britain and then by the United States. But the coloniality of power had created a structural-historical condition of dependence over three hundred years. National liberation—when it came between 1810 and 1820 approximately—occurred without social liberation and this simply rearticulated the coloniality of power on a new basis as Quijano puts it (Quijano 2000, p. 227). This particular context sets the parameters for the subsequent construction of the nation-state, citizenship, and democracy in the decades to come under national governments.

There is a powerful argument that coloniality is an integral element of modernity; its hidden side as it were that nevertheless continues to have an effect long after empires have dissolved or been overthrown. The colonial matrix of power, as Walter Mignolo calls it, has “four main spheres of activity: the struggle for economic control, particularly in regards to the exploitation of labor, the struggle for the control of political authority, through governmental, legal and military means, control of the public sphere through for example sexual regulation and, finally the control of knowledge through education and the subordination of existing forms of knowledge” (Mignolo 2000, p. 36). Thus we could argue, as does Mignolo, that the economic, political, and social control of the colonized subaltern depends on the power-knowledge element that disarticulates other types of knowledge and makes domination possible.

The mission of development and of modernization from the mid-twentieth century onward was equally marked by the colonial matrix of power. It was the victorious United States post-Second World War that established a new knowledge paradigm through the modernization model that superseded prior understandings. Likewise, the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s, which established the neoliberal globalization paradigm, equally did so through an effective demolition of the preexisting national/statist/developmentalist paradigm. Economic control, particularly of labor, and political domination, through the state, depend on a deeply embedded colonial matrix of knowledge and power. It is thus necessary for emancipation in Latin America to take a decolonizing orientation if it is to be successful.

There are many progressives in Latin America who are not particularly impressed by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, but most agree that he has the great merit of reintroducing the word “socialism” into the Latin American political lexicon. That, we could argue, is a decolonizing move because it did not accept the dominant knowledge paradigm or, to put it bluntly, that capitalism was “the only game in town.” Likewise, the current intense debates around the Amerindian social and political system as a possible alternative to market fundamentalism emerge as a challenge to Eurocentric/Western/colonial ways of thinking. The notions of reciprocity and communalism are alien to neoliberal thinking, but they do have real purchase within the Amerindian communities and more widely across the subaltern classes in Latin America.

If Latin America was always-already globalized since its inception to the present, so also have been its counter-hegemonic struggles. One decisive wave based on radical democracy and inclusive nation-building begins with the Mexican Revolution of 1910. It remains to be seen whether the new Zapatista revolt of 1994 has ushered in a new counter-hegemonic wave for the era of globalization. Certainly across the continent—and particularly in the Andean countries—there is an active recovery of Amerindian consciousness and models of social organization. Venezuela—but also in a different way, Brazil and Argentina—show a clear anticolonialist face to the world.

Transnationalism

Latin America’s recent transnationalization through the processes described by the term “globalization,” signaled the emergence of a new cultural political economy for the region. This process impacted

even on what we might consider politics to be and it particularly unsettled the very meaning of democracy. The agents of neoliberalism and the activists of the transnational NGOs in different, but sometimes, complementary ways redefined the meaning of the political and of democracy. A novel language for empowerment, self-help, capacity building, active citizenship, and so on began to forge a new political subject beyond the state and acting on behalf of a normative civil society. Progressive social movements began to accept the politics of social adjustment and the INGOs (International Non-governmental Organizations) often appeared to be the social face of neoliberalism (Munck 2006). Latin America's hybrid condition and its characteristically fluid relations between economy, society, and politics tended to be set aside in this new dominant paradigm based on European/North American conceptions of representative democracy and a particular variant of a modern civil society. A plea for a return to nationalist economics and populist politics was not a surprising reaction to this alien vision of transnationalism.

There is, however, no essentialized Latin American identity that can be captured to create an alternative to neoliberal modalities of transnationalism. As Canclini has analyzed in detail, "The transnationalization of the cultural political economy of Latin America has ruled out that essentialist-nationalist route" (Canclini 2002, p. 39). The world view from Latin America has changed utterly compared to the 1950s, for example, as has the Gramscian "common sense" prevailing, to put it in these terms. Our mental maps need to be transformed to take into account these complex transnational processes of transformation. Manichean nationalist solutions and simple anti-imperialisms will not help build a stable counter-hegemonic politics. That is not to say, however, that a simple embracing of transnationalism and a facile cosmopolitan politics would answer the pressing needs of Latin America. Clearly that is not the case.

It is the movement of people both within and out of the Latin America that most clearly signals its new transnational status. This is not just a reprise of the nineteenth century inward migration of rural workers from Europe, but a polifaceted, multi-flow movement of professionals, workers, students, bankers, and plain travelers. Certainly from the perspective of a global cultural political economy, the most noticeable flow is that of Hispanic-Latin-Amerindian peoples into the United States. Between 1960 and 2000 the number of people in the United States from a Latin American origin increased fivefold from

less than 7 million to over 35 million. Today, in 2012, there are 50 million “Latinos” in the United States and it is estimated that figure could reach 100 million by 2050. Since 2000, this population outstripped the Afro-American minority to become the largest “minority” by far in the United States. From a Latin American perspective, this is a diaspora population far larger than most individual countries in terms of population. In terms of hybridity, this border crossing segment of the population is deepening this characteristic constantly in ways far more complex than the mainstream “development and migration” discourses can account for.

Transnational migration is not a simple flow from poor to rich countries, with much of the migration flow being of a South-South character. Thus Venezuela today attracts many Latin American professionals in the same way that Argentina has historically acted as a pole of attraction for construction and domestic workers in the Southern Cone region. Nor can economic data alone account for the full impact of these flows both in the short term, and more crucially, in the long term. What does it mean for Uruguay that at the turn of the century more people were leaving the country than were born within its limits? What does it mean to Ecuador that perhaps one-fifth of its population today lives in Europe or the United States? Migration and its circular flows have become an integral element of what constitutes Latin America today, to the extent that it is not “complete” without taking into account the positive and negative impact of that diaspora. To put it simply, the nation-state is no longer the main or default frame for identity formation. New voices from the margins are making themselves heard—women, indigenous and black minorities, migrants, peasants, and the new poor—and opening up a new kaleidoscope of possibilities for social transformation.

Latin America is now part of the world and the world is now part of Latin America. This leads us beyond conceptual schemas based on simple binary opposites. The national arena is no longer (if it ever was) a self-evident and self-sufficient container of all social and political activity. The global system—with its intensified flow of money, people, and ideas—is no longer something “outside” Latin America, an external reference point as it were. Popular culture can no longer be conceived of as a simple and direct counter to hegemonic culture as though they operate in water-tight compartments. We are moving from a bipolar conception of the political to one that is much more

de-centered and where social and political relations are constructed in a more complex and contradictory manner. We now accept more readily the hybridity of the Latin American condition—in economic, political, social, and cultural terms—and the transnational character of the making and unmaking of hegemonic politics.

The transnational optic of globalization brought with it the promise of global development and at the political/cultural level that of a new cosmopolitanism. A dismantling of all the barriers to transnational flows was posed as a logical way to promote development. Latin American culture could find its richly deserved place in the global cultural circuits. The well-off could do their shopping in Miami. The world of enterprise would benefit from open competition and the consumer would be the main winner. Nationalism—like all forms of protectionism—would fade away and be replaced by a new cosmopolitanism. In the era of the Internet only hidebound reactionaries would appeal to old territorial notions of belonging. To unpack this worldview we will briefly examine transnational flows of culture, commodities, people, and illegal drugs.

The promise of globalization includes a large cultural component. We would move beyond the narrow boundaries of national culture to become part of a global cultural domain. Latin America seemed well placed to exploit global demand for its cultural products. Building on the “literary giants” of the 1960s (Gabriel García Márquez, Carlos Fuentes, and Mario Vargas Llosa), a new generation of Latin American writers was introduced to a global audience starting with Isabel Allende, for example. Music followed (*Buena Vista Social Club*) and dance (tango, salsa, etc.) was always-already globalised. The popular Brazilian *telenovela* also attained a global audience and a packaged Latin America became hot properly in the North. But what did all this mean in Latin America itself?

We cannot really speak in terms of a unified Latin American cultural identity and need to think much more in terms of a heterogeneous space. The transnationalized sector shares this space with a still-thriving national cultural industry and a popular culture sector, which, of course, is not separate from the global (see Rowe and Schelling 1996; Brooksbank Jones and Munck 2000). Certainly in terms of Internet connectivity, the Latin American average is higher than the global average and in some countries (for example, Argentina) it is very high indeed. But connectivity does not create, in and of itself, a homogenous space. The continued legacy of dependency, for example, is seen in the stark fact that, while two-thirds of Spain’s literary

production is exported to Latin America, only 2 to 3 percent of the latter's book production is exported to Spain.

Globalization also meant, of course, a massive increase in global commodity flows. The dramatic increase in imported consumer goods in the 1990s represented a real cultural as well as economic shift. Workers became consumers and citizens became shoppers. As Andy Baker describes, "The number of shopping malls in Brazil more than tripled between 1990 and 2006.... Market reforms indicated the 'mall decade.'... Citizens went shopping amid the employment flux, often for flashy new foreign goods or services" (Baker 2009, p. 258). Whether flashy or not, these commodities did have a large impact on society with the rise of mass consumerism and some degree of de-politicalization. The lure of *plata dulce* (sweet money) became a dominating motif as people searched for ways—licit and quite often illicit—to expand and sustain their consumer habits.

It is true, of course, that consumer goods expanded in the elite sectors and became generalized in the middle layers but it also impacted on popular consumption patterns. The old nationalist-statist development model was most often associated in the popular imagination with lesser quality national consumer goods. The foreign consumer goods—and the all-pervasive brands—became synonymous with an affluent lifestyle. Not surprisingly, even left-of-center national governments hesitated to tamper with the essentials of an economic model—such as open markets—that guaranteed the steady flow of consumer goods, for those who could afford them. None of this means that workers cease to be workers with work-related concerns, but they are also consumers and their political attitudes are, at least equally shaped by their perception of what they want as consumers.

Alongside the rise of cultural and commodity flows, we must place a dramatic rise in the flows of people within and without Latin America over the last 20 years. So, for example, it is estimated that 38 million Latin Americans currently live and work in the United States, including documented and undocumented. This very sizable population already has a significant economic weight but it is now also achieving considerable political influence. Currently in countries such as El Salvador we find that a considerable minority—maybe one in four—live outside the national territory, mainly in the United States. The flow of people leads to economic flows—in the shape of remittances—and also political networking and a complex web of social flows back and forth.

The flow of people may take legal forms but when states put up barriers (in the US case, literal ones) then covert means are the only recourse. The transit point from Latin America into the United States is most usually through Mexico, and the path into Mexico is most often across the Guatemalan border. Various routes, at various costs and with varying degrees of danger take the migrant through to employment and support networks in the United States. What we also know from detention data collected by the border crossings is that people from over 50 countries are part of this flow, including some from Africa and Asia. Latin America is truly a part of global flows and, as elsewhere, there is a complex range of legal and nonlegal routes and modalities to this movement of people.

While the flow of people straddles the legal-illegal divide, the growing flow of drugs out of Latin America is squarely without the law. In Mexico, Central America, and Colombia the issue of the drugs trade—and its attendant criminal activity—looms large in economic terms, in relation to undermining the authority of the state and through its deleterious social impact. At another level drugs are a highly competitive export industry, reversing traditional North-South dependency patterns. Latin America, for example, in relation to the cocaine commodity chain, accounts for close to 85 percent of US domestic consumption. As Manuel Castells puts it, “The flexible construction of these criminal activities in international networks constitutes an essential feature of the new global economy and of the social/political dynamics of the Information Age” (Castells 2010, p. 167).

It is an integral characteristic of globalization that there will be benign and perverse forms of integration with the new global order. It is the very nature of the internationalized and interlinked economic systems in the Americas, which has created or stimulated illicit drugs productions in Latin America. The illegal flow of cocaine and other narcotics from Latin America to North America, and to a lesser extent Europe, is now a major transnational issue not only in economic but also in security terms. Indeed it is safe to say it dominates the US agenda vis-a-vis Latin America. The corrosion of political authority in Colombia and, increasingly, in Mexico can be seen as a direct result of this particular form of integration into the world system. Its results are plain to see but the outcome is unclear and will depend on much more than the efforts of the DEA (US Drugs Enforcement Agency). Current moves by some Latin American governments to take more control over the drugs agenda points toward another arena

of conflict with the North where, even out of self-interest, there might be a greater commitment to self-determination.

To conclude on the importance of transnational flows in contemporary Latin America we might ponder Néstor García Canclini's view that "the notion of national identity is eroded through economic and communicational flows, the displacement of migrants, exiles and tourists, as by multinational financial exchanges and the repertoires of images and information distributed across the planet by newspapers and magazines, television networks and the Internet" (Canclini 2002, p. 39). What we can visualize is a Latin America immersed in a dense network of flows and exchanges, establishing a transnational cultural political economy far removed from any lingering notion of the nation-state as self-contained and self-sufficient envelope for all social activity.

Responses

Transnationalism clearly calls forth some kind of transnational response, not in any automatic way of course, but it does create a new matrix of the politics of contestation. Thus, for example, in reaction to the US-led project to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas in the 1990s, von Bülow describes how "a wide variety of actors, ranging from tiny non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to million-member unions and social movements, from countries with very different levels of economic development and cultural backgrounds...[found]...a common agenda and mobilize[d] together" (von Bülow 2010, p. 4). This was by no means an easy process and there were considerable tensions within this coalition. Differences between trade union organizational forms and those of the small campaigning organizations were acute and, as always, the workers organizations of the South came to the table from a very different position from that taken by the once powerful northern trade unions. Now all—even if in different ways—were affected by the social disintegration caused by the economic integration driven by neoliberal globalization and were able to respond collectively.

The transnational dimension of Zapatista activism is another clear demonstration of how local, national, and transnational dimensions of struggle interact. As Thomas Olesen says, "We need...a better understanding of the interaction between local, national and transnational social spheres in the case of the EZLN [Zapatistas]" (Olesen 2005, p. 4). Its local and indigenous roots are very clear, but this

movement also had very evident national resonance not least through its discursive association with Emiliano Zapata and the peasant insurgency of the Mexican Revolution. The transnational solidarity movement was, however, something new in 1994 when the Zapatistas emerged. This was, after all, before the “coming out” party of the counter-globalization movement in the Seattle mobilizations against the World Trade Organization in 1999. We would have to go back to the international dimension of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s to find comparable transnational levels of interest and solidarity. There is intense debate around the effectiveness of the transnational network—and in particular its internet-based manifestations—but there is little doubt that the transnational matters now as never before in forging counter-hegemonic politics.

However we should also be very conscious of the regional dimension in possible Latin American responses to globalization and its discontents. Two very clear examples present themselves, namely Mercosur and current attempts to set up ALBA that prophetically spells “dawn” in its Spanish acronym. The Southern Cone regional experience shows a rich seam of transnational social movement interaction. The trade unions in particular in Argentina and Brazil realized very early on the necessity of transnational links and the need to move beyond their nationalist optics. This conversation eventually embraced other national and social players and, at times, it was able to articulate a broad social alliance to counter the “globalization from above” plans of the regional political leaders and economic power-holders. ALBA is, of course, very different being a regional project also “from above” but with an explicit anti-neoliberal objective and based on equitable trading relations among the Latin American nations. As yet it is not possible to assess its success or otherwise, but it does signal that “another world is possible” also in the domain of regional integration.

There is also of course the city-level response as with the famous Pôrto Alegre participatory budget experiment, later generalized across a number of Brazilian cities. More generally we can refer to a field of “local” or “bottom-up” struggles where the social sphere is prioritized to the detriment of the political. The Zapatistas began as a local struggle and many of the indigenous movements have a strong local social base. To some extent the emphasis on the local is derived from the failure of the state-oriented guerrilla movements and the exhaustion of the democratic reform model. While they can be somewhat isolationist at times in their refusal to engage with politics, they

also contribute to an overall movement against commodification, for example, in the Bolivian struggles against water privatization. The theme of decommodification—removing a public good from the clutches of the market—could act as a common denominator among local, environmental, gender, indigenous, and labor struggles but to date this has not really happened.

In considering the combined and uneven nature of development we should also note the complex politics of scale determining or setting the parameters of social and political responses. Globalization never did create a “flat” world of planetary integration nor a global state for that matter. Rather, globalization has become embodied in particular places and spaces as part of a complex rescaling of social and economic activity. Spatial scales such as the local and the global were (re)constructed politically during this era. As Bob Jessop puts it, “The uneven development entailed in capitalism also re-organizes the division of labor, displaces growth poles and zones of instability, and generates centers of accumulation” (Jessop 2006, p. 23). This in turn generates new modalities of geopolitical and state-power conflicts, such as the transformation of Latin America’s condition of “dependency.” This spatial dimension is crucial in establishing a new matrix for capital accumulation in Latin America but it also impacts on the construction of a new counter-hegemony that cannot, quite obviously, be based on a pre-globalization model of capital accumulation and political relationships.

How we might respond to transnationalism is, of course, open to various political strategies. In the first instance, we can follow a transnationalist course, as argued for by the alter-globalization movement, for example. To the transnationalism from above, as it were, we could counterpose an alternative transnationalism from below. Perhaps more instinctive in a dependent situation such as that of Latin America, however, would be a nationalist response. We could argue that the dominant transnationalism is simply a cover for the nationalism and protectionism of the rich nations and classes. Governments, however, might also seek an accommodation with the new transnationalism, going along with some elements while holding out on others. Other governments have sought to articulate their own social development strategy within the parameters set by the new world order through what has been dubbed a globalised social democracy.

Latin America has been part of the broad alter-globalization movement over the last 20 years not least through the World Social Forum that originated in Pôrto Alegre, Brazil. There has also been

a strong move toward a transnational campaign against the US promoted free-trade project. The HSA (Hemispheric Social Alliance/ Alianza Social Continental) achieved considerable success in building up a transnational civic society network across the Americas. The politicalization of international trade generated a momentum where transnational communities of interest, organizing across campaigns prevailed, at least for a time. However, it would also be fair to say that there was a continuous tension between transnational solidarity and national interest, for example, with the trade unions involved. Inevitably, moves toward transnational regulation (of trade, for example), whether they are from below or from above will conflict with traditional notions of national sovereignty.

In Latin America, from a broad perspective, it would probably be true to say that nationalism has been the main response to transnationalism. The left-of-center governments in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina have all, albeit to varying degrees, articulated a nationalist response toward the global order and the United States in particular. For Jorge Castañeda this speaks to “the inability of the left to generate an alternative element in its discourse to replace nationalism” (Castañeda and Morales 2008, p. 100). This may well be the case but we do need to understand why nationalism is a valid response to imperialist domination. Even the most mild-mannered of social-democratic-political leaders in Latin America speak bitterly about the overbearing US presence in their region, in economic, political, military, and cultural matters. While global power relations are unequal, local responses will probably inevitably take a nationalist form in the main, although of course this does not preclude regionalist and even transnational political alliances at the same time.

We cannot really say, however, that nationalism is a sufficient or even adequate response to the new global order. Manichean nationalist “solutions”—most notably in the discourse of Hugo Chávez—do not take into account the heterogeneous nature of contemporary Latin American social formations. They are, as they always have been always-already globalised, crisscrossed by transnational flows and thus not amenable to simple calls to national unity. It would thus be wrong to counterpose a blunt nationalism to the vacuous pieties of global cosmopolitanism. While fully cognizant of the dependent situation of Latin America, it is not through a superficial national-territory-based unity that it will be confronted effectively. Just as the first independence failed to generate social transformation, so will the “second

independence” now called for if it remains restricted to the national domain.

From a Latin American Gramscian perspective, we might even question to what extent nationalism remains as part of the “common sense” in Latin America. In Mexico, for example, where revolutionary nationalism has been the hegemonic official ideology for over one hundred years, it is very much in question. Roger Bartra argues that revolutionary nationalism cannot even serve as a symbolic barrier to Western modernity any more. He refers scathingly to “how iron-fisted nationalist unification smothered multi-coloured Mexican society and legitimized underdevelopment and authoritarianism” (Bartra 2002, p. 63). We now see a post-nationalist rejection of cultural hypocrisy beginning to emerge. Nationalism, along with modernity, is perhaps a stage now superseded in Mexico (and Latin America) and, in Bartra’s words, “We have no choice but to face the post-modernity of the fragmented Western world of which we form a part” (Bartra 2002, p. 64).

Another possible response to the new global order would be an accommodationist one, and here we find a strong case still being made for the continued application of neoliberal economic strategies. Reid (2009) carries out a wide-ranging and well-informed review of economic policy in Latin America over the last year, arguing that what failed was not the Washington Consensus but the failure by governments to implement it fully and consistently. Reid’s underlying premise is that “however disillusioned they may be with particular reforms, Latin Americans, on the whole want the benefits of globalisation” (Reid 2009, p. 10). This may well be true if we take globalization to mean the increased global integration of the region in economic, social, and cultural terms. It is also true that we should not deploy the term neoliberalism or Washington Consensus as some sort of all-powerful Manichean force for evil.

It is very hard though to argue that neoliberalism—in the sense of open markets, deregulation, and de-statization—has been good for Latin Americans as a whole. The collapse of Argentina’s whole economic system in 2001–2002 as a direct result of following the accepted wisdom literally was followed by the global recession of 2008–2009, following a banking crisis in the United States. Nor can Reid simply replace the neoliberal bogeyman with a populist one, he sees as the reason why more sensible economic policies have not been followed. None of this is to deny that in practice—due not least to the very real integration with the global economic and financial

system—most Latin American governments (including left-of-center ones) have sought to accommodate their economic strategies within the constraints posed by the dominant powers and international financial institutions.

We see transnationalism being accommodated and confronted with what is essentially a nationalist strategy. But there has also been the development of what F. H. Cardoso calls a “globalised social democracy” that is quite novel in the Latin American context. Social scientist turned statesman Cardoso argues that accelerated economic growth between 2003 and 2007 “provides an impetus for economic growth and diversification, strengthens individual guarantees, stimulates the formation of democratic institutions, and at the same time, reduces poverty and misery” (Cardoso 2009b, p. 452). Thus economic integration with the world market is combined with a degree of national autonomy in decision making. The associated reform of the state made it more competitive, also meant making it more competent and the driver of more active social policies. Democratic rules prevail now, establishing not only clear spheres of influence for government and civil society but also a partnership between them in pursuit of social development.

Now, one response to the project of globalised social democracy has been that it underestimates the constraints of the international economic system. Certainly the Latin American political economy has limits set by the global power framework and the international economic institutions. However there is still room for national variations on how these pressures are responded to. Thus Brazil’s control over the banking system and its deployment for national development purposes can be contrasted with Mexico’s asymmetric integration with NAFTA and its denationalized banking sector. Chile under democratic governments did not follow the same political economy as Pinochet, whatever degree of continuity might be detected by the critics. In brief, we cannot say that globalized social democracy is not viable *per se* because of the less than favorable international context.

A second major query posed to “globalised social democracy” is whether it underestimates the specific historical circumstances that gave rise to European social democracy. A particular concatenation of forces—including above all a strong and mobilized workers’ movement—created a compromise state where the needs of capital were balanced by the provision of basic social and political rights to the mass of the population. The European welfare state perhaps best crystallized this historic compromise. Neither Brazil nor Chile have anything approaching a welfare state and Uruguay (once the

“Switzerland” of Latin America) may have been a precursor in that regard but it is hardly a model that can be replicated. However, if we take social democracy to be a project for social inclusion and for democracy to be extended from the political sphere to the social sphere, then it is still a valid political project in the sense that there is political space for it to develop further.

New Matrix

A clear conclusion from our overall analysis in the pages above is that we are now living in an interregnum in Latin America. The national-popular state-based hegemonic model cannot be revived under conditions of globalization, but equally, the neoliberal hegemonic project is, for its part, patently exhausted. As Manuel Antonio Garretón and coauthors put it, even before the Great Recession, “the region confronts a vacuum left by the failure of the neoliberal project” (Garretón et al. 2003, p. 99). They posit the emergence of a new multicentered sociopolitical matrix not only based on continued linkages with the world economy but also “by the strengthening, autonomy, complementarity, and mutually re-enforceable interactions among the state, the system of representation and civil society” (Garretón et al. 2003, p. 100). Examining the extent to which a new development matrix and hegemonic system has been built in the decade since this argument was put forward is now our focus.

We are now faced with the exhaustion of developmentalism without its objectives having been achieved. Of course modernization and development have occurred but, we would argue, they have not created a stable and sustainable new matrix for development. Francisco de Oliveira analyses the limitations and deformations of contemporary Brazil in a way that is clearly relevant to the rest of Latin America, which aims to follow in Brazil’s footsteps (Oliveira 2003). Brazil’s “passive revolution” according to Oliveira did achieve a substantial leap forward for the forces of production and the country’s successful adaptation to the Second Industrial Revolution characterized by Fordism. This was, for Oliveira, a “distinctively Brazilian form of *transformismo*, as a conservative modernization, or of revolution in production without bourgeois revolution” (Oliveira 2003, p. 44). Each cycle of modernization—whether led by civilian or military government—simply confirmed Brazil’s subordinate role in the international division of labor. Agrarian reform would have gone a long way toward achieving a more thoroughgoing modernization of

the relations of production but no bourgeois force seemed willing or capable of achieving this.

Where Oliveira's analysis becomes most interesting is in this founding member of the Workers' Party's withering critique of the Lula government. Essentially he reads it as "a novel combination of neo-populism and party statification, shored up by social-liberal handouts, on the one hand, and government graft, on the other, has helped to forge a new form of class rule that could be characterized as 'hegemony in reverse'" (Oliveira 2006, p. 5). Whether a new class (characterized by its access to public money) has been formed or not is a moot point but we can certainly see the state morphing into the Workers' Party and vice versa. Despite Lula's own unassailable position, the succession of corruption scandals affecting the upper echelons of the party argue poorly for its transformative potential. External dependency remained and inequality persisted despite some reduction in absolute poverty rates. The working class—that created the Workers' Party—has been decimated and informalization/precarization becomes dominant. Maybe we are witnessing (as in South Africa) a form of hegemony in reverse whereby the dominant class strengthens its grip on the economy while the progressive (or once progressive) political forces assume the "moral leadership of society."

If something like "hegemony in reverse" is occurring in Brazil—clearly the vanguard of capitalist development in Latin America—then the prospects of social transformation will have been deferred indefinitely. The Workers' Party, along with Brazil's dynamic trade unions and landless peasant movement, came closest to providing an alternative counter-hegemony. The globalization of the economy, and the decomposition of the working class caused by financialization, seems to close the avenue toward progressive modernization with equity as advocated by the Economic Commission for Latin America, for example. If capitalist rule in Brazil under a Leftist government has, indeed, been stabilized we might be looking at a new political phenomena. For Oliveira the Gramscian equation of "force + consent = hegemony" has been stood on its head insofar as consent clearly prevails, but "it is no longer the dominated who consent to their own subordination, now it is the dominant who consent to being sensibly 'led' by representatives of the dominated—on condition that they do not question the forms of capitalist relations" (Oliveira 2006, p. 22). While we cannot envisage this analysis yet as a new paradigm, it should perhaps make us turn elsewhere for new counter-hegemonic struggles.

José Carlos Mariátegui, who was rethinking Latin America as the crisis of 1929 loomed, looked toward the indigenous peoples of the America's for inspiration. Amerindian cultures and identity, could, again today, play an important role in constructing a new matrix to rethink social transformation. While having very varied relationships to democracy and socialism, the contemporary Amerindian movements have seriously unsettled dominant cultural meanings and created new ways of doing politics. Alternative conceptions of nature, culture, and citizenship have emerged out of these varied struggles, particularly but not exclusively in the Andean countries. While we cannot, of course, generalize the indigenous, cultural politics have unsettled dominant Eurocentric themes such as universality and individualism. Cultural differences are accepted and not subsumed under a false universalism determined by Enlightenment rationalism. Western individualism—and the rational economic actor—gives way to a more complex communal form of belonging and of constructing an alternative future based on traditions and the past.

Amerindian identity and cultural politics also feed in directly to the emerging Polanyian countermovement whereby society reacts against its distribution by unregulated market policies. Polanyi himself stresses the very different economic rationality of precapitalist societies when the “free” market and commodification did not prevail. What we are possibly seeing is the emergence of alternative modernities today. The indigenous movements, according to Fernando Calderón, pose the question of how to be modern and different at the same time: “How to enter modernity without ceasing to be Indians” (*como entrar en la modernidad sin dejar de ser indios*) (Calderón 1987). The emerging Amerindian politics is a hybrid formation and, just like nationalism, an “invented tradition.” It has not emerged today in direct descent from the Incas and is subject to very modern forms of interpretation and contestation. Perhaps we can follow Carmen Martínez and “deploy the indigenous as a metaphor to articulate broader political utopias” (Martínez Novo 2010a, p. 30) as part of the (re)imagining tasks of any counter-hegemonic project.

If the world economy is the conditioning situation that Latin America is set within, then its future evolution is critical. Since the 2008–2009 capitalist crisis and its subsequent unfolding, two clear future scenarios have emerged. On the one hand, there could be a genuine consolidation of the post–Washington Consensus with a reinvigorated role for the state and a robust rejuvenation of the financial sector. It would invest rather than drive austerity measures. We could

call this the “Stiglitz option” given his association with an internal critique of the World Bank/IMF model. Alternatively, we could see a “business as usual” approach in which the neoliberal model is clung to by the powerful economies. This would lead to increasing tensions as the contradictions of the model continue to unfold. The rise of the non-Western economies would be accelerated and in Latin America, for example, the role of China would grow rapidly.

The ongoing struggle for hegemony within the dominant block will, in turn, dictate what type of development model will be pursued. For some time now there has been a lack of a clear hegemonic model to cluster around. There is lip service paid to “growth with equity,” there is a rhetorical critique of “neoliberalism” but there is no sustainable development model with widespread consent, with the partial exception of Brazil. A new development matrix—with social support and political legitimacy—would necessarily require a strong role for the state while accepting market mechanisms. Regional integration mechanisms would have to overcome the political obstacles currently in the way of success. Integration with the global economy would thus occur on a sectoral basis, with strong regional backing to ensure a degree of Latin American autonomy.

We can probably be most sure of what scenario will not emerge in Latin America, namely the old national-statist model of development. For all their rhetoric, neither Venezuela nor Bolivia, for example, have essentially, gone down this route. The Latin American equivalent of the “Stiglitz option” mentioned above would be the current Economic Commission for Latin America strategy. They “propose growth with less structural heterogeneity and more productive development and the pursuit of equality through the enhancement of human capacities and the mobilization of state energies” (ECLAC 2010, p. 12). Latin America as a whole did emerge better than expected from then 2008–2009 capitalist crisis and there has been a move—albeit patchy and sporadic—toward an accumulation model that also has a social policy dimension designed to combat poverty and reduce inequality.

The political system of representation in Latin America will also be subject to various tensions as the various global economy and development scenarios unfold. The challenge is, as we have seen, to achieve a profound and sustainable deepening of democracy. The party political system will play a key role in articulating social, economic, and political interests. Many of the party systems are as yet weak and often unstable but there are clear signs of consolidation. However, overall we might surmise that the party system will be less central

in the period to come. There are clear signs across the region on the other hand of a revival of civil society through organized social movements promoting specific social interests, identities, and ethnicities (see Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998). There is no longer consensus that, for example, in relation to the indigenous communities a strategy of assimilation will suffice as it had done for many decades. Something new is required even from the established power-holders.

The other element within the political realm that is being transformed is that pertaining to what might be called “stateness.” For Garretón et al., stateness is being (or should be) reconstructed through various interrelated means, for example, “State devises and implements effective means to generate sustained growth, address poverty; and counter legal, social, economic and other exclusions” (Garretón et al. 2003, p. 97). This, of course, is a wide-ranging and ambitious program for any state. Stateness in Latin America also entails coordination of regional state activities and mediation between the global domain and players and the national economic and social actors. At one level we can now discern a revival in Latin America of the classic developmental state now that the antistate drive of free-market economic strategies is well and truly discredited.

It is clear that the process now unfolding in Latin America is as much about counter-hegemony as it is about hegemony. The ongoing process of social transformation is not only set within the parameters of the development model but also itself impacts upon it. A decade or more of left-of-center governments has created the space for the slow, patient work that creates a mind-shift amongst the population. Even if there is not a coherent alternative as yet to the neoliberal model, it no longer represents the popular common sense. The shifting-development model (expressing the state-economy relationship) is intimately linked with the hegemony model (which springs from the state-masses relationship). Statist, nationalist, popular, developmental, and even socialist discourses are now part of the mainstream debates across Latin America. They are setting the terms for a debate around a new hegemonic order perhaps.

The first reaction by the dominant classes to the rise of left-of-center governments and mass mobilizations was a conservative counteroffensive. An example was the coup d'état in Honduras in 2009 against an elected government and the “coup through impeachment” against President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2012. Overall, though the initiative has lain with the rising counter-hegemonic struggles more or less across the region. Indirect evidence of this pattern was the

reelection of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina in 2011 with 56 percent of the vote. A mobilized population and a disoriented conservative opposition made this possible. There is no single emancipatory subject evident in this process, although the organized working class remains at the core of opposition especially in the Southern Cone. In the Andean countries the Amerindian population is a key mobilized sector. But everywhere women, campesinos (peasants), environmentalists, human rights activists, and local communities compose some of the strands actively constructing counter-hegemony.

Describing this new wave of struggles, José Seoane and coauthors refer to the intensity with which “the subordinated sectors erupted into the citadel of neoliberal political governability with insurrections and uprisings causing not only the fall of governments but also the legitimacy of the street as the basis for a recovered popular sovereignty” (Seoane and Taddei 2010, p. 152). This could be seen very much as a moment in which counter-hegemony could be forged much as José Carlos Mariátegui—the “Latin American Gramsci”—had foreseen a century ago. The national-popular historic bloc is forged in just such conjunctures when the dominant classes have lost their hegemonic role and while they govern they do not have consent. As with Mariátegui’s discourse, this process can only but be anticolonial and needs to take up the communal forms of ownership of the Amerindian peoples to forge a new *Nuestra América*.

I would agree with Néstor García Canclini, that the overarching central tension in terms of the future is that “we are between the promises of global cosmopolitanism and the loss of national projects” (Canclini 2002, p. 50). It would be safe to say that the promises of global cosmopolitanism are now well and truly tarnished. Nor will simple nationalist projects be viable in the context of globalization. What is most likely then will be a mixed mode of development in a new, more multipolar world where the role of BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) is much stronger. A multi-scalar politics of social transformation will also be ongoing with transnational links increasing in some areas (for example, the environment) while national politics will still be absolutely vital, plus a flourishing of local empowerment initiative involving indigenous and other communities.

In terms of locating a space between a national strategy that has failed and a truly globalizing world that did not emerge, Mariátegui, if he were alive today, would almost certainly be looking at the new indigenous movements as possible drivers of social transformation. The Amerindian peoples had been decimated by the Iberian conquest

and excluded ever since their arrival. This was an ongoing and extremely violent process of exclusion, subjection, and exploitation. Resistance was mainly passive but it was continuous, based as it was on a radically different cosmovision or worldview. To the logic of accumulation they counterposed the logic of reciprocity. Now and then a concatenation of events drove sections of the Amerindian people into desperate acts of active resistance and revolt. The violent rebellions of the indigenous people, following Kearney and Varese, “embody and condense in heroic moments the on-going struggle that they wage on a daily basis in non-violent forms of resistance” (Kearney and Varese 2008, p. 205).

José Carlos Mariátegui was one of the first socialist thinkers to tackle creatively the so-called indigenous question in Latin America. He was engaging at a time when indigenous revolts were once again active: between 1919 and 1923 some 50 indigenous revolts rocked Peru, a “social earthquake” as Flores Galindo put it, “comparable to the independence wars” (Flores Galindo 2010: p. 167). Mariátegui’s approach—steering clear of both mechanical Marxist approaches along the lines of a national separatist solution and romantic or backward looking *indigenista* alike—repays attention today. The context is set by Mariátegui’s drive to “Latinamericanise” the Marxism he encountered during his exile-visit period in Europe (1920–1923). The economic exploitation and military repression of the Amerindian peoples was the principal problem facing Peru. Indeed, for Mariátegui, “Without the Indian no Peruvianess is possible” (Vanden and Becker 2011b, p. 141). The self-activity of the Amerindian masses and their move from a regional to a national level of organization would play the vital role in this process. Thus the making of the nation—*Peruanicemos al Peru* (let us Peruvianize Peru)—is inseparable from a recovery of the indigenous past of the “hidden Peru” in which an indigenous nonmarket logic of reciprocity and communalism would be essential. This was no antiquarian or conservative project but one based on the needs of contemporary socialism.

For Mariátegui the “problem of the Indian...cannot find its solution in an abstract humanitarian formula” (Vanden and Becker 2011b, p. 141). Rather, it needs to be “posed in its social and economic terms and is identified more than anything as a land problem” (Vanden and Becker 2011b, p. 142). The “hidden Peru” of the 1920s was characterized by a semifeudal landownership pattern with servile forms of production and the overarching system of *gamonalismo* (local boss or cacique) to ensure labor compliance. Land, or the lack of it, was

central to Amerindian identity and interests. In symbolic and real terms, the fusion of indigenous and land revindications represented a powerful boost to the project of constructing a counter-hegemonic force in Peru. The Amerindian imaginary—including traditional cultivation and irrigation methods—promoted a natural and embedded form of social solidarity that countered the destruction of agriculture by the colonial and criollo elites with their belief in the virtues of a self-regulating market. Contemporary socialism could only gain from an engagement with Inca prefigurative or early communism. That would apply equally in those countries where there is not now a significant Amerindian population insofar as the struggle to envisage a world beyond neoliberalism also applies.

While emphasizing the importance of the land question and the need to forge an alliance with the emerging urban working class, Mariátegui did not take an economic stance toward the Amerindian peoples. Mariátegui, it should be recalled, had maintained an early engagement with the cultural domain every bit as intense, as was Gramsci's. When in 1926 he launched the review journal *Amauta*, it was very much oriented toward a cultural regeneration, to the extent that his more orthodox colleagues complained about this. A special section was called *Boletín de Defensa Indígena* dedicated specifically to *indigenismo* and the struggle against *gamonalismo*. This also contained many contributions focused on what was then known as the “superstructure” (as against the economic base), with pieces on Inca music as a modality of religious expression, the emerging Inca literature, and the emerging iconography of Inca popular culture. It should be stressed that, while Mariátegui gave space to non-Marxist *indigenistas*, *Amauta* never sought to celebrate the Inca past in a folkloric way.

Perhaps the most contemporary of Mariátegui's concerns would be his emphasis on “Inca communism” rather than shoving this pre-Columbian society into the orthodox Marxist box of the “asiatic mode of production” (see Dunn 1982) seen as a dead end, unlike European feudalism that carried the seed of capitalism within it. According to Mariátegui, “The *ayllu*, the community, was the nucleus of the empire. The Incas unified and created the empire, but they did not create its nucleus. The legal state organized by the Incas undoubtedly reproduced the natural pre-existing state. The Incas did not disrupt anything” (Vanden and Becker 2011b, p. 95). Clearly subsequent historiography has developed a more complex understanding of Inca communism (see Flores Galindo 2010) but what is most relevant is

Mariátegui's refusal of statism and his view that socialism should grow organically out of practice and, like the Incas, not disrupt or violate preexisting communal relations. Socialism, from this perspective, cannot be reduced to state ownership of the means of production. Rather, it needs to reclaim the "community of emancipation" that once existed and develop its values of reciprocity, cooperation, and redistribution.

In the Andean countries in particular, the Amerindian past is very much part of the present. Thus during the anti-privatization of 2003–2005 in Bolivia, as García Linera describes, "hundreds of communities on the *altiplano* constituted what they call the 'great indigenous barracks' of Q'alachaca, an ad hoc confederation of militant *ayllus* and villages" (Linera 2006, p. 77). This relevance of the ancient *ayllu* was set in the context of a party system where patrimonial politics prevailed and the masses were co-opted through *clientilistic* networks. With weakened party organizations and state institutors lacking in legitimacy, it was understandable that community forms of organization (including community police) would come to the fore. Lacking in social or cultural hegemony, the capitalist state was open to a challenge from without. Nor did the capitalist labor process impose its discipline on the wide layers of the population that had become pauperized by neoliberal policies. Thus, as Linera describes, an "alternative system, anchored in the world of indigenous experience marginalized by Bolivia's uneven modernization process, is challenging the state's centuries-long pretence at modernity" (Linera 2006, p. 78). Collective aims and values from the Amerindian collective memory play a key role in this alternative politics and provide dramatic evidence of the potential of (an)other development and social model.

The resurgence of indigenous politics took many forms but there is a clear watershed in 1992, on the five hundredth "anniversary of the 'discovery'" of America. Neither the nation-state nor the nongovernmental organizations had managed to domesticate the indigenous communities. The policies of integration and assimilation were not making progress and lacked credibility. The myth of the submissive and passive Indian slowly began to melt away. Old resentments became overlain by the deep divisions caused by the neoliberal policies of the 1980s that privatized land and drove peasants out of the noncapitalist modes of production, as the commercialization of agriculture picked up apace. Within countries and even across national boundaries, indigenous communities began to mobilize under diverse political banners. The arrival of the new indigenous politics of liberation

was signaled most clearly by the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol, Tojolabal, and other indigenous peoples that were the social base of the Zapatista revolt in 1994.

The rise of the new *indigenismo* coincided with the rise of neoliberalism and some analysts even see neoliberalism promoting the development of indigenous identity. Yashar, for example, developed an analysis of indigenous politics based on a transition from “corporatist citizenship” to the new regime of “neoliberal citizenship” (Yashar 2005). The existing developmentalist nation-state is not seen as an adequate vehicle for developing indigenous rights while, in contrast, the neoliberal approach encouraged the adoption of identity politics as against the earlier socioeconomic demands of the indigenous communities. Whereas the old nationalist state promoted assimilation of the indigenous, neoliberalism promoted a more decentralized view where individual identity was valued. While there may have been an elective affinity of sorts between some strands of neoliberalism and some of the emerging identity politics in the 1990s, we can hardly say that neoliberalism benefited the rise of *neo-indigenismo*.

Multiculturalism is a banner under which many states and international organizations relate to indigenous identity and, on the face of it, multiculturalism would seem a policy well able to deal with cultural difference without forcing “assimilation” into the dominant culture. However, as Slavoj Žižek (1997) and others have pointed out, in practice it has fitted in with very much with the neoliberal project through repressive tolerance of difference. Multiculturalism masks the cultural uniformity being developed by the multinational corporations and in its elevation of cultural identity submerges the issue of socioeconomic exploitation. Put succinctly, multiculturalism accepts the folkloric Other while denouncing the real Other as fundamentalist. We can see this dynamic playing out in Latin America not only in relation to the indigenous movements but also more generally in the distinction between a good and a bad Left.

Also central to the debate around the role of the indigenous in social transformation is the question of autonomy (see Warren 1998; Da Silva 2012). This is a term with positive connotations but it is necessary to understand the complexity it sometimes hides. Like multiculturalism, a broad policy of “autonomy” (cultural, regional, etc.) may be quite compatible with neoliberalism. Thus the sometimes diffuse ideology of autonomy promoted by the Zapatistas could reduce the movement to becoming an isolated regional expression of some indigenous community grievances. Nor does a strategy of autonomy

resolve the question of what political alliances are needed if the movements are to have a broader political influence. Thus the Ecuadorian indigenous communities have combined a very real regional autonomy with the creation of an ad hoc political party *Pachakutik* that also embraces nonindigenous groups and is able to project a national-level strategy.

From a social-transformation perspective we can engage with the new indigenous politics in a different way perhaps. This politics is part of the broader counter-globalization movement around social and ecological sustainability. It also reflects the condition of hybridity we have seen as characteristic of Latin America since the start of this text. Following Homi Bhabha we can see how “the effect of colonial power is seen to be the *production* of hybridization...founded on the undecidability that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds for intervention” (Bhabha 1994, p. 120). Postcolonial history and politics is always based on the encounter of cultural difference. The postcolonial analyst always understands social development and political empowerment as a hybrid process. The gaze of the subaltern is always on those in power, and the silent other always finds its voice.

A politics of democratic hybridity would be capable of overcoming debilitating binary oppositions. Thus it is quite possible to focus on inclusion and socioeconomic equity while, at the same time, understanding that there are issues of identity and of racial discrimination at play in relation to the indigenous communities. We can thus avoid an essentialism that posits an unbroken indigenous identity going back five hundred years but also a reductionism that would insist the indigenous can be reduced to the land question, for example. Thus, while stressing the centrality of ethnicity we can also understand that it is, to some extent, an “invented tradition,” or social construct. Evo Morales in Bolivia articulates a contemporary *indigenismo* that is inclusive—all can be indigenous—and it is couched in terms of a broader discourse of liberation around social justice, ecology, and anti-imperialism.

A question often missing from considerations of indigenous politics in Latin America is its relationship with democracy. It relates to the broader issue of civil society and the assumption that its activity always encourages democracy, something that is not necessarily the case. Thus the contemporary indigenous movement in Ecuador has had a mixed relationship with democracy. Ecuador’s movement had its roots in traditions of local direct democracy that flourished in the

1990s and resisted the imposition of neoliberal policies. Ably entering the national political arena, it played a pivotal role in redefining the political agenda and created the conditions for the rise of the Left. However, as critical supporter Leo Zamosc acknowledges, “The swell of activism was not an unmitigated blessing for democratic politics” (Zamosc 2007, p. 27), as shown in its support for the January 2000 coup attempt and other major events.

Finally the rise of the new indigenous politics may play a vital role not only in terms of rethinking Latin America but also in reinventing it as a continent fit for its people in the twenty-first century. In 1742 a Quechua leader—Juan Santos Atahualpa—initiated a rebellion in the Peruvian highlands that kept the Spaniards out of the region for a full century. Their demands, as Kearney and Varese recount, included “the right to live in dispersed villages and households to allow a rational use of the tropical rainforest, the eradication of European pigs considered harmful to farming and people’s health, the right to freely cultivate and use coca, known as ‘the herb of God’ and the right to produce and ceremonially drink *masato*, a fermented manioc beverage of substantial nutritional value” (Kearney and Varese 2008, p. 203). This was a moral economy quite alien to that of the Spanish conquerors.

The contemporary indigenous perspective also provides a different logic from that dominant in the Western corridors of power. It is keenly attuned to biodiversity and sustainability rather than pursuing private profit in a mad rush. It prioritizes communal needs over individual ones. It values reciprocity and sharing rather than self-advancement and greed as good. The indigenous worldview places a major emphasis on the global community—just as it did in 1742—embracing not only the symbolic coca leaf but also oil and gas, and, above all, water. Oscar Guardiola-Rivera puts it thus: “They struggle to resolve the paradoxes caused by over-exploitation and consumerism, propelled into the uncertain future by a violent gust while catastrophes erupt behind and beneath them....Latin America is making world history, and looks set to lead the world into the twenty-second century” (Guardiola-Rivera 2010, pp. 17–18).

References

- Almeyra, G. 2004. *La protesta social en la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Continente.
- Altwater, E., and B. Mathkopf. 1997. "The World Market Unbound." *Review of International Political Economy* 4 (3): 448–471.
- Alvarez, S., E. Dagnino, and A. Escobar, eds. 1998. *Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-Visioning Latin American Social Movements*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Anderson, P. 2004. "The Role of Ideas in the Construction of Alternatives." In A. Boron, ed. *New Worldwide Hegemony: Alternatives for Change and Social Movements*. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.
- Aricó, J. 1988. *La cola del diablo: Itinerario de Gramsci en América Latina*. Buenos Aires: Puntosur.
- Arrighi, G., N. Aschoff, and B. Scully. 2010. "Accumulation by Dispossession and Its Limits: The South African Paradigm Revisited." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45: 410–438.
- Assadourian, S, ed. 1973. *El Modo de Producción en América Latina*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Baker, A. 2009. *The Market and the Masses in Latin America: Policy Reform and Consumption in Liberalizing Economies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barone, O. ed. 1996. *Diálogos: Borges, Sábato*. Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores.
- Bartra, R. 2002. *Blood, Ink, and Culture: Miseries and Splendors of the Post-Mexican Condition*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Bergquist, C. 1986. *Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Beverly, J. 1999. *Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Bhabha, H. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Blackburn, R. 2011. *The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation and Human Rights*. London: Verso.
- Blanchard, P. 2008. *Under the Flags of Freedom: Slave Soldiers and the Wars of Independence in Spanish America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press.
- Block, F. 2001. Introduction to *The Great Transformation* by Karl Polanyi. Boston: Beacon Press.

- Bonfil Batalla, G. 2006. *México Profundo: Una civilización negada*. México, DF: Debolsillo.
- Borges, J. 1970. *Labyrinths*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Borón, A. 2008. "Promises and Challenges: The Latin American Left at the Start of the Twenty-First Century." In P. Barret, D. Chavez, and C. Rodriguez-Gavarito, eds. *The New Latin American Left*. Amsterdam: TNI.
- Brennan, T. 2001. "Antonio Gramsci and Postcolonial Theory." *Diaspora* 10 (2) (Fall): 143–187.
- Bretón, V. 2010. "La deriva identitaria del movimiento indígena en los Andes ecuatorianos o los límites de la etnofagia." In Martínez 2010.
- Brooksbank Jones, A., and R. Munck, eds. 2000. *Cultural Politics in Latin America*. London: Macmillan.
- Brunner, J. 1987. "Notas sobre la modernidad y lo postmoderno en la cultural latinoamericana." *David y Goliath*, 17. Buenos Aires: CLASCO, pp. 30–39.
- Bulmer-Thomas V. 1994. *The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- von Bülow, M. 2010. *Building Transnational Networks: Civil Society and the Politics of Trade in the Americas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Burawoy, M. 2003. "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi." *Politics and Society* 31 (2): 193–261.
- Burdick, J., P. Oxhorn, and K. Roberts, eds. 2009. *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?: Societies and Politics at the Crossroads*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Calderón, F. 1987. "América Latina: Identidad y tiempos mixtos o cómo tratar de pensar la modernidad sin dejar de ser indios." en *David y Goliath* Año XVII, N° 52, CLASCO, Buenos Aires.
- Calderón, F., M. Hopenhayn, and E. Ottone. 1996. *Esa esquivia modernidad: Desarrollo, Ciudadanía y Cultura en América Latina y el Caribe*. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad.
- Calderón, F., Alejandro Piscitelli, and Jose Luis Reyna. 1992. "Social Movements: Actors, Theories, Expectations." In Arturo Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez, eds. *New Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 19–36.
- Callinicos, A. 2010. "The Limits of Passive Revolution." *Capital and Class* 34 (3): 491–507.
- Canclini, N. G. 1991. "Cultura y Nación: Para qué no nos sirve ya Gramsci." *Nueva Sociedad*, no. 115 (Sept.–Oct.): 98–113.
- . 1995. *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*. Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press.
- . 2002. *Latinoamericanos buscando lugar en este siglo*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Canessa, A. 2010. "Celebrando lo indígena en Bolivia. Unas reflexiones sobre el año nuevo Aymara." In Martínez 2010.
- Cardoso, F. H. 2001. *Charting a New Course: The Politics of Globalization and Social Transformation*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

- . 2009a. "New Paths: Globalization in Historical Perspective." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44: 296–317.
- . 2009b. "Response." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44: 450–456.
- Cardoso, F. H., and E. Faletto. 1969. *Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina*. Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- . 1979. *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cardoso, F. H., and J. Serra. 1978. "Las desventajas de la dialectica de la dependencia." *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 40 (40): 9–55.
- Castañeda, J. 1993. *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Castañeda, J., and M. Morales, eds. 2008. *Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left*. London: Routledge.
- Castells, M. 1992. "Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the State, Economy and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim." In J. Henderson and R. Appelbaum, eds. *States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim*. London: Sage Publications.
- . 2010. *End of Millennium: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture Volume III*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Centeno, M. 2002. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press.
- Centeno, M. A. and F. López-Alves, eds. 2001. *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chakrabarty, D. 2007. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chalmers, D., S. Martin, and K. Piester. 1997. "Associative Networks: New Structures of Representation for the Popular Sectors." In D. Chalmers, C. Vilas, K. Hite, S. Martin, K. Piester, and M. Segarra, eds. *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and Representation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chatterjee, P. 2000. "The Nation and Its Peasants." In V. Chaturvedi, ed. *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial*. London: Verso.
- da Cunha, Euclides. (1902) 1957. *Rebellion in the Backlands*. Translated from Portuguese *Os Sertões*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Da Silva, C. T. 2012. "Indigenismo como ideologia e prática de dominação." *Latin American Research Review* 47 (1): 16–34.
- Dagnino, E. 1998. "Culture, Citizenship, and Democracy: Changing Discourses and Practices of the Latin American Left." In Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998.
- de Janvry, Alain, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Wendy Wolford. 1998. "From State-Led to Grassroots-Led Land Reform in Latin America." Paper prepared for the WIDER-FAO workshop on "Access to Land," Santiago, Chile, April 27–29.
- Debray, R. 1970. *Revolution in the Revolution*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- . 1977. *A Critique of Arms Vol. 1*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Donghi, T. H. 1985. "Economy and Society in Post-Independence Spanish America." In L. Bethell, ed. *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. 3: From Independence to c. 1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Dos Santos, T. 1973. *Imperialismo y empresas multinacionales*. Buenos Aires: Galerna.
- Dri, Rubén. 2011. "De la multitud al pueblo, del no-poder al poder popular." *Herramienta* 15 (46).
- Dunn, Stephen P. 1982. *The Fall and Rise of the Asiatic Mode of Production*. London: Routledge.
- ECLAC. 2007. Social Indicators and Statistics Database (BADEINSO), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Santiago, Chile: ECLAC.
- . 2010. *Time for Equality, Closing the Gap, Opening Trails*. Santiago de Chile: United Nations.
- Edwards, S. 2010. *Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ellner, Steve. 2012. "The Distinguishing Features of Latin America's New Left in Power: The Chávez, Morales, and Correa Governments." *Latin American Perspectives* 39 (1): 96–114.
- Escobar, A. 1992. "Culture, Economics and Politics in Latin American Social Movements Theory and Research." In A. Escobar and Sonia Alvarez, eds. *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. Boulder: Westview Press, p. 62.
- . 2000. "Beyond the Search for a Paradigm? Post-Development and Beyond." *Development* 43 (4): 11–14.
- Evans, Peter. 2000. "Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks: Counter-Hegemonic Globalization." *Contemporary Sociology* 29 (1): 230–241.
- Ffrench-Davis, R., O. Muñoz, and J. Palma. 1994. "The Latin American Economies, 1950–1990." In L. Bethell, ed. *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. 6: Latin America Since 1930: Economy and Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Flores Galindo, A. 2010. *In Search of an Inca. Identity and Utopia in the Andes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Foucault, M. 1977. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Franco, J. 2000. *Critical Passions: Selected Essays*. Mary Louise Pratt and Kathleen Newman, eds. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Frank, A. G. 1970. *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Fuguet A., and S. Gómez. 1996. *McOndo*. Madrid: Grijalbo Mondadori.
- Fukuyama, F. 1995. *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
- Galeano, E. 1971. *Las venas abiertas de América Latina*. México: Siglo XXI.
- . 1973. *The Open Veins of Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- . 1991. "The Blue Tiger and the Promised Land." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 24 (5): 13–17.
- García, A., and M. Palmeira. 2009. "Traces of the Big House and the Slave Quarters: Social Transformation in Rural Brazil during the Twentieth Century." In Sachs, Wilhelm, and Pinheiro 2009.

- Garretón, A., M. Cavarozzi, P. Cleaves, G. Gereffi, and J. Hartlyn. 2003. *Latin America in the 21st Century. Towards a New Sociopolitical Matrix*. Miami: North-South Centre Press.
- Gerchunoff, P. and J. C. Torre. 1996. "Argentina: La política de liberalización económica bajo un gobierno de base popular." *Desarrollo Económico* 36 (Oct.–Dec.): 733–768.
- Germani, G. 1965. *Política y Sociedad en una época de transition*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Gerschenkron, A. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, a Book of Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Gill, S. 2000. "The Constitution of Global Capitalism." www.theglobalsite.ac.uk.
- . 2002. *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*. London: Macmillan.
- Gilly, A. 1998. "Chiapas and the Rebellion of the Enchanted World." In D. Nugent, ed. *Rural Revolt in Mexico: US Intervention and the Domain of Subaltern Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 261–333.
- . 2005. *The Mexican Revolution*. New York: New Press.
- Glade, W. 1986. "Latin America and the International Economy." In L. Bethell, ed. *The Cambridge History of Latin America Vol 6*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–56.
- Gramsci, A. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- . 1972. *La Questione Meridionale*. Roma: Riuniti.
- . 1973. *Sul Fascismo*. Roma: Riuniti.
- . 1978. *Selections from the Political Writings (1921–1926)*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- . 1995. *Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- . 2011. *Prison Notebooks*, Vols.1–3, edited and translated by Joseph Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Green, M. 2011. "Rethinking the Subaltern and the Question of Censorship in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks." *Postcolonial Studies* 14 (4): 387–404.
- Griffin, K. 1995. "Global Prospects for Development and Human Security." *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 16 (3): 359–370.
- Grossman, H. (1929) 1992. *Law of Accumulation and the Breakdown of the Capitalist System*. London: Pluto Press.
- Guardiola-Rivera, O. 2010. *What If Latin America Ruled the World?* London: Bloomsbury.
- Guevara, E. 1968. *Venceremos: The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara*. J. Gerassi, ed. New York: MW Books.
- Guillén, A. 1969. *Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana*. Mexico: Ediciones Liberación.
- Gwynne, R. 2009. "Structural Reform in South America and Mexico: Economic and Regional Perspectives." In R. Gwynne and C. Kay, eds. *Latin America Transformed: Globalization and Modernity*. London: Hoddon Arvila, pp. 39–66.

- Hall, M., and H. Spalding. 1986. "The Urban Working Class and Early Latin American Labour Movements." In L. Bethell, ed. *The Cambridge History of Latin America: Vol. 4*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harvey, D. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 2010. *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism*. London: Profile Books.
- Helwege A., and M. Birch. 2007. "Declining Poverty in Latin America? A Critical Analysis of New Estimates by International Institutions." Tufts University, Medford, MA. www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/07-02LatinAmPoverty.pdf.
- Hobsbawm, E. 1963. *Primitive Rebels*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- . 1969. *Bandits*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. 1992. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holloway, J. 2002. *Changing the World Without Taking Power*. London: Pluto Press.
- IDB. 1997. "Latin America after a Decade: Economic and Social Report." *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1997 Report*. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC.
- Ipola, E. de, and Portantiero J. C. 1989. "Lo Nacional-Popular y los Populismos Realmente Existentes." In *E de Ipola Investigaciones Políticas*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Visión.
- Jelin, E. 1998. "Toward a Culture of Participation and Citizenship: Challenges for a More Equitable World." In Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998, pp. 405–414.
- Jessop, B. 2001. "Developments in Marxist Theory." In K. Nash and A. Scott, eds. *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 2006. "Gramsci as a Spatial Theorist." In A. Bieter and A. Morton, eds. *Images of Gramsci: Connections and Contentions in Political Theory And International Relations*. London: Routledge, pp. 27–44.
- Kanoussi, D., and J. Mena. 1995. *La Revolución Pasiva: Una lectura de Los Cuadernos de la Cárcel*. México, DF: Universidad Autónoma de Puebla.
- Kapoor, I. 2008. *The Postcolonial Politics of Development*. London: Routledge.
- Kay, C. 1989. *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*. London: Routledge.
- . 2004. "Rural Livelihoods and Peasant Futures." In R. Gwynne and C. Kay, eds. *Latin America Transformed: Globalization and Modernity*. London: Hodder Arnold.
- Kearney, M., and S. Varese. 2008. "Indigenous Peoples: Changing Identities and Forms of Resistance." In R. Harris and J. Nef, eds. *Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Klein, H. and F. V. Luna. 2010. *Slavery in Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Knight, A. 1985. "The Mexican Revolution: Bourgeois? Nationalist? or Just a 'Great Rebellion.'" *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 4 (1): 1–37.

- . 1990. "Social Revolution: A Latin American Perspective." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 9 (2): 175–202.
- . 1994. "Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26 (1): 73–107.
- Korzeniewicz, R. 1977. "The Deepening Differentiation of Enterprises, States and Households in Latin America." In W. Smith and R. Korzeniewicz, eds. *Politics, Social Change, and Economic Restructuring in Latin America*. Miami: North-South Centre, University of Miami, pp. 215–250.
- Laclau, E. 2005. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Latin American Subaltern Studies. 1993. "Founding Statement." *Boundary* 2 20 (3): 110–121.
- Larraín, J. 2000. *Identity and Modernity in Latin America*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Lechner, N. 1977. *La crisis del estado en América Latina*. Caracas: El Cid Editor.
- . 1990. *Los patios interiores de la democracia: Subjetividad y política*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Linares, A. G. 2006. "State Crisis and Popular Power." *New Left Review* 37: 73–85.
- Long, N. 1998. "The Agrarian Structures of Latin America, 1930–1990." In L. Bethell, ed. *Latin America: Economy and Society Since 1930*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 313–380.
- Lynch, J. 1985. "The Origins of Spanish American Independence." In L. Bethell, ed. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America, Vol III: Colonial Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mallon, F. 1994. "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History." *The American Historical Review* 99 (5): 1491–1515.
- Mangabeira Unger, R. 2011. *La alternativa de la izquierda*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Mariátegui, J. C. 1969. *7 Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana*. Lima: Amauta.
- . 1970. *Ideología y política*. Lima: Amauta.
- Marini, R. M. 1972. "Brazilian Sub-Imperialism." *Monthly Review* 23 (9): 14–24.
- . 1980. "Las razones del neodesarrollismo (respuesta F. H. Cardoso y J. Serra)." *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 40: 57–106.
- Martínez Novo, C. 2010a. "Introduction." In Martínez 2010.
- . 2010b. *Repensando los movimientos indígenas*. Quito: FLACSO Ecuador.
- Mazzeo, M. 2009. *Invitación al descubrimiento: José Carlos Mariátegui y el socialismo de nuestra América*. Buenos Aires: Editorial El Colectivo.
- McDonald, L. and A. Ruckert, eds. 2009. *Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Macleod, M. 1984. "Aspects of the Internal Economy of Colonial Spanish America: Labour; Taxation, Distribution and Exchange." In L. Bethell ed. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America, Vol II: Colonial Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- McCaughan, E. 1997. *Reinventing Revolution: The Renovation of Left Discourse in Cuba and Mexico*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Merino, J. 2008. "No Such Thing as a Social Advantage for the Left?" In Castañeda and Morales 2008.
- Mignolo, W. 2000. *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Morales, M. 2008. "Have Latin Americans Turned Left?" In Castañeda and Morales 2008.
- Morton, A. 2010. "The Continuum of Passive Revolution." *Capital and Class* 34: 315–342.
- Munck, Gerardo L. 2009. "Development and Democracy in a Globalized World: Thinking about Latin America from Within" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44 (4): 337–358.
- Munck, R. 1989. *Latin America: The Transition to Democracy*. London: Zed.
- . 2005. *Globalisation and Social Exclusion: A Transformationalist Perspective*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
- . 2006. "Global Civil Society: Royal Road or Slippery Path?" *Voluntas* 17 (4): 324–331.
- Negri, A., and G. Cocco. 2006. *Global. Biopoder y luchas en una América Latina globalizada*. Buenos Aires: Paidós.
- Nugent, D., ed. 1998. *Rural Revolt in Mexico: US Intervention and the Domain of Subaltern Politics*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- O'Brien, P. 1985. "Authoritarianism and the New Economic Orthodoxy: The Political Economy of the Chilean Regime 1975–1983." In P. O'Brien and P. Cammack, eds. *Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- O'Donnell, G. 1979. "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy." In D. Collier, ed. *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- O'Donnell, G., P. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Olesen, T. 2005. *International Zapatismo: The Construction of Solidarity in the Age of Globalization*. London: Zed Books.
- Oliveira, de, F. 1973. "A Economia Brasileira: Crítica à Razão Dualista." *Cadernos CEBRAP*, no. 2: 3–82.
- . 2003. "The Duckbilled Platypus." *New Left Review*, no. 24: 40–57.
- . 2006. "Lula in the Labyrinth." *New Left Review*, no. 42: 5–22.
- Ortiz, R. 2009. "Culture and Society." In Sachs, Wilhelm, and Sergio Pinheiro 2009.
- Oxhorn, P. 2009. "Beyond Neoliberalism: Latin America's New Crossroads." In J. Burdick, P. Oxhorn, and K. Roberts, eds. *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?: Societies and Politics at the Crossroads*. New York: Palgrave, pp. 217–234.
- Panizza, R. 2009. *Contemporary Latin America Development and Democracy beyond the Washington Consensus*. London: Zed Books.
- Panizza, Francisco, and Romina Miorelli. 2009. "Populism and Democracy in Latin America." *Ethics & International Affairs* 23 (1): 39–46.

- Pannekoek, A. (1934) 1977. "The Theory of the Collapse of Capitalism." *Capital and Class* 1: 59–81.
- Petras, J. 1997. "Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America." *Monthly Review* 49 (7) (Dec.): 10–27.
- Petras, J., and H. Veltmeyer. 2005. *Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador*. London: Pluto Press.
- Polanyi, K. 1947. "Our Obsolete Market Mentality." In G. Dalton, ed. *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economics: Essays of Karl Polanyi*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- . 2001. *The Great Transformation: The Social and Political Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon.
- Polanyi, Karl, Conrad M. Arensberg, and Harry W. Pearson, eds. 1957. *Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Portantiero J. C. 1983. *Los usos de Gramsci*. Buenos Aires: Folios Ediciones.
- Prebisch, R. 1950. *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems*. New York: United Nations.
- Quijano, A. 1988. "Alternative Production Systems." In B. Sousa Santos, ed. *Another Production is Possible: Beyond the Capitalist Canon*. London: Verso, pp. 417–455.
- . 2000. "Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America." *International Sociology* 15 (2): 215–232.
- Reid, M. 2009. *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Reigadas, M. C. 1998. "Neomodernidad y posmodernidad: Preguntando desde América Latina." In E. Marí, ed. *Posmodernidad*. Buenos Aires: Biblio Editores.
- Resende, B. 2000. "Brazilian Modernism: The Canonised Revolution." In Schelling 2000.
- Rostow, W. 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth: An Anti-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rowe, W., and V. Schelling. 1996. *Memory and Modernity: Popular Culture in Latin America*. London: Verso.
- Sader, E. 2009. *El Nuevo Topo: Los caminos de la izquierda Latinoamericana*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XX.
- Santos, B. Sousa. 1995. *Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition*. New York: Routledge.
- Sarlo, B. 2000. "The Modern City: Buenos Aires, The Peripheral Metropolis." In Schelling 2000, pp. 108–126.
- Sarmiento, D. F. (1845) 2004. *Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism*. California: University of California Press.
- Schelling, V, ed. 2000. *Through the Kaleidoscope: The Experience of Modernity in Latin America*. London: Verso.
- Seoane, J. and E. Taddei. 2010. "Tras una década de luchas: Realidades y desafíos en los proyectos de cambio en América Latina." *Herramienta*. <http://www.herramienta.com.ar>.
- Sevcenko, N. 2000. "Peregrinations, Visions and the City: From Canudos to Brasilia, the Backlands Become the City and the City Becomes the Backlands." In Schelling 2000.

- Shohat, E. 1992. "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial.'" *Social Text*, nos. 31–32: 99–113.
- Silver, B. 2003. *Forces of Labor. Workers' Movements and Globalization Since 1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Silver, B. and G. Arrighi. 2001. "Workers North and South." *Socialist Register* 37: 53–76.
- Singer, P. 2009a. "Economic Evolution and International Connection." In Sachs, Wilhelm, and Pinheiro 2009.
- . 2009b. "Latin America in the Global Crisis." *Estudios Avanzados* 26 (66): 91–102.
- Smith, P. 2005. *Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stein, Stanley J., and Barbara H. Stein. 1970. *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stiglitz, J. 2002. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Tavares, M. C. 1964. "Rise and Decline of Import Substitution in Brazil." *Economic Bulletin for Latin America* 9 (March): 1–65.
- . 1990. "Economics and Happiness." *CEPAL Review* 42: 211–220.
- Taylor, M. 2006. *From Pinochet to the Third Way: Neoliberalism and Social Transformation in Chile*. London: Pluto Press.
- . 2009. "The Contradictions and Transformations of Neoliberalism in Latin America: From Structural Adjustment to 'Empowering the Poor.'" In L. Macdonald and A. Ruckert, eds. *Post Neoliberalism in the Americas*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thomas, P. 2009. *The Gramscian Moment. Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Thorp, R. 1994. "The Latin American Economies, 1929–1939." In L. Bethel, ed. *The Cambridge History of Latin America Vol IV Latin America Since 1930. Economy and Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thorp, R., and L. Whitehead. 1987. "Review and Conclusion." In R. Thorp and L. Whitehead, eds. *Latin American Debt and the Adjustment Crisis*. Houndmills: Macmillan.
- Tironi, E. 1984. *La Torre de Babel, Ensayos de Crítica y Renovación Política*. Santiago: Ediciones Sur.
- Torres-Rivas, E. 1987. *Centroamérica: La democracia posible*. San José, Costa Rica: EDUCA and FLACSO.
- Trotsky, L. 1970 [1932]. *History of the Russian Revolution*. New York: Pathfinder.
- Tussie, D., and P. Heidrich. 2008. "A Tale of Ecumenism and Diversity. Economic and Trade Policies of the New Left." In Castañeda and Morales 2008.
- Vanden, H., and M. Becker, eds. 2011a. "Amauta: An Introduction to the Life and Works of Jose Carlos Mariátegui." In *José Carlos Mariátegui: An Anthology*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- , eds. 2011b. *José Carlos Mariátegui: An Anthology*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Vasconcelos, J. 1977. *The Cosmic Race/La Raza Cósmica*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

- Véliz, C. 1994. *The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Veltmeyer, H. 2010. "The Global Crisis and Latin America." *Globalizations* 7 (1–2): 217–234.
- Wachtel, N. 1984. "The Indian and the Spanish Conquest." In L. Bethell, ed. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America, Vol I: Colonial Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Warren, K. 1998. *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Webber, J. 2009. "From Naked Barbarism to Barbarism with Benefits: Neoliberal Capitalism, Natural Gas Policy, and the Government of Evo Morales in Bolivia." In A. Ruckert and L. Macdonald, eds. *Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas?* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Williamson, J. 2007. "History without Evidence: Latin American Inequality since 1491." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 14766, Cambridge. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14766>.
- World Bank. 2007. World Development Indicators. <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.
- Yashar, D. J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zamosc, L. 2007. "The Indian Movement and Political Democracy in Ecuador." *Latin American Politics and Society* 49 (3): 1–34.
- Žižek, S. 1997. "Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism." *New Left Review* 1 (225): 28–51.

Index

bold type = extended discussion or term emphasised in text; t = table

- absolutism 27, **69–70**, 136, 182
- 'accumulation by dispossession'
 - (Arrighi *et al.* 143, 219
- Action Party (Italy) 79
- Africa 26, 27, 37, 54–5, 200
- Afro-Americans 197
- agrarian reform 27, 47, 50, 58, 85,
 - 96, 115, **118–20**, 126, **141–3**,
 - 207–8, 224–5
- agraristas* and *serranos* 85
- agriculture 32, 69–70, 97, 118–19,
 - 141–2, 171, 214, 215
- agro-export 10, 64, 69, 90, 93, 120, 179
- agro-industrial complex (Brazil) 59
- Alberdi, J. B. 19
- Alfonsín, R. 139
- Alianza Libertadora Nacional* (ALN, Brazil) 111
- Alianza Social Continental* 204
- Allende, I. 198
- Allende, S. 109, 119, 174
- Alliance for Progress 119
- Almeyra, G. 176, 219
- Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas* (ALBA) 154, 192, 202
- Althusser, L. 6, 39, 46, 108, 177
- altiplano* 215
- Altwater, E. 135, 219
- Alvarez, S. 211, 219
- Amauta* (journal, 1926–) 6, 214, 228
- American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) 75
- 'American [US] way of life' 19
- Americanism 131, 159
- Amerindians 2, 5, 7–8, 12, 19, 45,
 - 52–5, 58–9, 66, 76, 87, 149, 153,
 - 168, 172–3, 176, 184, 186, 194,
 - 195, 209, 212, 220, 224–5
- assimilation strategy 211
- Bolivia **154–5**
- Peru **213–14**
- population reduction (1492–1650) 9
- rights 'socially constructed' 29
- 'separate but equal' (or not) 63
- Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol, Tojolabal peoples 216
 - see also* indigenous movements
- 'anarchic syndicalists' 77
- anarchism 61, 173
- Andean countries 28, 69, 92, 98, 116,
 - 123, 154, 168, 171, 172, 180,
 - 192, 195, 209, 212, 215, 222
- 'Andean-Amazonian capitalism' 186
- Anderson, P. 187, 219
- Andrade, O. de 100
- Anglo-Saxons 25, 28, 68
- anomie* (normlessness) 84, 148
- 'another world is possible' 104, 161,
 - 176, 191, 192, 202, 214
- anthropology 161
- 'anti-clerical scientism' 77
- anti-colonialism 36, 212
 - see also* colonialism
- anti-imperialism 36, 68, 187, 191,
 - 196, 217

- anti-Semitism 122
- Antilles 54
- Apartheid* 122
- Arbenz, J. 174
- Argentina 18–19, 20, 26, 31, 46, 48, 62, 69, 85–6, 95, 111–15, 122, 125, 139, 141, 154, 155–6, 173–4, 175, 177, 179, 180, 185, 195, 197, 198, 202, 204, 219, 223, 227
 - currency pegged to US dollar 140, 184
 - economic collapse (2001) 11, 130, 151, 155–6, 173, 183–4, 205
 - economic recovery (2001–) 142
 - Gramscian current 14
 - ISI 92
 - migrant masses 77
 - military coup (1955) 85, 97
 - military coup (1976) 110, 112, 113, 121, 127
 - rural-urban migration 85
 - ‘under-developed’ classification (1950s) 18
- Argentinazo* 173
- Arguedas, J. M. 34
- Aricó, J. 5, 15, 46, 112, 219
- Ariel* (Rodó, 1900) 68
- armed struggle 46, 108–9, 112
- Arrighi, G. 143, 164–5, 219, 228
- Asia 26, 27, 37, 200, 221
- ‘Asiatic mode of production’ 6, 214, 222
- Assadourian, S. 57, 219
- assimilation 28, 100, 172, 211, 215, 216
- Atahualpa, Emperor 53
- Atahualpa, J. S. 218
- Australia 24, 25
- authoritarianism 24, 39, 95, 98, 117, 124, 170, 174, 180, 226
- autonomism 176
- ‘autonomy’ strategy 216–17
- ayllu* (Inca community) 7, 53, 214, 215
- Aztecs 9, 53
- Bachelet presidency (Chile, 2006–10) 184
- Baker, A. 147–8, 199, 219
- balance of payments 126, 137
- Banco do Brasil 93
- Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social* (BNDES) 93
- banks and banking 89, 155, 156, 205, 206
- Barber, B. 36
- Barbusse, H. 6
- Baring Crisis (1890) 152–3
- barter 155, 161, 173
- Bartra, R. 31, 205, 219
- basismo* tendencies 112
- Batista, F. 110
- Becker, M. 5, 228
- beef 62, 69
- belle époque* (LA) 182
- Bergquist, C. 87, 219
- Beverly, J. 34, 83, 219
- ‘beyond utopia’ (Castañeda) 113, 221
- Bhabha, H. 32, 217, 219
- binary oppositions 8, 17, 21, 23, 30, 35, 179, 197, 217
- ‘bio-political power bloc’ (Negri) 191
- ‘bio-power’ (Foucault) 145
- Birch, M. 182–3, 224
- Bismarck, O. von 77, 125
- Blackburn, R. 55, 56, 219
- Blades, Ruben 36
- Blanchard, P. 55–6, 219
- blanqueamiento* 28
- Block, F. 167, 219
- Bobbio, N. 51
- Boletín de Defensa Indígena* 214
- Bolívar, S. 36, 56, 59, 68, 154, 192
- Bolivarian Revolution (Chávez) 154
- Bolivia 113, 154, 172–3, 177, 179, 185–7, 192, 210, 215, 217, 220, 227, 229
 - nationalism 63
 - radical assembly (1970) 111
- Bolivia: ‘Water Wars’ 29, 30, 154–5, 203
- Bolivian Communist Party 110

- Bolivian Revolution (1952) 86, 110–11, 155
- Bonfil Batalla, G. 86, 153, 220
- ‘border thinking’ 35
- Borges, J. L. 19, 35–6, 220
- Borón, A. 190, 191, 220
- bourgeois hegemony 146, 184
- bourgeois revolution 3, 52, 82, 84–5, 92, 120, 207, 224
- versus ‘passive revolution’ 50
- bourgeoisie 10, 15, 47, 51, 86, 90, 93, 96, 106, 107, 110, 127
- ‘never a national class’ 120
- peripheral 48–9
- ‘*bourgeoisie conquérante*’ (‘classic Marxist notion’) 10, 52, 62, 84–5
- ‘*Bráden ó Perón*’ (slogan, 1946) 154
- Brazil 2, 12, 14, 31, 45, 48, 54–6, 94, 104, 114, 116, 123, 126, 127, 140, 142, 143, 171, 175, 177–80, 191, 192, 195, 199, 202, 204, 206–8, 210, 222, 224–8
- abolition of slavery (1888) 60, 65, 69
- constitution (1891) 59
- decolonization 59–60
- development path 59–60
- financial crisis (1982) 152
- flag 66
- import-substitution
- industrialization (1930–45) 93
- independence (1823) 60
- industrialization (1950–64) 115
- ISI 90–1, 92
- legacy of delayed decolonization
- ‘considerable’ 61
- ‘market and masses’ 147–8
- military coup (1889) 60
- military coup (1930) 61
- military coup (1964) 50, 97, 99, 106, 110, 112, 121
- monarchy 59
- ‘no national economy’ 60–1
- ‘overwhelming economic weight’ 185
- populism 97–8
- Portuguese style of colonization 59
- post-colonial economy 60
- poverty-reduction 183
- strikes (1969) 111
- ‘strong movement for modernity’ 66
- ‘sub-imperialist’ role 122, 225
- trade diversification 93
- Brazilian communist party (1922) 65
- Brazilian Republic (1889–) 59, 60, 65
- Brennan, T. 83, 220
- Bretón, V. 29, 220
- BRIC 191, 212
- Brooksbank Jones, A. 198, 220
- Brunner, J. 35, 220
- Buena Vista* Social Club 198
- Buenos Aires 8, 19, 65, 227
- Buenos Aires: *Cabildo* (colonial government house) 59
- Bülow, M. von 172, 201, 220
- Burawoy, M. 159, 220
- Burdick, J. 181, 220
- ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian state’ (O’Donnell) 11, 101, 122–3, 125–7, 226
- Burgess, J. W. 25
- caepulli* 53
- Caesarism (Gramsci) 74, 78, 79, 95–6, 106
- Caixa Econômica 93
- Calderón, F. 70, 84, 209, 220
- Calles, P. 77
- Callinicos, A. 49, 220
- Campaña del Desierto* (Desert Campaign, 1878–9) 18
- Canada 25
- Canclini, N. G. 33, 80, 196, 201, 212, 220
- Canessa, A. 29, 220
- Cannibalist Manifesto 100
- Canudos revolt (1893–7) 66, 67
- capacity-building 175, 196
- capital 21, 125, 127, 169, 185, 206
- foreign 91, 92, 96, 97, 99t, 116, 118, 138, 139
- ‘structural power’ 136

- Capital* (Marx) 102, 105
 capital accumulation 3, 11, 22–3, 32, 38–9, 40, 43, 60, 63, 70, 88, 91, 93, 96, 103, 104, 106, 114, 116–17, 124, 131, 139, 143, 146, 191
 changing pattern 137
 spatial dimension 203
 capitalism 3, 4, 24, 27, 31–2, 38, 54, 57, 62–4, 86–7, 92, 118, 131, 135, 145, 190, 193, 195, 208, 214, 224, 227, 229
 ability to regenerate and reconfigure 104
 ‘advanced countries’ (1920s) 47
 ‘capacity to reconfigure itself’ (Gramsci) 42
 contradictions 102
 crisis 101, 102–7
 crisis-collapse scenario 102, 223
 ‘floundering’ (mid-1970s onwards) 117
 global 136, 161, 165, 223
 transnational 161
 ‘capitalist revolution’ (1970s) 121
 Cárdenas, L. 48, 79, 92, 96–7, 153
 Cardenismo 96–7
 Cardoso, F. H. 21, 23, 64, 88, 92, 98, 103–4, 118, 127, 140, 175, 178, 193, 206, 220–1, 225
 structural-historical reading of dependency 123
 Caribbean 55, 220
 Carrancismo (constitutionalism) 85
 Castañeda, J. 113, 168, 177, 204, 221
 Castells, M. 91, 200, 221
 Castro, F. 108, 109
 ‘catastrophic balance’ 106, 107
 Catholic Church 28, 76, 77, 97, 149–50, 153
 ‘the church’ 173
 cattle 60, 69
 caudillos 67, 123
 Centeno, M. A. 62–3, 221
 ‘grand theory through lens of LA’ 39–40, 221
 Central America 18, 77, 92, 98, 116, 123, 126, 147, 183, 200, 228
 Central General de Trabajadores del Peru (CGTP) 6
 Chakrabarty, D. 35, 221
 Chalmers, D. 169, 221
Change World without Taking Power (Holloway, 2002) 176, 224
 Chatterjee, P. 81, 221
 Chávez, H. 2, 75, 154, 174, 177–80, 195, 204, 222
 rhetoric versus reality 185
 UN speech 154
 Chiapas 153, 223
 Chicago Boys (Chile) 115, 121, 140
 Chile 10, 59, 64, 106, 109, 111–12, 122, 126–7, 135, 137–8, 149–50, 174–5, 177–80, 187, 206, 219, 226, 228
 land reform (1964–) 119
 ‘model for rest of LA’ 140–1
 political structures, economic strategy (post-Pinochet) 178
 post-neoliberalism 184–5
 social disarticulation 148
 Socialist-Christian Democratic coalition 178
 state intervention 92
 China 107, 108, 117, 143, 152, 182, 191, 210
 Christian Democrats 119, 178
 Christian Socialism 158, 160
 Christianity 53, 159
 cities 33, 69, 77, 101, 202
 citizenship 149, 194, 196, 209, 221, 224, 229
 ‘corporatist’ versus ‘neo-liberal’ (Yashar) 172, 216
 ‘civil hegemony’ 4
 civil society 4, 26, 30, 33, 40, 42–3, 51, 79, 98–9, 99t, 107, 109, 112, 130, 147, 149, 150, 160, 168–72, 187, 196, 206, 207, 211, 217, 220
 depoliticized 173
 Gramsci’s conception 158–9, 171
 reactivation 168
 see also global civil society
 civilization 30, 53

Civilization or Barbarism

(Sarmiento, 1845) 18–19, 28, 227
clasista tendencies 112
 class 3, 4, 9, 10, 21, 26, 31, 34, 38,
 40–3, 45, 48, 50–2, 63, 65, 67,
 75, 78, 79, 86, 90, 94, 96, 97,
 99, 101, 104, 106, 108, 117,
 140, 155, 159, 164–5, 171–3,
 203, 208
 ‘not always determinant’
 (Polanyi) 162–3
see also dominant classes
 ‘class essentialism’ 6, 13
 class reductionism 162
 class struggle 22, 82, 84, 87, 88, 102,
 111, 112, 124, 191
 Clausewitz, K. 108
clientilistic networks 215
coatequit 54
 coca/cocaine 200, 218
 Cocco, G. 56, 191, 226
 Cochabamba Coca Growers’
 Federation 155
 Cochabamba ‘Water Wars’ 29, 30,
 154–5, 203
 coercion 4, 51, 55–7, 69, 120, 123–4,
 147, 186
 coffee 60, 61, 69, 153
 Cold War 20, 21, 26, 102, 161, 193
 ‘post-Cold War era’ 169–70, 221
 collective will (Gramsci) 171
 Colombia 98, 108, 147, 155, 170,
 174, 180, 183, 200, 219
 ‘colonial matrix of power’
 (Mignolo) 194–5, 226
 colonialism 3, 8, 12, 57, 78, 182
see also imperialism
 ‘coloniality’ (Quijano) 36, 193–4, 227
 Columbia University 25
 commodification 57, 165, 167, 203,
 209
 commodities 199
 common sense 68, 71, 122, 211, 227
 Gramscian 12, 76, 196, 205
 communalism 195, 213
 communism 6, 7, 13, 20, 85, 100,
 108, 125

‘disease of transition’ (Rostow) 25
 Inca 70–1, 214–15
 pre-emption 48
see also ‘primitive communism’
 Communist International (Third
 International) 8, 26, 46, 47, 75,
 102
 Communist Party of Argentina 46
 communists 26–7, 28
 ‘compromise state’ 10, 73–4, 78, 86,
 93, 94–100, 101, 120, 121, 127,
 138, 206
 Comte, A. 66
Concertación governments
 (Chile) 178
 ‘conjunctural crisis’ (Gramsci) 101, 104
 Conquest (Iberian) 45, 52–8, 182,
 212–13, 229
 Catholic conquest ‘impediment to
 modernization’ 25, 27
 from ~ to modernity, 1510–1910
 (chapter two) 9, 29, 45–71
 subjugation of labor 54
Conquistadores 18, 31, 66
 Conselheiro, A. 66
 consensus 41, 42, 105, 186
 consent 4, 43, 51, 54, 55, 79, 109,
 124, 148, 159, 184, 208
 ‘conservative modernization’ 9, 41,
 45, 49, 50, 52, 59, 95, 119, 207
 consumerism 140, 147–8, 149, 152,
 199, 218
 consumers 11, 22, 93, 141, 198
 consumption 24, 53, 73, 118, 219
Contras (Nicaragua) 113
 cooperation 7, 194, 215
 Córdoba (Argentina) 14
Cordobazo uprising (Argentina,
 1969) 111, 112, 113, 173
 core-periphery 89
 ‘centre-periphery’ 37, 191
see also periphery
 Correa, R. 177, 179, 222
 corruption 180, 186, 208
 Cortés, H. 53
 cosmopolitanism 7, 33, 68, 189, 196,
 198, 212

- Costa Rica 147, 228
 counter-globalization movement 171–2, 217
 counter-hegemony 80, 87, 148, 159, 191, 195–6, 202–3, 208–9, 211–12, 214
 Gramsci 15, 43, 67
 ‘most-clearly articulated by Polanyi’ 158
 ‘coup through impeachment’ (Paraguay, 2012) 211
 ‘creative destruction’ 103
criollos 9, 19, 28, 33, 45, 58, 59, 62, 65, 214
 ‘critique of dualist reason’ (Oliveira) 32, 92
 Cromwell, O. 79
 Cruz, C. 36
 Cuba 22, 55, 56, 154, 174, 185, 226
 ‘special period’ (1990s) 113
 Cuban Revolution (1959) 10–11, 14, 34, 101, 107–8, 119, 125, 127
 significance 110–13
 ‘watershed moment’ 109–10
 ‘cultural political economy’ 196–7, 201
 cultural revolution 77
 cultural studies 34, 80
 ‘cultural tradition’ 28
 culture 3, 13, 14, 22, 32, 35, 68, 71, 99t, 109, 171, 193, 198–9, 209, 214, 217, 219–22, 226
 national 42, 66, 87, 100, 198
 national (Gramsci) 76
 national (problematic in globalized world) 80
 transnational 36
 transnational political economy 33
 culture clash 58
 Cuoco, V. 47
- da Cunha, E. (1866–1909) 66, 67
 Da Silva, C. T. 216, 221
 Da Silva, L. I. (‘Lula’) 178, 179, 208, 226
 Dagnino, E. 109, 168, 171, 211, 219, 221
- data reliability 182
de te fabula narratur (Marx) 1
 Debray, R. 26, 107–8, 111–12, 221
 debt crisis (1982) 117–18, 137, 138, 139, 183
 debt default 156
 debt peonage 54, 63
 decentralization 29, 172–3
 decommodification 133, 169, 203
 democracy 2, 14, 98, 102, 126–7, 135, 141, 160, 169, 173, 181, 185, 190, 194, 196, 209, 217–18, 221, 226, 228
 ‘clear threat to established order’ 125
 form 95
 Left regimes and ~ 179–80
 as political category 168
 see also liberal democracy
 democratic deepening 175, 187, 210
 democratization 5, 9, 24, 41, 123, 147–50, 163, 170, 191
 rural life 171
 dependency 12, 82, 87–8, 102, 107, 114–16, 127, 139, 147, 189, 193, 194, 198–9, 203, 208
 socialist 110
 technological and financial 118
Dependency and Development in Latin America (Cardoso and Faletto 1969, 1979) 21, 221
 dependency theory 2, 21–3, 89, 178
 dependent development 84, 103–4, 113, 124
 see also development
 ‘dependent fascism’ (Dos Santos) 122, 123–4
 Derrida, J. 35
desarrollismo/developmentalism 138, 207
 ‘neo-developmentalism’ 175
 ‘developing’ world 8, 21, 140, 160, 163, 165
 see also Third World
 development 4, 10, 22–3, 27, 40, 43, 50, 56, 73, 103, 125, 138, 190, 195, 198, 223–4, 226

- export-driven strategy 140
- 'key framing concept' 2–3
- national-statist model 199, 210
- nationalist and regionalist approaches 177
- new matrix 207–18
- orthodox capitalist strategies 181
- structuralist policies 94
- and underdevelopment (Frank) 107
- see also* 'late' development
- development theory 21, 62
- developmental state 39, 88, 97, 160–1, 169, 211, 216
- definition (Castells) 91
- LA (1950–80) 91
- 'developmentalist alliance' 118
- dialectics 51
- global-local 166, 170
- 'differential temporalities' (optic) 70
- 'disciplinary neo-liberalism' (Gill) 136
- 'disciplinary society' (Foucault) 145, 149
- discipline 136, 137–8
- disembedding (Polanyi) 129, 130–5, 137
- dominant classes 4, 34, 45, 48, 50–2, 60, 81, 90, 94–5, 97, 99, 101, 106–7, 118, 120–1, 127, 211–12
- see also* subaltern classes
- Donghi, T. H. 69, 221
- Dos Santos, T. 122, 221
- double movement (Polanyi) 11–12, 129, 132, 159, 160, 164–5, 165–6, 167
- Dri, R. 173, 222
- Dunn, S. P. 214, 222
- Durkheim, É. 148
- East *see* Third World
- East Asia 143, 152
- Eastern Europe 63, 158
- Echeverría, L. 126
- Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Gerschenkron, 1962) 88, 223
- economic base, political superstructure (Marx) 50, 83, 214
- Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLA/ECLAC/CEPAL, 1949–) 31, 89, 114–15, 175, 182, 183, 208, 210, 222
- economic determinism 133–4, 162
- economic dualism 7, 31–2, 92
- 'economic earthquakes' (Polanyi) 162
- economic growth 115, 140, 206
- economic independence 63–4
- economic liberalism 114, 132, 159, 164
- 'economic reform' (euphemism) 138
- economic takeoff (Rostow) 24
- economic transition 101, 114–21
- economics 146, 196, 222
- economism 13, 22, 50, 67, 80, 162, 214
- Ecuador 154, 168, 172, 173, 177, 185, 192, 204, 227, 230
- attempted coup (2000) 218
- diaspora 197
- indigenous movement (relationship with democracy) 217–18
- education 76, 97, 179
- Edwards, S. 143, 151, 180, 222
- Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP, Argentina) 111, 112
- ejido* (collectivized sector, Mexico) 142, 153
- El Salvador 126, 147, 199
- elites 9, 19, 33, 45, 59, 62, 65, 66, 78, 164, 199, 214
- Ellner, S. 177, 222
- embeddedness (Polanyi) 134–5
- emigration 94, 147
- employment 115, 125, 143, 147
- empowerment 5, 175, 196
- 'end of history' (Fukuyama) 174
- Engels, F. 26, 67, 106
- Enlightenment 1, 18, 100, 194, 209
- entrepreneurship/entrepreneurs 8, 53, 54, 133, 141, 145–6
- epistemology 23, 35, 78
- Escobar, A. 21, 99, 211, 219, 222
- essentialism 6, 13, 15, 27, 28, 29, 30, 42, 196, 217

- estancia* (estate) 69
 ethnicity 46, 78, 81, 171, 211, 217
 ethnocentrism 2–3, 17, 20, 22, 75, 88, 161
 euro crisis (2009–) 156, 187
 Eurocentrism 7, 16, 26, 30, 34–5, 85, 87, 164, 166, 193, 195, 209, 227
 Europe 1, 8, 18, 22, 35, 38, 58–9, 65, 77, 122, 131, 194, 200, 213, 221
 ‘represented modernity’ (early C20) 19
 European Union 117
 Evans, P. 164, 165, 222
 export economy 61, 62, 84, 140, 141
 see also agro-export
 exports 60, 64, 91, 94, 115, 137

 Faletto, E. 21, 64, 88, 92, 98, 118, 221
 structural-historical reading of dependency 123
falta de braços (shortage of labor) 61
 fascism 10, 20, 41, 46, 48, 85, 105–6, 107, 122, 130, 164, 168, 223
 ‘state of exception’ 49
 ‘fascism or revolution’ 124
 fear 144, 146, 147
 feudalism 8, 27, 31–2, 47, 52, 62, 77, 92, 131, 214
 ‘Fifty years in five’ (slogan) 91
 First World *see* West, the
 Flores Galindo, A. 213, 214, 222
foquismo strategy 111
 Fordism 55, 71, 131, 159, 207
Foreign Affairs 151
Forgotten Continent: Battle for Latin America’s Soul (Reid, 2009) 23, 227
 Foucault, M. 21, 34–5, 136, 144–5, 149, 222
 disciplinary subjection 129
 penal torture 147
 Fourth International 102
 France 6, 19, 41, 47, 48, 82, 163
 Franco, J. 36, 222
 Francoism 127

 Frank, A. G. 21, 31–2, 57, 107, 113, 222
 free markets 164, 165, 168, 169
 ‘free-market approach’ 10, 11, 115, 129, 132, 145–6, 151, 211
 free trade 89, 172, 192
 free-trade agreements 153, 178
 Free-Trade Area of Americas (US project, 1990s) 201, 204, 220
 Freemasonry 77, 106
 French Revolution 52, 79, 106
Frente Amplio (Uruguay) 178
Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN, 1970–) 126
 Friedman, M. 121
 Fuentes, C. 198
 Fuguet, A. 36, 222
 Fukuyama, F. 135, 174, 222
 future/futurism 1, 7, 71

 Galeano, E. 29–30, 222
gamonalismo system 213, 214
 García, A. 61, 222
 García Márquez, G. 8–9, 36, 198
 Garibaldi, G. 79
 Garretón, M. A. 91, 95, 98–9, 99t, 207, 211, 222
gauchopolitics 71
gauchos (workers on horseback) 26
gegemoniya (hegemony) 3
 gender 4, 25, 66, 81, 184
 General Motors 31
 Gerchunoff, P. 139, 223
 Germani, G. 20, 223
 Germany 65, 122, 125
 Gerschenkron, A. 88, 223
 Gill, S. 51, 136–7, 160, 163, 223
 Gilly, A. 84, 153–4, 223
 Glade, W. 64, 65, 223
 global civil society 170, 226
 ‘rather vacuous concept’ 24
 global discipline 129, 135–44
 global economic crisis (2008–9) *see* Great Recession
 ‘global governance’ 162, 164

- globalization 4, 12–13, 15, 25, 29, 33,
 36, 80, 89, 100, 129, 132, 135,
 138–40, 147, 150–1, 153, 159,
 162, 165, 175, 220–3, 226, 228
 from above 202
 ‘always-already’ 189, 190–5
 ‘broadest sense’ 134
 counter-hegemonic 222
 ‘emergence as new modernization
 paradigm’ 23
 first wave (1870–1914) 64
 ‘human face’ 134, 151
 hybrid 33
 versus inequality and
 poverty 181–3
 ‘interdependent’ 23
 market-driven 167
 neo-liberal 2, 23, 88, 151, 154,
 160, 163–4, 167, 174, 190, 195,
 201, 207
 neo-liberal (peasant resistance in
 LA) 171
 neo-liberal (failure to deliver on
 promises) 16
 polarizing effects 141
 reactions 163
 rural sector 171
 transnational optic 198
 Westernization writ large 24
 ‘globalization revolution’ 11
 globalization theory 24
 globalization within, 1510–2010
 (chapter seven) 12–13, 189–218
 Gómez, S. 36, 222
 good governance 21, 166
 Goulart, J. 97, 99, 125
 governments 39, 203, 205
 see also Left governments
 Gramsci, A. 3–4, 10, 26, 69–71, 74,
 95, 104, 112, 129, 168, 171, 173,
 176, 214, 219–20, 223, 224, 227–8
 ‘always focused on territoriality’ 89
 ‘anti-positivist philosophy’ 15
 conception of civil society 158
 conception of social
 transformation 109
 ‘dialectical analyst’ 51
 East-West paradigm (‘historical,
 not geographical’) 30–1, 33, 107,
 158–9
 Eurocommunism 13
 focus on ‘peripheral’ European
 states 40
 imprisonment (1928–) 46, 130
 and Italy (‘basic problem’) 41
 LA perspective 9
 ‘Latinamericanized’ 15
 ‘man of ideas’ 46
 and Mariátegui 13
 ‘molecular changes’ 4, 41,
 48, 49
 national optic 13, 130
 national-international dialectic 88
 ‘never sought to glorify
 subalternity’ 78
 ‘new inspiration for Left’
 (late C20) 47
 ‘new’ versus ‘traditional’
 intellectuals 67
 ‘not a professor political
 science’ 40
 ‘not just sociological or Weberian
 supplement to Marx’ 51
 ‘orthodox communist’ 160
 ‘passive revolution’ concept 41
 perspective ‘firmly
 internationalist’ 13, 130–1
 ‘pessimism’ 47
 ‘philosopher of praxis’ 46
 political life (and his death) 105
 political methodology 38
 ‘questionable relevance today’ 80
 re-engagement with thought
 of ~ 14–15
 report on Italian situation
 (1926) 47
 rise to prominence (Turin,
 1919–20) 46
 role of intellectual 67
 ‘theorist of superstructure’
 (Bobbio) 51
 trajectory in LA 13–14

- Gramscian equation (force + consent = hegemony) 4, 40, 42, 43, 45, 51–2, 159, 208
- grassroots (or autonomist) Left 176
see also Zapatista Army of National Liberation
- Great Crash (1929) 10, 73, 90, 92, 104, 121, 138, 209
 ‘Wall Street Crash’ (1929) 105, 130, 131
- Great Depression (1930s) 10, 90, 96, 116, 130, 131, 160
- ‘great indigenous barracks’ of Q’alachaca 215
- Great Recession (2007–) 2, 12, 28, 89, 93–4, 103–4, 152–3, 156, 177, 187, 191, 193, 205, 207, 209–10, 228
- Great Transformation’ (Polanyi) 132, 135, 138, 161, 162, 219, 227
see also ‘second transformation’
- Green, M. 81, 223
- Grenada Revolution (1979–83) 113
- Griffin, K. 181, 223
- Grossman, H. 102–3, 223
- ‘growth with equity’ 210
- Guardiola–Rivera, O. 218, 223
- Guatemala 110, 126, 147, 174, 200, 229
- guerillero heróico* 110, 112
- guerrilla foco* 108
- guerrilla movements 101, 110–11, 126
- Guevara, E. 14, 110–11
 death (1967) 109, 113
 ‘futile rural *foco*’ 112
 speeches and writings 223
- Guevarism/*Guevarismo* 112, 127
- Guillén, A. 111, 223
- Gulf War (1990–1) 139
- Gwynne, R. 141, 184, 223
- hacienda* 54
- Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) 56
- Hall, M. 87, 223
- Harvey, D. 103, 164, 224
- Haya de la Torre, R. 6, 8, 74
- health 179, 218
- hegemony 1, 4, 14, 22, 34, 40, 43, 50–3, 63, 73, 76, 90, 93, 96, 190, 192, 210–11, 219
- agrarian hierarchy 9
- ‘born in factory’ (Gramsci) 131
- ‘bourgeois project for peripheral capitalist modernization’ 48; *see also* bourgeois hegemony
- capitalist (Gramsci) 159
- crisis 105
- Gramsci 15, 45, 46, 47, 67, 75, 80, 162, 171
- Gramsci’s notion (distance from Leninism) 130
- ‘key term’ 3–4
- ‘key to Gramscian paradigm’ 41–2
- Leninist notion 51
- moral centre 83
- ‘national-popular’ (Gramsci) 10
- organic crisis 107
- state-based 207
- ‘hegemony in reverse’ 208
- hegemony struggles, 1959–76
 (chapter four) 10–11, 29, 101–27
- Heidrich, P. 185, 228
- Helwege, A. 182–3, 224
- Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA) 204
- ‘hidden Peru’ 213
- hierarchy 33, 35, 53, 61, 62
- ‘historic bloc’ (Gramsci) 41–2
- historical materialism 39
- historiography 78, 83, 214
- history 22
 from below 81, 82–3
 Polanyi’s intuition 11
see also time
- History of the Russian Revolution* (Trotsky, 1932) 14, 228
- Hoare, Q. 41
- Hobsbawm, E. 29, 82, 224
- Holloway, J. 176, 224
- Honduras 180, 211
- Hopenhayn, M. 70, 220
- human rights 148, 149, 169, 170, 180

- hybridity 8, 17, 30, 32, 33, 36, 56, 68, 70, 84, 89, 95, 186, 197, 198, 209, 217, 220
- identity 28, 32–3, 67–8, 84, 148, 172, 173, 197, 209, 211, 217, 220, 222, 224–5
 - see also* ‘new’ social movements
- identity politics 30, 168, 216
- imperialism 47, 78, 79, 109, 110, 113, 127, 139, 170, 204, 221, 224, 227
 - British and French decline 19
 - neo-liberal 174
 - ‘new face’ 33
 - see also* independence
- import-substitution industrialization (ISI) 10, 73, 92, 96, 99t, 99, 114, 122, 228
 - achievements 114–15
 - Brazil 90–1
 - crisis 123
 - ‘exhaustion’ 93, 115, 117
 - ‘key limit’ 115
 - persistence (beyond heyday) 115–18, 153
 - see also* industrialization
- Inca civilization 52, 53, 214
- incapolitics* 71
- Incas 6, 29, 53–4, 57, 143, 209, 222
 - communism 70–1, 214–15
 - population 9
 - ruling class 52
- income distribution 63
- independence 18, 26, 45–6, 55–6, 58–64, 70, 73, 189, 192, 194, 219, 221
 - political versus economic 12
 - see also* neo-colonialism
- India 18, 82, 83, 117, 152, 182, 191
- indigenismo* 17, 28–30, 71, 82, 214, 216, 217–18, 220, 221
- indigenous imaginaries 190
- indigenous movements 202, 215–16, 229
 - ‘new indigenous movements/ politics’ 172, 212, 215–16, 217–18
 - see also* Amerindians
- individualism 29, 37, 148, 149, 152, 172, 209
- Industrial Revolution (UK, C19) 132, 135, 162, 163
- industrialization 1, 32, 49, 55, 61–2, 68, 73, 75, 84, 90, 95, 101, 114, 116, 119, 140, 143–4
 - ‘artificial’ policy 138
 - ‘deepening’ 117–18, 123
 - light 118
 - state-led 94, 98, 99t, 160
 - see also* late industrialization
- inequality 21, 33, 115, 140, 151, 172, 179, 181–3, 185, 208, 210, 221, 229
- inflation 123, 125, 126, 169
 - ‘hyperinflation’ 139, 183, 184, 186
- information age (Castells) 200, 221
- ‘information era guerrillas’ 37
- institutionalization
 - of change 20
 - of power 124
 - of traditional 20
- institutions 42, 99t
- ‘integral state’ (Gramsci) 51
- intellectuals 67, 76, 87, 122–3
- Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 151, 224
- Inter-American Indigenous Congress (1940) 28
- interdependency 191
- ‘internal colonialism’ 69
- international division of labor 89, 163, 207
- international finance 138
- international financial
 - institutions 139, 150, 174–5, 186, 206
- international law 154
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 136, 150, 210
- International NGOs (INGOs) 196
- internet 198, 201, 202
- ‘invented tradition’ 209, 217, 224
- investment 64, 103, 115, 123
 - foreign 94, 114, 138, 184
- ‘investor confidence’ 136

- Ipola, I. de 74, 224
 Ireland 7, 156
Italia fatta, bisogna fare gli Italiani 76–7
 Italian Communist Party (1921–) 6, 46, 107
 Italy 7, 9, 10, 13, 20, 31, 40, 43, 45, 49, 61, 69, 82, 89, 105–6, 159
 national unification process 47
 transformismo 1848– (Gramsci) 79
 ‘uneven development’ 47, 48
 unification (C19) ‘not classic bourgeois revolution’ 41

 Jacobins 47, 48, 50, 52, 159
 Janvry, A. de 141, 142, 221
 Japan 49, 117
 Jelin, E. 149, 224
 Jessop, B. 31, 38, 89–90, 166, 203, 224
 ‘Jihad versus McWorld’ metaphor (Barber) 36
 ‘just trade’ (slogan) 192

 Kanoussi, D. 50, 224
 Kay, C. 21, 119–20, 142, 171, 224
 Kearney, M. 213, 218, 224
 Keynes/Keynesianism 90, 152
 Kirchner, C. F. de 154, 212
 Kirchner, N. 154, 156, 175
 Kirchnerism/*Kirchnerismo* 127, 179, 180
 Klein, H. 55, 224
 Knight, A. 84, 85, 86, 224–5
 knowledge 194, 195, 226
 decolonization 36–7
 knowledge and language
 relationship subverted (Borges) 35
 knowledge-power paradigm (Foucault) 21
 Korzeniewicz, R. 143
 Kubitschek, J. 91
Kulturkampf 77

La Raza Cósmica (Vasconcelos, 1925) 68, 229

 labor 12, 57, 59, 63, 69, 132, 133, 138, 143, 161, 195, 215, 219
 coerced/forced 32, 56; *see also* *mita*
 ‘formal’ versus ‘real’ subsumption by capital (Marx) 117
 labor migration (from Europe) 65
 labor power 194
 Marx versus Polanyi 132–3, 163
 labor standards
 ‘race to bottom’ 172
 labor supply 32, 54
 Laclau, E. 74–5, 173, 225
laissez-faire 75, 132, 133–4
 land 7, 34, 53–4, 132, 133, 153, 161, 215, 217
 land reform 96–7, 118–20, 141–3, 213–14
 landlessness 142
 see also *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (MST)
 landowners 56, 61, 62, 65, 66, 94, 95, 105, 120
 landownership 60, 63
 Larraín, J. 27–8, 70, 225
 ‘late’ development 34, 40
 see also national development
 late industrialization 47, 88, 223
 see also import-substitution
 industrialization
latifundio-minifundio pattern 118–19, 142
 Latin America (LA)
 ‘clearly post-national’ 36
 ‘crisis of 1930’ 74
 deficiencies 8
 GDP increase (1910–80) 116
 global development perspective 1
 independence bicentenary 1
 ‘interregnum’ (current) 207
 introduction 1–16
 lenses 50
 ‘market and masses’ 147–8, 219
 ‘not a place apart’ 37
 political crisis (1920s) 121
 terminology 17

- Latin America: placings (chapter one) 8–9, 17–43, 79, 159
 ‘betwixt’ 17, 30–7
 part of ‘East’ 17, 24–30, 30–1
 part of ‘West’ 17, 18–24, 30–1
 political 18, 37–43
 post-colonial 17
- Latin American Subaltern Studies Group 78, 82
- ‘Latino’ category 25, 197
- law 131, 136, 137, 161
- Law of Accumulation and Collapse of Capitalist System* (Grossman, 1929) 102–3, 223
- Lechner, N. 120, 124, 144, 148, 150, 225
- Left 31–2, 220, 226
 independent 176
 populist 175
 radical, nationalist 177
 social-democratic 175, 176, 177–8
 traditional 177–8
see also social democracy
- Left governments 12, 157, 174–81, 190, 199, 204, 206, 208, 211
 ‘bad left’ versus ‘good left’ 174, 177, 179, 216
 ‘key questions’ 179
 sustainability 180
- ‘left populism’ 75
- Leguía, A. 6
- Lenin, V. I. 26, 46, 71, 80
- Leninism 5, 6, 7, 27, 43, 130
- liberal democracy 152, 174
see also parliamentary democracy
- liberalism 10, 133
- Lima 126
- liminality 8, 32–3, 37
- Linera, A. G. 186, 215, 225
- Long, N. 119, 225
- López-Alves, F. 39–40, 221
- l’ordre pour base; le progress pour but* (Comte) 66
- ‘lost decade’ (1980s) 118, 139
- Lugo, F. 211
- Luna, F. V. 55, 224
- Luxemburg, R. 7, 102
- Lyotard, J-F. 35
- Macleod, M. 54, 225
- Macondismo* 8–9
- Macondo* 34
- ‘McOndo’ (pun) 36, 222
- ‘made in USA’ model 24, 177
- ‘magic of market’ 133
- ‘magical realism’ (García Márquez) 15, 17, 34, 36
- maize/corn 53, 61, 153
- Mallon, F. 82, 225
- Mangabeira Unger, R. 175, 191, 225
- manufacturing 115, 163
- Mapuche people 52
- maquillas* 140
- March on Rome (1922) 105
- Mariátegui, J.C. (1894–1930) 5–8, 9, 53–4, 74–7, 87, 143, 157, 172, 176, 186, 209, 212, 225, 228
 ‘anti-positivist philosophy’ 15
 in Europe (1920–3) 213
 faith, passion, and will 15–16
 and Gramsci 13
 Inca communism 70–1, 214–15
 internationalism 16
 legacy 8
 ‘lifelong commitment to spirituality’ 71
 ‘not uncritical supporter of modernism’ 71
 rhetoric of revolutionary myth 15
- Marighela, C. 111
- Marini, R. M. 103, 225
- market/s 88, 89, 138, 219
 ‘disciplining agent’ 148
 internal 73
 self-regulated/self-regulating 132–4, 160, 163, 165–6, 167, 169, 181, 214
 unregulated 94, 155, 158, 209
see also world market
- market economy 53, 57, 175
- market fundamentalism 195
 ‘could kill patient’ (Stiglitz) 150

- market hegemony (1973–2001)
 (chapter five) 11, 129–56, 186
- marketization 142, 165
 popular reaction 157, 167–74
- Martin, S. 169, 221
- Martínez de Hoz team
 (Argentina) 115
- Martínez Novo, C. 172, 209, 225
- Marx, K. H. 1, 25, 27, 50, 51, 63,
 102, 105, 106, 132, 143, 193
 ‘formal’ versus ‘real’ subsumption
 of labor by capital 117
- Marxism 5–6, 14, 15, 26, 34, 62, 70,
 81, 83, 87, 92, 122, 124, 131,
 158, 162, 164, 213–14, 220, 224
 ‘open’ (Gramsci and
 Mariátegui) 13
 Western 6
- Marxism-Leninism 51
- Marxists 7, 8, 103, 152, 191
- masato* 218
- mass consumption (Rostow) 24
- Mathkopf, B. 135, 219
- Mayans 52, 53, 229
- Mazzeo, M. 8, 71, 225
- Mazzini, G. 79
- McCaughan, E. 109, 226
- McDonald, L. 181, 225
- McDonalds 36
- McWorld (Barber) 36
- Meiji Restoration (1868–1912) 49
- ‘*Méjico profundo*’ (‘hidden
 Mexico’) 153
- Mena, J. 50, 224
- Menem, C. 139, 175, 184
- mercantilism 45, 57, 134
- Mercosur 202
- mestizaje* 17, 68
 see also hybridity
- mestizos* 28, 33
- metanarratives 2, 35
- ‘methodological nationalism’ 22, 167
 see also nationalism
- methodology 15, 82
- Mexican Revolution (1910–20) 5, 49,
 50, 77, 84–6, 97, 109–10, 142,
 153, 195, 202, 223–5
- Mexico 14, 18, 25, 31, 48, 53, 54, 65,
 69, 83, 93, 96–7, 98, 114, 116,
 123, 126, 127, 140, 143, 151,
 174, 176–7, 180, 200, 205–6,
 219–20, 226
 ‘aggressive war’ waged by USA
 (1836–48) 62
 financial crisis (1982) 152
 poverty-reduction 183
 revolt (1810) 59
 silver output 62
 state intervention 92
- Mezzogiorno 9, 13, 41, 42, 50, 65,
 70, 76, 77, 81
- middle class 85, 94, 118, 122, 155,
 179
 impoverishment (Argentina) 141
- Mignolo, W. 194, 226
- migration 196–7, 199–200
- military dictatorships 4, 14, 20, 34,
 50, 99, 106, 129, 137, 170, 180
- modernization (primary
 method) 146–7
 remaking society 144–50
- ‘military state’ 11, 101, 121–7
- mineral resources 52, 53
- mines/mining 54, 62, 63, 84, 86,
 126, 155
- mita* (*corvée*) 31, 53, 54, 58
- mode of production 3, 25, 30, 31, 53,
 56, 57, 131, 215, 219
- modernist movement
 (Brazil, 1920s) 100
- modernity 12, 30, 45–6, 48, 64–71,
 99*t*, 100, 183, 190, 193–4, 205,
 209, 220, 223, 225, 227
 ‘disciplinary component’ 35
 ‘peripheral form’ 10
- ‘modernity without
 modernization’ 32
- modernization 27, 32, 58, 63–4, 126,
 152, 195, 207–8, 215
 peripheral 49
 uneven 70
 see also ‘conservative
 modernization’
- modernization paradigms 19–20

- modernization theory 2, 17, 20–5, 28, 30, 31, 34, 37, 39, 62, 88, 131
- monetarism 121, 124, 138
- money 57, 132, 133, 137, 138
- Monroe Doctrine (1823) 68
- Montevideo 8
- Montezuma II, Emperor 53
- Montoneros* (Argentina) 111, 112, 127, 179
- Morales, E. 155, 177, 179, 180, 186, 217, 222, 229
- Morales, M. 177, 221, 226
- ‘morbid symptoms’ (Gramsci) 42
- Morton, A. 48, 49, 224, 226
- Movimento dos Sem Terra* (MST) (Rural Landless Workers’ Movement, Brazil) 142, 171, 208
- Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS, Bolivia) 155
- Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR, Chile) 111, 112
- Mujica, J. 112
- multiculturalism 29, 216, 229
- multinational corporations 89, 216, 221
- ‘transnational corporations’ 117, 139, 140
- Munck, G. L. 179, 226
- Munck, R. 161, 170, 198, 220, 226
- music 198, 214
- Mussolini, B. 20, 46, 49, 85, 105–6
- Napoleon 59, 63, 79
- narcotics 200–1
- nation-building 33, 62, 67, 130, 195
- centralists versus federalists 64
- nation-making (1910–64) (chapter three) 10, 73–100
- nation-state 9, 21–2, 33, 41, 45, 60, 62, 77, 88, 131, 165, 166, 175, 189, 191–2, 194, 197, 215, 216, 221
- ‘national bourgeoisie’ 8, 26–7, 77, 78, 96, 120
- national development 3, 10, 12, 29, 59, 87–94, 99t, 101, 129, 139, 160, 191
- ‘deemed an oxymoron’ 89
- ISI model 96
- statist, protectionist, developmentalist 73
- see also* underdevelopment
- national development state 91
- national identity 60, 78, 201
- national security 125, 126
- ‘national self-determination’ (Leninist) 7
- National Socialism 76
- national sovereignty 7, 172, 190–1, 204
- ‘national-popular’ concept (Gramsci) 10, 15, 34, 42, 46, 48–9, 52, 73, 74–80, 81, 86–7, 94, 96–7, 124, 173, 175, 207, 212, 224
- era ‘closes symbolically in 1964’ 120–1
- see also* compromise state
- nationalism 7, 12, 26, 34, 37, 63, 68, 78, 85, 86, 114, 122, 123, 167, 176, 177, 179, 189, 193, 196, 198, 203, 204–5, 206, 209, 211, 212, 224
- economic 121, 175
- ‘invented tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger) 29
- revolutionary 205
- see also* transnationalism
- nationalization 91, 92, 96, 126, 177, 186
- Nazism 122
- Negri, A. 56, 173, 191, 226
- neo-classical assumptions/theory 89, 150
- neo-colonialism 20, 174, 194
- see also* post-colonial era
- neo-indigenismo 29, 216
- neo-liberal era 29, 84, 141, 142, 172
- neo-liberal model 155, 210, 211
- contradictions 150, 181
- demise 155–6
- ‘exhausted’ 104

- neo-liberalism 2, 11–12, 15, 29, 37, 39, 91, 132–7, 140, 143, 145, 147–9, 161, 165, 170, 175, 178, 180, 192, 205, 210, 212, 215, 216, 218, 228
 ‘based on mirage’ 152
 beyond ~ 157–8, 181–7, 220, 225–6, 229
 ‘collapse as hegemonic doctrine’ 153
 exercise of global discipline 136
 ‘with human face’ 177, 187
 ‘illusions end’ 129–30, 150–6
 ‘reforms’ 89, 168
 restructuring of socioeconomic relations 168
 ‘social face’ 196
 US free-trade project 172
see also globalization
 ‘neo-slavery hierarchy’ (Negri and Cocco) 56
 ‘new capitalism’ 162, 163
 ‘new dependency’
 (Cardoso, 1970s) 193
 ‘new imperialism’ (Harvey) 224
 ‘new international order’
 (Chávez) 154
 New Left 113, 222, 228
 ‘new localisms’ 163
 New Mexico 62
 ‘new’ social movements 12, 84, 162, 171
 ‘new working classes’ 163
 new world order 23, 189, 192, 203, 223
 New Zealand 25
 Newly-Industrialized Countries (NICs) 117
 Nicaragua 54, 126–7
 Nicaraguan Revolution (1979) 34, 101, 113
 nitrate industry (Chile) 64
Non-Communist Manifesto (Rostow sub-title, 1960) 20, 227
 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 172, 173, 192, 196, 201, 215, 227
 ‘vanguard of imperialism’ 170
 North America 18, 20, 24, 182
 ‘Caliban’ (Rodó) 68
 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 140, 153, 206
 Nowell Smith, G. 41
Nuestra América (Mariátegui) 7, 189, 212
 Nugent, D. 83, 226
 Oaxaca valley 53
 Obregón, A. 77
 O’Brien, P. 121, 226
 ‘obsolete market mentality’
 (Polanyi, 1947) 161, 227
 O’Donnell, G. 122–3, 226
 oil 140, 177, 185, 218
 oil companies 92, 96
 oil shocks (1970s) 116, 121, 138, 139
 Olesen, T. 169–70, 201, 226
 ‘oligarchic modernity’ (Larraín) 70
 oligarchy 56, 59, 60, 65, 73–5, 77, 87, 92, 94–5, 101, 120, 122, 179
 agrarian 50, 70, 96, 97, 119, 127
 post-colonial pact 84
 Oliveira, F. de 32, 92, 207–8, 226
 ‘one big market’ (Polanyi) 139, 159
see also globalization
 Orogan, J. C. 112
Open Veins of Latin America
 (Galeano, 1971, 1973) 29, 222
 optimism 35, 65, 73, 158, 182
 ‘optimism of will’
 versus ‘pessimism of intelligence’ 15
Ordem e Progresso (Order and Progress) 66, 67
Ordine Nuovo period 112, 130
 ‘organic crisis’ (Gramsci) 10, 15, 42, 52, 101, 104, 107
 organic intellectual (Gramsci) 171
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 115
 ‘oriental mode of production’
 (Marx) 27
 Orientalism 17, 22, 27, 28, 29

- Ortega, D. 113
 Ortiz, R. 64, 226
Os Sertões/Rebellion in Backlands
 (da Cunha, 1902) 66, 67
 other/otherness 17, 19, 20, 27, 37, 78,
 100, 216
 Ottone, E. 70, 220
 Oxhorn, P. 181, 185, 220, 226
- Pachamama* (mother earth) 30
 Packakutik (political party,
 Ecuador) 217
 Palestine Liberation Organization
 (PLO) 126
 Palmeira, M. 61, 222
 Panama 54
 Panizza, F. 151
 Pannekoek, A. 102, 227
 Paraguay 211
 parliamentary democracy 51, 122
see also political democracy
Partido Socialista Peruano (1928–) 6
Pasado y Presente (journal) 46
 passive revolution (Gramsci) 9,
 15, 41, 45, 46–52, 95, 207,
 220, 226
 ‘best epitomized by Brazil’ 61
 dialectic 69–70
 dualism 78
 ‘matrix of post-colonial period’ 79
 two deployments of concept by
 Gramsci 47, 50
patria financiera (financial
 country) 141
 Patriot movement (USA) 163
 peasant resistance 81–2, 153
 peasants/peasantry 3, 6, 54, 83,
 86–7, 98, 108, 110, 113, 119,
 126, 141–2, 154, 168, 171–2,
 202, 212, 215, 221
 self-sufficient, pre-capitalist 134
 Pedro II 60
 ‘peripheral states’ (Gramsci) 10
 periphery 9, 13, 15, 22, 24, 30–1,
 33–4, 38, 45–50, 69, 70, 78, 79,
 103, 136, 227
 terms of trade 89
- Perón, J. D. 20, 48–9, 79, 85–6, 95,
 114, 119, 125
 election slogan (1946) 154
 return to office (1973–4) 97
 Peronism 46, 87, 98, 112, 179, 184
 decomposition 121
 ‘influential model of compromise
 state’ 97
 ‘personalist populism’ 85
 Peru 5–8, 53, 54, 59, 76, 87, 110,
 172, 213–14, 214–15, 218
 armed revolt (1780) 58
 indigenous revolts (1919–23) 213
 military regime (1968–75) 126
Peruanicemos al Peru (slogan) 213
peso (Argentina) 155, 184
 pessimism 15, 47, 148, 158
 Petras, J. 170, 178, 227
 ‘philosophy of praxis’ (Gramsci)
 80–1
 Piester, K. 169, 221
 Pinochet, A. 115, 124, 138, 140, 178,
 206, 228
 speech (1982) 149–50
 Pinochet coup (1973) 10, 106, 109,
 110, 121, 122, 141
Pinochetismo 125–6, 127
piqueteros 173
 Piscitelli, A. 84, 220
 plantations 54, 56, 61
plata dulce (sweet money) 140, 199
 Poland 40, 47
 Polanyi, K. 144, 150, 157, 173, 181,
 193, 209, 219, 220, 227
 counter-hegemony theory 158
 embeddedness ‘central
 notion’ 134–5
 ‘real’ versus ‘fictitious’
 commodities 132–3
 ‘rich anthropological studies’ 167
 social class ‘not always
 determinant’ 162–3
 ‘social countermovement’
 notion 159
see also double movement
 Polanyi problematic 132, 159
 concretization 164–6

- Polanyi—*Continued*
 counter-globalization movement
 (reactionary versus progressive
 forms) 166–7
 spatialization 166
*Política y Sociedad en época de
 transición* (Germani, 1965) 20,
 223
 political democracy
 versus economic development 39
see also radical democracy
 political economy 12, 129, 131, 186,
 206
see also ‘cultural political economy’
 ‘political hegemony’ (Gramsci) 4
 political parties 10, 104–6, 152, 176,
 180, 184
 political party system 210–11,
 215
 political science 37–8
 political society (Gramsci) 42, 43, 51,
 130, 158
see also state, the
 political sociology 37
 political stability
 ‘good for business’ 64–5
 political stages theory 27
 political will 74
 politics 18, 37–43, 99t, 146, 148,
 168, 175, 176, 196, 212, 219,
 220, 222
 national (understanding
 subverted) 170
 politics of contestation 201
 politics of scale 166, 170, 203
 popular culture 36, 76, 78, 197, 214,
 220
 Popular Unity Coalition (Chile) 109,
 112, 126, 127
 populism 42, 48, 75, 79, 86–7, 95–6,
 118, 119, 122, 124, 126, 129,
 146, 157, 173, 175–7, 179,
 180–1, 185, 196, 222, 224–5
 Brazil 97–8
see also compromise state
populus 74–5
 Porfirismo and Huertismo 85
 Portantiero, J. C. 15, 46, 74, 79, 86,
 224, 227
 Pôrto Alegre 192, 202, 203
 Portugal 13, 31, 40, 47, 54–5, 182,
 194
 positivism 66
 ‘post-anticolonial critique’ 35
 post-colonial era 45, 50, 61, 66, 160,
 217
 post-colonial studies approach 193
 post-colonialism 9, 13, 21, 22, 33–6,
 83, 220–1, 228
see also United States/imperialism
 post-dependency approach 23
 post-development perspective 99, 222
 ‘post-First/Third Worlds theory’ 35
 post-Marxism 13
 post-modernism 2, 17–18, 35–7, 165,
 220, 227
 definition 35
 ‘iconoclastic irrationalism’
 (Reigadas) 37
 ‘strongest criticism’ 37
 post-modernity 37
 post-neoliberalism 2, 57, 190, 192
 post-structuralism 34–5, 36, 82–3
 post-war era (1945–) 11, 19, 122,
 131, 138, 150, 160, 165, 195
 poverty 3, 99–100, 110, 142, 149,
 151, 208, 211
 poverty-reduction 141, 178, 179, 206,
 210, 224
 globalization and ~ 181–3
 power 21, 35, 168, 171, 176, 192,
 222, 227
 ‘colonial matrix’ 194–5
 Foucault’s rethinking 144–5, 149
 global versus local structures
 (dialectics) 83
 power-knowledge element 194
 power relations 59, 184
 ‘determinant importance’ 38
 ‘linchpin in capitalist order’ 39
 pragmatism 7, 46, 68, 85, 91, 113,
 180, 181, 185
 Prebisch, R. 88–9, 114, 115, 227
 press/media 105, 130, 180

- 'primitive accumulation' (Marx) 143
 'primitive communism' 54, 143
 see also communism
Prison Notebooks (Gramsci)
 see Selections from Prison Notebooks
 private sector 136, 140
 privatization 93, 136, 139, 141, 144,
 147–8, 154–5, 215
 production 3, 11, 116, 125, 160
 see also mode of production
 productivity 97, 115, 118
 'progressive restorations'
 (Gramsci) 48
 proletarianization 28, 73, 84, 171
 proletariat 3, 5, 7, 15, 81, 96, 101,
 106, 163
 protectionism 89, 93, 114, 115, 118,
 137, 160, 166, 198
Provincializing Europe
 (Chakrabarty, 2007) 35, 221
 public opinion 130, 147–8, 177
pueblo 74–5, 86–7, 173, 175, 222

Qué se vayan todas (let them all
 go) 155
 Quechua 218
 Quijano, A. 36, 167, 193, 227

 race 18, 19, 58, 63, 68, 94, 193, 194,
 217
 'global hierarchy' 25
 racism 33, 56, 66, 67, 68, 78
 radical democracy 5, 195
 see also social democracy
 railways 62, 84
 Ranger, T. 29, 224
 reciprocity 53, 57, 161–2, 167, 194,
 195, 213, 215, 218
 redistribution 67, 109, 161–2, 215, 217
 re-embedding (Polanyi) 157, 158–67
 reform 23, 219
 intellectual and moral
 (Gramsci) 171
 reform/restoration (conservative
 modernization) 50
 see also passive revolution

 'reform or revolution' 4, 102, 107
 reformism 107, 109
 'failed attempt to construct
 hegemony' (Lechner) 120
 reformist liberals 85
 regions/regionalism 78, 177, 202, 210
 Reid, M. 23, 180, 205, 227
 Reigadas, M. C. 37, 227
Reinventing Revolution
 (McCaughan, 1997) 109, 226
 relations of production 55, 60, 117,
 208
 remaking society 129, 144–50
repartimiento (sharing or
 rationing) 54
 repression 124, 136, 144–5, 146, 149,
 159
 Resende, B. 100, 227
 resistance 137, 191, 213, 224
 revolution 5, 35, 107–13
 'small' versus 'big' motors 108,
 111
 'stages theory' 27, 32
 Trotsky's dictum 85
 see also reform
 'Revolution Against Capital'
 (Gramsci, 1917) 15
 'revolution in permanence' (Marx and
 Engels) 106
Revolution in the Revolution
 (Debray, 1970) 107, 108, 111,
 221
 'revolution-restoration' (Gramsci) 41,
 47, 48
 revolutions (1810) 59
 revolutions (1848) 106
 Reyna, J. L. 84, 220
 Rio de Janeiro 62
 Risorgimento 9, 41, 47, 49, 61, 79, 81
 Roberts, K. 181, 220
 Rocha, G. 34
 Rodó, E. (1871–1917) 36, 68
 Rolland, R. 6
 Rosas, J. M. de 67
 Rostow, W. W. 20, 24–5, 26, 27, 88,
 227
 Rowe, W. 198, 227

- rubber 60, 63
- Ruckert, A. 181, 225
- rule of law 180
- ruling class 47, 63, 79, 93, 98, 106, 127
- rural revolt 13, 83, 226
- 'Russia' (unspecified) 158–9
- Russian Federation 31, 191
- Russian Revolution (1917) 3, 5, 15, 26, 30, 46, 71, 88, 102, 106, 107, 108
- 'sad working' (*trabajo a tristeza*) 170
- Sader, E. 155, 227
- Salinas, President (1988–94) 140
- Sandinistas 113, 126–7, 177
- Sandino, A. 113
- Sarlo, B. 19, 65, 227
- Sarmiento, D. F. 18, 28, 67, 68, 227
- Schelling, V. 66, 198, 227
- Seattle 153, 202
- 'second independence' 204–5
- Second International 102
- 'second transformation' 192–3
- Selections from Prison Notebooks* (Gramsci), 75–6, 223
 - 'Letters from Prison' (Gramsci) 79
 - 'Prison Notebooks' (Gramsci) 47, 80–1, 95, 131, 223
- self-determination 190–1, 201
- semi-periphery 47, 50
- Seoane, J. 212, 227
- Serra, J. 103–4, 221, 225
- Shakespeare, W. 68
- Shohat, E. 35, 228
- Siete Ensayos sobre Realidad Peruana* (Mariátegui, 1928) 5, 6
- Silver, B. 162, 164–5, 228
- simplistic approaches 4, 33, 80, 84, 109, 168, 179, 181, 196, 197
- Singer, P. 55, 60, 91, 94, 228
- Sinn Féin 7
- slavery 19, 31, 54–6, 57–61, 94, 219, 222, 224
 - abolition (Brazil, 1888) 60, 65, 69
- smallholders 61, 101, 155
- Smith, A. 150
- Smith, P. 25, 228
- social countermovement, 1998–2012 (chapter six) 11–12, 154, 157–87
- social democracy 26, 130, 177
 - 'globalized' (Cardoso) 178–9, 203, 206–7
 - see also* democracy
- social exclusion 149, 161, 226
- social inclusion 94, 172
- social inequality 115, 179
- 'social market economy' 178
- social movement theory 83–4, 220
- social movements 29, 97, 170, 171, 173, 201, 211, 219, 227
 - transnational 202
- social networks 136
- social protection 136, 159, 164, 181
- social relations 5
 - capitalist 38–9
 - dis-embedding and re-embedding 169
 - endogenous development 40
 - 'reduced to market relations' 134
- social revolution'
 - proletarian 'myth' 15
- social transformation 6, 10, 12–13, 16, 20, 22, 24, 26, 29–30, 37, 40–3, 48–50, 61, 84–5, 90, 107, 109, 120, 129, 132, 137, 141, 152, 159, 168, 171, 177–8, 181, 190, 192, 197, 204, 209, 211–12, 216–17, 220, 222, 228
 - 'framing concept' 4–5
- socialism 4, 14, 16, 22, 61, 77, 85, 87, 95, 103, 104, 162, 168, 178, 185, 186, 193, 195, 209, 211, 213–15
- Cuban model 110
- 'international doctrine' (Mariátegui) 7
- parliamentary road 109
- Peruvian 76
- twenty-first century 154, 174
 - see also* Left governments
- society/societies 2, 11–12, 104, 168, 209, 220, 221, 226
 - 'decommodification' 160

- 'groups' and 'sections' 165
- non-capitalist 167
- pre-capitalist 134–5, 161, 162, 209
- protection from ravages of self-regulated market 165–6
- sociology 20, 37, 47, 134, 165, 220, 224
- sociology of decadence 148
- sociology of disintegration 148
- solidarity 7, 202, 214, 226
- 'Some Aspects of Southern Question' (Gramsci) 41
- Somoza regime 113
- Sorel, G. 15
- South (global) *see* Third World
- South Africa 4–5, 122, 143, 208, 219
- South America 18, 77
- Southern Cone 63, 65, 69, 98, 108–9, 111, 116, 123, 126, 170, 180, 197, 202, 212
- 'Southern Question' *see* Mezzogiorno
- 'Soviet Union financial crisis (1990)' 152
- Spain 13, 31, 40, 45, 47, 77, 182, 194, 198–9
 - crisis (1808) 59
 - slave trade 54–5
- Spalding, H. 87, 223
- Spaniards 218
 - American versus Peninsular 58, 63
- Spanish Civil War (1930s) 202
- Spanish language 25
- Spanish-American War (1898) 68
- Spivak, G. 80
- stages of economic growth (Rostow) 20, 25, 27, 88
- Stalin/Stalinism 8, 27, 46
- state, the (general) 24, 26, 30, 43, 50, 79, 84, 99, 104–8, 130, 138, 144, 158, 168, 173, 192, 200, 207, 225
 - 'nexus between economic and political' 40
 - retreat from traditional social role 170
 - rolling back ~ 10
 - traditional Marxist conception 51
 - 'virtual evaporation' (Argentina) 155
- state, the (type)
 - bourgeois 90, 106
 - capitalist 215
 - nationalist 123, 216
 - neo-liberal (radical democratic challenge) 169
 - 'populist' 73
 - strong 135, 137, 186
 - strong, centralized (pre-Conquest) 52–3
 - weak 47, 147
- state-economy interaction 40
- state intervention 93
- state reform 175
- state regulation of economies 94
- state role 38–9, 88, 89, 99t, 114, 133, 141, 178, 181, 185, 209, 211
- 'stateness' 211
- statism 215
- statist-national-popular sociopolitical matrix, 1930–90 (Garretón *et al.*) 98, 99t
- steel 92, 114
- Stein, B. H. 63, 228
- Stein, S. J. 63, 228
- Stiglitz, J. 150–1, 228
- 'Stiglitz option' 210
- structural determinism 124
- structural 'reforms' (Orwellian label) 136
- 'structures' (Gramsci) 51
- subaltern classes 73, 80–7, 93–6, 98–9, 105, 108, 120, 125, 130, 137, 160, 173, 184, 189, 192, 194–5, 217, 223
 - groups covered by term 81
 - see also* class
- subaltern insurgency 127
- subaltern studies 81, 221
- subalternity 78, 82, 219, 226
 - constitution (Gramsci) 81
- sugar 55, 60, 61
- superstructures (Gramsci) 51
- supply and demand 133

- surplus value 103
sustainability 33, 218
- Tavares, M. C. 34, 228
taxation 59, 137
Taylor, M. 137, 150, 186, 228
technocrats 121, 123, 137, 183
technology 28, 55
telenovela (Brazil) 198
Tempest (Shakespeare) 68
Tequila Crisis (1994) 151
terms of trade 139
terror (state terrorism) 146–7
‘theoretical practice’ (Leninist) 6
theory of imminent revolution 107
Third Revolution 3
‘Third Space’ (Bhabha) 32–3
Third World 13, 17, 33, 35, 36, 37, 83
 ‘East’ 17, 24–31
 ‘South’ (global) 8, 31, 139
 see also ‘developing’ world
Thomas, P. 130, 228
Thorp, R. 90, 125, 228
Tierra del Fuego 53
time: centuries
 sixteenth 54, 194
 seventeenth 57
 eighteenth 57, 58, 218
 nineteenth 9, 18, 39, 56, 60, 62–5, 70, 83–4, 90, 123, 132, 135, 162, 182, 196
 twentieth 10, 26, 31, 39, 56, 61, 65, 68–9, 73–100, 135–6, 139, 148, 174, 195, 222
 twenty-first 12, 165, 174, 182, 189–90, 218, 220
 twenty-second 218
time: decades
 1920s 5, 47, 50, 53, 54, 66, 70–1, 74, 85, 86, 94, 102, 105, 164, 172, 213
 1930s 10, 27, 47, 48, 50, 75, 90–1, 95–6, 103, 115, 121, 123, 140, 173, 202, 228
 1940s 46, 52, 90, 108, 175
 1950s 18, 20, 27, 29, 42, 52, 75, 90–2, 108, 114–16, 119, 160, 174, 175, 196
 1960s 10, 29, 46, 52, 54, 92, 93, 103, 108, 115–19, 123, 141–2, 153, 160, 163, 171, 198
 1970s 6, 10, 14, 34, 39, 46–7, 51–2, 115–19, 122, 129, 138, 141–2, 151, 163, 165, 171, 174, 179, 193
 1980s 14, 23, 34, 39, 42–3, 46, 80, 90, 92, 113, 115, 118, 129, 132, 138–9, 143, 147, 165, 169, 189, 191, 193, 195, 215
 1990s 23, 28–9, 43, 46, 93, 113, 114, 140, 148, 151, 155, 168–9, 171–2, 179, 181–3, 190, 193, 218
Tironi, E. 148, 228
Tlatelolco massacre (1968) 126
Torre, J. C. 139, 223
Torres-Rivas, E. 147, 228
torture 135–6, 146–7, 148, 152
trabalhismo (laborism or workerism) 98
trade (international) 31, 32, 58, 64, 116, 138
 see also free trade
trade unions 3, 23, 43, 84–7, 94, 96–8, 103, 106, 133, 136, 140, 149, 159, 161, 163, 170, 172–3, 184, 201–2, 204, 208
transformismo (Gramsci) 78, 79, 95, 127, 207
transnational networks 202, 220, 222
transnationalism 189, 195–201, 205
 ‘from above’ versus ‘from below’ 203
 ‘internationalism’ 7, 16
 responses 201–7
 see also ‘methodological nationalism’
transparency 166, 184
Trinidad 54
Trotsky, L. 14, 46, 85, 88, 102, 228
trust 135, 169, 184, 222

- Tucumán province (Argentina) 112
 Túpac Amaru, J. G. 57–8
 Tupamaros 58, 111, 112, 178
 Turin Workers' Councils (1919–20) 6,
 46, 105, 130
 Turkey 49
 'turn to Gramsci' (late 1970s) 34
 Tussie, D. 185, 228
- underdevelopment 2, 3, 21, 88, 103,
 224
see also uneven development
 unemployment 92, 133, 168, 173
 uneven development 47, 48, 61, 64,
 69–70, 99–100, 110, 203
see also dependent development
 Union of Soviet Socialist
 Republics 107, 110
 United Kingdom 9, 58–9, 127, 132,
 194
 'England' 1, 47, 54, 79, 182
 guilds movement 158, 160
 hegemony (C19) 61, 64
 informal empire 62
 move to abolish slavery (1808) 54
 United Nations 134, 154
 United States 22, 65, 67, 68, 92–3,
 119, 121, 131, 156, 163, 177,
 178, 182, 184, 192, 194, 195,
 204, 226
 'aggressive war' against Mexico
 (1836–48) 62
 hegemony 101
 hegemony contested 117
 immigration 197, 199
 imperialism 19, 113, 153–4;
see also anti-colonialism
 seizure of Mexican territory
 (C19) 25
 United States: Civil War (1861–5) 56
 United States: Drugs Enforcement
 Agency (DEA) 200
 universality 159, 209
 urban revolutionary movement
 (1967–73) 111–12, 223
 urbanization 4, 18, 61, 73, 95, 115, 119
- Uruguay 58, 111, 112, 177, 178, 184,
 197, 204, 206–7
 US dollar 140, 155
 utopias 194, 209, 222
- Vanden, H. 5, 228
 Varese, S. 213, 218, 224
 Vargas, G. 48, 79, 91, 94, 97–8, 119
 Vargas Llosa, M. 36, 198
Varguismo (Brazil) 97
 Vasconcelos, J. (1882–1959) 68, 229
 Velasco Alvarado, J. 126
 Véliz, C. 27–8, 229
 Veltmeyer, H. 178, 227
 Venezuela 2, 54, 59, 110, 154, 177,
 179, 180, 183, 187, 192, 195,
 204, 210, 219
 attempted coup
 (US-sponsored, 2002) 154
 immigration 197
 post-neoliberalism 185
 'regional presence' 185
 Videla, J. R. 115
 Villa, P. 85
 villages 215, 218
- Wachtel, N. 53, 57, 58, 229
 wage-labor 3, 22, 31, 54, 55, 57, 69,
 127, 137, 193
 wages 53, 65, 114, 131, 141, 161
 war: 'continuation of politics by other
 means' (Clausewitz) 108
 war of maneuver versus war of
 position (Gramsci) 14, 43,
 106–7
 Warren, K. 216, 229
 Washington Consensus 12, 24, 151,
 152, 178, 181, 182, 185, 205
 post-Washington Consensus 12,
 24, 151, 152, 184, 209
 water 218
see also Bolivia
 Webber, J. 186, 229
 welfare state 160, 161, 184, 206–7
 West, the 3, 8, 13, 17, 17–24, 79, 103,
 152, 163

- West, the—*Continued*
 ‘advanced capitalist countries’
 (1920s) 47
 ‘First World’ 33, 35, 94
 ‘North’ (global) 31
 see also Gramsci/East-West
 paradigm
 ‘West Indies’ (original term for LA) 18
 westernization 20, 24
 Whitehead, L. 125, 228
 Williamson, J. 182, 229
 women 60, 140, 149, 170, 197, 212
 workers 6, 61, 93, 147, 168, 171–2,
 197, 199, 206, 228
 contestation of exploitation 38
 Workers’ Party (Brazil) 112, 178,
 208
 working class 3, 10, 35, 51, 80–2,
 84, 86–7, 96–8, 101, 106, 111–12,
 114–15, 118, 121, 125, 146, 162,
 163, 170, 212, 214, 223
 ‘decomposition caused by
 financialization’ 208
 immiseration 102
 World Bank 21, 29, 136, 143, 150,
 154, 164, 169, 182, 183, 210, 229
 world (dis)order and its
 prospects 164–5
 world economy 60, 64, 89, 143, 207,
 209
 ‘global economy’ 200, 210
 ‘international economy’ 99t
 world market 125, 187, 206, 219
 ‘no longer external’ (Negri and
 Cocco) 191
 World Social Forum (2001–) 192,
 203
 World Trade Organization
 (WTO) 202
 World War I 61, 90, 104–5
 World War II 116, 129, 132
 Yashar, D. J. 216, 229
 Zamosc, L. 168, 218, 230
 Zapata, E. 85, 153, 202
 Zapatista Army of National
 Liberation (EZLN) 37, 85, 153,
 169–71, 176, 192, 195, 216
 transnational dimension 201–2,
 226
 Žižek, S. 216, 229